Truth and Aletheic Paradox by Scharp, Kevin Andrew
 
TRUTH AND ALETHEIC PARADOX 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
Kevin Scharp 
 
 
AB, Washington University, 1995 
 
 
MA, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of 
 
 
Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment 
 
 
of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Pittsburgh 
 
 
2005 
 
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH 
 
FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES  
 
 
 
 
This dissertation was presented  
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Kevin Scharp 
 
 
 
It was defended on 
 
 
9 May 2005 
 
 
and approved by 
 
 
Anil Gupta, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh 
 
 
John McDowell, University Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh  
 
 
Hartry Field, Professor of Philosophy, New York University 
 
 
Dissertation Director: Robert Brandom, Distinguished Service Professor, University of 
Pittsburgh 
 
 
 ii
 
 
 
 
TRUTH AND ALETHEIC PARADOX 
 
 
Kevin Scharp, PhD 
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My objective is to provide a theory of truth that is both independently motivated and compatible 
with the requirement that semantic theories for truth should not demand a substantive distinction 
between the languages in which they are formulated and those to which they apply.  I argue that 
if a semantic theory for truth does not satisfy this requirement, then it is unacceptable.  The 
central claim of the theory I develop is that truth is an inconsistent concept: the rules for the 
proper use of truth are incompatible in the sense that they dictate that truth both applies and fails 
to apply to certain sentences (e.g., those that give rise to the liar and related paradoxes).  The 
most significant challenge for a proponent of an inconsistency theory of truth is producing a 
plausible theory of inconsistent concepts.  On the account I provide, inconsistent concepts are 
confused concepts.  A concept is confused if, in employing it, one is committed to applying it to 
two or more distinct types of entities without properly distinguishing between them; that is, an 
employer of a confused concept thinks that two or more distinct entities are identical.  I propose 
a semantic theory for predicates that express confused concepts, and a new many-valued 
relevance logic on which the semantic theory depends.  This semantic theory serves as the basis 
for my theory of inconsistent concepts.  Given this account of inconsistent concepts and my 
claim that truth is inconsistent, I am committed to the view that truth is confused.  I use the 
semantic theory for confused predicates as a semantic theory for truth.  On the account I 
advance, a proper theory of truth requires a distinction between several different types of truth 
predicates.  I propose an account of each truth predicate, and I advocate using them as consistent 
replacements for the concept of truth.  The result is a team of concepts that does the work of the 
inconsistent concept of truth without giving rise to paradoxes.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The contemporary literature on truth in the analytic tradition divides into two groups.  The first 
contains writings on the nature of truth, while the second contains writings on the logic of truth.  
Those in the former category address such questions as ‘what is truth?’, discussing, e.g., which 
entities can be true or false, whether truth is a substantive concept or a logical one, and how best 
to account for the ways we use truth predicates.  Those in the latter category aim to describe the 
logical principles governing languages that contain truth predicates, focusing on the liar paradox 
and related phenomena.   
While each of these traditions is well developed and thriving, there is little interaction 
between them.  I argue that this lack of communication is unacceptable.  A proper account of the 
nature of truth is the key to understanding the liar paradox, while the lessons learned from 
investigating the logic of truth are crucial to understanding what truth is.  My dissertation 
contains a theory of truth that draws on the insights of both traditions.   
I begin by arguing for a condition on any theory of truth.  The condition is intended to 
capture the intuition that a theory of truth that offers an approach to the liar paradox should not 
require a substantive distinction between the language in which it is formulated and the 
languages to which it applies.  I provide an argument for the claim that semantic theories for 
truth that require such a distinction are unacceptable.  The argument turns on the claim that these 
theories cannot be applied successfully to natural languages.  This requirement on theories of 
truth is difficult to meet—of the dozens of theories proposed in the last forty years, only a few 
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 even purport to meet it.  Thus, the requirement serves as an effective criticism of a wide range of 
theories from each tradition. 
The objective of my dissertation is to provide a theory of truth that is both independently 
motivated and compatible with the requirement that semantic theories for truth should not 
demand a substantive distinction between the languages in which they are formulated and those 
to which they apply.  The theory of truth I develop satisfies both these demands: it is capable of 
accounting for our practice of using truth predicates, and it is expressible in the languages to 
which it applies.  The central claim of this account is that truth is an inconsistent concept: the 
rules for the proper use of truth are incompatible in the sense that they dictate that truth both 
applies and fails to apply to certain sentences (e.g., those that give rise to the liar and related 
paradoxes).  The most significant challenge for a proponent of an inconsistency theory of truth is 
producing a plausible theory of inconsistent concepts.  Accordingly, I first construct a theory of 
inconsistent concepts, and then I apply it to truth.   
On the account I provide, inconsistent concepts are confused concepts.  A concept is 
confused if, in employing it, one is committed to applying it to two or more distinct types of 
entities without properly distinguishing between them; that is, an employer of a confused concept 
thinks that two or more distinct entities are identical.  (An example popularized by Hartry Field 
is the Newtonian concept of mass.)  I propose a semantic theory for predicates that express 
confused concepts, and a new many-valued relevance logic on which the semantic theory 
depends.  This semantic theory serves as the basis for my theory of inconsistent concepts.   
  Given my account of inconsistent concepts and my claim that truth is inconsistent, I am 
committed to the view that truth is confused.  Accordingly, I use the semantic theory for 
confused predicates as a semantic theory for truth.  On the account I advance, a proper theory of 
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 truth requires a distinction between several different types of truth predicates.  I propose an 
account of each truth predicate, and I advocate using them as consistent replacements for the 
concept of truth.  An important feature of this account is that it permits a generic truth predicate, 
which allows our practice of using ‘true’ to go on without much interruption even though our 
inconsistent concept of truth has been replaced with a group of consistent ones.  The generic 
truth predicate can be used in most conversational situations without having to consider which 
specific concept of truth is appropriate; only in very specialized situations does one need to 
distinguish between the various types of truth.  The result is a team of concepts that does the 
work of the inconsistent concept of truth without giving rise to paradoxes.   
I set out to provide both a compelling argument against theories of truth that require a 
substantive distinction between the language in which they are formulated and those to which 
they apply, and an alternative theory of truth that is independently motivated.  Chapters One and 
Two, address the first task.  Because I advocate a theory of truth on which truth is an inconsistent 
concept, the second task requires a theory of inconsistent concepts.  In Chapter Three, I motivate 
the claim that truth is an inconsistent concept.  Chapters Four, Five, and Six contain the theory of 
inconsistent concepts, and in chapter Seven, I apply this theory to truth.   
 
Chapter One 
Most theories of truth that address the liar paradox must be formulated in a language that is 
expressively richer than the languages to which they apply.  Although some philosophers have 
objected to theories with this feature, no one has formulated a detailed criticism of them.  I set up 
such a criticism in Chapter One by developing a system of concepts and distinctions capable of 
characterizing theories with this feature in a sufficiently precise way.  Of these concepts, the 
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 most important is internalizability.  A semantic theory for truth is internalizable for a language if 
and only if there exists an extension of the language such that (i) the theory is expressible in that 
extension, and (ii) the theory assigns meanings to all the sentences of that extension that express 
the concept of truth.   
 
Chapter Two 
This chapter is devoted to arguments for two internalizability requirements.  First, a semantic 
theory should be internalizable for every language; a semantic theory for some concept that fails 
to meet this requirement fails to adequately explain that concept.  Second, a semantic theory for 
truth that applies to a natural language should be internalizable for that natural language.  Unless 
a semantic theory for truth meets this requirement, it will not be able to describe the natural 
language in question.  Of course, any theory that satisfies the first requirement satisfies the 
second.  However, providing a separate defense enables one to handle the objection that even if a 
semantic theory for truth is not internalizable for every language, it will still work well for 
natural languages.  Very few, if any, semantic theories for truth are internalizable for natural 
languages; hence, the internalizability requirements serve as powerful criticisms of most theories 
of truth. 
 
Chapter Three 
In this chapter, I explain why it is so difficult to construct a semantic theory for truth that is 
internalizable for natural languages.  I show that theories of truth that treat truth as a consistent 
concept must inevitably resort to a substantive distinction between object language and 
metalanguage to maintain consistency.  Such theories do not satisfy the internalizability 
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 requirement I defend in Chapters One and Two.  In the remainder of the chapter, I provide 
further defense of the view that truth is an inconsistent concept.   
 
Chapter Four 
The most significant challenge for an inconsistency theory of truth is a plausible theory of 
inconsistent concepts.  In Chapter Four, I present the outlines of such a theory.  I argue that the 
constitutive rules for an inconsistent concept are incompatible, where a concept’s constitutive 
rules are those that a person who employs that concept is committed to following by virtue of his 
or her employment of that concept.  That is, when one employs a concept, one is obligated to 
follow its constitutive rules.  In the case of inconsistent concepts, the constitutive rules stipulate 
that the concept should both apply and fail to apply to some object or objects.  Such concepts are 
perplexing.  It is unclear how we should understand them, whether sentences that express them 
are true or false, and how we should evaluate arguments that contain such sentences.  My views 
on these issues all stem from my commitment to explain inconsistent concepts in terms of 
confusion.  A person is confused if she thinks that two or more distinct entities are identical.  
One can be confused about a variety of things, but I focus on cases in which someone is 
conceptually confused.  Newtonian mass serves as good example of conceptual confusion.  
Today we know that there are two “kinds” of mass (proper mass and relativistic mass), but 
before the advent of relativity, people who employed the concept of Newtonian mass assumed 
that there was a unique property, mass, that objects possess.  Hence, the concept of Newtonian 
mass is a confused concept.   
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 Chapter Five 
Given that I explain inconsistent concepts in terms of confused concepts, I require a theory of 
confused concepts.  In this chapter, I describe and defend one such theory that takes Joseph 
Camp’s theory of confused names as its starting point.  According to this theory, confusion is not 
to be understood as a mental state, but rather as a certain status.  Camp’s theory of confusion 
employs a four-valued logic to evaluate arguments that contain confused expressions.  The logic 
has four “epistemically interpreted” semantic values: told true, told false, told neither, and told 
both.  One can show that the inferences validated by this logic are those that are validated by the 
logic of first-degree entailments (a relevance logic).  To employ the four-valued logic, one must 
first determine the components of the confused concept, which are the distinct entities thought to 
be identical by the confused person (e.g., the components of Newtonian mass are proper mass 
and relativistic mass).  One then generates semantic values for sentences that contain confused 
expressions by substituting the component expressions into a confused sentence and evaluating 
the result for truth (e.g., one determines whether the sentence that results from substituting 
‘proper mass’ for ‘mass’ in the confused sentence in question is true; one does the same for 
‘relativistic mass’).  One can then use the four-valued logic to evaluate arguments with confused 
expressions. 
 
Chapter Six  
In order for the theory of confusion described in Chapter Five to serve my needs, it must be 
extended in four ways; these extensions are the topic of Chapter Six.  First, I advocate adding a 
certain conditional that renders the resulting logic equivalent to the sentential logic of relevant 
implication (R), and I advocate the standard first-order extension of R.  Second, I present a 
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 family of many-valued logics that are intended to generalize the four-valued logic described in 
Chapter Five.  The four-valued logic is what I call a 2-component logic on the grounds that it 
allows for at most two epistemic perspectives (told true and told false).  I generalize this to the n-
component case so that the theory of confusion that employs these logics can handle confused 
concepts with more than two components.  For example, if there had turned out to be three 
“kinds” of mass, then the concept of Newtonian mass would have had three components, and one 
would have needed to use a 3-component logic (which has six semantic values) to evaluate 
arguments whose sentences express this concept.  Third, I construct a family of partial n-
component logics, which include “told gappy” values.  The result is that the theory of confusion 
can handle confused concepts whose components are partially defined, even if the components 
have different ranges of application.  Finally, I combine the extended theory of confusion with a 
conceptual role semantics to arrive at a semantic theory for confused expressions.  The chapter 
closes with a more detailed treatment of inconsistent concepts and a sequence of replies to 
objections. 
 
Chapter Seven 
In the final chapter, I apply the theory of inconsistent concepts to truth and arrive at an 
inconsistency theory of truth.  Given the theory of inconsistent concepts I develop in Chapters 
Four, Five, and Six, I endorse the claim that truth is a confused concept.  On the theory I 
propose, truth has six components: ascending weak truth, descending weak truth, ascending 
strong truth, descending strong truth, ascending dual truth, and descending dual truth.  Ascending 
weak truth obeys the ascending truth rule (i.e., from ├ p infer ├ True(〈p〉)), but it obeys the 
descending truth rule (i.e., from ├True(〈p〉) infer├ p) only for non-pathological sentences.  
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 Descending weak truth obeys the descending weak truth rule, but it obeys the ascending weak 
truth rule only for non-pathological sentences.  Ascending versions of strong truth and dual truth 
are defined in terms of ascending weak truth, while descending versions of strong truth and dual 
truth are defined in terms of descending weak truth.  Ascending (descending) strong truth has the 
same extension as ascending (descending) weak truth, but is completely defined on truth-apt 
sentences; ascending (descending) dual truth has the same anti-extension as ascending 
(descending) weak truth, but is completely defined on truth-apt sentences.  I use these six 
components as the basis for the semantic theory for truth I develop; it uses a partial 6-component 
logic to evaluate arguments that express the inconsistent concept of truth.   
In the end, I advocate replacing inconsistent concepts with consistent ones.  For truth, the 
six component concepts constitute an ideal group of replacements.  I demonstrate the importance 
of introducing a generic truth predicate whose extension is the union of the extensions of the six 
component concepts and whose anti-extension is the intersection of the anti-extensions of the six 
component concepts.  The generic truth predicate allows our practice of using ‘true’ to go on 
without much interruption even though our inconsistent concept of truth has been replaced with a 
group of consistent ones.  The generic truth predicate can be used in most conversational 
circumstances without having to consider which component concept of truth is appropriate.  One 
needs to distinguish between the various types of truth only in very specialized situations (e.g., 
when providing a semantics for an expressively rich language). 
 
Appendix A: Fragmentary Theories of Truth 
Some theories of truth explain natural language truth predicates in terms of a group of restricted 
truth predicates; the extension of each restricted truth predicate is a proper subset of the 
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 extension of ‘true’.  I call these fragmentary theories of truth.  Examples of fragmentary theories 
of truth are Tarski’s theory, the disquotational version of deflationism, and most approaches to 
the liar paradox, including fixed-point theories, revision theories, and contextual theories.  I 
argue that many fragmentary theories of truth are inconsistent with our intuitions about which 
assertions of truth ascriptions are warranted.  Because these theories purport to describe the way 
language users actually use truth predicates, their failure to respect our intuitions on warranted 
assertibility renders them unacceptable. 
 
Appendix B: Risky Business 
It is relatively easy to construct versions of the liar paradox that employ empirical predicates.  
One surprising consequence of this claim is that whether a sentence token counts as paradoxical 
can depend on empirical facts that are independent of its syntactic and semantic features.  In 
other words, paradoxicality does not supervene on the syntactic and semantic features of 
sentence tokens.  This fact has profound consequences for the study of truth.  In particular, I 
argue that it casts doubt on the claim that utterances of paradoxical sentences are not assertions, 
the claim that propositions are primary truth bearers, minimalist theories of truth aptness, a 
prominent version of deflationism, and contextual approaches to the liar paradox. 
 
Appendix C: Revision and Revenge 
The revision theory of truth is currently one of the three most prominent approaches to the liar 
paradox (the others being fixed-point theories and contextual theories).  Although the revision 
theory must be formulated in a language that is expressively richer than those to which it applies, 
its proponents claim that it does not fall prey to revenge paradoxes.  I argue that it does face a 
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 revenge paradox, and this revenge paradox casts doubt on both its claim to be an acceptable 
approach to the liar paradox and its prospects for applying to natural languages. 
 
Appendix D: Purportedly Internalizable Semantic Theories for Truth 
Several semantic theories for truth have appeared in the last few decades, and the supporters of 
these theories claim that they do not require a substantive distinction between object language 
and metalanguage.  I compare and contrast these theories, and I evaluate the extent to which they 
are internalizable for a single language and for natural languages. 
 
Appendix E:  Theories of Inconsistent Concepts 
I compare the theory of inconsistent concepts developed in Chapters Four, Five, and Six with 
several other theories designed to handle inconsistent concepts. 
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1.0  INTERNALIZABLE SEMANTIC THEORIES 
 
 
1.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter and the next one, my aim is to provide a detailed argument for a claim that 
appears frequently in philosophical discussions of truth, but has, in my view, never been 
adequately defended.  The claim to which I allude is: a semantic theory for truth that must be 
formulated in a language that is expressively richer than the languages to which it applies is 
unacceptable.  This issue arises in the literature on truth because the vast majority of semantic 
theories for truth do not apply to the languages in which they are formulated.  Thus, if the 
arguments I provide below are successful, then they constitute a refutation of the vast majority of 
semantic theories for truth. 
In Chapter One, I introduce some terminology in an attempt to capture this intuition.  In 
particular, for a given language, I distinguish between semantic theories that are internalizable 
for that language and those that are essentially external for that language.  I claim that semantic 
theories that are internalizable for every language can be expressed in the languages to which 
they apply, while semantic theories that are essentially external for every language are those that 
require formulation in languages that are essentially richer than the languages to which they 
apply.  In Chapter Two, I argue for two internalizability requirements on semantic theories, the 
most important of which is that if a semantic theory for truth can be successfully applied to a 
natural language, then that semantic theory is internalizable for that language.     
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 Before presenting my account of internalizable semantic theories, I want to provide the 
reader with some background on truth and the liar paradox in an effort to motivate the 
distinctions I make in this chapter.1  Let me begin by stipulating that a theory of truth is any 
theory that specifies some aspect of the nature of truth, and a semantic theory for truth is a theory 
that provides the meanings of the sentences in a particular language that express the concept of 
truth.  I discuss these terms at length in section two, but these brief definitions should be 
adequate for now.   
Any semantic theory for truth that applies to a language with minimal expressive 
resources must incorporate an approach to the liar paradox; otherwise, if it is remotely plausible, 
then it will almost certainly be inconsistent.  The liar paradox involves sentences like the 
following (which I call a liar sentence):  
(1): (1) is false. 
There is an intuitively plausible argument whose conclusion is that (1) is both true and not true.  
The argument is depends on inference rules of classical logic and the truth rules: (i) the 
ascending truth rule (i.e., 〈〈p〉 is true〉2 follows from 〈p〉), (ii) the descending truth rule (i.e., 〈p〉 
follows from 〈〈p〉 is true〉), and (iii) the substitution rule (i.e., two names that refer to 〈p〉 are 
intersubstitutable in 〈〈p〉 is true〉 without changing its truth-value).  On the one hand, if (1) is true, 
then ‘(1) is false’ is true (by substitution).  If ‘(1) is false’ is true, then (1) is false (by 
descending).  Thus, if (1) is true, then (1) is false.  On the other hand, if (1) is false, then ‘(1) is 
                                                 
1 In these introductory remarks, I have sacrificed rigor for accessibility.  I hope that readers who are familiar with 
the formal presentations of these issues will be patient with my attempts to introduce them to those readers who are 
not. 
2 ‘〈’ and ‘〉’ are angle quotes; ‘p’ serves as a sentential variable that can be replaced by a sentence, and ‘〈p〉’ is the 
quote-name of such a sentence.  See McGee (1991, 2000) for this usage (McGee uses different symbols).  I also use 
‘p’ as a logical constant (e.g.: p is true).  Note that these uses are distinct: an occurrence of ‘p’ cannot be both a 
sentential variable and a constant.  Corner quotes, ‘⎡’ and ‘⎤’, are used in conjunction with constants.  For example, 
if ‘p’ and ‘q’ are names of sentences, then ‘⎡p ∧ q⎤’ is the name of the sentence that results from placing sentence p 
and sentence q on opposite sides of ‘∧’. 
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 false’ is true (by ascending).  If ‘(1) is false’ is true, then (1) is true (by substitution).  Thus, if (1) 
is false, then (1) is true.  Therefore, (1) is true if and only if (1) is false.  It follows that (1) is both 
true and false.  The paradox is that from intuitively plausible assumptions via intuitively 
plausible inferences, one can derive an intuitively unacceptable conclusion.  Anyone who 
endorses a semantic theory for truth that applies to a language with sentences like (1) must reject 
one of the premises, reject one of the inferences, or accept the conclusion.   
As I mentioned, most semantic theories for truth do not apply to the languages in which 
they are formulated.  The reason turns out to be linked to the liar paradox.  One of the most 
frustrating and ubiquitous features of approaches to the liar paradox is the presence of revenge 
paradoxes.  A revenge paradox for a given semantic theory for truth involves a sentence (a 
revenge liar sentence) that is similar to the liar sentence, but the sentence in question expresses a 
key concept used by the semantic theory to classify the liar sentence.  One can derive a 
contradiction using the revenge liar from assumptions and inferences that are compatible with 
the semantic theory in question.  For example, a popular approach to the liar paradox stipulates 
that liar sentences are truth-value gaps (i.e., they are neither in the extension nor in the anti-
extension of truth).  A semantic theory for truth that incorporates this approach classifies 
sentences of a language as true, false, or gappy (given certain information about the sentences 
and the world in which they are evaluated).  The revenge paradox for such a semantic theory 
involves the following sentence: 
(2): (2) is either false or a truth-value gap. 
There is an intuitively plausible argument whose conclusion is that (2) is both true and not true.3  
The liar paradox takes its revenge on the semantic theory in question by giving rise to a new 
                                                 
3 If (2) is either false or a truth-value gap, then ‘(2) is either false or a truth-value gap’ is true.  If ‘(2) is either false 
or a truth-value gap’ is true, then (2) is true.  Hence, if (2) either false or a truth-value gap, then (2) is true.  
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 paradox that uses a key concept of the semantic theory (in this example it is the concept of a 
truth-value gap).  Victims of revenge paradoxes commonly restrict their semantic theories for 
truth so that the theories do not apply to languages with the resources to construct revenge 
paradoxes.  Because the revenge paradox incorporates key terms of the semantic theory itself, 
this restriction prevents the semantic theory from applying to the language in which it is 
formulated.4
A related phenomenon forces the same sort of restriction.  This phenomenon is 
sometimes confused with the revenge paradox phenomenon, and it does not seem to have a 
commonly used name.  I call it the self-refutation problem.  The problem is that most semantic 
theories for truth imply that paradoxical sentences (e.g., (1) and (2)) are not true.5  However, one 
can construct a paradoxical sentence that attributes non-truth to itself.  Thus, a semantic theory 
for truth that implies that paradoxical sentences are not true will have a paradoxical (and hence, 
an untrue) sentence as a consequence.  Hence, this semantic theory for truth implies that one of 
its consequences is untrue.  Therefore, this semantic theory is self-refuting.  The self-refutation 
problem occurs when a semantic theory implies that a certain sentence is not true and the 
sentence in question is a token of the same type as the consequence of the theory.  In other 
words, some paradoxical sentences seem to mimic what a semantic theory says about them.  For 
example, consider again the semantic theory for truth that incorporates the truth-value gap 
                                                                                                                                                             
Likewise, if (2) is true, then ‘(2) is either false or a truth-value gap’ is true.  If ‘(2) is either false or a truth-value 
gap’ is true, then (2) is either false or a truth-value gap.  Hence, if (2) is true, then (2) is either false or a truth-value 
gap.  Consequently, (2) is true if and only if (2) is either false or a truth-value gap.  Therefore, (2) is both true and 
either false or a truth-value gap (a contradiction—if we assume that a sentence that is either false or a truth-value 
gap is not true). 
4 See van Fraassen (1968), Parsons (1974), Kripke (1975), Burge (1979a), Priest (1987), McGee (1991), Simmons 
(1993), Gupta and Belnap (1993), Gupta (2000), McDonald (2000), and Field (2003a, 2003b) for discussion. 
5 That is, most semantic theories for truth imply that paradoxical sentences are untrue.  The ‘not’ in the sentence on 
which this footnote is a comment should be read as exclusion negation. 
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 approach to the paradoxical sentences.  The self-refutation problem for this semantic theory 
concerns the following sentence: 
(3): (3) is not true. 
There is an intuitively plausible argument whose conclusion is that (3) is both true and not true.  
Thus, the semantic theory in question should classify (3) as a truth-value gap.  However, if (3) is 
a truth-value gap, then (3) is not true.  Consequently, the semantic theory in question implies that 
(3) is not true.  However, that is just the content of (3) itself.  Therefore, the semantic theory in 
question has ‘(3) is not true’ as a consequence, and it implies that ‘(3) is not true’ is not true.  
Thus, it is self-refuting—it implies that one of its consequences is untrue.  The standard response 
to the self-refutation problem is to restrict one’s semantic theory to languages in which such 
sentences cannot be formulated.  Semantic theories with this restriction are not self-refuting 
because they do not have any consequences for sentences like (3).  Thus, they do not imply that 
their own consequences are untrue.  Like a revenge paradox, a self-refutation problem for a 
semantic theory pertains to a sentence that expresses a concept employed by the theory itself; 
thus, restricting the theory to avoid the self-refutation problem prevents it from applying to the 
language in which it is formulated.6   
Several philosophers have claimed that restricting a semantic theory for truth so that it 
does not give rise to revenge paradoxes or self-refutation problems is unacceptable.  For 
example, Vann McGee proposes the “integrity of language” requirement, which states, “[i]t must 
be possible to give the semantics of our language within the language itself,” (McGee 1991: 
159).  McGee comments on his requirement that it “is intended to hold open the possibility that 
the methods we develop can be applied to natural languages.  If in developing the theory of truth 
                                                 
6 See Burge (1979), Priest (1987), Simmons (1993), Gupta (2000), and Glanzberg (2003) for more on the self-
refutation problem. 
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 for a language, we required the services of an essentially richer metalanguage, that possibility 
would be closed off.  …  [It] makes it reasonable to hope that our methods can be used to get a 
semantics of a natural language,” (ibid.)  William Reinhardt expresses a similar sentiment in the 
following passage:  
Let us suppose, as I believe is intuitively correct, that one of the primary features 
of [truth] is that it is one notion: in particular it does not split into some hierarchy 
of notions.  …  Let us explain that the truth predicate of our formal language (call 
the language L) is intended to be taken in the sense of our preexisting informal 
notion of truth.  …  Unless we are prepared to entertain splitting the notion of 
truth, we are forced to admit that the metalanguage is included in the object 
language.  If the formal language is to provide an adequate explication of the 
informal language that we use, it must contain its own metalanguage.  I take it 
that this is in fact a desideratum for success in formulating a theory of truth, 
(Reinhardt 1986: 227-228). 
 
Both McGee and Reinhardt suggest that if a semantic theory for a language requires a richer 
language for its formulation, then the theory cannot be applied successfully to natural 
languages.7  Two of my goals in the first two chapters are to formulate this intuition in a 
sufficiently precise way and to argue for it.   
In section one, I consider several arguments for the intuition voiced by McGee and 
Reinhardt and reject each of them.  Section two contains a definition of internalizability, which is 
the central concept I use to capture this intuition, and a discussion of several related concepts.  
To illustrate these concepts, I apply them to Kripke’s semantic theory for truth.  I then turn in 
Chapter Two to formulating several requirements on semantic theories in general and semantic 
theories for truth in particular that are similar to the above intuition.  The rest of Chapter Two 
                                                 
7 Kearns, Priest, Simmons, and Martin express similar sentiments as well; see Kearns (1970), Priest (1987), 
Simmons (1993), and Martin (1997).  See also Field’s discussion in Field (2003a, 2003b).  In the following passage, 
Brandom imposes a similar requirement on his theory of meaning: “One of the criteria of adequacy that has guided 
the project from the outset is that it be possible to elaborate the model of discursive practice to the point where it is 
characterized by just this sort of expressive completeness.  This means that the model reconstructs the expressive 
resources needed to describe the model itself,” (Brandom 1994: 641).  However, there is a subtle difference between 
this requirement and the one imposed by McGee and Reinhardt; see below on the distinction between theories of 
meaning and meaning-theories and footnote 35 for more on the difference.     
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 contains arguments for two of these requirements.  The first argument pertains to any semantic 
theory whatsoever, while the second concerns semantic theories for truth that apply to natural 
languages.  Chapter Two closes with a discussion of Tarski’s indefinability theorem and related 
results. 
 
 
 
 
1.2  PREVIOUS PROPOSALS 
 
 
In this section, I consider three arguments for the claim that semantic theories for truth that 
cannot be formulated in the languages to which they apply are unacceptable.  The first is an 
argument of McGee’s, which depends on a commitment to naturalism.  The second is based on 
certain views about our capacity to comprehend natural languages.  The third depends on claims 
about the expressive capacity of natural languages; it is explicitly formulated by Anil Gupta (in 
an effort to discredit it) as part of his defense of the revision theory of truth (which does not 
apply to languages in which it is formulated).   
 
 
1.2.1  THE NATURALISM ARGUMENT 
 
 
Although philosophers have used ‘naturalism’ as the name of several different doctrines, 
McGee’s usage is common.8  McGee’s naturalist believes that the methods and concepts of 
science are amenable to humans and our activities, which include natural languages.  
Consequently, the naturalist believes that it is possible to provide a theory of human language 
that encompasses all human languages, even the one that is used to formulate the theory.  Hence, 
                                                 
8 See King (1994) for discussion of the types of naturalism. 
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 naturalists ought to reject semantic theories that do not apply to the languages in which they are 
formulated.9
McGee assumes that there is something all languages have in common and that, whatever 
this is, it calls out for a scientific explanation.  One response to the naturalism argument is to 
deny that the lack of a unified scientific theory of language poses a threat to naturalism.  Perhaps 
languages can be explained only one by one, or maybe it is only fragments of natural languages 
that can be explained as coherent units.  One could endorse such a piecemeal explanation and 
maintain naturalism as long as the explanation employed only scientifically acceptable concepts. 
There is evidence that McGee himself should accept piecemeal explanations of language as 
naturalistically acceptable because he uses this claim as an objection to Field’s criticism of 
Tarski.  Field argues that Tarski’s truth definition is not acceptable to naturalists because it 
employs an enumerative account of reference and predication.10  McGee defends Tarski by 
claiming that enumerative accounts are naturalistically acceptable, and he cites lepidoptery as an 
example of a science that is enumerative.  He even argues that a piecemeal account of language 
should be expected because of the conventional character of languages.11  Hence, McGee 
provides a good reason to think that a piecemeal explanation of language could be legitimate in 
the eyes of a naturalist.  If this view is correct, then there is no reason to think that an appeal to 
naturalism justifies the claim that semantic theories should apply to the languages in which they 
are formulated. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 McGee (1991: ix; 1994: 628-9). 
10 Field (1972) and Tarski (1933). 
11 McGee (1991: 83-86). 
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 1.2.2  THE COMPREHENSIBILITY ARGUMENT 
 
 
A different argument for the intuition is based on the comprehensibility of natural languages.  
Many humans have the ability to speak, write, hear, and read natural languages.  Let anyone who 
has one of these capacities for a particular natural language be said to comprehend that natural 
language.  According to some views of comprehension, human comprehension is theory-based in 
the sense that someone who comprehends a particular natural language uses a theory that 
prescribes the use of the elements of that language.12  Someone who comprehends, say, English, 
could simply state the theory on which his comprehension is based and he would have a semantic 
theory for English.  Hence, English (and any other natural language that can be comprehended) 
must be able to express its own semantic theory.13
There are several weak points in the argument.  One objection is that it relies on the 
assumption that human linguistic competence is based on the acceptance or knowledge of a 
semantic theory.14  It seems to me that this assumption is linked to a certain view on the nature 
of linguistic competence.  Fodor expresses it adequately in this passage: “To describe a language 
is to formulate the rules which are internalized by speakers when they learn the language and 
applied in speaking and understanding it,” (Fodor 1964: 198).  Davidson, in particular, has 
criticized the claim that comprehending a language is internalizing a set of rules for uttering and 
                                                 
12 Proponents of the theory theory and those who advocate the simulation theory have been engaged in a prominent 
debate for several decades now about how humans come to know about one another’s mental states.  See the papers 
in Carruthers and Smith (1996) for an overview of the debate.  A similar issue concerns the way in which humans 
come to know about the semantic features of words and sentences, but this issue receives considerably less attention 
than the debate about mental states.  It seems to me that someone who endorses the comprehensibility argument 
would have to accept a variant of the theory theory for linguistic competence.   
13 Gupta formulates this argument for the purposes of attacking it.  He says that it is the most common such 
argument and attributes it to Simmons, but I am not convinced that Simmons advocates such an argument.  In the 
passage of Simmons (1993) that Gupta quotes, Simmons argues that natural languages are semantically universal 
because they are semantically closed, not that anyone with the capacity to comprehend a language can state the 
theory underlying that capacity.  Regardless of who advocates it, it seems to be a relatively intuitive argument that 
many people with whom I have discussed these issues find compelling.  See Gupta (1997: 440 n. 22) and Simmons 
(1993: 15). 
14 Gupta presents this objection in his discussion of the argument.  See Gupta (1997: 440-1). 
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 interpreting its words and sentences.15  I am not interested in engaging with this debate here.  I 
do want to point out that the comprehensibility argument seems to have this controversial 
assumption. 
Another problem with it is that it might be that a human can comprehend a particular 
natural language and that this capacity is theory-based without it being the case that the human in 
question can express the theory he uses to comprehend the language in that language.  Perhaps 
comprehension of English is based on a theory that can be expressed in the language of thought, 
but is not expressible in English. 
 
 
1.2.3  EXPRESSIVE CAPACITY ARGUMENTS 
 
 
Some critics of semantic theories that do not apply to languages in which they are formulated 
argue that such semantic theories cannot successfully describe natural languages.  There are 
several ways to make such an argument, but they all have the same form: (i) natural languages 
have certain expressive resources, (ii) a semantic theory that cannot apply to the languages in 
which it is formulated cannot apply to languages with those expressive resources, thus, (iii) a 
semantic theory that cannot apply to the languages in which it is formulated cannot apply to 
natural languages. 
The expressive resources cited differ depending on who formulates the argument, but one 
popular choice is semantic self-sufficiency.16  A language is semantically self-sufficient if and 
only if it can express its own semantic theory (i.e., a semantic theory that assigns a meaning to 
                                                 
15 Davidson (1986). 
16 Others are universality and semantic closure (see section 1.4 for discussion). 
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 every sentence of the language).17  Gupta, in an effort to defend the revision theory of truth, 
formulates this version of the expressive capacity argument:  
(a) It is possible to provide a semantic description of a natural language L. 
 
(b) A semantic description of L must be expressible in L (i.e., L is semantically self-
sufficient). 
 
(c) The revision theory must be formulated in a language that is expressively richer 
than the one it describes. 
 
(d) The revision theory is not suitable for L (from (a), (b) and (c)). 
 
  ∴ (e) The revision theory fails to explain truth in L (from (d)). 
 
Gupta then attacks this argument by claiming that we have no reason to believe that natural 
languages are semantically self-sufficient.18   
It seems to me that the reasoning Gupta reconstructs is common among those who 
criticize semantic theories that require formulation in languages that are expressively richer than 
the ones to which they apply.  Although I agree with Gupta that we have no reason to think that 
natural languages are semantically self-sufficient, I find another problem with this argument.  It 
is improper to infer from the claim that L can express a semantic theory for L to the claim that, 
to be acceptable, a semantic theory for L must be expressible in L.  It is possible that there is a 
perfectly good semantic theory for a semantically self-sufficient language that is not expressible 
in that language (of course, it would not be the semantic theory for that language that is 
expressible in it).  Hence, the inference from (a), (b), and (c) to (d) is invalid.  Therefore, even if 
one could show that natural languages are semantically self-sufficient, that would not, by itself, 
                                                 
17 That is, it must be able to express a theory that correctly assigns a meaning to every sentence of the language.  
There must be some sort of correctness clause in the definition or else most any language would count as 
semantically self-sufficient by virtue of expressing the claim that all its sentences are meaningless or that all its 
sentences mean that Roquefort is yummy.   
18 Gupta (1997: 437). 
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 constitute a criticism of semantic theories that cannot apply to the languages in which they are 
formulated (the same point undermines the comprehensibility argument as well).   
  A different sort of expressive capacity argument can be formulated for an individual 
semantic theory.  For example, natural languages (e.g., English) can express the concept of a 
truth-value gap.  A particular semantic theory for truth that employs the concept of a truth-value 
gap cannot apply to languages that can express the concept of a truth-value gap.  Thus, this 
semantic theory does not apply to natural languages.  Although this type of argument can serve 
as a criticism of an individual semantic theory, it does not justify the claim that any semantic 
theory for truth should apply to the languages in which it is formulated.  To get that result, one 
would have to claim that natural languages are universal in the sense that they can express any 
concept whatsoever.  That leads one back to the first type of expressive capacity argument.   
To sum up: although the intuition expressed by McGee and Reinhardt could be used as a 
powerful critique of most theories of truth, it lacks justification.  In particular, none of the 
arguments surveyed in this section gives us good reason to accept it.19   
 
 
 
 
1.3  INTERNALIZABLE SEMANTIC THEORIES 
 
 
In this section, I present a conceptual framework designed to capture the intuition that semantic 
theories that do not apply to languages in which they are formulated are unacceptable.  At the 
center of this framework is the concept of internalizability.  In the first subsection, I define 
                                                 
19 Another argument for the same conclusion is that a semantic theory that does not apply to the languages in which 
it is formulated is self-refuting; see Fitch (1946) and Simmons (1993: 58-61).  It seems to me that once the 
restrictions on these theories are properly understood, it is clear that these theories are not self-refuting.  See Chapter 
Three, section 3.2 for discussion. 
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 ‘internalizability’ and several related terms.  In the second, I use Kripke’s semantic theory for 
truth to illustrate them. 
 
 
1.3.1  DEFINITIONS 
 
 
In order to expose and avoid certain difficulties, I first present and reject three suggestions for 
capturing the intuition voiced by McGee and Reinhardt.  One suggestion is that semantic theories 
should be expressible in the languages to which they apply.  However, this requirement is too 
strong.  The above intuition is that semantic theories that cannot be expressed in the languages to 
which they apply are unacceptable.  I do not want to say that a semantic theory that happens to 
be inexpressible in a language to which it applies is unacceptable.  For example, assume that T is 
a semantic theory for counterfactual expressions that employs the concept of a possible world, 
but T need not be formulated in a language that is expressively richer than those to which it 
applies.  Assume also that T applies to a language L that contains counterfactuals but does not 
have the vocabulary to express the concept of a possible world.  In this case, T is not expressible 
in L.  However, it is plausible to assume that L could be extended to a new language L′ such that 
T is expressible in L′ and T applies to L′.  The first suggestion would reject theories like T even 
though they can be formulated in the very languages to which they apply.   
A second suggestion is that a semantic theory should be expressible in an extension of the 
languages to which it applies.  This condition is too weak because for any semantic theory and 
any language to which it applies, there exists an extension of that language in which the theory 
can be expressed, so long as the theory does not apply to the extended language.  The intuition I 
am trying to capture is that a semantic theory should apply to the very languages in which it can 
be expressed.   
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 As a final suggestion one might say that for a given semantic theory and a language to 
which it applies, the theory should both be expressible in an extension of that language and apply 
to that entire extended language.  This characterization is better, but I want the account to work 
for semantic theories that focus on a single concept (e.g., a semantic theory for truth) as well as 
semantic theories for entire languages (e.g., a semantic theory for English).   
The best formulation of the intuition is that a semantic theory that applies to a language is 
acceptable if and only if it is expressible in an extension of that language and applies to 
everything in that extension to which it is supposed to apply.  A semantic theory of this type is 
internalizable for that language.  The following is a more elaborate definition of internalizability: 
A semantic theory T that purports to specify the meanings of sentences that 
express a concept X is internalizable for a language L if and only if there exists 
an extension of L such that all the sentences that compose T can be translated into 
sentences that belong to the extension of L and T specifies the meanings of all the 
sentences of the extension of L that express X. 
 
That is rather long-winded and contains many expressions whose meanings are unclear.  In the 
interest of clarity, I discuss four aspects of this definition: semantic theory, language, expression, 
and application.  Semantic theories and languages are objects (in a loose sense that includes 
abstract entities) and expression and application are relations between a semantic theory and a 
language.   
I begin with ‘semantic theory’.  First, a theory is a set of declarative sentences all of 
which belong to a single language.20  The term ‘semantic theory’ is tricky to define because it 
has been used in so many ways.  I follow Dummett in distinguishing between meaning-theories 
                                                 
20 This account of theoryhood is not without its problems.  First, we usually think of theories as things that can be 
expressed in different languages.  We find it natural to say that two physics textbooks, one written in English, the 
other written in French, both contain Newton’s theory of mechanics.  However, on my account, they contain two 
different theories.  I attempt to defuse this problem by speaking of a theory and its translations into other languages.  
Furthermore, although philosophers (and many other people) use the term ‘theory’ quite often, it is rather difficult to 
say which sentences constitute a particular informal theory.  I have no doubt that I would have trouble specifying the 
sentences that constitute Lewis’s theory of natural laws or Davidson’s paratactic theory of indirect discourse; see 
Lewis (1994) and Davidson (1968).  Nevertheless, I stick with the idealization. 
 24
 and the theory of meaning.  For Dummett, the theory of meaning is the branch of philosophy that 
deals with the nature of meaning, while a meaning-theory is a particular theory that specifies the 
meanings of the words or sentences of a particular language or languages.  I use the term ‘a 
theory of meaning’ in a Dummettian spirit to designate a theory that specifies the nature of 
meaning.21  Theories of meaning provide necessary and sufficient conditions on meaning-
theories.  According to my usage, a semantic theory is a type of meaning-theory.  In particular, a 
semantic theory is a theory that specifies the meanings of certain sentences that belong to some 
particular language or languages.22  I use the locution ‘semantic theory for X’, where X is a 
placeholder for the name of a concept (e.g., a semantic theory for moral obligation, a semantic 
theory for truth).  A semantic theory for X specifies the meanings of the sentences of certain 
languages that express the concept X (e.g., a semantic theory for truth specifies the meanings of 
sentences that express the concept of truth).23  I also use the locution ‘theory of X’; a theory of X 
is a theory that makes claims about the nature of X.24  
A language is a function from sets of sentences (syntactic strings) to a set of sentential 
meanings.  A sublanguage L0 of a language L1 is a language whose set of sentences is a subset of 
                                                 
21 Dummett (1991: 20-22).  See Peacocke (1981) for this use of ‘a theory of meaning’.   
22 Dummett also uses the term ‘semantic theory’ but his account differs from mine.  For Dummett, a semantic theory 
must specify the truth-value of each sentence in a given language (see Dummett 1991: 25, 33, 35).  King (1994: 57) 
and Soames (2002: 97) define ‘semantic theory’ as I do. 
23 I briefly discuss the nature of concepts in section 4.2 of Chapter Four, but I prefer to accommodate a range of 
views on the nature of concepts.   
24 Although I do not make much of it, the distinction between a semantic theory for X and an X definition is 
important.  An X definition provides the extension, the intension, or the sense of a word that expresses the concept 
X.  (The extension of a predicate is the set of things of which the predicate is true; the intension of a predicate 
determines its extension across possible worlds, and the sense of a predicate is something like its cognitive 
significance.)  There is a certain amount of overlap between an X definition and a theory of X, but the distinction 
between them is important.  For example, a theory of planethood makes claims about the nature of planets—what it 
is for something to be a planet.  A planethood definition might specify the extension of ‘planet’—which things are 
planets.  A semantic theory for planethood specifies the meanings of the sentences that contain ‘planet’ and its 
synonyms.  It is also important to keep in mind the distinction between a semantic theory for X and a semantic 
theory for things that are X.  For example, a semantic theory for vagueness specifies the meanings of sentences that 
contain ‘vague’ and its synonyms, whereas a semantic theory for things that are vague specifies the meanings of 
sentences that contain vague terms.  A semantic theory for quantification specifies the meanings of sentences that 
contain ‘quantifier’ and its synonyms, whereas a semantic theory for things that display quantification specifies the 
meanings of sentences that contain quantifiers. 
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 the set of sentences of L1 and whose set of sentential meanings is a subset of the set of sentential 
meanings of L1.  A language L1 is an extension of a language L0 if and only if L0 is a 
sublanguage of L1.  Although this definition of language as an abstract entity is popular among 
analytic philosophers, it leaves much to be desired.25   Perhaps the most difficult issue facing 
proponents of this account of language is specifying the relation between languages and the 
humans who use them.  I refer to this relation as the actual language relation.26  A specification 
of the actual language relation explains what it is about the mental, physical, and social activities 
of a group of humans that makes them users of a particular language.  I say nothing about what 
the actual language relation is or how one determines which language a group of people use.  
Another problem with this account of language is that any change in the syntactic or semantic 
features of the expressions used by a person or group of people results in a change in the 
language they use.  Consequently, the language one uses changes almost continuously.  Despite 
its deficiencies, I use this account of language because it simplifies discussions of language, and 
because it is the one that is assumed by most of those who propose semantic theories for truth.  
An attempt to construct a more plausible account of languages would take me too far afield.27    
I follow most people who study languages by insisting on the distinction between types 
and tokens.28  A token of a word or sentence is a physical entity (e.g., ink marks on a page, sound 
waves, pulses of light, etc.), while a type is an abstract entity.  There might be many different 
                                                 
25 See Lewis (1969), Soames (1984), Stalnaker (1987), and Davidson (1992). 
26 See Lewis (1969, 1975) and Schiffer (1993) for more on this issue.  See Hawthorne (1990) and Field (1994a) for 
criticism.   
27 Some philosophers and linguists define languages in terms of mental or pragmatic elements instead of as an 
abstract syntactic and semantic structure.  Mental definitions of language usually focus on the brain states of the 
humans that have linguistic capacities (e.g., Chomsky 1995), while those who favor pragmatic definitions of 
language often concentrate on the dispositions, regularities, or rules associated with the members of a linguistic 
practice (e.g., Sellars 1954 and Lewis 1975). 
28 See Kaplan (1973), Szabó (1999), and Truncellito (1999).  See Kaplan (1990) for criticism.  I take for granted that 
a person who comprehends a language can, in general, determine when a particular physical object counts as a token 
of a certain type of that language.  Some philosophers find it useful to talk about purely abstract languages that have 
no tokens because these languages have never been used.  To accommodate these views, I want to permit languages 
that have no tokens.   
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 tokens of the same type.  There might be many different tokens of the same type.  For example, 
the previous two sentences are two tokens of the same sentence type.  All the languages I 
consider have an infinite set of sentence types because they have sentential operators (e.g., ‘and’) 
and allow unlimited iterations of some term functions (e.g., ‘the father of x’).  I assume that 
every language has a finite set of expression tokens and a finite set of sentence tokens.29
So much for semantic theories and languages.  The next topic is the expressibility 
relation.  A theory T that belongs to one language L0 is expressible in another language L1 if and 
only if for every sentence q that composes T, there exists a sentence p of L1 such that p is a 
translation of q.30  This definition of ‘expressible’ relies on a notion of translation from one 
language into another.  I assume that a sentence of one language is a translation of a sentence 
that belongs to another if they have the same or relevantly similar meanings (or contents).31  
Although I say very little about meaning and what makes two meanings relevantly similar, I 
assume that two sentences with the same or relevantly similar meanings have the same truth 
conditions.  For the most part, I ignore issues related to the indeterminacy of translation, the 
indeterminacy of interpretation, the inscrutability of reference, and their implications for defining 
suitable notions of meaning and translation.32  I do not want to give the impression that I think 
these issues are not worth discussing.  Quite the contrary; there is so much to say about them that 
                                                 
29 One physical object can count as a sentence token of two different languages (e.g., ‘Kripke rang’ is a sentence of 
both English and German), but such a physical object counts as two different tokens.  If we erase the ‘n’ and add an 
‘ed’ on the end of ‘Kripke rang’, then, although the result might be classified as the same physical object, it is a 
different sentence token of English and it is no longer a sentence token of German.  Of course, not all physical 
changes to a physical object will change its status as a token.  The ‘Kripke rang’ example is from Sawyer (1999). 
30 I use the word ‘express’ in two different ways.  Words or sentences express concepts, while languages express 
sentences or theories.  I define the latter in terms of translation and content.  I say little about the former.   
31 For the most part, I ignore the distinction between meaning and content, but the standard way of drawing it is that 
a context dependent expression has the same meaning in every context, but its content differs from context to 
context.  The distinction for sentential meaning and sentential content is analogous.  
32 See Quine (1960) and Davidson (1973, 1979).  It is my view that there is room for accepting both Quine’s thesis 
on the indeterminacy of translation given the behavioristic evidence he allows and Davidson’s thesis on the 
indeterminacy of interpretation given the evidence base he allows, while at the same time accepting a perfectly 
legitimate notion of translation that does not commit one to the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths.  
However, I do not argue for this claim here. 
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 I could not possibly give these issues the space they deserve and still discuss everything that is 
required to start coming to terms with the problems bequeathed to us by our concept of truth.33   
The fourth aspect of my definition of internalizability on which I comment is application.  
Before defining it, I want to mention that, because of the prevalence of revenge paradoxes, it is 
common to treat semantic theories for truth as if they do not apply to languages that contain 
paradoxical sentences (i.e., the semantic theory would imply that such sentences both have and 
do not have some semantic property).  However, I treat semantic theories as if they apply by 
default to every language, and I treat restrictions as explicit parts of a semantic theory—I often 
use the locution ‘version of a semantic theory’ to distinguish between semantic theories that 
differ only in the way they are restricted.34  For example, Tarski’s truth definition has come to be 
used as the standard semantic theory for first-order classical languages that do not contain their 
own truth predicates.  However, one version of this semantic theory applies to first-order 
classical languages that do contain their own truth predicates.  Tarski showed that if this 
semantic theory applies to certain languages that contain their own truth predicates, one can 
derive a contradiction.  That is, the semantic theory implies that some sentences of these 
languages are both true and not true (the sentences for which this occurs are like liar sentences).  
According to my convention, the version of Tarski’s theory that applies only to languages that do 
not contain their own truth predicates is one semantic theory and the version that applies to 
languages that do contain their own truth predicates is another.  The former is consistent and the 
                                                 
33 Given that I do not define ‘sentential meaning’, one can think of my definitions of ‘language’ and ‘expression’ as 
definition schemata—as the forms of definitions of ‘language’ and ‘expression’.  It does not matter for my purposes 
how one explains sentential meanings (e.g., in terms of sets of possible worlds, structured propositions, inferential 
roles, causal relations, nomic relations, etc.).  One might worry that translation depends on one’s choice of semantic 
theory.  Although I disagree, a defender of this view can still accept my arguments by relativizing translation to a 
semantic theory.  Of course, all the definitions that depend on translation are then relativized to a semantic theory as 
well, but that does not affect the cogency of the arguments.   
34 My approach is considerably more liberal than Davidson’s.  For Davidson’s views on what it is for a certain 
theory to apply to a given language, see Davidson (1967, 1973). 
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 latter is not.  This convention of treating the restrictions as explicit additions to the theory is 
intended to avoid equivocations.   
A restriction for a semantic theory T is a claim that T does not provide the meanings for 
the sentences of certain languages or that T does not provide the meanings of certain sentences of 
certain languages.35  An unrestricted semantic theory is one that has no restrictions, and a 
restricted semantic theory is the conjunction of an unrestricted semantic theory and its 
restrictions.  A semantic theory applies to a language L if and only if the semantic theory does 
not contain a restriction specifying that it does not provide the meanings for sentences of L.  A 
semantic theory applies to a sentence of L if and only if it is not restricted from doing so.  I say 
that the scope of a semantic theory T is the set of sentences to which T applies.36  I assume that a 
semantic theory has no consequences for sentences outside its scope. 
I employ a deductive account of theory application.  Assume that T is a semantic theory 
for X and that S is the set of all the sentences in T’s scope.  For each member of S, an assignment 
follows from the union of the set of sentences that constitute T and a set of additional claims.37  
An assignment is a specification of the meaning of a sentence in the scope of the semantic theory 
in question.  I have emphasized that the assignments of a semantic theory need not have the 
                                                 
35 There are at least two ways to interpret the restriction claim.  One is that it is a stipulation for how the unrestricted 
semantic theory should be used (i.e., one should not use it to assignments for such and such sentences); the other is 
that it is a claim about how the semantic theory is used (i.e., such and such sentences are not within the scope of this 
theory).  On the first version, if one were to go ahead and use the restricted theory (the conjunction of the 
unrestricted theory and the restriction clause) in a way that is incompatible with its restrictions, then one would be 
guilty of some sort of pragmatic contradiction (perhaps one espouses a self-refuting theory).  On the second version, 
if one were to do that, then the restricted theory would be false since the restriction clause would incorrectly 
describe the scope of the restricted theory.  I prefer the second interpretation of the restriction clause because it 
avoids messy issues having to do with self-refutation.   
36 The assumption that this collection is a set plays no role in my presentation or arguments other than ease of 
exposition. 
37 The set of additional claims might involve syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic information about the sentences in S 
(e.g., that certain sentence is declarative, that a certain name names a particular object, or that a certain sentence 
token has been used to make an assertion). 
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 form: 〈p〉 means that q; instead, most semantic theories assign truth-values to sentences under 
certain conditions.   
To determine the assignments of a given semantic theory, one requires a theory of logical 
consequence for a set of sentences, which specifies the sentences that follow from each subset of 
that set.  I assume that each language will require its own theory of logical consequence.  When 
comparing sentences from different languages, I invoke the notion of translation.  However, I 
often ignore this complication and write as if a sentence of one language is a logical consequence 
of a set of sentences that belong to another.  A semantic theory T together with a set of auxiliary 
claims (e.g., claims about the syntactic structure of the sentences in the scope of T) entail, on the 
theory of logical consequence, an assignment for each member of the scope of T.  For example, 
if T is a semantic theory for truth and T applies to a language L, then T provides the meanings 
for the sentences of L that are members of the scope of T.  An assignment for each member of L 
that is in the scope of T follows from T. 
Semantic theories can be restricted so that they apply to only a fragment of a language.  
Assume that a semantic theory T for X specifies the meanings of the sentences of a language L 
that expresses X.  The scope of T for L is the set of sentences of L for which the theory delivers 
an assignment.  Yet the scope of T for L need not be all the sentences of L that express X.  
Indeed, T might apply to only a proper subset of the set of sentences that express X.  I call the 
sentences of a language that express a certain concept X the X-sentences of the language, and a 
language that contains an X-sentence I call an X-language.  I assume that a semantic theory for X 
is restricted by default to X-languages and to the X-sentences of X-languages.  For example, 
assume that a theorist is constructing a version of Tarski’s semantic theory for truth that is 
supposed to apply to English, but she does not want the theory to be inconsistent; the theorist 
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 should restrict the scope of the theory so that it does not provide an assignment for sentences like 
the liar sentence that cause trouble for Tarski’s semantic theory.  That is, the theorist should 
restrict the scope of the semantic theory so that it does not apply to all the truth-sentences of 
English. 
Tarski uses the terms object language and metalanguage to distinguish between the 
language to which his truth definition is intended to apply and the language in which the truth 
definition is formulated.38  According to this usage, the metalanguage is expressively richer than 
the object language.  Tarski does not say exactly what he means by ‘expressively richer’, but the 
idea is that some concepts can be expressed in the metalanguage that cannot be expressed in the 
object language.  It turns out to be rather difficult to characterize what ‘expressively richer’ 
means in the case of Tarski’s truth definition.39   
I would like to introduce two terms to mark a distinction that is similar to the one Tarski 
draws.  I use ‘employed language’ and ‘target language’ instead of Tarski’s terms because his 
terms have connotations associated with them that I want to avoid.  According to my usage, the 
employed language is the language in which a semantic theory is formulated, and a target 
language is a language to which that semantic theory applies.  I do not require that the employed 
language be expressively richer than the target language(s).  Indeed, if a semantic theory is 
internalizable for some language, then the theory’s employed language and its target language 
might be the same language.   
There is a sense in which a semantic theory for X that applies to a language L should 
provide an assignment for every X-sentence of L.  It will be helpful to have a term for semantic 
theories that satisfy this demand.   
                                                 
38 Tarski (1933). 
39 See DeVidi and Solomon (1999) for discussion of what Tarski meant by ‘expressively richer’. 
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 A semantic theory T for X is descriptively complete for L if and only if T provides an 
assignment for every X-sentence of L. 
 
A semantic theory T for X is descriptively incomplete for L if and only if it is not the case 
that T is descriptively complete for L. 
 
The notion of descriptive completeness plays an important role in the definition of 
internalizability and in the arguments of Chapter Two. 
Now that I have discussed the components of the definition of internalizability and I have 
introduced some new terminology, I can provide a more economical definition of it and related 
terms. 
A semantic theory T for X is internal for L if and only if T is expressible in L and T is 
descriptively complete for L. 
 
A semantic theory T for X is external for L if and only if it is not the case that T is 
internal for L. 
 
A semantic theory T for X is internalizable for L if and only if there exists an extension 
L′ of L such that T is internal for L′.   
 
A semantic theory T for X is essentially external for L if and only if it is not the case that 
T is internalizable for L.40
 
I claim that these distinctions allow one to formulate the intuition expressed by McGee and 
Reinhardt: for a semantic theory to successfully apply to a natural language it must be 
internalizable for some language.41  Notice that the notion of descriptive completeness does 
much of the work in the definition of internalizability because one can always extend a given 
language to express a particular semantic theory.  That is, if T is a semantic theory for X that 
applies to an X-language L, then L can be extended to a language L′ in which T can be 
                                                 
40 Although these definitions hold only for semantic theories, one could define similar notions for theories of 
meaning.  Brandom’s expressive completeness requirement seems to be something like an internalizability 
requirement for theories of meaning.  According to Brandom, if no semantic theory that meets the conditions 
specified by a theory of meaning T provides the right assignments to the sentences that constitute T, then T is 
unacceptable.  See Brandom (1994). 
41 Although in the passage I quoted above, McGee seems to claim that for a semantic theory to successfully apply to 
a natural language, it must be internal for that language, in later writings he makes it clear that he is interested in 
internalizability instead of internality.  See McGee (1997: 405-406). 
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 expressed.  It might even be the case that T is essentially external for L, but T is descriptively 
complete for L (e.g., if T is not descriptively complete for L′ because it is restricted from 
applying to some of the X-sentences of L′).  Internalizability for L requires that T be both 
expressible in L′ and descriptively complete for L′.   
Notice also that the definition of internalizability does not have any implications for the 
correctness or truth of a semantic theory.  If a semantic theory T for X is descriptively complete 
for an X-language L, but is essentially external for L, then one can construct a new theory T′ that 
is internalizable for L.  One simply picks an extension L′ of L in which T can be expressed, and 
one stipulates that T′ agrees with T on the sentences of L and T′ implies that every sentence of L′ 
that is not a sentence of L is necessarily false (any other semantic concept expressible in L′ 
would work just as well).  T′ is internalizable for L because there exists an extension L′ of L such 
that T′ is expressible in L′ and T′ is descriptively complete for L′.  Of course, T′ is certainly false 
because for every X-sentence p of L′ that does not belong to L, T′ implies that both p and ⎡~p⎤ 
are necessarily false.  The moral is that internalizability is relatively easy to achieve if one is 
willing to sacrifice correctness.  The difficult task, when it comes to semantic theories for truth, 
is a theory that is both correct and internalizable for some language (by ‘correct’, I mean that it is 
correct not only for the truth-sentences of L, but for all the sentences in its scope); even more 
difficult is the task of constructing a semantic theory for truth that is correct and internalizable 
for a natural language. 
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 1.3.2  EXAMPLE: KRIPKE’S SEMANTIC THEORY 
 
 
In this subsection I apply the conceptual machinery I developed above to Kripke’s semantic 
theory for truth.  In 1975, Kripke published what is probably the most influential essay on truth 
since Tarski’s truth definition of 1933.  Kripke describes a procedure by which a truth predicate 
(‘true-in-L’) is introduced into a first-order language L.42  One important feature of Kripke’s 
approach is that the truth predicate is a partial predicate.  That is, the truth predicate’s extension 
and anti-extension are not jointly exhaustive.  Kripke describes a procedure by which all the 
sentences of L that do not contain ‘true-in-L’ are placed in either the extension or the anti-
extension of ‘true-in-L’, while some (but not all) of the sentences that contain ‘true-in-L’ are 
assigned to either the extension or anti-extension of ‘true-in-L’.  One way of thinking about 
Kripke’s theory is that it assigns truth-values to some of the sentences of L under certain 
conditions.  Those that are assigned truth are placed in the extension of ‘true-in-L’ and those that 
are assigned falsity are placed in the anti-extension of ‘true-in-L’.43  Sentences without truth-
values are often called truth-value gaps, or just gaps.  Kripke is quite explicit about his preferred 
interpretation of gaps: sentences assigned gaps do not express propositions, but they need not be 
meaningless.  According to Kripke, a sentence is meaningful if it has a truth-value in some 
circumstances.44  Thus, as long as there are some circumstances in which a sentence expresses a 
                                                 
42 Kripke (1975).  See Yablo (1982, 1985, 2003), Feferman (1982), Burgess (1986), Fitting (1986), McGee (1989, 
1991, 2000), Gupta and Belnap (1993), Halbach (1997), Soames (1999), Visser (2001), Blamey (2002), Field (2002, 
2003a, 2003b, forthcoming b), and Maudlin (2004) for discussion of Kripke’s theory. 
43 As we will see, it is important to distinguish between the concept of truth that is expressed by L’s predicate ‘true-
in-L’ and the concept of truth employed by the semantic theory.  I use the term ‘truth-value’ to refer to the 
assignments of the semantic theory.  In this informal presentation, I sacrifice rigor for accessibility. 
44 Kripke (1975: 699).  See Blamey (2002), Maudlin (2004), and Appendix B for discussion of this aspect of 
Kripke’s theory.  
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 proposition (i.e., has a truth-value), it is meaningful.  He also stresses that the employed language 
need not have gaps.45   
Kripke shows that his procedure for placing sentences that contain ‘true-in-L’ in either 
the extension or the anti-extension of ‘true-in-L’ eventually reaches a point where no more 
sentences are placed in either one.  A language with a truth predicate that has this feature is 
called a fixed point.  This procedure allows Kripke to define several important semantic notions 
(e.g., groundedness, paradoxicality, etc.) and a whole system of different fixed points and 
valuation schemes.46
In order to illustrate how the concepts defined above apply to Kripke’s semantic theory 
for truth, consider an example.  Let us assume that Rex is a person who decides to construct a 
version of Kripke’s semantic theory for truth that is intended to apply to English (I use ‘KT’ as a 
name for the theory Rex constructs).  The truth-sentences of English are all those English 
declarative sentences that contain ‘true’ or its synonyms.47  Rex needs to decide on the scope of 
KT for English.  There are five issues that should affect his decision: (i) KT is expressively 
restricted, (ii) KT applies only to interpreted languages, (iii) KT is a semantic theory for a 
language-specific concept of truth, (iv) KT might give rise to revenge paradoxes, and (v) KT 
might face self-refutation problems.  I address each of these issues in order. 
                                                 
45 Kripke (1975: 700-701 n. 18).  My interpretation of Kripke’s semantic theory might seem to be at odds with the 
one given by Field, who denies that the languages Kripke considers have truth-value gaps; see Field (2003b: 270).  
However, Field means something different by ‘true-value gap’ than most of those who work on truth and the liar 
paradox.  The common usage is that a sentence p of a language L is a truth-value gap if p is a member of neither the 
extension nor the anti-extension of ‘true-in-L’.  On Field’s usage, a sentence p of L is a truth-value gap if the 
sentence ‘p is not true-in-L and p is not false-in-L’ is in the extension of ‘true-in-L’.  The languages Kripke 
considers allow truth-value gaps in the common sense of the term, but do not allow truth-value gaps in the Fieldian 
sense of the term.  There is a difference between a language that has truth-value gaps and a language that contains a 
true sentence that says that a particular sentence of that language is neither true in that language nor false in that 
language.  If L is a language Kripke considers, then some sentences of L are neither true-in-L nor false-in-L, but one 
cannot utter a true-in-L sentence of L that expresses this claim.   
46 A valuation scheme is roughly a method for assigning truth-values to the logically compound sentences of L.   
47 To be precise, we can assume that the language in question is English as spoken by me at noon GMT on January 
1st, 2004.  Hereafter I assume that all the sentences I discuss are declarative. 
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 First, Kripke’s semantic theory is expressively restricted.  An expressively restricted 
semantic theory is one that applies only to languages that lack certain expressive resources.  In 
particular, Kripke’s semantic theory cannot apply to languages that contain non-monotonic 
sentential operators.48  For languages that contain non-monotonic sentential operators, Kripke’s 
procedure never reaches a fixed point and, hence, it does not provide any assignments for the 
sentences of such languages.  Thus, Rex must restrict the scope of KT for English so that it does 
not contain any sentences with non-monotonic sentential operators.49   
Second, Kripke’s semantic theory (like most semantic theories) applies only to 
interpreted languages.  An interpreted language is one whose universe of discourse is a set—the 
domain of the language.  In such a language, the predicates have extensions that are subsets of 
the domain, the n-place relation terms are assigned sets of n-tuples of objects from the domain, 
the singular terms pick out objects from the domain, and the quantifiers range over objects in the 
domain.  Although for most purposes we can treat sentences of English as if they belong to an 
interpreted language, English seems to contain expressions and sentences that cannot be treated 
as if they are part of an interpreted language because they are “about” collections of things that 
are “bigger” than any set (e.g., some expressions and sentences of set theory).  Hence, for KT to 
                                                 
48 In a three-valued scheme, a sentential operator is monotonic if and only if for a sentence containing that sentential 
operator, changing a component of that sentence from a gap to a truth-value (i.e., from a gap to true or from a gap to 
false) never results in changing the sentence from one truth-value to the other or from a truth-value to a truth-value 
gap (i.e., from true to false, from false to true, from true to a gap, or from false to a gap).  Intuitively, one can “fill 
in” the gaps in the components without changing the truth-value of the compound.  For example, choice negation (~) 
is monotonic, while exclusion negation (¬) is non-monotonic: if 〈p〉 is true, then 〈~ p〉  is false and 〈¬ p〉 is false; if 
〈p〉 is false, then 〈~ p〉 is true and 〈¬ p〉 is true; if 〈p〉 is a gap, then 〈~ p〉 is a gap and 〈¬ p〉 is true. 
49 Some philosophers claim that there are no non-monotonic sentential operators; see Parsons (1984), Priest (1990), 
Tappenden (1999), and Maudlin (2004).  I do not want to pause to consider these views in detail, but I reject them 
for two reasons.  First, I can define a non-monotonic sentential operator and use it (I did so in footnote 48, and 
logicians who study many-valued logics have been doing so for decades).  I find it radically implausible that 
everyone who has ever employed a non-monotonic sentential operator was using a meaningless expression.  Second, 
those who deny the existence of non-monotonic sentential operators do so in an attempt to avoid revenge paradoxes 
for their accounts of truth.  I have yet to see an independent argument for the claim that there are no such things. 
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 apply to English, Rex will have to restrict its scope to sentences that can be treated as if they are 
members of an interpreted language.  
Third, Kripke’s semantic theory is not actually a semantic theory for truth, it is a 
semantic theory for truth-in-L for some particular language L.  The term ‘true-in-L’ acts just like 
‘true’ when applied to sentences of L, but yields either false or truth-valueless sentences when 
applied to sentences of other languages (depending on how it is defined).  Because Rex wants 
KT to apply to sentences of English that express truth, he can either treat the predicate ‘true’ of 
English as ‘true-in-English’ and assume that sentences of English that attribute truth to sentences 
of other languages are false or gappy, or he can restrict the scope of KT so that these sentences 
are outside T’s scope.  The former choice renders KT false, and the latter renders it descriptively 
incomplete for English.50
Fourth, Kripke’s semantic theory itself employs certain concepts that give rise to 
paradoxes.  In the introduction, I discussed the phenomenon of revenge paradoxes.  A revenge 
paradox for KT concerns the following sentence: 
(2): (2) is either false or a truth-value gap. 
Of course, one could reject one of the steps of the argument used to generate the paradox, but 
Kripke deals with revenge paradoxes like the one associated with (2) by restricting his theory so 
that it does not apply to languages that have the resources to construct revenge paradoxes.51  Rex 
must either reject one of the steps of the argument or restrict the scope of KT so that it does not 
include any sentences that contain ‘gap’ or the other predicates of KT that give rise to revenge 
                                                 
50 There are other ways of dealing with this issue.  For example, Rex can treat ‘true’ as if it is synonymous with 
‘translatable into a sentence of English that is true-in-English’, he can treat it as if it is ambiguous, or he can treat it 
as if it is context dependent.  I object to the first and second options in Appendix A and to the third option in 
Appendix B. 
51 Kripke (1975: 714).  One can also construct revenge paradoxes for Kripke’s semantic theory with the terms 
‘paradoxical’ and ‘grounded’.   
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 paradoxes.  One consequence of this restriction is that some sentences of English (those that 
contain both ‘true’ and ‘gap’) will fall outside KT’s scope, despite the fact that they are truth-
sentences of English. 
It is interesting that the concept of truth Kripke’s semantic theory employs gives rise to 
revenge paradoxes as well; thus, Rex will have to restrict the scope of his theory even more.  
Kripke’s semantic theory is a semantic theory for weak truth predicates.  A weak truth predicate 
is one for which attributions of truth have the same truth-status52 as the target of the attribution.  
For example, a weak truth predicate obeys the following rules: if 〈p〉 is true, then 〈〈p〉 is true〉 is 
true, if 〈p〉 is false, then 〈〈p〉 is true〉 is false, and if 〈p〉 is a gap, then 〈〈p〉 is true〉 is a gap as well.  
A strong truth predicate is one that behaves like a weak truth predicate except that in the case 
where 〈p〉 is gap, 〈〈p〉 is true〉 is false.  If a set of truth attributions (where a truth attribution is a 
sentence of the form 〈〈p〉 is true〉 or 〈~ 〈p〉 is true〉) contains sentences that are gaps, then the truth 
predicate that appears in these truth attributions is a weak truth predicate.  Truth attributions that 
contain a strong truth predicate are not assigned gaps.   
The following is an argument for the claim that the truth predicate Kripke’s semantic 
theory employs gives rise to a revenge paradox.  First, KT can be formulated in a bivalent 
language (i.e., one that does not have gaps).  Second, some of the languages to which KT applies 
do have gaps.  Third, some of the consequences of KT are truth attributions (e.g., 〈〈p〉 is true〉 
where 〈p〉 is a member of the scope of KT).  Fourth, if both 〈〈p〉 is true〉 and 〈〈q〉 is a gap〉 are 
sentences that belong to the language in which KT is formulated, then 〈〈q〉 is true〉 and 〈〈p〉 is a 
gap〉 belong to this language as well.  A consequence of these four claims is that KT does not 
                                                 
52 I use ‘truth-status’ in a loose way to include truth-values and any of the ways a sentence can lack a truth-value.  
For example, some sentences have the truth-status of being true, some the truth-status of being false, and some have 
the truth-status of being a gap.    
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 employ a weak truth predicate.  Assume otherwise; if 〈p〉 is a sentence in the scope of KT and 〈p〉 
is a gap, then the sentence 〈〈p〉 is true〉 (which belongs to the employed language for KT) is a gap 
because 〈p〉 is a gap and the truth predicate of the target language is weak.  However, we know 
that no sentence of the employed language for KT is a gap because the employed language is 
bivalent.  Hence, KT does not employ a weak truth predicate.  Therefore, KT employs a truth 
predicate that is different from the one that belongs to its target languages.  Indeed, KT employs 
a strong truth predicate, but it applies to languages that contain only weak truth predicates.53   
To get the revenge paradox, consider the following sentence: 
(4): (4) is not strong true.54
An analog of the reasoning used to derive a contradiction from sentence (2) shows that sentence 
(4) is paradoxical as well.  Kripke’s method of avoiding the paradox by assigning a gap to the 
paradoxical sentence does not work for (4).  Rex must either reject a step of the reasoning that 
shows (4) is a revenge paradox or restrict the scope of KT so that it does not apply to sentences 
that express strong truth, which includes some of KT’s consequences.  If he chooses the latter, 
KT cannot be used as a semantic theory for some of its consequences.   
Fifth, Rex needs to restrict KT so that it is not self-refuting.  In the introduction, I 
discussed the self-refutation problem.  For KT, this problem concerns the following sentence: 
                                                 
53 I am assuming that the only options are a weak truth predicate or a strong truth predicate.  In reality there are other 
options.  My point is that KT employs a truth predicate that is stronger than a weak truth predicate.  In fairness to 
Kripke, he never explicitly says that his semantic theory employs the same kind of truth predicate as the one that 
belongs to the languages to which it applies.  Kripke does explain how his semantic theory can be altered to apply to 
a language with a strong truth predicate (through a procedure he calls “closing off”).  However, it should be obvious 
that the truth predicate that belongs to the closed off language is different from the one that is employed by the 
semantic theory for that language; see Kripke (1975: 715).  See Kremer (2000) and Field (2003a, 2003b) for related 
points. 
54 Note that sentence (4) does not employ exclusion negation, which is not allowed in the scope of Kripke’s theory 
because it is non-monotonic.  Sentence (4) uses choice negation, which is monotonic.  Of course, those familiar with 
Kripke’s theory already know that a sentence like (4) would cause a problem for Kripke’s theory; my observation is 
that Kripke’s theory employs the strong truth predicate that occurs in (4) instead of the benign weak truth predicate 
the theory purports to describe. 
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 (3): (3) is not true. 
Reasoning analogous to that for sentences (1), (2), and (4) shows that (3) is paradoxical.  Thus, it 
seems that Kripke’s semantic theory should classify (3) as a gap.  Sentences that are gaps are not 
true.  Thus, according to Kripke’s semantic theory, (3) is not true (because it is a gap).  However, 
the proposition that (3) is not true is what is expressed by (3).  Therefore, (3) itself is a 
consequence of Kripke’s semantic theory, and Kripke’s semantic theory implies that (3) is not 
true.  Consequently, Kripke’s semantic theory is self-refuting; hence, it is false.  My view is that 
the self-refutation problem, like the problem posed by revenge paradoxes, should be used with 
caution as a criticism of semantic theories for truth.55  I discuss both at length in Chapter Three.  
If the self-refutation problem is a legitimate concern, then Rex should restrict KT so that it does 
not have any consequences that it labels untrue.   
Is KT internalizable for English?  It will be instructive to answer this question in stages.  
For now I assume that KT is restricted so that: (i) it does not apply to sentences containing non-
monotonic sentential operators, (ii) it applies only to sentences that can be treated as members of 
an interpreted language, and (iii) it does not apply to sentences of a language that attribute truth 
to sentences of other languages (or to non-sentences).  I discuss restrictions for revenge problems 
and self-refutation problems below.  Whether KT is internalizable for English depends on what 
one takes the theory to be.  English is certainly capable of expressing KT, but because KT is 
expressively restricted (i.e., it applies only to languages that lack certain expressive resources—
for KT, the languages to which it applies do not have non-monotonic sentential operators), it is 
not descriptively complete for English or any extension of English.  The reason is that some 
sentences of English contain both a truth predicate and a non-monotonic sentential operator; 
                                                 
55 For example, the self-refutation problem for KT does not pose any additional threat.  If (3) contains a strong truth 
predicate, then the restriction that saves KT from the revenge paradox insures that it does not apply to (3).  If KT 
contains a weak truth predicate then (3) is not a consequence of Kripke’s theory. 
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 these sentences are outside the scope of KT.  Because KT is not descriptively complete for any 
extension of English, KT is not internalizable for English.   
Given that KT is expressively restricted, it is more instructive to consider whether KT is 
internalizable for a language that has fewer expressive resources.  That will allow me to separate 
the issue of expressive restriction from the issue of internalizability.  Expressively restricted 
semantic theories (i.e., those that apply only to languages that lack certain expressive resources) 
cause one set of problems and essentially external semantic theories (i.e., those that are not 
internalizable) cause another set of problems.  To separate these problems, consider English*, 
which is the sublanguage of English that contains no non-monotonic sentential operators.  Is KT 
internalizable for English*?  Although it is unclear whether KT requires non-monotonic 
sentential operators for its formulation,56 I am willing to assume that it does not; it follows from 
this assumption and the claim that KT is expressible in English that KT is expressible in 
English*.  KT is capable of providing assignments for all the truth-sentences of English* 
(provided we have semantic theories for all the other linguistic items that occur in them).  
Furthermore, KT is expressible in English* and descriptively complete for English*; hence, KT 
is internal for English*.  Consequently, KT is internalizable for English*.  However, KT implies 
that some of the sentences within its scope (e.g., the revenge liar—sentence (2)—discussed 
above) are both true and not true.  Hence, insofar as KT is expressible in English* and 
descriptively complete for English*, KT is inconsistent.   
Let us assume that Rex decides to restrict KT so that none of the revenge liar sentences of 
English* occur in its scope.  Let KT′ be the restricted version of KT.  Although KT′ is 
expressible in English*, it is not descriptively complete for English* (because it does not provide 
                                                 
56 Whether it does depends on which sentences count as those that compose the theory, and, as I have said, there is 
room for reasonable people to disagree on this issue. 
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 assignments for all the truth-sentences of English); hence, it is not internal for English*.  
Because it is restricted so that it does not provide assignments for truth-sentences that contain 
‘gap’, and KT′ requires a gap predicate for its formulation, there is no extension of English* for 
which KT′ is descriptively complete and in which KT′ is expressible.  Thus, KT′ is not 
internalizable for English*. 
It might seem odd to say that one version of Kripke’s theory (which is inconsistent) is 
internalizable for English* because it is common to treat a theory as if it is automatically 
restricted to avoid inconsistency.  As I stated, I prefer to treat versions of a theory with different 
restrictions as different theories to avoid equivocations.  One can consider the version of 
Kripke’s semantic theory for truth that Rex constructs for English (KT) as the unrestricted 
version of Kripke’s semantic theory for truth conjoined with the claim that it is restricted in 
certain ways; one can consider the version of Kripke’s semantic theory for truth that Rex 
constructs for English* (KT′) as KT conjoined with even more restrictions.      
 
 
 
 
1.4  COMPARISONS 
 
 
In section one, I considered several arguments for the intuition voiced by McGee and Reinhardt, 
which I hereafter call the internalizability intuition.  I argued that none of these arguments is 
successful.  It is my view that the attempts to characterize the intuition on which these arguments 
are based are lacking.  In section two, I proposed an alternative conceptual structure designed to 
capture this intuition.  In this section, I compare my account of internalizability to some of the 
 42
 other attempts to capture the internalizability intuition.  In particular, I discuss universality, 
semantic closure, and semantic self-sufficiency. 
 
 
1.4.1  UNIVERSALITY  
 
 
A universal language is one that can express anything that can be expressed at all.  Tarski is 
notable for claiming that natural languages are universal.57  The claim that natural languages are 
universal could mean several different things.  First, it could mean that there is a set (or at least a 
collection) of things that can be expressed in any language whatsoever and all of these things can 
be expressed in the language in question.  Second, it could mean that although a natural language 
might not be able to express everything, it can be extended so that the extended language can 
express everything.  Third, it could mean that for any thing there is to express, a natural language 
can be extended so that the extended language can express that thing.58    
What is the relation between internalizability and universality?  It is possible for a 
semantic theory T for X to be internalizable for a language L even though L is not universal in 
any of these senses.  In other words, it is possible that although T is expressible in an extension 
of L and descriptively complete for that extension of L, there are some things that cannot be 
expressed in any extension of L. On the other hand, even if L is a universal language, a semantic 
theory for X need not be internalizable for L because internalizability requires not just 
expressibility but descriptive completeness as well.     
 
 
 
                                                 
57 Tarski (1933: 164).  See also Herzberger (1970b), Kripke (1975), Martin (1976), Simmons (1993), and Gupta 
(1997). 
58 Keith Simmons discusses the concept of semantic universality, where a language is semantically universal if and 
only if it can express any semantic concept.  See Simmons (1993). 
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 1.4.2  SEMANTIC CLOSURE  
 
 
‘Semantic closure’ is another term used to classify the expressive capacity of a language.  Tarski 
originally coined the term; according to him, a language is semantically closed if and only if it 
contains names for its expressions, it contains its own truth predicate, and one can assert all the 
sentences that determine the proper usage of the truth predicate in the language.59  This term is 
widely misinterpreted.  Tarski presented a truth definition for certain artificial languages and he 
claimed that no such thing was possible for natural languages, in part because natural languages 
are semantically closed.60  Some have taken this claim to imply that a language is semantically 
closed if and only if it contains its own truth predicate (or its own semantic predicates in 
general).61  On the contrary, a language can contain its own truth predicate and fail to be 
semantically closed if its capacity for representing its syntax is restricted.62  Others have 
assumed that semantically closed languages are those whose semantic theories can be expressed 
in them.63  However, a language can be semantically closed without being able to express its 
semantic theory (e.g., if the semantic theory for some concepts of the language other than truth 
cannot be expressed in the language itself).64   
It is difficult to determine the relation between internalizability and semantic closure 
because the phrase ‘all the sentences that determine the proper use of the truth predicate in the 
                                                 
59 Tarski (1944: 348). 
60 Tarski (1944). 
61 See McCarthy (1985). 
62 See Gupta (1982). 
63 Leitgeb (2001). 
64 Sweet proposes a semantic theory with the property of local semantic closure.  He presents a way of specifying a 
hierarchy of neighborhoods for each sentence of a language.  A language is locally semantically closed if and only if 
every sentence of it is contained in a neighborhood that is part of a hierarchy of neighborhoods such that every 
neighborhood is contained in one that contains a truth concept for it.  I hope it is clear by now that this is a strange 
use of ‘semantic closure’.  The language in question can represent its syntax, can express all the sentences that 
govern the use of ‘true’, and contains its own truth predicate(s).  However, it does not contain a truth predicate that 
applies to all the true sentences of the language.  See Sweet (1999). 
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 language’ is imprecise.  If we assume that the sentences of a correct semantic theory for truth 
that is descriptively complete for L determine the proper use of the truth predicate in L, then a 
semantically closed language is one for which there exists a semantic theory for truth that is 
internal for that language.65  However, the converse does not hold because a semantic theory for 
truth could be internal for a language that is not semantically closed (e.g., if the language did not 
have names for all its expressions).  Moreover, one could certainly specify a semantic theory for 
truth that is internalizable for a language that is not semantically closed.  To sum up, if the 
sentences of a semantic theory for truth are all those that determine the proper use of the truth 
predicate in a language, then there exist semantic theories for truth that are internalizable for 
semantically closed languages.  Furthermore, requiring that a semantic theory for truth be 
internalizable for its target languages does not require those target languages to be semantically 
closed.66   
 
 
1.4.3  SEMANTIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY 
 
 
Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap coined the term ‘semantic self-sufficiency’ to capture the intuition 
that natural languages can express their own semantic theories.67  A language is semantically 
self-sufficient if and only if a correct total semantic theory for that language is expressible in it.68   
                                                 
65 See Yablo (2003) for a different interpretation of semantic closure according to which the T-sentences for each 
sentence of the language are the sentences that determine the proper use of the truth predicate in that language. 
66 Herzberger distinguishes between three different types of expressive capacity.  Although he calls them “degrees of 
semantic closure,” it should be obvious that none of these is properly called “semantic closure.”  A language is 
atomically closed if and only if it contains the means for recording the truth-value of each of its own sentences.  A 
language is molecularly closed if and only if it contains the means for expressing all singular consequences of its 
semantic theory.  A language is generally closed if and only if it contains the means for expressing the whole of its 
semantic theory.  See Herzberger (1970b). 
67 Gupta and Belnap (1993: 257).  See also Gupta (1997).  Note that Gupta does not support the internalizability 
requirement and argues against the claim that natural languages are semantically self-sufficient.  Gupta and Belnap’s 
notion of semantic self-sufficiency and Herberger’s notion of general closure seem to be the same.  Fitch uses 
‘universal’ to mean what Gupta and Belnap mean by ‘semantically self-sufficient’; see Fitch (1968) and Martin 
(1976).  
 45
 There are some interesting relations between internalizability and semantic self-
sufficiency.  First, a semantic theory for X can be internalizable for L even though L is not 
semantically self-sufficient and L has no semantically self-sufficient extensions.  Assume that T 
is a correct semantic theory for truth, that T is internalizable for a language L, and that L 
expresses a concept, Y, for which there exists no semantic theory that is internalizable for L.  L 
is not semantically self-sufficient.  Let L′ be an extension of L such that T is expressible in L′ 
and T is descriptively complete for L′.  Of course, as long as L contains a totally defined, two-
place sentential connective, some truth-sentences of L will express Y.  It might seem as if T will 
not be able to provide assignments for the truth-sentences of L that express Y unless the semantic 
theory for Y is expressible in L′.  However, some reflection shows that this impression is false.  
Let U be a correct semantic theory for Y.  Assume that we extend L′ to a new language L′′ in 
which U is expressible.  Since U is essentially external for L, U will not be descriptively 
complete for L′′.  However, a speaker of L′′ can use both T and U to provide assignments for the 
truth-sentences of L′ that express Y.  Thus, T is both expressible in L′ and descriptively complete 
for L′ despite the fact that neither L′ nor any extension of L′ is semantically self-sufficient.  
Hence, T is internalizable for L, and no extension of L is semantically self-sufficient. 
If Y is inexplicable in the sense that no semantic theory for Y is descriptively complete 
for any Y-language, then T is essentially external for L (as is every semantic theory for a concept 
expressible in L).  In that sense, demanding that semantic theories that apply to natural languages 
should be internalizable for those natural languages does place demands on the intelligibility of 
                                                                                                                                                             
68 A total semantic theory is one that applies to every sentence of a language, while a partial semantic theory is one 
that is not total.  For example, a semantic theory for truth is a partial semantic theory because it does not apply to 
those sentences that do not express the concept of truth.  I assume that a total semantic theory for a language is 
descriptively complete for that language. 
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 the other elements of natural languages.  However, it does not imply that natural languages have 
extensions that are semantically self-sufficient.   
 
 
 
 
1.5  CONCLUSION 
 
 
The main point of this chapter is to define internalizability for semantic theories.  According to 
my definition, a semantic theory T that purports to specify the meanings of sentences that 
express a concept X is internalizable for a language L if and only if there exists an extension of 
L such that all the sentences that compose T can be translated into sentences that belong to the 
extension of L and T specifies the meaning of all the sentences of the extension of L that express 
X.  I discussed the various parts of this definition and provided an example of a semantic theory 
(Kripke’s) that is not internalizable for a particular sublanguage of English (so long as the theory 
is consistent).  Finally, I contrasted internalizability with universality, semantic closure, and 
semantic self-sufficiency.  I argued that it is possible that a semantic theory for X is 
internalizable for a language even though none of the extensions of that language is universal, 
semantically closed, or semantically self-sufficient. 
I want to close by saying that one of my goals has been to shift the emphasis away from 
the expressive properties of languages and toward the relations between semantic theories and 
languages.  One of the lessons readers should take away from this dissertation is that the debate 
should be conducted in terms of the relations between theories and languages, not in terms of the 
properties of languages.   
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 In the next chapter, I provide my reasons for claiming that semantic theories that apply to 
natural languages should be internalizable for those languages.  In Chapter Three, I explain why 
it is so difficult to construct a semantic theory for truth that is internalizable for a natural 
language.  It turns out that the problem is the concept of truth, not the expressive powers of 
natural languages.   
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2.0  INTERNALIZABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
 
 
 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In Chapter One, I introduced the resources required to distinguish, for a given language L, 
semantic theories that are internalizable for L from those that are essentially external for L.  If 
there is an extension of L such that the semantic theory in question is expressible in that 
extension and descriptively complete for that extension, then that semantic theory is 
internalizable for L; otherwise it is essentially external for L.   
Recall that McGee and Reinhardt express the intuition that if a semantic theory does not 
apply to the language in which it is formulated, then that semantic theory is unsuitable for 
application to natural languages.  In my terminology, this is an internalizability requirement: if a 
semantic theory T for X applies to a natural language then there exists a language L such that T 
is internalizable for L.  It turns out that that my terminology allows one to distinguish between 
several internalizability requirements of different strengths, and this one is rather weak.  In the 
first section of this chapter, I present and discuss five internalizability requirements, and I define 
some of the terms used to formulate them. 
The rest of this chapter is devoted to defending two internalizability requirements.  I 
provide two arguments—one for each of them.  The first argument shows that if T is a semantic 
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 theory for X and there exists an X-language L such that T is essentially external for L, then there 
exists an X-language to which T does not successfully apply.  The conclusion is that a semantic 
theory T for X should be internalizable for every X-language.  The second argument is specific 
to semantic theories for truth and to natural languages.  I argue that if a correct semantic theory 
for truth is essentially external for a natural language L, then T is not descriptively complete for 
L.  The conclusion is that a semantic theory T for truth that applies to a natural language L 
should be internalizable for L.  The first argument is in section three; the second is in section 
four.  Each argument is accompanied by my replies to several objections. 
 
 
 
 
2.2  INTERNALIZABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
 
 
In this section, I discuss what it is for a semantic theory to successfully apply to a language, and I 
present several internalizability requirements as way of explicating the internalizability intuition.   
What is it for a semantic theory to apply successfully to a language?  The answer is sure to be 
something like: the semantic theory accurately describes the parts of the language that it is 
supposed to describe.  In Chapter One, I introduced the notion of descriptive completeness to 
capture what it means for a semantic theory to describe what it is supposed to describe.  Now I 
define descriptive correctness to capture the ‘accurately’ in ‘accurately describes’.   
A semantic theory T for X is descriptively correct for a language L if and only if T is 
consistent and T provides correct assignments for every member of L in its scope. 
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 The consistency clause forbids theories that have correct assignments but contradictory 
consequences.  I assume that a consistent theory has no contradictions as consequences 
(according to first-order classical logic).1   
Next I define versions of ‘descriptive completeness’, ‘descriptive correctness’, and 
‘internalizability’ that express properties of semantic theories instead of relations between 
semantic theories and languages.   
A semantic theory T for X is descriptively complete if and only if for every X-language 
L, T is descriptively complete for L.   
 
A semantic theory T for X is descriptively correct if and only if for every X-language L, 
T is descriptively correct for L.   
 
A semantic theory T for X is internalizable if and only if for every X-language L, T is 
internalizable for L.2
 
It is possible that a semantic theory for X is internalizable for some X-language and essentially 
external for a different X-language (for example, if T is a semantic theory for X that is 
expressively restricted so that no sentences that express the concept Y are within its scope and 
none of the sentences of T express Y, then T might be internalizable for some X-language that 
does not express Y, but it will not be internalizable for those X-languages that express Y and 
have a completely defined two-place sentential operator because such languages will have X-
                                                 
1 It is my view that self-refutation should be explained in terms of logical inconsistency.  Thus, the consistency 
clause is intended to rule out both semantic theories that face revenge problems and those that face self-refutation 
problems.   
2 All the terms defined here are strong.  Each one has a weak version as well and their antonyms have weak and 
strong versions.  For example, a semantic theory for X is weakly descriptively correct if and only it is descriptively 
correct for some X-language.  A semantic theory for X is strongly descriptively incomplete if and only if it is 
descriptively incomplete for every X-language.  When I use one of the terms defined in the text without ‘strong’ or 
‘weak’ I intend the strong version; when I use one of their antonyms, I intend the weak version (e.g., an 
internalizable semantic theory for X is one that is internalizable for every X-language, and an essentially external 
semantic theory for X is one that is essentially external for some X-language).  That is not as counterintuitive as it 
sounds.  A semantic theory for X is internalizable if and only if it is not essentially external.  That is, a semantic 
theory for X is strongly internalizable if and only if it is not weakly essentially external.  That is, a semantic theory 
for X is internalizable for every X-language if and only if it is not the case that it is essentially external for some X-
language. 
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 sentences that express Y).3  That means that there are two notions of internalizability—a weak 
one and a strong one.  If a semantic theory for X is internalizable for some X-language, then it is 
weakly internalizable; if a semantic theory for X is internalizable for every X-language, then it is 
strongly internalizable.   
The following are two internalizability requirements: 
(STRONG)  A semantic theory for X should be internalizable for every X-language (i.e., 
should be strongly internalizable). 
 
(WEAK)  A semantic theory for X should be internalizable for some X-language (i.e., 
should be weakly internalizable). 
 
Any semantic theory that satisfies (STRONG) satisfies (WEAK) as well.  However, these 
requirements make no mention of natural languages.  The following are three internalizability 
requirements that are specific to natural languages: 
(STRONGN)  A semantic theory for X that applies to a natural language should be 
internalizable for every X-language. 
 
(MODERATEN)  A semantic theory for X that applies to a natural language should be 
internalizable for that language. 
 
(WEAKN)  A semantic theory for X that applies to a natural language should be 
internalizable for some X-language. 
 
A semantic theory that satisfies (STRONGN) satisfies (MODERATEN) and one that satisfies 
(MODERATEN) satisfies (WEAKN), but the converses of these claims are false.   
The internalizability intuition voiced by McGee and Reinhardt I have set out to capture is 
that a semantic theory that does not apply to the languages in which it is formulated should not 
apply to a natural language.  In my terminology, they suggest (WEAKN).  Instead of arguing for 
(WEAKN) directly, I argue for (STRONG) in section four, and I argue for (MODERATEN) as a 
                                                 
3 McGee’s semantic theory for truth is an example of a semantic theory that is both expressively restricted and 
internalizable for some language.  See McGee (1991) and see McGee (1989) for an abstract.  See also Maudlin 
(2004) and Field (2003a, 2003b) for examples.  See Appendix D for discussion. 
 52
 requirement on semantic theories for truth in section five.  Both (STRONG) and 
(MODERATEN) imply (WEAKN).  Moreover, there are good reasons for thinking that semantic 
theories that satisfy (WEAKN) but not (MODERATEN) are not descriptively correct and 
descriptively complete for natural languages. 
I use the term ‘natural language’ throughout the rest of this chapter.  At this point, I 
prefer to leave it at an intuitive level (i.e., natural languages are things like English, Russian, and 
Arabic).  I discuss what I take to be the features of natural languages in section four when it is 
relevant to my argument.  I would like to list two of my assumptions about languages (all 
languages, not just natural languages).  First, there are no concepts that are language-specific.  If 
there exist two languages, L1 and L2, such that L1 can express a concept that L2 cannot, then L2 
can be extended to a new language L3 that can express the concept in question.  Second, humans 
can learn to translate between languages, even if translation requires augmenting one or both of 
the languages involved.  That is, for any two languages L1 and L2, L1 can be extended to a 
language L3 and L2 can be extended to a language L4 such that L3 and L4 are intertranslatable 
(i.e., for any sentence of L3, there is a translation of it in L4 and vice versa).  To express this 
claim, I say that any two languages are quasi-intertranslatable.   
 
 
 
 
2.3  STRONG INTERNALIZABILITY 
 
 
In this section, I argue that a semantic theory T for X that is essentially external for an X-
language L is not descriptively complete for every X-language.  In other words, if a semantic 
theory for X is descriptively complete, then it is internalizable. 
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2.3.1  THE ARGUMENT 
 
 
Assume that T is a semantic theory for X and that T is essentially external for an X-language L.  
I claim that T is not descriptively complete.  Because T is essentially external for L, it is not the 
case that both T is expressible in L and T is descriptively complete for L.  Hence, either T is not 
expressible in L or T is not descriptively complete for L.  If T is not descriptively complete for L, 
then T is not descriptively complete (which is my conclusion); so if T is not descriptively 
complete for L, then I am done.  Assume that T is descriptively complete for L.  Hence, T is not 
expressible in L.  Given that T is a theory, there is some language L′ in which T is expressible 
(e.g., L′ is the employed language for T).  L and L′ are quasi-intertranslatable because all 
languages are quasi-intertranslatable.  Hence, L can be extended to a language L′′ and L′ can be 
extended to a language L′′′ such that L′′ and L′′′ are intertranslatable.  If T is expressible in L′, T 
is expressible in L′′′; if T is expressible in L′′′, then T is expressible in L′′.  Hence, T is 
expressible in L′′.  If T is expressible in L′′, then T is not descriptively complete for L′′ (because 
T is essentially external for L).  Hence, T is not descriptively complete for L′′.  Therefore, T is 
not descriptively complete.   
Here is an intuitive summary of the argument.  T is essentially external for L, but T has to 
be formulated in some language or other; if we consider the result of adding to L whatever 
expressive resources it takes to express T, then T will be descriptively incomplete for that 
extended language.  For example, assume that T is a semantic theory for truth that treats 
paradoxical sentences like the liar as truth-value gaps.  Assume that if a revenge liar for gaps 
(e.g., ‘this sentence is either false or a gap’) is in the scope of T, then T is inconsistent (e.g., it 
implies are that the revenge liar is both true and not true).  In order to keep T consistent, one 
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 restricts T so that it does not apply to sentences that contain ‘gap’.  Although T might be 
descriptively complete for a language that does not contain a gap predicate, T will not be 
descriptively complete for languages that have both a truth predicate and a gap predicate because 
such a language will contain a sentence in which both a truth predicate and a gap predicate 
occur; such a sentence will not be in the scope of T.  Hence, T does not provide assignments for 
all the truth-sentences of this language.  Therefore, T is not descriptively complete for this 
language.  Consequently, T is not descriptively complete. 
Note that since expressively restricted semantic theories (ones that cannot apply to 
languages with certain expressive resources) are not internalizable, expressively restricted 
semantic theories are not descriptively complete either.  To see that an expressively restricted 
semantic theory is not internalizable consider a semantic theory T for X such that sentences that 
express the concept Y are not within its scope.  Notice that so long as none of the sentences of T 
express Y, T might be internalizable for some X-language.  However, consider the extension L′ 
of an X-language L that results from adding a Y-expression to L.  L′ is an X-language as well 
and so long as L′ contains a completely defined, two-place sentential operator (e.g., ‘and’), L′ 
will contain X-sentences that express Y and, hence, are outside the scope of T.  Thus, T is not 
descriptively complete for L′.  Because every extension of L′ will contain some X-sentences that 
express Y, T is not descriptively complete for any extension of L′.  Therefore, T is not 
internalizable for L′.  The moral is that the argument of this subsection casts doubt on 
expressively restricted semantic theories as well. 
Why should one care about descriptive completeness?  The most obvious requirement for 
a semantic theory for X is that it should explain the concept X.  Philosophical explanation is a 
notoriously slippery concept but it is fairly straightforward in the case of semantic theories: a 
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 semantic theory T for X explains the concept X if and only if T assigns the right meaning to 
every sentence that expresses X.  In my terminology, that means that a semantic theory for X 
should be both descriptively complete and descriptively correct.  I have shown that only 
internalizable semantic theories can satisfy this demand; indeed, I have shown that only 
internalizable semantic theories can satisfy the descriptive completeness condition, regardless of 
whether they are descriptively correct.  A semantic theory for X that is essentially external for 
some X-language will not be able to specify the meanings of all the sentences that express X.  
Hence, a semantic theory for X that is essentially external for an X-language does not explain X.  
In the next subsection, I reply to several objections.   
 
 
2.3.2  OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 
 
 
Objection 1: We have no idea whether a semantic theory that is both descriptively 
complete and descriptively correct is even possible.  Consider the case of truth.  We are talking 
about a theory that works for every language that has a truth predicate.  There is no good reason 
to require semantic theories to live up to these expectations.  It hardly makes sense to criticize a 
semantic theory for failing to be applicable to a handful of sentences in a handful of languages.   
Reply 1: This sort of “burden of proof” objection is common in the literature on truth; I 
address it here in some detail and refer back to it when it comes up later.4  The obvious and 
intuitive view is that truth is a concept and there is something all sentences that express this 
concept have in common.  That is the view we take on other areas of inquiry.  A semantic theory 
for X that is consistent and provides correct assignments for all the X-sentences in all the X-
languages is the ideal for a semantic theory for X.  Such a semantic theory is descriptively 
                                                 
4 See Gupta (1997) for a similar comment on semantic self-sufficiency and Priest (1998) for a similar argument 
against the law of non-contradiction. 
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 complete and descriptively correct.  Any semantic theory that fails to live up to this ideal is 
inadequate.  Essentially external semantic theories (or EE theories as I sometimes call them) are 
not descriptively complete and descriptively correct.  Thus, EE theories are inadequate. 
A proponent of an EE theory (an EE theorist) can respond to this fact in several different 
ways.  He could claim either that an EE semantic theory is actually a semantic theory for X in 
some contexts or that it is a semantic theory for a restricted version of X.  I have no problem with 
either of these responses, and there is an important place for such theories.  However, both leave 
us without a semantic theory for X and so without an explanation of X.  Instead, an EE theorist 
might argue either that the obvious and intuitive view is wrong—that there really is nothing in 
common that calls for explanation—or that no matter how hard we try, the concept in question 
will remain inexplicable.5  Either of these responses requires substantial argumentation.  
However, an EE theorist who points out that we do not know whether it is possible to achieve the 
ideal of descriptive completeness and descriptive correctness has not adequately responded to the 
problem.  Of course we do not know if it can be done.  If it turns out that we cannot accomplish 
it then there remains something we cannot explain.  If an EE theory is the best we can do, then 
the best we can do is inadequate based on our understanding of what needs to be done.  I admit 
that I cannot prove that a given semantic theory is descriptively complete and descriptively 
correct because I do not have access to all the languages to which it applies.  However, I can 
prove that some theories are not descriptively complete and descriptively correct.  Thus, even 
though we do not know whether it is possible to provide a descriptively complete and 
descriptively correct semantic theory for X, we do know both that EE semantic theories are not 
descriptively complete and descriptively correct, and that semantic theories that are not 
                                                 
5 See Williams (1996) for the claim that the intuitive view of knowledge is wrong—there really is nothing in 
common that calls for explanation.  See McGinn (2000) for the claim that the intuitive view of consciousness is 
wrong—no matter how hard we try, it will remain inexplicable. 
 57
 descriptively complete and descriptively correct are inadequate.  In conclusion, unless we 
already have good reason to believe that a descriptively complete and descriptively correct 
semantic theory for X is impossible, we have good reason to be unhappy with a semantic theory 
for X that is essentially external for some X-language.6
Objection 2: It is unreasonable to require a semantic theory for X to be descriptively 
complete for an X-language because any sentence that expresses X is an X-sentence.  One should 
require a semantic theory for X to provide assignments only for some proper subset of the set of 
X-sentences of a given language.  Perhaps it should be the set of X-attributions (an X-attribution 
is a sentence of the form: α is X) if X is a predicate.7   
Reply 2:  I do not expect a semantic theory for X to provide assignments for all the X-
sentences of an X-language by itself.  A semantic theory for X should work together with 
semantic theories for the other phenomena displayed by the language (concepts, quantifiers, 
names, demonstratives, sentential operators, etc.).  Given this assumption, it is reasonable to 
expect a semantic theory for X to be able to provide assignments for all the X-sentences of an X-
language when it can work together with other semantic theories that apply to that X-language.  
For example, if a semantic theory for necessity were unable to provide assignments for sentences 
that both express necessity and contain pronouns, even when working together with a 
satisfactory semantic theory for pronoun expressions, then that semantic theory for necessity 
would be inadequate.  A semantic theory for X should be able to work together with other 
semantic theories to provide an assignment for any X-sentence whatsoever.   
Objection 3: Let us assume that when we use a semantic theory for X to derive an 
assignment for a sentence that expresses both concept X and concept Y, we use both a semantic 
                                                 
6 A different burden of proof objection is that I have not shown that it is possible to construct internalizable semantic 
theories.  My reply should be obvious. 
7 Anil Gupta suggested this objection in conversation. 
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 theory for X and a semantic theory for Y to do it.  In order to demonstrate that a semantic theory 
for X is descriptively complete for an X-language L, we must have semantic theories for all the 
other linguistic items that occur in L.  Hence, whether a semantic theory for X is descriptively 
complete and descriptively correct depends on the existence of semantic theories for all the other 
linguistic items that appear in X-languages.  Achieving descriptive completeness and descriptive 
correctness is a team effort.  Hence, a semantic theory for X can fail to be descriptively complete 
if it turns out to be impossible to provide a semantic theory for some other concept that appears 
in an X-language.  Why should a semantic theory be held accountable for that? 
Reply 3:  I have shown that internalizability is a necessary condition for descriptive 
completeness.  However, it is not a sufficient condition; an internalizable semantic theory of X 
might turn out to be descriptively incomplete.  Perhaps it will turn out that there are inexplicable 
linguistic items.  If there are, then no semantic theory will be descriptively complete.  I agree that 
we should not fault a semantic theory for X for failing to be descriptively complete because some 
X-language contains an inexplicable linguistic phenomenon that is relatively unrelated to X.  If 
such a phenomenon occurs in an X-language, then a descriptively incomplete semantic theory for 
X will be the best we can hope for.  That is, if we have good reason to believe that some concept 
Y is inexplicable, then we would have good reason to think that a semantic theory for X need not 
be descriptively complete.  However, that is not the case with EE semantic theories.  An EE 
semantic theory for X entails that it is not descriptively complete.  The theory itself is 
responsible for its inadequacy, not some unrelated inexplicable concept.   
Moreover, the fact that descriptive completeness is a team effort cuts both ways.  If one 
accepts an EE semantic theory for X, then one accepts that it is impossible to provide a 
descriptively complete semantic theory for any other linguistic item that occurs in an X-
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 language.8  Assume that T is a semantic theory for X that is essentially external for L.  There 
exists an X-language for which T is not descriptively complete.  Hence, there exists an X-
sentence of this language for which T provides no assignment.  Consider a semantic theory T′ for 
Y, where Y is expressed by this X-language.  There exists a sentence of this X-language that is 
both an X-sentence and a Y-sentence and is outside the scope of T.9  Because T cannot provide 
an assignment for this sentence, T′ cannot either.  Hence, T′ is not descriptively complete for this 
language.  Therefore, T′ is not descriptively complete.  That is a serious problem.  It means that 
if we accept an EE semantic theory for truth, then we give up on descriptive completeness for 
semantic theories for knowledge, for semantic theories for necessity, for semantic theories for 
moral obligation, for every other semantic theory one can imagine.  It means that if we accept 
even one EE semantic theory, we effectively give up trying to explain any of our concepts.  The 
best we would be able to do is to explain restricted versions of them.  I, for one, am not willing to 
damn humanity to eternal ignorance. 
Objection 4:  When we do semantics, we make idealizations.  Even when we focus on 
natural languages, we often study artificial languages and ignore certain aspects of natural 
languages (e.g., indexicals, demonstratives, intensional expressions, pronouns, indefinite 
descriptions, vagueness, ambiguity, empty names, interrogatives, imperatives, etc.).  If we try to 
explain everything all at once, then it becomes difficult to make any progress.  The criticism of 
EE theories seems to be like saying that a semantic theory for X is inadequate because one can 
make up some new term that the theory was not designed to handle.  That hardly seems fair.  If 
we accept the internalizability requirement (STRONG), we would no longer be able to make 
idealizations in semantics.   
                                                 
8 Semantic theories that are internalizable for some languages would still be possible though. 
9 I assume that the language has some completely defined two-place sentential operator (e.g., ‘and’). 
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 Reply 4:  I am not arguing that we should give up idealizations in semantics.  In the 
current state of the discipline, idealizations are important and helpful.  The internalizability 
requirement (STRONG) does not imply that idealizations in semantics are illegitimate.  The 
internalizability requirement does mandate that it is possible to use a version of the theory in 
question in the absence of idealizations.  When presenting a semantic theory, one might want to 
ignore certain linguistic phenomena.  However, the assumption is that the semantic theory should 
be compatible with an account of those phenomena.  That is, the idealization can be dropped at a 
later time.  If one thinks of the restrictions placed on EE semantic theories as idealizations then 
they are idealizations that cannot be dropped.  Consider Kripke’s semantic theory for truth, 
which employs a gap predicate.  A restricted version of this theory is not applicable to sentences 
that contain gap predicates.  One might think of this as an idealization.  However, it constitutes a 
permanent idealization.  It cannot be used in combination with a semantic theory for gaps 
without being inconsistent. 
Furthermore, when one makes an idealization for a semantic theory for X by excluding 
some linguistic phenomenon, one must be in a position to say that the phenomenon in question is 
relatively unrelated to X.  For example, we feel justified when giving a semantics for truth in 
excluding color predicates from the ideal languages we consider because the two are relatively 
independent.  However, according to EE semantic theories for X, the very concepts that get 
excluded are intimately related to X.  For example, an EE semantic theory for truth that uses 
gaps posits an important relation between truth predicates and gap predicates.  Yet it excludes 
gap predicates from the languages it considers.  And, because it is an EE theory, it is impossible 
to drop this idealization.   
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 Objection 5: Not all EE semantic theories are like Kripke’s semantic theory for truth.  
Some are restricted from applying to sentences that contain terms employed by the semantic 
theory because these terms do not appear in ordinary language and the theory does not explain 
them.  However, that does not mean that the theory generates inconsistencies when providing 
assignments for these sentences.  For example, consider again the semantic theory for truth that 
treats paradoxical sentences as gaps.  One need not interpret the gap predicate as a totally defined 
predicate.  If, instead, ‘gap’ itself has gaps then one could say that ‘this sentence is either false or 
a gap’ is neither true, nor false, nor a gap.  It would be a gap for the ‘gap’ predicate, or a ‘gap’ 
gap.  This approach treats the revenge paradox for the gap approach in the same way that the gap 
approach treats the original liar paradox.  Of course, this approach would itself face a revenge 
liar: 
(5): (5) is either false or a gap or a ‘gap’ gap. 
One could then posit gaps for the ‘‘gap’ gap’ predicate and so on for a whole sequence of ‘gap’ 
predicates.  Indeed one would generate a hierarchy of gap predicates.  This semantic theory 
would then be applicable to any particular language no matter what expressive resources it has.  
Indeed, there are semantic theories for truth that adopt analogous strategies: Gupta and Belnap’s 
semantic theory for truth and Field’s semantic theory for truth.10
Reply 5: I agree that an uninterpreted semantic theory that is used as a semantic theory for 
truth can also be used to explain the concepts it employs.  The objection claims that I was wrong 
to assume in the previous reply that all EE theories employ paradoxical concepts; they can be 
interpreted as employing concepts that are unexplained (not paradoxical), and the theory can be 
used to explain the very concepts it employs.  I disagree.  There is no reason to restrict a 
semantic theory for truth that can be used to explain one of the concepts it employs.  Semantic 
                                                 
10 See Gupta and Belnap (1993) and Field (2003a, 2003b). 
 62
 theories that are essentially external have been restricted to avoid either revenge paradoxes or 
self-refutation problems.  However, even if that claim is false, the essentially external semantic 
theories for truth that can also be used to explain a concept employed by the theory are not 
descriptively complete. 
For simplicity, I focus on Gupta and Belnap’s revision theory for truth.11  According to 
the revision theory, truth is a circular concept in the sense that the definition of truth is circular 
(i.e., the definiendum appears in the definiens).  The revision theory of truth is based on a theory 
of circular concepts, on which the meaning of a word that expresses a circular concept is 
captured by a rule of revision.  A rule of revision specifies the semantic features of an expression 
given a hypothesis about its semantic features.  For example, the rule of revision for a circular 
predicate F implies that if we assume F has a certain extension, then we can determine a different 
extension for F.  The rule of revision specifies the extensions of F under different assumptions 
about the extensions of F.  Although circular concepts do not have fixed semantic features, one 
can use the revision rule for a given circular concept to acquire information about its semantic 
features by considering its behavior during repeated applications.  For example, if we begin with 
an arbitrary extension for F and apply the revision rule for F over and over, we generate a 
sequence of extensions for F.  If a certain object b always ends up in the extension of F and stays 
there through repeated applications of the revision rule to different starting extensions, then b 
satisfies F.  Likewise, if a certain object c always ends up outside the extension of F and stays 
there through repeated applications of the revision rule to different starting extensions, then c 
does not satisfy F.  We can say that b is categorically F and that c is categorically not F.  When 
used as a semantic theory for truth, the theory of circular concepts yields the revision theory for 
                                                 
11 Ancestors of the revision theory I describe were developed by Herzberger and Gupta independently; see 
Herzberger (1982a, 1982b), and Gupta (1982).  The theory I describe is the one expounded in Gupta and Belnap 
(1993).  Field’s theory is quite different and I discuss it in Appendix A. 
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 truth.12  For a given language L, the revision theory for truth specifies the set of categorical 
sentences (those that are categorically true or categorically false) and the set of uncategorical 
sentences. 
The employed language for the revision theory for truth must be expressively richer than 
its target languages.13  According to my terminology, the revision theory for truth is essentially 
external.  In particular, it is not descriptively complete for languages that contain ‘categorical’.  
One way to interpret this limitation is that the revision theory is restricted from applying to 
sentences that contain ‘categorical’ because it implies that some of them (e.g., sentence (6) 
below) are both categorical and uncategorical: 
  (6): (6) is either false or not categorical. 
Gupta and Belnap explicitly reject this interpretation because, according to them, ‘categorical’ is 
a circular concept as well.14   
One of the exciting properties of the theory of circular concepts is that it can handle 
systems of interdependent circular concepts.  Gupta and Belnap show that if one treats both 
‘true’ and ‘categorical’ as circular concepts that are interdependent, then one can construct a 
semantic theory for a language containing both these terms that is descriptively complete for that 
language.  Sentences like the categorical liar turn out to be uncategorical according to this 
theory.  However, Gupta and Belnap claim that this is a different notion of categoricality from 
                                                 
12 Note that what Herzberger, Gupta, and Belnap say about truth constitutes several theories of truth (i.e., accounts 
of the nature of truth) and several semantic theories for truth (i.e., theories that provide the meanings of sentences 
that contain truth-expressions).  For example, the claim that truth is a circular concept is part of Gupta and Belnap’s 
theory of truth, but it is not part of their semantic theory for truth.  I use ‘the revision theory for truth’ as a term for 
the semantic theory for truth that, together with their claims about the nature of truth (their theory of truth), 
constitutes what they call “the revision theory of truth”.  
13 Gupta and Belnap admit that this is the case and that the restriction is the result of the revenge paradox: “We have 
been concerned, for the most part, with languages whose only problematic element is the truth predicate.  Even if 
these languages can be enriched, the strengthened versions of the paradoxes show that an adequate description of 
any of them requires, within our general framework, a richer metalanguage,” (Gupta and Belnap 1993: 256). 
14 Gupta and Belnap (1993: 229-235, 255-256). 
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 the one expressed in the target language.  To avoid confusion, I use ‘categoricality0’ for the 
notion of categoricality employed by the revision theory for truth, and I use ‘categoricality1’ for 
the notion of categoricality employed by the revision theory for truth and categoricality0.  Using 
Gupta and Belnap’s strategy, one can construct a revision theory for truth and any finite number 
of categoricality concepts.  Accordingly, sentence (6) should read: (6) is either false or not 
categorical0.  Whereas the liar sentence is not categorical0, sentence (6) is not categorical1.  
Gupta and Belnap claim that it is inappropriate to call the liar sentence true and inappropriate to 
call it false; likewise, it is inappropriate to call sentence (6) either categorical0 or not 
categorical0.15   
I want to make two points about this approach.  First, the uninterpreted16 revision theory 
is used to construct a semantic theory for truth; the uninterpreted theory is then used to construct 
a semantic theory for truth and categoricality0, the uninterpreted theory is then used to construct 
a semantic theory for truth, categoricality0, and categoricality1, etc.  These are different theories.  
It is possible that the revision theory for truth is descriptively complete for a language that does 
not contain any of the categoricality predicates.  It is possible that the revision theory for truth 
and categoricality0 is descriptively complete for a language that contains a truth predicate and a 
categoricality0 predicate but none of the other categoricality predicates.  And so on.  It is a 
revision theory for groups of interdependent concepts that works as a semantic theory for a 
language that contains some of the categoricality predicates.  It might seem like we are adding 
components to the revision theory for truth to accommodate the new terms added to the 
                                                 
15 Gupta and Belnap (1993: 255). 
16 I distinguish between uninterpreted semantic theories and interpreted semantic theories.  An uninterpreted 
semantic theory is a mathematical or logical structure, which does not serve as a semantic theory by itself.  An 
interpreted semantic theory is one that has been designated for some specific purpose.  For example, Kripke’s 
semantic theory is a mathematical structure that can be used for multiple different purposes.  Kripke uses it as a 
semantic theory for truth, but McGee uses it as a semantic theory for definite truth.  These are two different 
interpreted semantic theories that derive from the same uninterpreted semantic theory.  See Kripke (1975) and 
McGee (1991). 
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 language, but this impression is false.  Truth, categoricality0, categoricality1, etc. must be 
explained together if a revision theory that explains them is to be descriptively complete for the 
language in which they appear.  When we add a new categoricality predicate to the language, we 
must discard the theory that worked before and construct a new theory for the extended 
language. 
Second, given a particular revision theory for truth, categoricality0, categoricality1, …, 
categoricalityn, one can produce a language for which it is not descriptively complete (e.g., one 
with a categoricalityn+1 predicate).  Hence, no particular revision theory is descriptively 
complete.  Moreover, there is no language for which a particular revision theory is internalizable.  
Given some comments in Gupta and Belnap (1993), the following scenario might seem 
plausible.  We have a language L that contains a truth predicate and no categoricality predicates, 
and we have a revision theory T0 for truth that is descriptively complete and descriptively correct 
for L.  T0 is not expressible in L because T0 employs a categoricality0 predicate, and L does not 
contain such a predicate.  We extend L to L0 by adding a categoricality0 predicate to L.  Now L0 
can express T0, but T0 is not descriptively complete for L0 because T0 does not apply to sentences 
that contain categoricality0 predicates.  We construct a new theory T1 that is a revision theory for 
truth and categoricality0.  T1 is descriptively complete for L0 but is not expressible in L0 because 
T1 employs a categoricality1 predicate and L0 does not contain a categoricality1 predicate.  We 
continue in this manner extending the languages with categoricality predicates and constructing 
new revision theories.  At no point do we reach a revision theory and a language such that that 
revision theory is both expressible in that language and descriptively complete for that 
language.17  Therefore, no revision theory is internalizable.  That is the most optimistic outlook.  
                                                 
17 There is no reason to think that revision theories for transfinite sets of categoricality predicates (if one were to 
extend the revision theory in this way) would fare any better than those for finite sets. 
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 However, I argue in Appendix C that this outlook is not accurate either; the revision theory does 
face revenge paradoxes. 
To sum up: in my reply to the previous objection, I assumed that the concepts employed 
by an EE theory are paradoxical and that the idealization used to restrict the application of the 
EE theory could never be dropped.  The objection currently under discussion holds that one can 
drop the idealization used to restrict the application of an EE theory if one treats the concepts 
employed by the EE theory as if the EE theory itself applies to them.  My reply to this counter-
objection is that no single EE theory is internalizable.  Although the idealization used to restrict 
one EE theory can be dropped by using another EE theory to explain a concept employed by the 
first, the second will require its own idealization.  Hence, one can produce a sequence of EE 
theories such that each one explains a concept employed by the one before it, but this is simply a 
process whereby one idealization is replaced with others.  One never reaches an unrestricted 
theory or a point at which the idealizations have been dropped.18   
Objection 6: The argument for strong internalizability is no better off than the expressive 
capacity argument discussed in section one because a semantic theory for truth is internalizable 
for a language L if and only if L is semantically self-sufficient.  Thus, internalizability is just the 
property of semantic self-sufficiency.19
Reply 6: One of the strengths of the conceptual framework I offer is that it does not fall 
prey to the objections lodged against expressive capacity arguments.  Having a semantic theory 
that is internalizable for a language L is a relational property of L, and it is weaker than any of 
the commonly cited expressive properties used in expressive capacity arguments (e.g., 
universality, semantic closure, and semantic self-sufficiency).  In particular, it is possible that a 
                                                 
18 This strategy results in a hierarchy of semantic theories and concepts.  I argue that such theories are unacceptable 
in Appendix A. 
19 Gupta suggested this objection in conversation. 
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 semantic theory is internalizable for a language L even though it is not the case that L is 
universal, semantically closed, or semantically self-sufficient and it is not the case that L has an 
extension that is universal, semantically closed, or semantically self-sufficient.  I discussed each 
of these concepts in Chapter One. 
To summarize this section: I have argued that semantic theories should be descriptively 
complete and descriptively correct and that if a semantic theory for X is essentially external for 
some X-language, then it is not both descriptively complete and descriptively correct.  These two 
claims constitute a strong internalizability requirement (STRONG) on semantic theories (i.e., a 
semantic theory for X should be internalizable for every X-language).    
 
 
 
 
2.4  MODERATE INTERNALIZABILITY, TRUTH, AND NATURAL LANGUAGES 
 
 
The claim I defend in this section is weaker than the one found in the previous section in two 
respects.  First, it pertains only to semantic theories for truth.  Second, I focus on internalizability 
for natural languages instead of on strong internalizability.  I defend the claim that a semantic 
theory for truth that is essentially external for some natural language is not both descriptively 
complete and descriptively correct for that language.  My strategy is to show that if a semantic 
theory for truth is (i) essentially external for a language L, (ii) descriptively complete for L, (iii) 
descriptively correct for L, then L lacks certain expressive resources.  I argue that no natural 
language lacks these resources.  My conclusion is that a descriptively correct semantic theory for 
truth that is essentially external for a natural language is not descriptively complete for that 
natural language.  This section serves as a reply to an EE theorist who responds to the 
 68
 considerations of the previous section by saying that although an EE theory for truth is not both 
descriptively complete and descriptively correct, it will be descriptively complete and 
descriptively correct for most natural languages.  Furthermore, the argument I present shows that 
it is not just a handful of sentences that have to be excluded from the scope of a semantic theory 
for truth that is essentially external for a natural language.  Thus, an EE theorist cannot even say 
that his theory will be descriptively complete and descriptively correct for a large fragment of a 
natural language. 
I first want to consider why certain semantic theories are essentially external.  As I made 
clear in section two, some semantic theories are expressively restricted.  That is, they simply 
return no assignments when applied to certain languages or to fragments of languages that 
contain certain expressive resources (recall that Kripke’s semantic theory for truth is one of 
these).  However, not all expressively restricted semantic theories are essentially external (and 
not all essentially external semantic theories are expressively restricted).  If one can formulate an 
expressively restricted semantic theory for X without using any of the X-sentences that are 
outside its scope, then it might well be internalizable for the languages to which it applies.20  
Although expressively restricted semantic theories have their restrictions “built in” (because they 
simply return no assignments for the sentences of the languages in question), essentially external 
semantic theories often have been restricted to keep them from being inconsistent or self-
refuting.  That is, some semantic theories that are not expressively restricted have inconsistent or 
self-refuting consequences for some sentences within their scope.  To avoid falsity, these 
semantic theories are restricted so that the sentences for which they have inconsistent or self-
refuting consequences are not within their scope.  Given a semantic theory T for X, T’s restricted 
                                                 
20 McGee uses a variant of Kripke’s semantic theory as a semantic theory for definite truth that has this property.  It 
is both internalizable for the language in which it is formulated and expressively restricted.  See McGee (1991). 
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 set is the set of X-sentences that do not belong to the scope of T.21  That is, the restricted set of a 
semantic theory for X is the set of sentences that express X and for which T provides no 
assignment.  For example, consider Kripke’s semantic theory for truth.  A restricted version of it 
applies only to sentences that do not contain gap predicates.  Hence, sentences that contain both 
‘true’ and ‘gap’ are in the restricted set of this semantic theory.  The theory should apply to them 
(because it is a semantic theory for truth and these sentences express truth) but it does not 
(because it has been restricted to keep it consistent).   
 
 
2.4.1  THE ARGUMENT 
 
 
Let T be a descriptively correct semantic theory for truth that is essentially external for a natural 
language L.  That is, for every extension L′ of L, either T is not expressible in L′ or T is not 
descriptively complete for L′.  The issue currently under discussion is how well T can describe 
L.  If T is not both descriptively complete for L and descriptively correct for L, then T does not 
describe L well.  I intend to show that T is not both descriptively correct for L and descriptively 
complete for L.   
I first argue that T’s restricted set is not empty.  Given that T is essentially external for L, 
there exists a truth-language M such that T is not descriptively complete for M (that was the 
main result of section three).  Thus, some truth-sentences of M are in the restricted set for T.  Let 
R be the set of these sentences.   
Since L contains a truth predicate, some sentences of L will be truth attributions.  If L has 
a name ‘r’ for one of the members of R (the sentences of M that are outside the scope of T), then 
there are sentences of L that express truth but cannot fall within the scope of T.  Here is the 
                                                 
21 It might turn out that the collection of X-sentences that are outside the scope of T do not constitute a set.  This 
complication will not affect my argument. 
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 reason.  T provides assignments for L’s truth-sentences.  T cannot provide assignments for 
members of R.  However, ‘r is true’ is a sentence of L and has the same truth conditions as r.  
Hence, if r is outside the scope of T, then ‘r is true’ must be as well.  Hence, T is not 
descriptively complete for L; there are truth-sentences of L that are not within the scope of T.  
Given that T is descriptively correct, that T is essentially external for L, and that L contains some 
minimal linguistic resources (a name for a member of R), there are truth-sentences of L that are 
outside the scope of T.22   
We can weaken the assumptions about L’s linguistic resources considerably.  If L does 
not contain a name for a member of R, then L might still contain a definite description that refers 
to a member of R.  Let ⎡ιxφx⎤ be a definite description that refers to a member of R (where ⎡φx⎤ 
is a formula with ‘x’ as its only free variable).  An analogous argument shows that ⎡ιxφx is true ⎤ 
is a truth-sentence of L, and it cannot be a member of the scope of T.  What resources does L 
need to contain such a definite description?  It is hard to say.  For example, the following definite 
descriptions might play the role of ⎡ιxφx⎤: ‘the sentence that John uttered yesterday at 0314 
GMT’, ‘the first complete sentence on page 132 of the lightest book in Springfield’s public 
library’, and ‘the object currently at 42.99311073141ºN, 87.90563965926ºW, and 632.2342 ft. 
above sea level’.  In order to determine whether L has a definite description that refers to a 
member of R, one would have to know which objects are potential referents of its definite 
descriptions. 
Even worse is the fact that one can devise coding schemes that allow one to talk about the 
sentences of a certain language by talking about arithmetic.  Gödel’s method of arithmetization is 
probably the most famous one of these, and it allows one to use a language to talk about its own 
                                                 
22 One might object that on a strong reading of ‘true’, ‘r is true’ and r do not have the same truth conditions.  My 
reply is that the argument goes through only for semantic theories for weak truth.  However, in Chapter Seven, I 
show that strong truth can be defined in terms of weak truth.  See also Beall (2002) on this issue. 
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 syntactic features.23  But one could devise others that allow one to use one language to talk about 
the syntactic features of another language without too much trouble.  So long as the natural 
language in question can express arithmetic, one can use it to refer to the sentences of the 
restricted set in question.  Of course, the coding scheme need not be expressible in the target 
language for it to permit one to use the target language to refer in this way.   
What if L has no names and no definite descriptions and cannot express arithmetic?  We 
can still construct truth-sentences that are outside the scope of T.  For example, all we need is a 
quantified truth attribution that ranges over a member of R.  The sentence, ‘every declarative 
sentence is either true or false’ quantifies over all declarative sentences; hence, members of R are 
in its range.  That is all we need to construct a truth-sentence of L that is outside the scope of T, 
assuming we accept that if ⎡(∀x)ψ(x)⎤ is true, then ⎡ψ(α)⎤ is true where α is a member of the 
range of the quantifier.24  Demonstratives cause trouble for T as well.  The sentence ‘that is true’, 
where ‘that’ refers to a member of R, is a truth-sentence of L that cannot be in the scope of T.  In 
order to determine whether L contains such a demonstrative sentence, one would have to know 
which objects are in the vicinity of the users of L.  Anaphoric dependents (e.g., pronouns), 
propositional attitude terms (e.g., believes, knows, desires, etc.), and discourse terms (e.g., says, 
asserts, utters, etc.) will cause problems as well (e.g., ‘it is true’, ‘everything Herschel believes 
about clowns is true’, and ‘everything Mel said on yesterday’s episode is true’).   
If (i) a semantic theory T for truth is essentially external for a natural language L, (ii) T is 
descriptively correct, and (iii) T is descriptively complete for L, then L must be extremely 
impoverished.  The considerations above show that if someone can use L to name, refer to, 
quantify over, or demonstrate a member of the restricted set for T, then T is not descriptively 
                                                 
23 Gödel (1931). 
24 In this example we also need to accept that 〈p or q〉 is true if and only if 〈p〉 is true or 〈q〉 is true. 
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 complete for L.  Worse still is the fact that if someone can use L to name, refer to, quantify over, 
or demonstrate a sentence (perhaps of some language other than L) that attributes truth to a 
member of T’s restricted set, then T is not descriptively complete for L.  The same problem will 
occur if L can be used to name, refer to, quantify over, or demonstrate a sentence (perhaps of 
some other language M) that is used to name, refer to, quantify over, or demonstrate a sentence 
(perhaps of some language other than L or M) that attributes truth to a member of T’s restricted 
set.  And so on.   
Of course, if T is a semantic theory for truth that is essentially external for a natural 
language, then that natural language does have the capacity to name, refer to, and quantify over 
the sentences of T’s restricted set.  Many natural languages have some linguistic device that 
allows for the construction of the name of a linguistic item by displaying that item.  In English, 
one can use single quotes for this purpose (e.g., ‘βαναυσία’, ‘découper’, ‘بﻩو’ are words of 
Greek, French, and Arabic, respectively, but the names of these words—which occur in this very 
sentence—belong to English).  Given coding schemes it is easy to say that a certain sentence of 
another language is true by talking about numbers.  Natural languages also have the capacity to 
construct definite descriptions that refer to most anything imaginable, physical or abstract, 
observable or theoretical, actual or merely possible.  In addition, natural languages have 
quantifiers and syntactic terms that allow them to express claims like ‘every declarative sentence 
is either true or false’.  All that is needed is a universal quantifier, a sentencehood predicate, and 
a truth predicate.  Natural languages also have demonstratives, pronouns, propositional attitude 
terms, and discourse terms.  These are the direct ways of naming, referring to, and quantifying 
over restricted sentences.  There are innumerable indirect ways as well.  One can say in English 
that a certain sentence of German is true, where that sentence of German is a truth attribution to a 
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 sentence of the restricted set in question.  The same goes for naming, referring to, and 
quantifying over sentences of other languages that are truth attributions to restricted sentences, 
and for naming, referring to, and quantifying over sentences of other languages that name, refer 
to, or quantify over sentences of other languages that are truth attributions to restricted sentences, 
and so on.  For example, one can say in English that a certain sentence of German is true, where 
that sentence of German attributes truth to a sentence of Portuguese, which attributes truth to a 
sentence of the restricted set in question.  Given that natural languages have these resources, no 
semantic theory for truth that is essentially external for a particular natural language will be 
descriptively complete and descriptively correct for that language.    
Before responding to some objections, I want to return to the version of Kripke’s 
semantic theory for truth that is restricted so that no sentence containing a truth-value gap 
predicate, a paradoxicality predicate, a groundedness predicate, or any of the other predicates of 
Kripke’s theory that lead to revenge paradoxes is within its scope.  Assume that the employed 
language for Kripke’s theory is English (or my idiolect of English at noon GMT on January 1, 
2004) and that a target language for Kripke’s theory is English*, which is a sublanguage of 
English.  Assume that English* is a first-order language that contains a truth predicate, but it 
does not contain any non-monotonic sentential operators and it does not contain any of the above 
predicates of English to which Kripke’s theory cannot apply.  Kripke’s theory is essentially 
external for English*.  Hence, there exists a truth-language M such that M contains some truth-
sentences that are in the restricted set for Kripke’s semantic theory.  We do not have to look far 
to find a language like M.  Kripke’s theory is not descriptively complete for English because 
none of the sentences of English that contain both a truth predicate and a truth-value gap 
predicate are in its scope.  Thus, some sentences of English (the employed language for Kripke’s 
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 theory) are in the restricted set for Kripke’s theory.  The issue now is: is Kripke’s theory 
descriptively complete for English*?  My answer is “no.”   
Let R be the set of sentences of English that are prohibited from being in the scope of 
Kripke’s theory.  If English* contains a name ‘r’ of one of these sentences (e.g., ‘this sentence is 
either false or a gap’), then the sentence ‘r is true’ of English* will have the same truth 
conditions as the member of R that r names.  Thus, although ‘r is true’ is a truth-sentence of 
English, it is not a member of T’s scope.  Hence, if English* contains a name of one of the 
sentences of R, then T is descriptively incomplete for English*.  Likewise, if English* contains 
any singular term that refers to a member of R, then T is descriptively incomplete for English*.  
The same result holds if English* contains sentences that quantify over members of R or it 
contains a demonstrative that can be used to refer to a member of R.  Moreover, if 〈〈p〉 is true〉 is 
a sentence of English* where 〈p〉 is a sentence of some other language that attributes truth to a 
member of R, then T is descriptively incomplete for English*.   
 
 
2.4.2  OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 
 
Objection 1: Most of the semantic theories for truth are actually semantic theories for language-
specific truth predicates—those that are true of only the sentences of a single language.  Here is a 
representative quotation: 
The problem to be solved, then, is this: Given a first-order language L with a 
distinguished predicate T that means “true-in-L,” and given a classical model M 
of the T-free fragment of L, construct a systematic account of the signification of 
T that [1] yields a classification of the sentences of L into 
true/false/paradoxical/etc.—a classification that conforms to our ordinary 
intuitions and uses of ‘true’ and [2] yields an interpretation of the T-biconditionals 
that is in accord with the Signification Thesis, (Gupta and Belnap 1993: 32). 
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 Note the use of the expression ‘true-in-L’.  That is a truth predicate that is restricted to the 
sentences of a single language (L).  I call a truth predicate restricted to the sentences of a single 
language, a language-specific truth predicate (an LS truth predicate).  Semantic theories for LS 
truth predicates do not purport to be descriptively complete or internalizable for natural 
languages.     
Reply 1: I agree that many of the semantic theories for truth that have been proposed are 
designed to apply only to artificial languages that contain LS truth predicates.  The practice goes 
back to Tarski, who thought that attempts to provide semantic theories for the unrestricted truth 
predicates that occur in natural languages were futile.25  Moreover, the vast majority of the 
artificial languages for which these semantic theories are designed are considered in isolation—
the domains of these languages do not even include linguistic items from other languages.   
Most of those who propose semantic theories for LS truth predicates have as a goal the 
description of truth predicates in natural languages.  Here is Gupta again: “[The] revision theory, 
if it is to fulfill its own goals, has to be applicable to English,” (Gupta 1997: 442).  Those 
theorists who propose semantic theories for LS truth predicates and suggest that these theories 
illuminate truth predicates of natural languages follow a strategy of idealization: first solve a 
difficult problem for certain ideal circumstances and then determine how to solve it in more 
complex cases.  If the result of such a strategy is an EE theory for truth, then the strategy cannot 
work.  I have argued that only semantic theories for truth that are internalizable for a natural 
language can be both descriptively correct and descriptively complete for that natural language.  
Those philosophers who propose semantic theories for LS concepts of truth are subject to the 
strong internalizability requirement; those who ignore the strong internalizability requirement but 
                                                 
25 Tarski (1933). 
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 suggest that their theory can be applied to natural languages are subject to the more moderate 
internalizability requirement.26   
Objection 2:  There is no reason that a semantic theory for an LS truth predicate should 
be internalizable for its target language.  Such a theory applies to only one language; hence, if it 
is descriptively complete for that language then it is descriptively complete; the issue of whether 
it can be expressed in its target language is irrelevant.  Moreover, because semantic theories for 
LS truth predicates can explain the truth predicates that occur in natural languages, there is no 
need for an internalizability requirement when it comes to truth. 
Reply 2: I make three points in this reply: (i) semantic theories for LS truth predicates 
apply to multiple languages, (ii) even if we allow only LS truth predicates, the argument of 
section 2.4.1 still goes through, and (iii) one cannot explain a truth predicate of a natural 
language in terms of LS truth predicates.  A semantic theory that purports to describe a single 
expression of a single language is useless for explaining an expression of a natural language.  
Any change in the language would render the semantic theory obsolete.  I assume that when we 
talk about semantic theories for LS truth predicates, we are talking about theories that purport to 
provide the meanings for sentences that express the concept truth-in-L for some fixed language 
L.  Given this assumption, the claim that an LS truth predicate for a language L must belong to L 
is false.  Any language can be extended to include an LS truth predicate for a given language.  
Hence, it is not the case that a semantic theory for an LS truth predicate has only one language as 
its target language.  Thus, its descriptive completeness does depend on its internalizability.   
Moreover, even if we allow only LS truth predicates, the argument for the moderate 
internalizability requirement still goes through.  Assume: (i) that T is a semantic theory for truth-
                                                 
26 Another “burden of proof” objection might come to mind at this point according to which I have not shown that it 
is possible to provide a semantic theory for an unrestricted truth predicate.  My reply to such an objection is 
analogous to my reply to the earlier “burden of proof” objection. 
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 in-L that applies to L and that the employed language for T is N, (ii) that t is any paradoxical 
sentence in N, (iii) that a language M contains a sentence s that is the translation of t, (iv) that M 
contains a sentence r that attributes truth-in-M to s, (v) that L contains a sentence q that is a 
translation of r and L contains a name for q, (vi) that L has a truth-in-L predicate and a truth-in-
M predicate, and (vii) that L contains a sentence p that attributes truth-in-L to q .  L contains p, 
and p is a truth-in-L-sentence, but p cannot be in the scope of T unless T is inconsistent.  Here is 
the reason.  If t is paradoxical, then r is paradoxical, and if r is paradoxical, then p is paradoxical 
(i.e., if p is in the scope of T, then T implies that p is both true-in-L and not true-in-L).  Hence, if 
T is consistent, then p is outside the scope of T; thus, T is descriptively incomplete for L.27   
The above argument is complex and best understood with an example.  Consider again 
the restricted version of Kripke’s semantic theory T for truth-in-L.  Assume that its employed 
language (language N in the previous paragraph) is English, which contains a gap predicate, and 
assume T is restricted to avoid revenge problems.  Let t be ‘t is either false-in-English or gappy-
in-English’.  That is, t is a revenge paradox for the semantic theory for truth-in-English.  Assume 
that L is a sublanguage of English that contains a truth-in-L predicate but no gap predicate.  
Because L has no unrestricted truth predicate, it might seem that L cannot contain a sentence α 
such that α is paradoxical if t is paradoxical.  If L has a name ‘t’ for t, then L contains ‘t is true-
in-L’.  However, ‘t is true-in-L’ is false, not paradoxical because t is not a sentence of L.  
Furthermore, t is not translatable into L; hence, ‘t is translatable into a sentence of L that is true-
in-L’ is false as well.  However, we can still construct a sentence of L such that it is paradoxical 
if t is paradoxical.   
                                                 
27 This argument is inspired by remarks in Mackie (1973: 252-253). 
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 Assume that language M is a sublanguage of English that has a gap predicate, a truth-in-
M predicate, and a sentence s that is a translation of t.  Let s be the only sentence written on a 
certain blackboard, and let M contain a sentence r, which is ‘the sentence on the blackboard is 
true-in-M’.  Assume finally that L has a sentence q that is a translation of r, and that L has a 
name for q.  Let sentence p be ‘q is true-in-L’.  Sentence p belongs to L, and p is paradoxical if t 
is paradoxical.  Here is the argument: 
(a)  If t is true-in-English, then r is true-in-M.  (Argument: If t is true-in-English, then 
s is true-in-M because s is a translation of t.  Sentence r (‘the sentence on the 
blackboard is true-in-M’) says that s is true-in-M.  Sentence s is true-in-M.  Thus, 
r is true-in-M.)   
 
(b)  If r is true-in-M, then p is true-in-L.  (Argument: If r is true-in-M, then q is true-
in-L because q is a translation of r.  Sentence p (‘q is true-in-L’) says that q is 
true-in-L.  Thus, p is true-in-L.)   
 
(c)  If t is false-in-English or gappy-in-English, then r is false-in-M or gappy-in-M.  
(Argument: If t is false-in-English or gappy-in-English, then s is false-in-English 
or gappy-in-English because s is a translation of t.28  Sentence r says that s is true-
in-M.  Sentence s is false-in-M or gappy-in-M.  Thus, r is false-in-M.) 
 
(d) If r is false-in-M or gappy-in-M, then p is false-in-L or gappy-in-L.  (Argument: If 
r is false-in-M or gappy-in-M, then q is false-in-L or gappy-in-L because q is a 
translation of r.  Sentence p says that q is true-in-L.  Thus, p is false-in-L.) 
   
∴ (e) If t is true-in-English iff t is false-in-English or gappy-in-English, then p is true-
in-L iff p is false-in-L or gappy-in-L.  
 
Despite the fact that L has no truth predicate for the language to which t belongs and has no 
sentence that is a translation of t, we have still managed to construct a sentence of L such that it 
is paradoxical if t is paradoxical.  Thus, if p is in the scope of T, then T implies that p is both 
true-in-L and not true-in-L.  Therefore, T is either descriptively incomplete for L or descriptively 
incorrect (see Figure 2.1 for a diagram of the facts used in this argument).   
 
                                                 
28 Even if we allow multiple translations of t into M, they will all have the same truth conditions and thus will all be 
false or gappy. 
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s is the translation of t into M, and s is on the blackboard
r is 'the sentence on the blackboard is true-in-M'
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truth-in-English-
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truth-in-L-
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Figure 2.1 (Three-Language Situation) 
 
 
 
Notice that, although there are many premises to this argument, all of them are quite 
plausible for natural languages (except the assumption that L has no unrestricted truth 
predicate—but the point was to show that even if L does not have an unrestricted truth predicate, 
T is still descriptively incomplete for L).  The argument assumes that L has a LS truth predicate 
for a language that can express the revenge liar (t) for T.  One might assume that if L had no such 
LS truth predicate, then T might be descriptively complete for it.  On the contrary, a somewhat 
more complicated example shows that this assumption is false.  An argument analogous to the 
one presented above for the situation depicted in Figure 2.2 shows that even if L has no truth-in-
English predicate, no gap predicate, and no LS truth predicates for languages that have truth-in-
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 English predicates or gap predicates, L still contains a sentence such that it is paradoxical if the 
revenge paradox for T is paradoxical. 
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Figure 2.2 (Four-Language Situation) 
 
 
 
So far, I have made two of the three points promised in the first sentence of this reply.  
The third point is that truth predicates of natural languages cannot be explained in terms of LS 
truth predicates.  That is a controversial claim and I do not have the space to defend it fully 
here.29  However, I do want to present some considerations that have not received the emphasis 
they deserve in the literature on this issue.   
The biggest problem facing LS theorists (i.e., those who claim that natural language truth 
predicates can be explained in terms of LS truth predicates) is that the most familiar and widely 
                                                 
29 The issue of LS truth predicates arises in debates about disquotationalism, which is a version of deflationism 
about truth.  See Leeds (1978, 1995, 1997), Williams (1986, 1999, 2002), Field (1986) (in which they are discussed 
but not endorsed), Resnik (1990), Quine (1992), McGee (1993), Field (1994a, 1994b), Weir (1996), Halbach (1999, 
2000, 2002), and Burgess (2002).  See also Appendix A. 
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 used truth predicates in natural languages are not language-specific (e.g., in English we have 
‘true’, not ‘true-in-English’, ‘true-in-Sanskrit’, ‘true-in-Klingon’, etc.).  We use the English word 
‘true’ to attribute truth to English sentences as well as to sentences of other languages (and to 
beliefs, propositions, etc.).   
Two responses to this objection on behalf of LS theorists are: (i) claim that a natural 
language truth predicate is an ambiguous language-specific truth predicate (i.e., that ‘true’ is 
ambiguous and can be synonymous with ‘true-in-English’, ‘true-in-Sanskrit’, ‘true-in-Klingon’, 
etc.), or (ii) claim that a natural language truth predicate is a translational language-specific truth 
predicate (i.e., that ‘true’ is synonymous with ‘translatable into a sentence of English that is true-
in-English).30  I refer to ambiguous language-specific truth predicates as ALS truth predicates 
and I refer to translational language-specific truth predicates as TLS truth predicates.  I address 
each of these proposals in order. 
I have two objections to the ALS theorist.  First, we do not treat our natural language 
truth predicates as if they are ALS truth predicates.  For example, most people who understand 
the sentences in the following argument would say that it is valid: 
(a) ‘Schnee ist weiss’ is true. 
(b) ‘snow is white’ is true. 
(c) ‘Schnee ist weiss’ ≠ ‘snow is white’. 
  ∴ (d) there are at least two distinct things that are true. 
If the truth predicate of English is ambiguous and takes on the meanings of different LS truth 
predicates in different circumstances, then this argument is invalid and suffers from an 
equivocation.   
                                                 
30 For the latter, see Field (1986) (in which it is discussed but not endorsed), McGee (1993), Field (1994a) (in which 
it is endorsed as an option), Leeds (1995, 1997), and Williams (1999, 2002).  For deflationist alternatives to LS truth 
predicates, see Field (1994a), Lance (1996), Azzouni (2001), Horwich (2001), and Brandom (2002). 
 82
 Second, if our natural language truth predicates were ALS truth predicates, then we 
would not be able to use them properly.  We routinely attribute truth blindly.  That is, we assert 
that some sentence or set of sentences is true without knowing exactly which sentences are the 
targets of the attribution (e.g., everything Kripke said yesterday is true).  If our truth predicate 
were an ALS truth predicate, then the speaker of a blind assertion of a truth attribution would 
have to attach a restriction or set of restrictions to the truth attribution without knowing which 
restrictions to attach.  Thus, to use an ALS truth predicate properly, one could not use it in blind 
attributions.  Moreover, a truth attribution to several sentences that belong to different languages 
would have to be either implicitly disjunctive or it would count as several attributions at once.  
Neither option is plausible.  See Appendix A for an expanded version of this criticism. 
The supporters of a TLS theory hope that by combining an account of translation with a 
semantic theory for a restricted truth predicate they can explain truth predicates of natural 
languages.  Although this proposal works better than an account of an LS truth predicate alone, it 
is still inadequate.  I offer five criticisms.  First, TLS truth predicates cannot be used in blind 
assertions of truth attributions either.  Even if one advocates a position according to which all 
natural languages are intertranslatable, TLS truth predicates are still more demanding than 
natural language truth predicates.  See Appendix A for an expanded version of this criticism. 
Second, as long as we treat natural languages as fixed entities, they are not 
intertranslatable.  Let E be the idiolect of English I spoke at noon GMT on January 1, 2004 and 
E* the language that results from removing ‘categorical’ from E.  Because the revision theory for 
truth can be applied to E* and is expressible in E, E is expressively richer than E*.  Hence, there 
are sentences of E that are not translatable into E*.31  Of course, I have assumed that any two 
natural languages are quasi-intertranslatable; that is, there are extensions of each that are 
                                                 
31 Richard (1996), Soames (1997), and Shapiro (2003) make similar points. 
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 intertranslatable.  However, I see little hope for a quasi-translational language-specific truth 
predicate—one that belongs to a language L and is synonymous with ‘translatable into a sentence 
of an extension of L that is true-in-that-extension-of-L’.  The problem is that this view tries to 
treat ‘L’ as both a name and a variable.  Let ‘true*’ be a quasi-translational language-specific 
truth predicate, and let L′ be an extension of L.  If ‘true*’ is synonymous with ‘translatable into a 
sentence of L′ that is true-in-L′’, then ‘true*’ is inadequate because there is no guarantee that L′ 
will be intertranslatable with the other language in question.  If ‘true*’ is synonymous with 
‘translatable into a sentence of some extension L′ of L that is true-in-L′’, then ‘true*’ is not an 
LS truth predicate at all because ‘L′’ is functioning as a variable in this expression.   
Third, the hope is that a TLS truth predicate can replace a group of LS truth predicates or 
an ALS truth predicate, but this hope is misplaced.  Assume that L and N are languages and that 
〈p〉 is a sentence of L.  Assume that I speak a different language, M.  If I say in M that 〈p〉 is true, 
then that could mean that 〈p〉 is translatable into a sentence of M that is true-in-M or it might 
mean that 〈p〉 is translatable into a sentence of N that is true-in-N, etc.  These are different truth 
attributions.  It is possible that one is true and the other is false.  If M has only ‘translatable into a 
sentence of M that is true-in-M’, then I cannot say in M that 〈p〉 is translatable into a sentence of 
N that is true-in-N.  If I do have both truth predicates, then we run into the same problems we 
saw before with LS truth predicates.  Thus, a single TLS truth predicate does not replace a group 
of LS truth predicates or an ALS truth predicate.   
Fourth, many of the general principles about unrestricted truth predicates fail for TLS 
truth predicates.  For example, a disjunction is true if and only if one of the disjuncts is true.   
 For a TLS truth predicate, this principle becomes: a disjunction is translatable into a sentence of 
L that is true-in-L if and only if one of the disjuncts is translatable into a sentence of L that is 
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 true-in-L.  But the principle for the TLS truth predicate is false because there are disjunctions 
such that one of the disjuncts but not the other is translatable into L (the left-hand side of the 
biconditional is false, while the right-hand side is true).  Thus, what we take to be general 
principles for natural language truth predicates are false if natural language truth predicates are 
TLS truth predicates. 
Finally, doing semantics requires truth predicates that apply to sentences of other 
languages directly.  Consider a first-order language L all of whose sentential operators are 
monotonic.  L has a single partial predicate that is interpreted as truth-in-L.  In a different 
language, E, we formulate a version of Kripke’s semantic theory T for truth-in-L.  Assume that E 
is a classical first-order language.  T provides assignments for the sentences of L, which are 
specifications of the truth conditions of the sentences of L.  To do so, E must have a truth 
predicate, a falsity predicate, and a gap predicate.  All of these predicates will be totally defined 
since E is bivalent.  To avoid liar problems for E, we can assume that liar sentences of E are 
meaningless (this assumption is implausible as a general solution to the liar paradox but it will 
not cause problems in this example).  Some of T’s consequences are of the form 〈〈p〉 is true〉, 〈〈p〉 
is false〉, 〈〈p〉 is gap〉, where 〈p〉 is a sentence of L.  If the truth predicate of E is the LS truth 
predicate ‘true-in-E’, then one might think that T could still provide assignments for sentences of 
L by saying: 〈〈p〉 is translatable into a sentence of E that is true-in-E〉, etc.  However, no sentence 
with a partial predicate can have the same content as a sentence that contains only completely 
defined predicates so long as two sentences with the same content have the same truth 
conditions.  Note that when we talk about truth conditions, we usually assume that when we 
characterize the conditions under which a sentence is true, we also characterize the conditions 
under which it is false.  But for sentences with partial predicates, one must characterize the truth 
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 conditions, falsity conditions, and gap conditions.  The gap conditions for a sentence with a 
partial predicate are part of its content.  Otherwise, two predicates, F and G, that have the same 
extension where F is completely defined and G is partially defined will have the same content no 
matter how different their anti-extensions are.  This is obviously false.  Hence, given that E is 
bivalent and that the truth-sentences of L contain partial predicates, the truth-sentences of L 
cannot be translated into E.  Thus, if the truth predicate of E is ‘true-in-E’ or a TLS truth 
predicate, then all the assignments of T for truth-sentences of L are false.  In order to do 
semantics in E for L, E must have either an unrestricted truth predicate or a truth-in-L predicate.  
Therefore, a TLS truth predicate is not adequate for the needs of semantics.32
Objection 3: The theorist who uses a semantic theory T for truth to provide assignments 
for truth-sentences of L need not say in advance which sentences are in the scope of T.  The 
sentences used in the above criticism will be exceedingly rare and if, by chance, the theorist runs 
across one, he or she can restrict the theory at that time.  For most natural languages, even 
semantic theories for truth that are essentially external for natural languages will be descriptively 
complete.   
Reply 3: Why do we (philosophers) construct semantic theories?  We find that we gain an 
understanding of natural language phenomena if we can construct a theory that will provide the 
right assignments for certain classes of sentences.  If we want to understand truth and we feel 
that providing a semantic theory for truth is a good way to achieve such understanding, then the 
theory should work for the sentences of arbitrary natural languages that express truth.  To be 
successful, the theory must provide assignments not only for the sentences that we find 
commonly bandied about; it must provide assignments for all the sentences of the language that 
                                                 
32 I am assuming (contra Field) that semantic theories actually use truth predicates to provide truth conditions for the 
sentences of their target languages.  Field distinguishes between semantic value predicates and truth predicates in an 
effort to avoid the revenge problems for his theory of truth.  See Field (2003a, 2003b).   
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 express truth.  That is, given a sentence type of the language in question and a context for a token 
of that type, the theory should return an assignment for that sentence token in that context.  The 
philosopher who constructs a semantic theory is expected to say, in advance of its application, 
what linguistic phenomena it is designed to illuminate.  Of course, one could say, “I do not know 
how this theory will help our understanding; let us use it and see what it does,” but no such 
suggestion would be taken seriously.  Theorists often present their theories as restricted 
explanations by saying that the theory in question is a semantic theory for X, but it works only in 
such and such circumstances.  Such theories are important because they serve as steps toward 
more comprehensive ones.  Again, a theorist could say, “here is a semantic theory for truth and I 
know that it works only in some circumstances, but I cannot say which ones; let us use it and see 
what it does,” but, as before, no such suggestion would be taken seriously.  For example, did 
Kripke write of his semantic theory that if one discovers that a revenge liar is in its scope, then 
one should restrict the semantic theory so that it does not apply to that sentence?  No.  He 
provided a restriction in advance—one that would insure that the theory would not apply to 
sentences that might render it false. 
The reason for skepticism in cases where a theorist suggests that we should restrict the 
theory “on the fly” is that we think that theories should not have ad hoc restrictions.  The theorist 
who says we should restrict a semantic theory that is essentially external for a natural language if 
the need arises is saying something like, “my theory works except in those cases where it does 
not work.”  A semantic theory that might be inconsistent if circumstances turn unfavorable is an 
inadequate semantic theory.33  Even if one were allowed to restrict one’s semantic theory “on the 
                                                 
33 That is an important difference between semantic theories and truth attributions.  Truth attributions can be risky, 
but semantic theories cannot.  I discuss this issue in Appendix B. 
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 fly”, the objection would still fail given that any natural language will have sentences that force 
the semantic theory to be restricted. 
Objection 4:  The claim that a descriptively correct semantic theory T for truth that is 
essentially external for a natural language L is not descriptively complete for L is justified by 
appeal to a sentence of L (say, p) that attributes truth (directly or indirectly) to a sentence of T’s 
restricted set (say, r).  The argument depends on the claim that p cannot be in T’s scope because r 
is outside T’s scope, and p has the same truth conditions as r.  However, this is not sufficient 
reason to exclude p from T’s scope.  The assumption seems to be that if T cannot assign a 
meaning to r, then T cannot assign a meaning to p because they have the same truth conditions 
and hence, the same meaning.  But two sentences can have the same truth conditions without 
having the same meaning. 
Reply 4: T has plenty of consequences other than its assignments.  For example, the 
unrestricted version of Kripke’s semantic theory T for truth implies that (2) (i.e., ‘(2) is either 
false or a gap’) is both true and untrue (so long as certain assumptions hold), but neither the 
claim that (2) is true nor the claim that (2) is untrue is an assignment of T.  T assigns meanings to 
sentences by assigning truth conditions to sentences.  T attributes truth to sentences under certain 
circumstances, falsity to sentences under certain circumstances, and gaphood to sentences under 
certain circumstances.  The pressure to restrict T need not come from a problematic assignment 
of meaning—it can come from some other problematic consequence of T.  I have assumed that T 
has no consequences for sentences outside its scope (other than the claim that they are outside its 
scope). 
In the argument of section 2.4.1, I claim that if r is outside T’s scope, then p must be as 
well.  One can appeal to aletheic deflationism to justify this claim.  For a deflationist, r and p (‘r 
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 is true’) have the same content.  Thus, if r is outside the scope of T, then ‘p is true’ is as well.  An 
appeal to deflationism is certainly not the only way to defend this portion of the argument.  
Recall the revenge liar for gaps: 
(2): (2) is either false or a gap. 
If sentence (2) is in the scope of Kripke’s semantic theory for truth, then that theory implies that 
(2) is true and that (2) is not true.  The following sentence is just as paradoxical as (2): 
 (7): (2) is true.34
If a proponent of the semantic theory in question restricts the theory to keep it consistent, then he 
must insure that both (2) and (7) are outside its scope.  The fact that truth attributions to 
paradoxical sentences are paradoxical is well known by those who work on the aletheic 
paradoxes, and this is a fact about truth, not a consequence of deflationism.  Gupta, one of 
deflationism’s harshest critics, writes: “The sentence ‘The Liar Sentence of Hebrew is true’ is no 
less perplexing to us than ‘the Liar Sentence of English is true’,” (Gupta and Belnap 1993: 
266).35
In this section, I have argued that if a descriptively correct semantic theory T for truth is 
essentially external for a natural language L and L has the expressive resources that we take all 
natural languages to have, then T is not descriptively complete for L.  Therefore, semantic 
theories that are essentially external for natural languages are inadequate for use on natural 
languages.   
 
 
                                                 
34 Provided that ‘true’ in (7) is a weak truth predicate. 
35 The quotation should obviously be credited to Belnap as well.  Gupta’s attacks on deflationism can be found in 
Gupta (1993a, 1993b). 
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 2.5  INDEFINABILITY 
 
 
I have argued that a semantic theory for truth should be internalizable for every truth-language 
(from STRONG) and for every natural language to which it applies (MODERATEN).  In section 
2.3.2, I admitted that these conditions on semantic theories for truth are not binding if one shows 
that there is no possibility of satisfying them.  It might seem that we do have results that suggest 
an internalizable semantic theory for truth is impossible; namely, Tarski’s indefinability theorem 
and related results.  In this section, I argue that such results have been misinterpreted and that, 
when properly understood, they give us no reason to think that an internalizable semantic theory 
for truth is impossible. 
Let us first review Tarski’s indefinability theorem.  He proved that if a language L is 
bivalent (i.e., every sentence of L is either true or false), L is monoaletheic (i.e., no sentence of 
the language is both true and false), and L has the capacity to describe its own syntax, then L 
does not contain a predicate that is true of all and only the true sentences of L.  That is, truth-in-L 
is indefinable in L.  Given that a semantic theory for truth-in-L contains sentences that express 
the concept of truth-in-L, no such language can express a semantic theory for truth-in-L.  Tarski 
proves his theorem by reductio; he shows that if L does contain its own truth-in-L predicate and 
satisfies the conditions of the theorem, then it contains a paradoxical sentence (i.e., a sentence for 
which one can derive that it is both true-in-L and not true-in-L).36   
One can prove similar results using revenge paradoxes.  For example, one can prove that 
a language that is not bivalent but satisfies the other conditions of Tarski’s theorem does not 
contain a predicate with an extension that is the set of true sentences of the language and an anti-
                                                 
36 Tarski (1933).  See also McGee (1985, 1991), Gupta and Belnap (1993), Simmons (1993), Halbach (1995), 
Soames (1999), Ketland (2000), Field (2003a, 2003b), and Maudlin (2004).  
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 extension that is the set of untrue sentences of the language.  One can prove this theorem using 
the revenge paradox for gap approaches to the liar paradox (i.e., ‘this sentence is either false or a 
truth-value gap’).  Another example comes from Gupta and Belnap’s semantic theory for truth 
(i.e., the revision theory).  As I mentioned in section 2.3.2, the revision theory employs the 
notion of categoricality; it implies that paradoxical sentences are uncategorical.  Accordingly, 
one can construct a revenge paradox for the revision theory using the sentence ‘this sentence is 
either false or uncategorical’.  On the revision theory, this sentence is both categorical and 
uncategorical.  Gupta and Belnap use this result to prove the indefinability of categoricality in 
languages that have the capacity to construct this revenge liar.  One consequence is that no 
language that satisfies these conditions can express the revision theory.  Thus, the revision theory 
is essentially external so long as it is consistent.37
One might argue that it is impossible to construct an internalizable semantic theory for 
truth on the following grounds.  Every semantic theory for truth faces a revenge paradox.  Each 
revenge paradox can be used to prove an indefinability theorem.  Each indefinability theorem 
implies that the semantic theory in question is essentially external.  Therefore, we have good 
reason to believe that an internalizable semantic theory for truth is impossible.38   
There are a number of places at which a supporter of the internalizability requirements 
can attack this line of reasoning.  First, it is false that every semantic theory for truth faces a 
revenge paradox.  I agree that most semantic theories for truth face revenge paradoxes, but not 
all do.  A semantic theory based on an error theory of truth (i.e., all sentences with truth 
predicates are false) does not face a revenge paradox (of course, it faces a horrible self-refutation 
problem, but that is quite different—one cannot prove indefinability results with self-refutation 
                                                 
37 Gupta and Belnap (1993: 229-230).  I elaborate on these claims in Appendix C. 
38 See Herzberger (1970a, 1981), Parsons (1983), and McCarthy (1985), which contain remarks that suggest that 
these philosophers would be sympathetic to this argument. 
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 problems).  One might argue that any plausible semantic theory for truth faces a revenge paradox 
or that any semantic theory for truth that does not face a self-refutation problem faces a revenge 
paradox, but those are not the arguments under consideration.  Moreover, in my view, there are 
plausible semantic theories for truth that do not face revenge paradoxes or self-refutation 
problems.  All of them are in the inconsistency tradition.  That is, they all imply that truth is an 
inconsistent concept.39  It is my view that revenge paradoxes and self-refutation problems result 
from treating what is essentially an inconsistent concept as if it were consistent.  Of course, I 
cannot defend that claim here.40  My point is that inconsistency theories of truth do not face 
revenge paradoxes and hence, the above reasoning is unsound. 
Second, the indefinability results are not as strong as they appear.  Let us take a look at 
the indefinability results in more detail.  Each one has the following form: if L is a language with 
properties P1, P2, etc., and a semantic concept τ is definable in L, then L contains a sentence s 
and s both has and does not have some property Q.  The proof concludes by rejecting the claim 
that τ is definable in L. 
Each indefinability result has a number of hidden premises.  First, they assume that the 
semantic concept in question is consistent.  If it is an inconsistent concept, then it should not 
come as a surprise that it both applies and fails to apply to certain items.  Moreover, if the 
concept in question is inconsistent, then it is not obvious that reductios are valid forms of 
reasoning for sentences that express this concept.  Second, each result uses certain claims about 
the semantic concept in question to derive the contradiction.  For example, Tarski’s 
indefinability result relies on convention T (i.e., that for each sentence 〈p〉 of the language, one 
                                                 
39 See Chihara (1973, 1979, 1984), Yablo (1985, 1993a, 1993b), Priest (1987), and Eklund (2002).  A number of 
other philosophers have made remarks that suggest they are sympathetic to the inconsistency view, including Mates 
(1981), Barwise and Etchemendy (1987), McGee (1991), and Tappenden (1994). 
40 I defend it in Chapter Three. 
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 can show that 〈p〉 is true if and only if p).  A second example is that Gupta and Belnap’s 
indefinability result for categoricality relies on the claim that the truth predicate in question 
obeys the revision theory for truth.  Thus, each indefinability result depends on a certain theory.  
Moreover, each depends on the claim that the theory in question applies to the language in 
question.  Finally, each result depends on the claim that the theory in question is consistent.  
Obviously, if the revision theory for truth is inconsistent, then it should come as no surprise that 
one could show that it implies that the sentence ‘this sentence is either false or uncategorical’ is 
both categorical and uncategorical. 
Once the hidden premises of the indefinability results are made explicit, it is obvious that 
they pose no threat to the internalizability requirements.  Each result has the form: if such and 
such theory is consistent, correct, and applies to such and such languages, then these languages 
cannot express such and such consistent concept.  However, that is considerably weaker than the 
original formulation and it does not support the claim that no semantic theory for truth can be 
internalizable.  Therefore, there is no good argument from the indefinability results to the claim 
that an internalizable semantic theory is impossible. 
 
 
2.6  CONCLUSION 
 
 
I have presented and defended several internalizability requirements on semantic theories.  The 
strong internalizability requirement is that a semantic theory for X should be internalizable for 
every X-language.  My argument (presented in section two) is that a semantic theory for X 
should be both descriptively complete and descriptively correct, and that if a semantic theory for 
X is descriptively complete, then it is internalizable for every X-language.  A more moderate 
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 internalizability requirement is that a semantic theory for truth that applies to a natural language 
should be internalizable for that natural language.  In other words, if a semantic theory for truth 
purports to specify the meanings of the sentences of a natural language that express the concept 
of truth, then there should be an extension of that natural language such that all the sentences of 
that semantic theory are translatable into that extended natural language and that semantic theory 
specifies the meanings of all the sentences of that extended natural language that express the 
concept of truth.  My argument (presented in section 2.4.1) is that a descriptively correct 
semantic theory for truth that applies to a natural language and is not internalizable for that 
natural language will not be descriptively complete for that natural language. 
The consequences of the internalizability requirements are far-reaching.  Very few 
semantic theories for truth are internalizable for natural languages.41  Even fewer are 
internalizable for every X-language.  The internalizability requirements imply that essentially 
external semantic theories for truth do not illuminate the concept of truth we find in natural 
languages.  That result turns the internalizability requirements into an effective criticism of most 
semantic theories for truth.  In Appendix D, I discuss the semantic theories for truth that purport 
to be internalizable.   
This concludes my discussion of internalizability.  In the remainder of this dissertation, I 
present my positive proposals for a theory of truth and a semantic theory for truth.  On my view, 
truth is an inconsistent concept.  In Chapter Three, I explain why the fact that truth is 
inconsistent makes it exceedingly difficult to construct internalizable semantic theories for truth.  
Chapters Four, Five and Six are devoted to the construction of a theory of inconsistent concepts.  
In Chapter Seven, I apply this theory of inconsistent concepts to truth and derive both a theory of 
                                                 
41 The only ones that purport to be are those proposed by McGee, Simmons, Field, and Maudlin.  See McGee 
(1991), Simmons (1993), Field (2003a, 2003b, 2003c), and Maudlin (2004).  See Appendix D for my evaluation of 
them. 
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 truth on which truth is an inconsistent concept and a semantic theory for truth that is 
internalizable and does not give rise to any revenge paradoxes or self-refutation problems.
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3.0  ALETHEIC VENGEANCE 
 
 
 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In Chapters One and Two, I argued that a semantic theory for X should be internalizable for 
every X-language and, in particular, that semantic theories for truth that apply to natural 
languages should be internalizable for those languages.  Those who are unfamiliar with the 
literature on the aletheic paradoxes (e.g., the liar) might be surprised to find out that this 
requirement is so hard to satisfy that very few philosophers who present theories of truth even try 
to meet it.1  The fact is that the vast majority of semantic theories for truth are not internalizable 
for any language.  Why is it so hard to construct an internalizable semantic theory for truth?  The 
question has rarely been asked and has never received an adequate answer.   
My explanation is, roughly, that there are compelling reasons to accept that certain 
principles (e.g., the truth rules) are constitutive of our concept of truth; consequently, any theory 
of truth has to respect these constitutive principles in order to be plausible.  Any theory of truth 
that respects these constitutive principles has to account for certain seemingly paradoxical 
sentences like the liar.  Any theory of truth that respects the constitutive principles and 
                                                 
1 I said in Chapter One that internalizability is relatively easy to achieve if one is willing to sacrifice descriptive 
correctness.  I am assuming that no right-minded philosopher would be willing to trade descriptive correctness for 
internalizability.  Thus, internalizability is difficult to achieve so long as one has a penchant for theories that are not 
trivially false. 
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 adequately accounts for the liar sentence has four options: (i) it faces a revenge paradox, which 
renders it inconsistent, (ii) it faces a self-refutation problem, which renders it false, (iii) it is 
restricted (in order to avoid either the revenge paradoxes or the self-refutation problems), or (iv) 
it has the unacceptable consequence that a large class of linguistic expressions are meaningless 
or incoherent (in order to avoid either the revenge paradoxes or the self-refutation problems).  
Theories that incorporate option (i) or (ii) might be internalizable, but they are obviously false.  
Theories that incorporate option (iii) are usually essentially external for every language, but it is 
possible to construct one that is internalizable for an expressively weak language; however, none 
of these theories is internalizable for a natural language.  Theories that incorporate option (iv) are 
usually internalizable for an expressively weak language, but none of them is internalizable for a 
natural language; in addition, they are unacceptable because they imply that certain coherent 
linguistic expressions are incoherent.  Thus, the revenge paradoxes and the self-refutation 
problems work together to insure that theories of truth that respect the constitutive principles for 
truth are not internalizable for natural languages.  I tell that story in section two. 
In section three, I argue that truth is an inconsistent concept.  I provide four arguments, 
but I admit that none of them is conclusive.  However, I claim that they do give us very good 
reasons for pursuing theories of truth on which truth is an inconsistent concept.  The first 
argument is that the explanation for why it is so difficult to construct a descriptively correct 
internalizable semantic theory for truth (from section two) gives us good reason to think that 
truth is an inconsistent concept.  The second argument is that when one admits that truth is an 
inconsistent concept, one can explain the difficulties philosophers have had in constructing 
acceptable theories of truth; that is, one can explain why any theory of truth that respects the 
constitutive principles for truth faces either revenge paradoxes or self-refutation problems 
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 (unless it is restricted or it implies that certain linguistic expressions are unintelligible).  No other 
account of truth has been able to provide such an explanation.  The third argument is that 
McGee’s theorem gives us good reason to believe that even theories of truth that do not respect 
the constitutive principles of truth cannot account for the way truth predicates interact with 
expressions of classical logic.  The final argument is that, by treating truth as an inconsistent 
concept, one can arrive at a semantic theory for truth that is internalizable for every language.  
The rest of the dissertation is devoted to the presentation of such a theory.  Thus, the full 
justification for treating truth as an inconsistent concept is not complete until the end of the 
dissertation. 
 
 
3.2  WHY IS INTERNALIZABILITY SO HARD? 
 
 
Let me begin by discussing the relation between semantic theories for truth and theories of truth.  
Keep in mind that I am providing an explanation for the fact that it is rather difficult to provide a 
descriptively correct internalizable semantic theory for truth.  My explanation focuses on 
problems faced by theories of truth.  Recall that a theory of truth is just a theory that specifies 
some aspect of the nature of truth, while a semantic theory for truth is a theory that assigns 
meanings to some collection of sentences that express the concept of truth.  I have discussed 
revenge paradoxes and self-refutation problems as problems confronting semantic theories for 
truth, but theories of truth face them as well.  For example, a theory of truth on which bivalence 
holds and on which the truth rules and the inference rules of classical logic are valid implies that 
the liar is both true and false.  Indeed, the revenge paradoxes and self-refutation problems pose a 
greater threat to theories of truth than they do to semantic theories for truth.  The reason is that 
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 one can construct a semantic theory for truth that is not based on a truth conditional theory of 
meaning.  These semantic theories might assign conceptual roles, assertibility conditions, or 
nomological roles to sentences; consequently, these theories might not imply that the sentences 
within their scope have any particular truth status.  However, a theory of truth will imply that the 
sentences within its scope have certain truth statuses.  Of course, the theory of truth alone might 
not have these consequences, but when combined with a set of auxiliary claims, it will.  For 
example, a theory of truth might imply that a sentence is true if and only if there is a fact to 
which it corresponds.  Alone, that theory of truth has no implications for the truth status of ‘dogs 
are mammals’, but when combined with the auxiliary claim that it is a fact that dogs are 
mammals and ‘dogs are mammals’ corresponds to this fact, it implies that ‘dogs are mammals’ is 
true.  One can formulate this point by saying that theories of truth imply truth definitions—that 
is, some of the consequences of a theory of truth (when combined with auxiliary hypotheses) are 
assignments of truth statuses to the sentences within its scope.  Thus, although a semantic theory 
for truth might be able to avoid the revenge paradoxes and self-refutation problems by assigning 
non-truth-conditional meanings, a theory of truth cannot.   
There are two important “based on” relations pertaining to semantic theories.  A semantic 
theory for X is based on both a theory of meaning and a theory of X.  The theory of meaning on 
which a given semantic theory is based determines what sort of meanings it assigns to the 
sentences in its scope (e.g., a semantic theory for truth that is based on an inferential role theory 
of meaning assigns inferential roles to the sentences within its scope, a semantic theory for truth 
that is based on a truth conditional theory of meaning assigns truth conditions to the sentences 
within its scope, etc.)  The theory of X on which a semantic theory for X is based lays down 
necessary and sufficient conditions on the semantic theory for X (e.g., a semantic theory for truth 
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 that is based on a contextual theory of truth assigns meanings to the sentences within its scope 
that conform to the dictates of the theory of truth—e.g., these meanings might be functions from 
contexts to sets of possible worlds).  If a theory of truth implies that all declarative sentences are 
either true or false, then the semantic theory for truth that is based on this theory of truth must 
assign meanings to the sentences within its scope that are consistent with this principle.  
Obviously, the theory of meaning and the theory of X on which a semantic theory for X is based 
must be consistent, at least with respect to the sentences within the scope of the semantic theory.  
In sum, a semantic theory T for X is based on a theory of meaning M if and only if the meanings 
T assigns to the sentences in its scope conform to the conditions M lays down for meanings; a 
semantic theory T for X is based on a theory T′ of X if and only if T is consistent with the 
conditions T′ lays down for semantic theories for X.   
One important consequence of the fact that a semantic theory for truth is based on a 
theory of truth is that if the theory of truth in question is restricted to avoid revenge paradoxes or 
self-refutation problems, then any semantic theory for truth that is based on this theory of truth 
will inherit these restrictions.  It turns out that if a theory of truth implies that truth is a consistent 
concept and it respects the truth rules, then it is either: (i) inconsistent because it faces a revenge 
paradox, (ii) false because it faces a self-refutation problem, (iii) restricted to avoid either a 
revenge paradox or a self-refutation problem, or (iv) false because it implies that certain coherent 
linguistic expressions are incoherent.  Thus, any descriptively correct semantic theory that is 
based on a theory of truth that both implies that truth is a consistent concept and respects the 
truth rules will be restricted as well.  The restrictions the semantic theory inherits from the theory 
of truth on which it is based prevent it from being internalizable for natural languages.  The rest 
of this section is devoted to explaining these claims. 
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3.2.1  CONSISTENT CONCEPTS AND NAÏVE THEORIES 
 
 
Most philosophers working on truth and the liar paradox assume that truth is a consistent 
concept.  In fact, this assumption is so widespread that it is almost never articulated.  To many, 
the assumption seems so obvious that to deny it is unintelligible.  However, a handful of 
philosophers working on truth and the liar paradox have denied that truth is a consistent concept, 
and the theory I advocate is a member of this tradition.2  The first order of business for someone 
who makes this move is to explain what an inconsistent concept is.  Those who claim that truth is 
an inconsistent concept often disagree about the best explanation of inconsistent concepts.  When 
I claim that truth is an inconsistent concept, I mean that the constitutive principles for truth are 
inconsistent.  That is, simply by employing the concept of truth, one commits oneself to 
following incompatible rules for using it.  I discuss inconsistent concepts at length in Chapters 
Four, Five, Six, and Seven.  Here, it is enough to understand that inconsistent concepts are 
overdetermined for some objects.  That is, the concept both applies and fails to apply to some 
objects.  In the case of truth, it both applies and fails to apply to paradoxical sentences like the 
liar.   
Those theorists who assume that a concept X is a consistent concept usually offer a naïve 
theory of X.  When one offers a naïve theory of X, one proposes several principles that describe 
X, and one collects these principles into a theory.  Thus, a naïve theory of X is a collection of 
sentences that purport to be principles that describe X.  For example, the theory composed of the 
sentences ‘every declarative sentence is either true or false’, ‘a sentence is true if and only if it 
corresponds to some fact’, and ‘no sentence is both true and false’, constitute a naïve theory of 
                                                 
2 See Chapter Seven for discussion. 
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 truth.  Axiomatic theories are common examples of naïve theories, but a naïve theory need not be 
formalized in this way.  Naïve theories are so common that one might assume that they are the 
only type of theory.  This assumption and the assumption that all concepts are consistent go hand 
in hand.   
If one accepts that a certain concept X is an inconsistent concept, then one will almost 
certainly want to avoid a naïve theory of X.  For, if X is an inconsistent concept, then it is 
impossible to construct a consistent naïve theory for X.  That is, if the principles governing the 
use of X are incompatible and a naïve theory of X is a collection of these principles, then the set 
of sentences that constitute the naïve theory of X is inconsistent.  Given that one does not want 
an inconsistent theory of X, admitting that X is an inconsistent concept forces one to avoid naïve 
theories of X.  Because of this fact, the assumption that all theories are naïve and the assumption 
that all concepts are consistent reinforce one another: if one admits that X is an inconsistent 
concept, then it seems that one will have to endorse an inconsistent theory of X, and if one wants 
a consistent theory of X, then it seems that one will have to treat X as a consistent concept.  
(Some philosophers have both assumed that truth is an inconsistent concept and proposed naïve 
theories of truth—such theorists are forced to claim that inconsistent theories can be acceptable.  
This view of truth is called dialetheism; I discuss it in Appendix E.  It seems to me that many 
philosophers are reluctant to admit that a given concept is inconsistent because they assume that 
such an admission commits them to a version of dialetheism; the theory of inconsistent concepts 
I offer in the next three chapters shows that this worry is unfounded.) 
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 3.2.2  TRUTH RULES AND PARADOXICALITY 
 
 
I claim that the truth rules are constitutive of the concept of truth in the sense that anyone who 
employs the concept of truth is committed to following them (note that this claim does not mean 
that everyone who employs the concept of truth actually follows them).  There are three truth 
rules: 
The ascending truth rule (Asc): 〈〈p〉 is true〉 follows from 〈p〉. 
 
The descending truth rule (Desc): 〈p〉 follows from 〈〈p〉 is true〉. 
 
The substitution truth rule (Sub): two names that refer to 〈p〉 are intersubstitutable in 〈〈p〉 
is true〉 without changing its truth-value).   
 
I do not claim that the ascending and descending truth rules are valid for every declarative 
sentence or even for every declarative sentence that has a truth-value.  One can easily construct 
counterexamples to them using indexicals, demonstratives, ambiguous expressions, anaphoric 
expressions, etc.  My claim is that they are valid for a large class of declarative sentences, which 
includes sentences like the liar (i.e., sentence (λ), which is ‘(λ) is false’).  If a person uses a 
linguistic expression that is not governed by these rules, then that linguistic expression does not 
express our concept of truth.  I assume that the truth rules are valid in hypothetical contexts as 
well as in categorical contexts.  That is, one can use the truth rules in conditional arguments.  In 
section 3.3, I discuss the options for theories of truth that deny that the truth rules are constitutive 
of the concept of truth. 
I assume that a theory of truth that implies that truth is governed by the truth rules also 
implies that natural language truth predicates are univocal, invariant, and non-circular.  That is, a 
theory of truth that implies that natural language truth predicates are ambiguous or context-
dependent, or that they express circular concepts does not respect the truth rules.  These theories 
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 might posit other rules that are similar to the truth rules, but they are different in significant 
ways.  For example, a theory of truth on which natural language truth predicates are ambiguous 
and can have the meaning of language-specific truth predicates (e.g., ‘true-in-English’) might 
imply that a truth predicate of English obeys truth rules that are restricted to sentences of 
English.  In section 3.3, I discuss the options for theories of truth that deny that natural language 
truth predicates are univocal, invariant, and non-circular.   
Any theory of truth that respects the truth rules has to assign some truth-status to 
paradoxical sentences like the liar unless it is restricted so that paradoxical sentences are outside 
its scope.  From the truth rules, the assumption that the liar is either true or false, and the rule of 
conditional proof, one can derive that the liar is true if and only if it is false.  In classical logic, it 
follows that the liar is both true and false.  A consistent theory of truth that respects the truth 
rules and allows sentences like the liar within its scope must either reject classical logic or assign 
some other truth-status to the liar.  In particular, it is not a viable option for a theory of truth to 
imply that what seem to be paradoxical sentences are either ungrammatical or meaningless.  The 
most obvious reason is that on accepted theories of syntax and meaningfulness, these sentences 
count as both syntactically well formed and meaningful.  However, there is another reason that 
this strategy for dealing with paradoxical sentences is unacceptable: whether a sentence is 
paradoxical can be independent of the syntactic and semantic features of the sentence.  Of 
course, the syntactic and semantic features of a sentence can guarantee that it is paradoxical; my 
point is that this need not be the case for every sentence.  I refer to this claim as the riskiness 
thesis, and I discuss it at length in Appendix B.   
Most theories of truth that respect the truth rules and have paradoxical sentences within 
their scope assign these sentences a truth-status other than truth or falsity.  Indeed, most such 
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 theories imply that paradoxical sentences are defective in some way and, thus, they do not have 
truth-values.  One can think of these theories as assigning these sentences the status of truth-
value gaps; I call this the gap approach.  There are many ways of interpreting truth-value gaps, 
but the differences between them do not affect the considerations in this chapter.3
 
 
3.2.3  REVENGE AND SELF-REFUTATION 
 
 
In this subsection, I argue that any theory of truth that respects the truth rules and has paradoxical 
sentences like the liar in its scope faces either a revenge paradox or a self-refutation problem.  
Before presenting the argument, I want to discuss both revenge paradoxes and self-refutation 
problems; I discuss each in connection with the gap approach.  I begin with revenge paradoxes. 
The most well-known revenge paradox concerns the gap approach to the liar paradox.  On the 
gap approach, the standard liar sentence, (λ) (= ‘(λ) is false’), is a gap.  However, this theory 
runs into problems when confronted with the revenge liar for the gap approach:  
(λ′): (λ′) is either false or a gap. 
One can argue that if (λ′) is either true, false, or a gap, then it is both true and false.  The 
argument is that if it is either true or false, then it is both true and false (the reasoning is 
analogous to the reasoning in the standard liar).  If (λ′) is a gap, then the second disjunct of (λ′) 
is true; hence, (λ′) is true.  Therefore, if (λ′) is either true, false, or a gap, then it is both true and 
false.4  I prefer another argument that does not rely on the rule for disjunctions.  This argument is 
analogous to the reasoning that shows that the standard liar is paradoxical.  Assume that (λ′) is 
true.  Then ‘(λ′) is either false or a gap’ is true, and it follows that (λ′) is either false or a gap.  
                                                 
3 See Yablo (1985), Soames (1999), Blamey (2002), and Field (2003a, 2003b) for discussion. 
4 See Gupta (2000). 
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 Assume that (λ′) is either false or a gap.  Then ‘(λ′) is either false or a gap’ is true, and it follows 
that (λ′) is true.  Thus, (λ′) is true if and only if (λ′) is either false or a gap.  Therefore, (λ′) is 
both true and either false or a gap.   
The gap approach can handle the standard liar in the sense that it does not imply that the 
standard liar is both true and not true.  However, it cannot handle the revenge liar.  It implies that 
the revenge liar is both true and not true (reading ‘not’ in this sentence as exclusion negation).  
When confronted with the revenge paradox, a gap theorist has two options: (i) restrict the theory, 
or (ii) deny that (λ′) is either true, false, or a gap.5  Call the first option the modest response to 
the revenge paradoxes.  On the first option, semantic theories for truth that are based on the 
restricted theory are not internalizable for any natural language.6  (Argument: assume otherwise; 
for some language L there exists an extension L′ of L such that a semantic theory for truth that is 
based on the restricted theory of truth in question is both expressible in L′ and descriptively 
complete for L′.  Some of the sentences of T contain a gap predicate.  Thus, L′ contains a gap 
predicate.  Thus, L′ contains a revenge liar for the theory of truth.  However, T is restricted from 
applying to such sentences.  Hence, T is not descriptively complete for L′.)   
The second option is to stipulate that the gap predicate is itself gappy.  Call this the 
robust response to the revenge paradox.  Hence, it is not the case that (λ′) is either true, false, or 
a gap; instead, it is a ‘gap’ gap.7  Of course, this approach will face a new revenge paradox (e.g., 
(λ′′) = ‘(λ′′) is either false, a gap, or a ‘gap’ gap’).  A more sophisticated version of this option is 
that there is a hierarchy of gap predicates, each of which can both be used to classify a revenge 
                                                 
5 A gap theorist can insist that both (λ′) and ‘(λ′) is true if and only if (λ′) is either false or a gap’ are gaps as well, 
but this move engenders self-refutation problems.  I discuss it below.  
6 See Kripke (1975) for an example.  See McGee (1991), Gupta and Belnap (1993), and Field (2003a, 2003b) for 
discussion. 
7 See McGee (1991) for an example. 
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 liar and figures in a new revenge liar.8  On this theory, none of the revenge liars poses a problem.  
The theory implies that (λ) is a gap, that (λ′) is a ‘gap’ gap, that (λ′′) is a ‘‘gap’ gap’ gap, etc.  At 
no point do we reach a sentence for which a contradiction follows from the theory.  I discuss 
such theories and offer criticism in Appendix A. 
One problem with this theory is that one can define a gap predicate that does not have 
gaps.  With this new terminology, one could construct a sentence that is very much like (λ′) in 
the sense that the theory implies that it is both true and either false or a gap (and this 
consequence is a genuine contradiction).  To avoid this problem the defender of the suggestion 
would have to make the implausible assumption that no such vocabulary could be introduced or 
that it is incoherent.  I discuss this move below. 
I want to move on to the self-refutation problem.  The standard formulation of the self-
refutation problem concerns the following sentence: 
(ρ): (ρ) is not true. 
We can reason that, on the gap approach, (ρ) must be a gap because assuming that it is either true 
or false leads to contradiction.  However, sentences that are gaps are not true.  Thus, (ρ) is not 
true.  Notice that our conclusion, ‘(ρ) is not true’, is identical to (ρ).  Thus, (ρ) is a consequence 
of the gap approach.   
At this point, there are two ways the self-refutation problem is commonly pursued: (i) the 
strong liar reasoning, or (ii) the self-refutation reasoning.  Those who take the first avenue claim 
that, because (ρ) is a consequence of the gap approach, the gap approach implies that (ρ) is true 
after all, and if the gap approach implies that (ρ) is true, then it implies that (ρ) is both true and 
false.  Hence, the gap approach is inconsistent.  The conclusion of this line of reasoning is that 
                                                 
8 See Field (2003a, 2003b) for an example. 
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 the gap approach does not solve the paradox because we can use this reasoning to arrive back at 
the contradiction.  The reasoning in short is: (ρ) is either true, false or a gap.  If (ρ) is either true 
or false, then it is both true and false (by standard liar reasoning).  If (ρ) is a gap, then (ρ) is not 
true.  If (ρ) is not true, then ‘(ρ) is not true’ is true (by ascending).  If ‘(ρ) is not true’ is true, then 
(ρ) is true (by substitution).  Therefore, if (ρ) is a gap, then (ρ) is true.  Consequently, if (ρ) is 
either true, false, or a gap, then it is both true and false.  Call this the strong liar reasoning.9  
This result is supposed to cast doubt on the efficacy of the gap approach.  
Those who travel down the other path from the observation that the gap approach has (ρ) 
as a consequence point out that the gap approach implies that this consequence is a gap.  Thus, 
the gap approach implies that one of its consequences is a gap.  Hence, it implies that one of its 
consequences (i.e., (ρ)) is not true.  Therefore, this theory of truth is self-refuting.  Call this the 
self-refutation reasoning.10
Before continuing, I want to clarify what I take to be an important issue.  If either of the 
above arguments is valid, then the ‘not’ in (ρ) must express exclusion negation.  If we assume 
that it expresses choice negation, then the step from ‘(ρ) is a gap’ to ‘(ρ) is not true’ is invalid.  If 
the ‘not’ in (ρ) is read as choice negation, then this inference would be equivalent to the 
inference from ‘(ρ) is a gap’ to ‘(ρ) is false’, and this inference is obviously invalid.   
Let us distinguish between two versions of the liar sentence that figures in self-refutation 
problems:  
(ρ1): (ρ1) is notC true. 
                                                 
9 See Burge (1979), Simmons (1991), and Gupta (2000).   
10 See McGee (1991). 
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 (ρ2): (ρ2) is notE true.11   
The gap approach certainly implies that (ρ1) is a gap.  Neither version of the self-refutation 
problem (i.e., neither the strong liar reasoning nor the self-refutation reasoning) applies to this 
result.  Given that (ρ1) is the natural reading of the standard liar sentence, the gap approach does 
a fine job of handling the standard liar.12  The self-refutation problems arise when the gap 
approach confronts sentence (ρ2). 
One should notice right away that when properly formulated, the strong liar reasoning is 
just the reasoning associated with the revenge paradox.  Indeed, as I discuss below, (ρ2) is 
equivalent to (λ′) (on a strong Kleene reading of the disjunction in (λ′)).  Thus, the strong liar 
reasoning poses no additional threat to the gap approach.  On the other hand, the self-refutation 
reasoning might pose a new threat.   
The gap theorist has at least two options for dealing with sentences like (ρ2).  First, she 
can say that the gap theory is restricted so that it does not apply to (ρ2) (and sentences like it).  
Call this the modest approach to the self-refutation problem.13  An adherent of the modest 
approach admits that her theory cannot deal with sentences like (ρ2).  Of course, this sort of 
restriction renders any semantic theory for truth that is based on a gap theory of this sort 
essentially external for every truth language.14   
                                                 
11 ‘notC’ expresses choice negation and ‘notE’ expresses exclusion negation. 
12 It is standard practice to assume that when extending sentential operators from a classical setting to a many-valued 
setting, the monotonic versions (e.g., ‘notC’) are the most natural readings. 
13 The modest approach to the self-refutation problem and the modest approach to the revenge paradox are very 
similar.  See Kripke (1975) for example. 
14 It might seem that adherents of the modest approach suffer from a new self-refutation problem that pertains to 
restricted theories.  The modest gap theory is restricted so that no sentences containing exclusion negation operators 
are in its scope.  Of course, (ρ2) contains an exclusion negation operator.  Thus, it is outside the scope of the modest 
gap theory.  Given that the modest gap theory is a theory of truth, it contains or has as a consequence a truth 
definition, which specifies which sentences are true, which ones are false, and which ones are gaps.  Because (ρ2) is 
outside the scope of this truth definition, and the truth definition specifies which sentences are true, the truth 
definition implies that (ρ2) is notE true.  That is, because the truth definition does not specify that (ρ2) is true, it 
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 The second option for the gap theorist is to deny that (ρ2) is a genuine problem.  That is, 
he claims that any language that contains a truth predicate has gaps and that exclusion negation is 
incoherent.15  Thus, there is no sentence (ρ2) that causes a problem.  Call this the robust 
response to the self-refutation problem.  On the robust approach, the argument of the self-
refutation problem is invalid.  Thus, there is no reason to think that the gap approach implies that 
(ρ2) is not true.  There is no way to express this claim according to the robust gap theorist.   
The objector can respond to the robust gap theorist by constructing a new sentence: 
(λ′): (λ′) is either false or a gap. 
Of course, the gap theorist cannot deny the intelligibility of (λ′) because his own theory employs 
a gap predicate.  As we saw in the discussion of the revenge problem, one can easily show that 
on the gap approach, (λ′) is true if and only if (λ′) is either false or a gap.  The robust gap theorist 
can deal with this objection by claiming that (λ′) is a gap and that ‘(λ′) is true if and only if (λ′) is 
either false or a gap’ is a gap as well.  The robust gap theorist can justify these claims by appeal 
to certain readings of the logical connectives that occur in these sentences.16   
The robust gap theorist who takes this path faces an additional objection.  The robust gap 
theory implies that (λ′) is a gap.  Thus, it implies that (λ′) is either false or a gap.  Hence, (λ′) is a 
consequence of the robust gap theory.  Then one can re-institute the self-refutation problem with 
(λ′); that is, the robust gap theory is self-refuting because it implies that one of its consequences 
                                                                                                                                                             
implies that (ρ2) is notE true.  Hence, the theory of truth on which the truth definition is based implies that (ρ2) is 
notE true.  Of course, ‘(ρ2) is notE true’ just is (ρ2), so the theory of truth has (ρ2) as a consequence.  Hence, the 
theory of truth implies that one of its consequences is notE true.  Therefore, it is self-refuting.  The problem with this 
objection is the claim that the theory of truth implies that (ρ2) is notE true because (ρ2) is outside the scope of the 
theory.  It is perfectly acceptable to say that a theory has no consequences for items that are outside its scope.    
15 See Parsons (1984), Tappenden (1999), and Maudlin (2004).   
16 See Blamey (2002) and Maudlin (2004). 
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 is a gap.  The robust gap theorist will have to agree with this assessment and respond by claiming 
that theories that are gaps are just as acceptable as theories that are true.   
The robust gap theorist then faces two additional objections.  First, the claim that it is 
acceptable to endorse a theory that is a gap causes problems with the notion of assertibility.  
Thus, it seems that the gap theorist has merely pushed off the problems posed by the liar from 
truth to assertibility.  Hence, the robust gap theorist has done nothing more than move the bump 
in the rug into a dimly lit corner of the room in the hopes that no one will notice it there.17  
Instead of pushing this line of criticism, I want to consider a different problem with the robust 
gap approach.  The robust gap theory implies that one of its consequences, (λ′), is a gap.  
However, it also implies that (λ′) is true because it implies that the truth rules are valid.  Hence, 
the robust gap theory implies that (λ′) is both true and a gap.  Hence, it implies that (λ′) is both 
true and notE true.   
The robust gap theorist can respond to this charge with the claim that it does imply that 
(λ′) is a gap and it does imply that (λ′) is true, but that is not problematic because ‘(λ′) is true’ is 
a gap as well.  The robust gap theorist claims that, although somewhat counterintuitive, this 
result is not unacceptable; in fact, it is the only acceptable way of dealing with the liar.   
Of course, the objector is not finished.  The objector’s next move is to either introduce 
into the object language logical connectives that allow him to formulate his objection properly or 
formulate the objection in a bivalent language (these are essentially the same move).  The 
objection is then that the robust gap theory implies that (λ′) is true and that (λ′) is not true.  
Hence, the robust gap theory is inconsistent.  The robust gap theorist is now backed into a corner 
and becomes aggressive.  He claims that there is no such language in which to formulate the 
                                                 
17 See Maudlin (2004). 
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 objection.  That is, it is illegitimate to introduce these logical connectives into the language 
because they are incoherent.  Likewise, there are no bivalent languages that contain truth 
predicates.  Thus, from the point of view of the robust gap theorist, the objection is either benign 
(if formulated in the gappy object language) or it is unintelligible (if formulated in what purports 
to be a bivalent language).   
Instead of pursuing these objections to the robust gap theorist to this point, it seems to me 
that the opponent of the robust gap theory should take a stand with the robust gap theorist’s first 
move.  The robust gap theorist’s first move is to deny that bivalent languages with truth 
predicates and languages with non-monotonic sentential operators are intelligible.  Call this 
move the unintelligibility response.  The objector should point out that it is unacceptable to 
defend one’s theory by claiming that an entire topic of study (e.g., many valued logics with non-
monotonic sentential operators) is incoherent or meaningless.  (Notice that the same objection 
undermines the robust response to the revenge paradoxes discussed above.)  It is obviously false 
that there are no bivalent languages with truth predicates or that the logical connectives used to 
formulate the objections are incoherent.  Logicians have been studying such things for decades.18  
We can construct both bivalent languages with truth predicates and languages with non-
monotonic sentential operators, and we can use them perfectly well.  Moreover, provided that a 
bivalent language with a truth predicate cannot represent its syntax, it can be consistent; provided 
that a language with non-monotonic sentential operators does not contain a truth predicate, it can 
be consistent.  Hence, the robust gap theorist’s claim that none of these linguistic phenomena are 
intelligible is radically implausible.   
                                                 
18 See Gupta (1982) for a discussion of consistent languages that contain truth predicates and Urquhart (2001) for an 
overview of many-valued logics.   
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 Another problem with the unintelligibility response is that one cannot rationally deny that 
plenty of humans have been formulating and studying languages that contain non-monotonic 
sentential operators.  To claim that these people have been dealing with meaningless expressions 
is absurd.  The only semi-plausible view in the vicinity is that these expressions are meaningful 
but inconsistent.  However, if the robust gap theorist is to be able to defend his claim that such 
things are inconsistent, then he owes us an account of what these people have been doing for the 
past fifty years.  Any such account will have to deal with the paradoxes that can result from such 
devices (i.e., the revenge paradoxes).  One might as well just use such an account for the liar 
paradox and avoid the radically implausible claim that all non-monotonic sentential operators 
and all bivalent languages with truth predicates are incoherent.  My conclusion is that a robust 
gap theory is unacceptable—the self-refutation problem is a genuine concern for theories of truth 
that respect the truth rules and have paradoxical sentences within their scope. 
So far, I have discussed the revenge problems and the self-refutation problems; I have 
also presented both a modest and a robust response to each.  Now I argue that any theory of truth 
that respects the truth rules faces either a revenge paradox or a self-refutation problem unless it is 
restricted or incorporates the unintelligibility response.  The heart of the argument is showing 
that the revenge paradoxes and the self-refutation problems reinforce one another—attempts to 
avoid one bring on the other; one can avoid both of them only by restricting one’s theory or 
endorsing an unintelligibility response.   
Consider the theory of truth T that accepts the truth rules and classical logic.  The 
standard liar sentence (λ) poses a problem for T.  Either T implies that (λ) is both true and false 
or T is restricted so that sentences like (λ) are not in its scope.  Thus, T is either inconsistent or 
restricted.   
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 Now consider a theory of truth T′ that respects the truth rules and implies that (λ) is a gap 
(i.e., (λ) is not a member of the extension of ‘true’ and (λ) is not a member of the anti-extension 
of ‘true’).  Given that T′ treats truth as partially defined, it must abandon classical logic for some 
many-valued logic.  An argument of the same form that shows (λ) causes a problem for T shows 
that (λ′) causes a problem for T′.  Below are both arguments: 
(a) (λ) is true. (Assumption) (a′) (λ′) is true.(Assumption) 
(b) ‘(λ) is false’ is true. (Sub) (b′) ‘(λ′) is false or a gap’ is true. (Sub) 
(c) (λ) is false. (Desc)  (c′) (λ′) is false or a gap.  (Desc) 
(d) (λ) is false. (Assumption) (d′) (λ′) is false or a gap.  (Assumption) 
(e) ‘(λ) is false’ is true. (Asc) (e′) ‘(λ′) is false or a gap’ is true (Asc) 
(f) (λ) is true. (Sub)  (f′) (λ′) is true. (Sub) 
 
Thus, if T and T′ accept the truth rules and T implies that (λ) is true iff (λ) is false, then T′ 
implies that (λ′) is true iff (λ′) is false or a gap.   
There are seven possibilities for the way T′ handles (λ′): 
(1) T′ implies that ‘(λ′) is true iff (λ′) is false or a gap’ is a contradiction.  Hence, (λ′) 
constitutes a revenge paradox for T′, and T′ is inconsistent.   
 
(2) T′ implies that the gap predicate in (λ′) is partially defined and (λ′) is a ‘gap’ gap.  
Hence, T′ incorporates the robust response to the revenge paradox.  However, one can 
construct a new sentence that is just like (λ′) except that it contains a completely 
defined gap predicate.  Then T′ will imply that this new sentence is both true and 
either false or a gap. 
 
(3) T′ incorporates the robust response to the revenge paradox just as in the second 
option, but it incorporates an unintelligibility response by claiming that completely 
defined gap predicates and any other linguistic devices that can be used to construct 
genuine revenge paradoxes are incoherent.  Thus, T′ is false because it implies that 
certain coherent linguistic devices are incoherent. 
 
(4) T′ implies that ‘(λ′) is true iff (λ′) is either false or a gap’ is a gap.  Hence, T′ implies 
that one of its consequences is a gap.  Therefore, (λ′) constitutes a self-refutation 
problem for T′, and T′ is unacceptable.   
 
(5) T′ implies that ‘(λ′) is true iff (λ′) is either false or a gap’ is a gap.  Hence, T′ implies 
that one of its consequences is a gap.  However, T′ implies that gappy theories are 
acceptable.  Thus, T′ incorporates the robust response to the self-refutation problem.  
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 However, one can argue that because T′ respects the truth rules, it implies that its 
consequence is both true and notE true.  Therefore, T′ is false. 
 
(6) T′ incorporates the robust response to the self-refutation problem just as in the fifth 
option, but it incorporates an unintelligibility response by claiming that non-
monotonic sentential operators and any other linguistic devices that can be used to 
formulate the self-refutation objection are incoherent.  Therefore, T′ is false because it 
implies that certain coherent linguistic devices are incoherent.   
 
(7) T′ is restricted so that sentences like (λ′) in which gap predicates occur are not in its 
scope. 
 
Of these seven options, only the seventh results in an acceptable theory.  Of course, it also results 
in a theory of truth that is restricted from applying to languages or sentences with gap predicates.  
Because it requires a gap predicate for its formulation, it is essentially external for every 
language.  Therefore, the only acceptable theory that respects the truth rules is essentially 
external for every language.   
I want make several comments on the other options and on the argument as a whole 
before moving on to the next section.  One important thing to notice about the above discussions 
of the revenge problem and the self-refutation problem is that they concern the same sentence: 
(λ′).  For some gap theories, (λ′) figures in a revenge paradox, while for others, it figures in a 
self-refutation problem.  Another key observation is that no matter what truth-status T′ assigns to 
(λ′), T′ has (λ′) as a consequence.  If T′ implies that (λ′) is true, then T′ has (λ′) as a consequence.  
If T′ implies that (λ′) is false, then T′ implies that (λ′) is either false or a gap; hence, T′ has (λ′) as 
a consequence.  If T′ implies that (λ′) is a gap, then T′ implies that (λ′) is either false or a gap; 
hence T′ has (λ′) as a consequence.  If T′ implies that (λ′) is a ‘gap’ gap, then there is some other 
sentence that is just like (λ′) but contains a completely defined gap predicate; if we call that other 
sentence (λ′), then T′ has (λ′) as a consequence. 
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 The fact that the items that cause trouble for a theory of truth are sentences and, 
moreover, that they are consequences of the theory itself makes the liar paradox especially 
difficult.19  It is this fact that allows the revenge paradoxes and the self-refutation problems to 
“team up” against theories of truth that accept the truth rules.   
In short, the problem is this: any theory of truth that respects the truth rules will have to 
classify (λ′), and it has (λ′) as a consequence.  If it classifies (λ′) as true or false, then it is 
inconsistent because it has a contradiction as a consequence (i.e., (λ′) poses a revenge paradox).  
If it classifies (λ′) as a gap, then it is self-refuting because it classifies one of its consequences as 
a gap (i.e., (λ′) poses a self-refutation problem).  No wonder some theorists are driven to claim 
that the linguistic resources required to formulate a revenge paradox or a self-refutation objection 
are unintelligible; it seems to be the only way to avoid both the revenge paradox and the self-
refutation problem other than restricting one’s theory.  The theorist who endorses the truth rules 
is dining at a bullet buffet. 
 
 
3.3  TRUTH, INCONSISTENCY, AND INTERNALIZABILITY 
 
 
In the previous section, I presented an explanation for the dearth of internalizable semantic 
theories for truth.  I claim that the solution to this problem is a theory of truth on which truth is 
an inconsistent concept.  Such a theory cannot have the form of most theories of truth, which are 
just the principles that govern the concept of truth.  Such theories are obviously inconsistent.  
What is needed is a consistent theory of truth that treats truth as an inconsistent concept.  That is 
the goal for the rest of the dissertation.  In this section, I present four arguments for treating truth 
                                                 
19 Other well-known paradoxes (e.g., Russell’s paradox, Grelling’s paradox, Berry’s paradox) do not have this 
feature.  Thus, they do not pose the same difficulty we see with the liar paradox. 
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 as an inconsistent concept.  My goal is not to prove that truth is an inconsistent concept.  Rather, 
I aim to give good reasons for pursuing theories of truth that treat truth as an inconsistent 
concept.   
The first argument is based on the discussion in the previous section.  The argument there 
shows that if a theory of truth accepts the truth rules, then that theory of truth is either 
inconsistent, self-refuting, restricted, or unacceptable (because it includes an unintelligibility 
response).  That is, any unrestricted theory of truth that respects our intuitions about truth will be 
unacceptable.  One lesson to learn from this is that the principles we take to govern our concept 
of truth really are inconsistent; hence, if our concept of truth behaves as we think it does, then 
our concept of truth is inconsistent.  That is, the principles that are constitutive of this concept 
are inconsistent.  Another lesson is that an acceptable theory of truth cannot take the form of a 
collection of principles that govern truth.  If truth is an inconsistent concept, then any such theory 
will be inconsistent.   
One might try to avoid these conclusions by claiming that our concept of truth is not as 
we take it to be.  There are two broad categories of theories that deny the truth rules.  Those in 
the first category posit some hidden semantic feature of truth in order to avoid the liar paradox 
and claim that the truth predicate obeys rules that are very similar to the truth rules but are 
specific to concepts with this hidden semantic feature.  The second type of theory flatly denies 
that the truth rules are valid.  I consider them in order. 
There are several theories of the first type.  Ambiguity theories claim that truth predicates 
in natural languages are ambiguous.  Usually, these theories imply that natural language truth 
predicates are radically ambiguous.  By that, I mean that they imply that instead of common 
instances of ambiguity (e.g., ‘bank’), a natural language truth predicate can express a transfinite 
 117
 number of distinct concepts.  Usually, such theories posit restricted versions of the truth rules for 
each of the distinct meanings of the truth predicate.  I discuss these theories in detail and pose 
several objections to them in Appendix A.   
Contextual theories of truth also posit a hidden semantic feature in our natural language 
truth predicate.  They claim that sentences containing natural language truth predicates display 
the same sort of context dependence as those containing indexicals (e.g., ‘here’), attributive 
adjectives (e.g., ‘tall’), or quantifiers (e.g., ‘everything’).  They also formulate rules that are 
similar to the truth rules, but are specific to context dependent expressions.  I discuss these 
theories and pose several criticisms of them in Appendix B.   
The revision theory of truth is another theory that posits a hidden semantic feature.  I 
have already discussed this theory several times.  It implies that truth is a circular concept that is 
governed by a rule of revision instead of the usual rule of application that governs most concepts.  
Again, the revision theory implies that truth obeys principles that are similar to the truth rules, 
but are specific to circular concepts.20
All of the theories of truth that posit hidden semantic features in our natural language 
truth predicates face at least three major problems.  First, they imply that our truth predicates 
have certain features that have gone unnoticed despite centuries of use and study.  These theories 
posit these features purely as a way of avoiding the liar paradox and its kin.  Thus, there is no 
independent reason to think that our truth predicates have these features.  Second, these theories 
face revenge paradoxes of their own.  For example, a contextualist theory has just as much 
trouble with a sentence like (κ) (where (κ) is ‘(κ) is false in all contexts’) as the gap theory has 
                                                 
20 Another example is Skyrms’ intensional theory, which denies the substitution truth rule; see Skyrms (1970a, 
1970b, 1984). 
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 with (λ′).21  Thus, there is no real payoff for positing hidden semantic features of natural 
language truth predicates.  Third, these theories miss the real point of an approach to the liar 
paradox.  The problem is not: what should we say about truth given that it generates these 
terrible paradoxes?  The problem is: what should we say about these terrible paradoxes?  
Positing some hidden semantic feature of natural language truth predicates might save our 
natural language truth predicates, but so long as one can just introduce a linguistic expression 
that behaves like a truth predicate without this hidden feature, it does not offer a solution to the 
liar paradox.  It simply reclassifies the liar paradox as a problem facing some concept other than 
truth.  Saying that the liar paradox is not a problem for natural language truth predicates because 
they do not behave in the way that generates the paradox does nothing to answer the question of 
what we should do about the paradoxes that result from linguistic expressions that do behave in 
the way that generates the paradox.22 These theories leave us with implausible theories of truth 
and no approach to the liar paradox.   
Another way of avoiding the conclusion that an inconsistency theory of truth is the only 
acceptable approach to truth is to deny flat out one or more of the truth rules.23  Of course, the 
most obvious reason to accept the truth rules is that they seem to be constitutive of the concept of 
truth.  One problem facing theories of truth of this sort is that most people will not take them to 
be theories of truth.  A concept that does not obey the truth rules is a concept that is distinct from 
our concept of truth.   
Even if I could be persuaded that our concept of truth does not obey the truth rules, I 
would still have a problem with these theories qua approaches to the liar paradox.  They face the 
same problem that confronts those who posit hidden semantic features of natural language truth 
                                                 
21 In Appendix C, I argue that the revision theory faces revenge paradoxes as well. 
22 Yablo (1993b) makes this point as well. 
23 See Feferman (1982) and Reinhardt (1986) for examples.  See Friedman and Sheard (1987) for discussion. 
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 predicates: even if their claims about truth are plausible, at most they show that the liar paradox 
is not a paradox that pertains to truth.  These theories do not constitute approaches to the liar 
paradox because one can simply introduce an expression for which the truth rules are 
constitutive.  Thus, denying that the truth rules hold is analogous to renaming the liar paradox to 
indicate that, although it still causes horrible problems, those horrible problems do not concern 
the concept of truth.  Given that truth seems to obey these rules and that we need an approach to 
concepts that obey these rules anyway, it is better to propose an account of such concepts and 
apply that account to truth.  Assuming that the argument of the previous section is correct, it is 
impossible to provide a theory of truth that: (i) respects the truth rules, (ii) is unrestricted, (iii) 
treats truth as a consistent concept, and (iv) is not obviously false (e.g., inconsistent, self-
refuting, or incorporates an unintelligibility response).  The way out of this predicament is to 
treat truth as an inconsistent concept. 
The second argument is that if one decides to treat truth as an inconsistent concept, then 
one has available a satisfying explanation of the current situation in truth studies.  That is, one 
can explain why other theories of truth face either self-refutation problems or revenge paradoxes 
and so are unable to serve as the basis for internalizable semantic theories for truth.  No other 
theory of truth has managed to do this.24
The explanation for why theories of truth that imply truth is a consistent concept face 
revenge paradoxes or self-refutation problems is straightforward.  Our concept of truth is 
inconsistent in the sense that its constitutive principles, the truth rules, are incompatible.  That is, 
there are objects that these rules classify as both true and not true.  We can call the set of such 
objects the overdetermination set for truth.  All the paradoxical sentences considered so far are 
members of the overdetermination set for truth.  Any naïve theory of truth that includes these 
                                                 
24 See Glanzberg (2005) for the only other explanation of which I am aware. 
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 principles and accepts classical logic is inconsistent and can be rendered consistent only by 
restricting it.  If a theory of truth implies that some of the sentences in the overdetermined set for 
truth are gaps, then its fate depends on which of these sentences it classifies as gaps.  Recall that 
many of the members of the overdetermination set for truth are truth status attributions, and no 
matter what truth status one assigns them, they are consequences of the assignment.  No matter 
whether one’s theory of truth classifies these paradoxical sentences as true, false, or gappy, these 
paradoxical sentences are consequences of one’s theory.  Thus, if a theory of truth implies that 
all the sentences in the overdetermined set for truth are gaps, then the theory implies that some of 
its consequences are gaps.  On the other hand, if a theory of truth does not classify some of these 
sentences as gaps, then the truth rules imply that they are both true and not true.  On the first 
option, the theory is self-refuting, while on the second, it is rendered inconsistent by a revenge 
paradox.   
In section two, I argued that theories of truth that accept the truth rules are not 
internalizable for natural languages because they face either revenge paradoxes or self-refutation 
problems.  If we admit that truth is an inconsistent concept, then we can explain why such 
theories inevitably face either revenge paradoxes or self-refutation problems.  Therefore, by 
accepting that truth is an inconsistent concept, we arrive at a deeper explanation for why theories 
of truth that accept the truth rules fail to be internalizable for natural languages. 
The third reason for adopting an inconsistency theory of truth is that Vann McGee has 
shown that a theory of truth that entails the obvious principles governing the interaction of the 
truth predicate with the logical expressions of classical first order logic is ω-inconsistent.  More 
precisely, McGee’s theorem states that a set, S, of sentences that meets the following conditions 
is ω-inconsistent: 
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 (a) S contains the axioms of arithmetic. 
(b) S is closed under first-order consequence. 
(c) S contains 〈〈p〉 is true〉 whenever it contains 〈p〉. 
(d) S contains all instances of: 〈〈p implies q〉 is true〉 implies 〈〈p is true〉 implies 〈q is 
true〉〉. 
(e) S contains all instances of: 〈〈~ p〉 is true〉 implies 〈~ 〈p〉 is true〉. 
(f) S contains all instances of: 〈For all x, 〈p(x)〉 is true〉 implies 〈〈for all x, p(x)〉 is true〉. 
 
A set is ω-inconsistent (roughly) if and only if there is some formula 〈p(x)〉 such that 〈it is not the 
case that for all x, p(x)〉 is a consequence of the set of sentences, but for each n, 〈p(n)〉 is a 
consequence of it.  Thus, a set is ω-inconsistent if it implies all the instances of a generalization, 
and implies the negation of the generalization.  Granted, McGee’s theorem does not show that a 
theory of truth that satisfies these properties is inconsistent (indeed, he proves that his result 
cannot be strengthened in this way), but ω-inconsistency is bad enough.  For example, one can 
show that an ω-inconsistent theory cannot give arithmetical expressions their normal meanings.25   
My point is that the conditions in McGee’s theorem are natural ones to want for a theory of truth.  
He has shown that any naïve theory of truth that satisfies them is unacceptable (because it is ω-
inconsistent).  Thus, we have good reason to think that any theory of truth on which truth is a 
consistent concept will be implausible because it either denies one of these eminently plausible 
principles or it is ω-inconsistent.  That gives us another reason to prefer an inconsistency theory 
of truth. 
The fourth and final reason for adopting an inconsistency theory of truth is that by doing 
so, one can avoid the self-refutation problems and revenge problems that plague the other 
theories of truth.  Thus, an inconsistency theory of truth does not need to be restricted to avoid 
these problems.  Hence, it can serve as the basis for a semantic theory for truth that is 
internalizable for every language.  If that is a legitimate goal, and I have argued at length in 
                                                 
25 See McGee (1985). 
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 Chapters One and Two that it is, then the prospect of an internalizable semantic theory for truth 
is one of the best reasons for adopting an inconsistency theory of truth.  In other words, if (i) 
only theories of truth that support internalizable semantic theories for truth really explain truth, 
(ii) an inconsistency theory of truth can support an internalizable semantic theory for truth, and 
(iii) we have good reason to believe that a consistency theory of truth cannot support an 
internalizable semantic theory for truth, then we have good reason to believe that only an 
inconsistency theory of truth really explains truth.  Of course, I have not yet shown that by 
admitting that truth is an inconsistent concept one can construct a theory of truth that serves as 
the basis for an internalizable semantic theory for truth.  However, the theory I develop in 
Chapters Four, Five, Six, and Seven justifies this claim.  It is a consistent theory of truth that 
faces no self-refutation problems and no revenge paradoxes; hence, it does not require 
restrictions, and it can serve as the basis for an internalizable semantic theory for truth (which I 
also provide).   
 
 
3.4  CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this chapter, I have argued for treating truth as an inconsistent concept.  In section 3.2, I 
presented detailed accounts of the self-refutation problem and the revenge paradoxes.  I argued 
that any theory of truth that treats truth as univocal and invariant and respects the truth rules is 
self-refuting, inconsistent, restricted, or radically implausible.  In section 3.3, I presented four 
arguments for treating truth as an inconsistent concept.  Thus, this chapter serves as motivation 
for the approach I develop in the rest of the dissertation. 
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4.0  A THEORY OF INCONSISTENT CONCEPTS 
 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter is the first of three in which I present a theory of inconsistent concepts.  In this 
chapter, I propose a definition of ‘inconsistent concept’ and present several distinctions and 
examples.  I also discuss three policies for dealing with a concept one has discovered to be 
inconsistent, and I argue that inconsistent concepts should be replaced.  Finally, I discuss the link 
between conceptual inconsistency and conceptual confusion, which is the focus of Chapters Five 
and Six.   
 
 
4.2  INCONSISTENT CONCEPTS 
 
 
In this section, I provide a definition of ‘inconsistent concept’ and discuss several distinctions 
and examples; I also present my account of inconsistent concepts.  Before discussing inconsistent 
concepts I want to make a few remarks about concepts.  I prefer to accommodate a range of 
views on the nature of concepts.  I do invoke the expression relation that holds between words 
and concepts; however, I provide no explicit account of it.  I also speak of applying a concept.  
Roughly, I think of concept application on the lines of belief formation or assertion.  For 
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 example, I apply the concept scab to some object α if I am prepared to assert ‘α is a scab’ or I 
believe that α is a scab.1     
An important part of my account of concepts is that there are rules that govern the 
employment of a concept.  A person who possesses a certain concept and is committed to 
employing it is committed to following the rules for the employment of that concept.  One such 
rule is that the concept scab should be applied to scabs and it should not be applied to things that 
are not scabs.2  One can think of these rules as constitutive in the sense that if a person utters a 
word that expresses the concept scab, then that person is committed to following the rules for the 
employment of scab.  By ‘committed to following the rules’ I do not mean that the person 
actually acts in accordance with these rules or that he explicitly endorses them; rather, I mean 
that the person ought to follow them—he is obligated to follow them—whether he explicitly 
endorses them or not.3   
An inconsistent concept is one whose constitutive rules are incompatible in the sense that 
they dictate that the concept both applies and does not apply to some entities.  The rules for the 
employment of an inconsistent concept impose conflicting commitments on the employers of 
that concept.  Thus, the employer of an inconsistent concept cannot follow the rules for the 
application of that concept in all circumstances.4  Consider an example: 
(1a)  ‘rable’ applies to x if x is a table. 
(1b)  ‘rable’ disapplies to x if x is red.5
                                                 
1 I use bold type as a convention for the names of concepts. 
2 I am not committed to explaining concepts in terms of such rules; see Davidson (1982) for a criticism of those who 
favor such an explanatory strategy. 
3 My commitment to constitutive rules for concepts places me in the tradition of meaning-constitutive accounts of 
concepts.  However, not all the members of this tradition agree on rules as the relevant constitutive element.  Some 
constitutive accounts choose the possession of propositional attitudes, the truth of theories, the validity of 
implications, etc.  See Peacocke (1992) for an example. 
4 See Chihara (1979, 1982) and Yablo (1993a) for similar views on inconsistent concepts. 
5 I say that a concept applies to the members of its extension and disapplies to the members of its antiextension. 
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 Rable is an inconsistent concept.  Someone who possesses rable might run into difficulty 
employing it because it both applies and disapplies to red tables.  When confronted with a red 
table, an employer of rable will be unable to satisfy the demands it places on her.  Of course, 
someone could employ rable without trouble as long as she avoids red tables.  Notice that rable 
is undefined for things that are neither red nor tables.   
It is essential to distinguish between inconsistent concepts and unsatisfiable concepts.  An 
unsatisfiable concept is one that is consistent but which does not apply to anything.  An 
unsatisfiable concept places incompatible demands on the objects to which it applies, while an 
inconsistent concept places incompatible demands its employers.  For example, 
(2) x is a squircle if and only if x is a square and x is a circle. 
Squircle is an unsatisfiable concept, but it is not inconsistent.  Someone who possesses squircle 
has no problem employing it.  It should be disapplied to everything.6   
I want to make several points about inconsistent concepts.  First, attempting to place the 
definition of an inconsistent concept in the standard form results in a consistent concept that is 
either conjunctive or disjunctive.  Notice the difference in definitions (1) and (2).  (2) prescribes 
both the application conditions and the disapplication conditions for squircle at once, while (1) 
has two separate clauses for rable.  When considering a definition like (2), it is common to 
assume that if something is not both a square and a circle, then it is not a squircle.  This 
assumption fits well with consistent concepts because their application conditions and 
disapplication conditions are disjoint.  The application conditions and disapplication conditions 
for inconsistent concepts overlap.  That makes it impossible to introduce them with definitions 
that are in the form of (2).  Consider another definition: 
                                                 
6 I mention the distinction between inconsistent and unsatisfiable concepts because it is a common mistake to 
assume that inconsistent concepts are merely unsatisfiable.  See Stenius (1972), Chihara (1979), and Yablo (1993b) 
for discussions of the distinction and the mistake. 
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 (3)  x is a non-red-table if and only if x is a table and x is not red. 
There is a big difference between non-red-table and rable.  Non-red-table is consistent and 
applies to things that are both tables and not red; it disapplies to everything else.   
Second, inconsistent concepts characteristically give rise to paradoxes.  For example, 
assume for reductio that some red tables exist.  Let R be the name of a red table.  R is a table; 
hence, R is a rable.  R is red; hence, it is not the case that R is a rable.  Thus, R is a rable and it is 
not case that R is a rable.  Contradiction.  Therefore, no red tables exist.  It is obvious that 
something has gone wrong in this argument, but what?  I take it as a condition on any account of 
inconsistent concepts that it must explain the fallacy in the above argument.  It should not be 
surprising that arguments like this one feature prominently in criticisms of theories that posit 
inconsistent concepts.  I address it in Chapter Six.   
The next point is that there is an affinity between inconsistent concepts and partial 
concepts.  A partial concept is one that has a limited range of applicability.  Some concepts are 
partial by definition.  Here is Scott Soames’ example of a partial concept: 
(4a) ‘smidget’ applies to x if x is greater than four feet tall; 
(4b) ‘smidget’ disapplies to x if x is less than two feet tall.7
Smidget is a partial concept because it is undefined for entities that are between two and four feet 
tall.  I want to introduce several terms that are helpful in discussing partial concepts and 
inconsistent concepts.  When discussing any partial concept, I assume that there is a set of all the 
objects that exist; I call it the domain.  This assumption brings with it several obvious and 
difficult set theoretic problems that I will not go into; they do not matter for my purposes.  I say 
that the range of applicability of a concept is the subset of the domain to which it either applies 
or disapplies.  The range of inapplicability is usually the complement of the range of 
                                                 
7 Soames (1999).  See Glanzberg (2003) for criticism. 
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 applicability.  I say that a concept is inapplicable to an object if that object falls within its range 
of inapplicability.  Smidget’s range of applicability is the set of objects that are either greater 
than four feet tall or less than two feet tall.  Rable’s range of applicability is the set of objects 
that are either tables or non-red things.  For the purposes of distinguishing between inconsistent 
and consistent concepts, I draw a distinction between the objects a concept applies to and those it 
is true of.  Both inconsistent and consistent concepts can apply to objects, but only consistent 
concepts can be true of objects.  This usage coincides with my conclusion in Chapter Five that 
sentences involving inconsistent concepts are truth-value gaps.  It would sound odd to say that Φ 
is true of α, but ⎡Φα⎤ is not true.  Likewise, only consistent concepts have extensions or 
antiextensions.  I call the set of things to which a concept applies its application set and the set of 
things to which a concept disapplies is its disapplication set.  The application sets of consistent 
concepts are their extensions and the disapplication sets of consistent concepts are their anti-
extensions.  A concept’s overdetermined set is the intersection of its application set and its 
disapplication set.  One must be especially careful dealing with negation and partial concepts.  ‘α 
is not a smidget’ is ambiguous because it can either mean that smidget disapplies to α or that 
smidget is inapplicable to α.  The former reads ‘not’ as choice negation and the latter reads it as 
exclusion negation (I discuss these issues at length in Chapter Seven).   
There is an important distinction between completely defined partial concepts and 
partially defined partial concepts.8  The former have explicitly specified ranges of applicability 
and inapplicability.  The latter have explicitly specified ranges of applicability, but nothing is 
said about their range of inapplicability.  Smidget is a partially defined partial predicate.  The 
following definition of ‘smidget’ makes it completely defined partial predicate: 
                                                 
8 Soames (1999) makes use of this distinction in his theory of truth.  See Gupta (2002) for this terminology, which 
Soames endorses in Soames (2002b). 
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 (5a)  ‘smidget’ applies to x if x is greater than four feet tall; 
(5b)  ‘smidget’ disapplies to x if x is less than two feet tall; 
(5c)  ‘smidget’ is inapplicable to x if x is between two and four feet tall (inclusive) or x 
does not have a height. 
 
If a concept’s application set and disapplication set are neither disjoint nor jointly exhaustive, 
then it will be both partial and inconsistent.   
Up to this point I have discussed only inconsistent concepts whose application sets and 
disapplication sets are not disjoint.  However, if a concept’s range of applicability and its range 
of inapplicability are not disjoint, then it is inconsistent as well.  For example: 
(6a)  ‘mammamonkey’ applies to x if x is a mammal. 
(6b) ‘mammamonkey’ disapplies to x if x is an animal and x is not a mammal. 
(6c)  ‘mammamonkey’ is inapplicable to x if x is either a monkey or x is not an animal. 
Although the application set and disapplication set for mammamonkey are disjoint, it is an 
inconsistent concept because its range of applicability and range of inapplicability overlap.  A 
concept can exhibit both types of inconsistency as well.  I mark this distinction by saying that an 
application-inconsistent concept is one whose application set and disapplication set are not 
disjoint; a range-inconsistent concept is one whose range of applicability and range of 
inapplicability are not disjoint.  I focus primarily on application-inconsistent concepts in the 
remainder of this chapter, but most of my comments and results hold for range-inconsistent ones 
as well.   
Before discussing policies for handling conceptual inconsistency, I present several other 
types of inconsistent concepts.  I have already introduced rable, which is inconsistent and causes 
problems for anyone who decides to employ it in the vicinity of red tables.  However, even if an 
employer of rable never encounters a red table, the concept still poses a problem for her because 
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 inconsistent concepts pose a normative problem for their employers.  Someone who chooses to 
employ rable should apply it to tables and should disapply it to red things.  These are conceptual 
norms to which the employer has decided to bind herself.  Of course, a concept possessor can 
decide to employ a certain concept without knowing that it is inconsistent.  All the types of 
inconsistent concepts I discuss cause normative problems for their employers; however, they 
differ on the availability of the items that cause problems for someone who has decided to 
employ the inconsistent concept.  Red tables are plentiful; hence, an employer of rable will run 
into trouble in pretty common circumstances.   
It is possible to define an inconsistent concept that can be employed without difficulty in 
any physically possible situation.  Consider the following definition: 
(7a)  ‘uranicube’ applies to x if x is a cube whose volume is at least one cubic mile.  
(7b)  ‘uranicube’ disapplies to x if x is composed entirely of uranium. 
As I have defined it, uranicube is both partial and inconsistent.  Its range of applicability is the 
union of the set of cubes whose volumes are greater than one cubic mile and the set of things 
composed entirely of uranium.  I assume that, according to the laws of nature, it is physically 
impossible for a cube of pure uranium whose volume is at least one cubic mile to exist (this is a 
stock example from philosophy of science discussions).  Thus, an employer of uranicube will 
not run into any difficulty while applying it to objects of the actual world.  Although uranicube 
is an inconsistent concept and an employer of it is in normative difficulty, he will never have to 
decide whether to apply it or disapply it to an object in its overdetermination set.9   
Even less threatening inconsistent concepts are possible as well.  Consider: 
(8a)  ‘cirquare’ applies to x if x is a square. 
                                                 
9 Depending on one’s views on counterfactuals and laws of nature, an employer of uranicube might run into trouble 
by using it in certain subjunctive conditionals or by formulating natural laws with it. 
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 (8b)  ‘cirquare’ disapplies to x if x is a circle. 
Cirquare is an inconsistent concept, but since squircles are conceptually impossible, there is no 
actual or possible threat to an employer of it.  In fact, cirquare is so benign that one might deny 
that it is inconsistent at all. 
Up to this point I have discussed mostly inconsistent concepts that are inconsistent by 
definition.  However, one can construct an example of a concept that is inconsistent by virtue of 
the environment in which it is used.  I call the former intrinsically inconsistent and the latter 
empirically inconsistent.  The following is an example of an empirically inconsistent concept 
based on an example of Gupta’s.10    
Consider a community of people who speak a language that is similar to English except 
that in their language, the rules for using the expression ‘x is up above y’ (where ‘x’ and ‘y’ are 
replaced by singular terms) are different.  I call the members of this community Higherians.  
Two equally important features of the Higherians’ ‘up above’ talk are that they can perceptually 
distinguish situations in which one object is up above another (these situations are similar to the 
ones in which an English speaker would say that one object is up above another), and that they 
can determine when the ray connecting two objects is parallel to a particular ray that is 
designated as “Standard Up” (where Standard Up is orthogonal to a tangent plane for the surface 
of the object on which the Higherians live).  An assertion of ‘A is up above B’ is warranted if 
and only if either A and B are constituents of one of the perceptually distinguishable situations 
(call this the perceptual criterion), or the ray connecting A and B is parallel to Standard Up and 
A is farther from the surface than B (call this the conceptual criterion).  An assertion of ‘A is not 
up above B’ is warranted if and only if either A and B are not in the proper perceptually 
                                                 
10 Gupta (1999).     
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 distinguishable relation to one another, or it is not the case that both the ray connecting A and B 
is parallel to Standard Up and A is further from the surface than B.   
Assume that ‘up above’ is defined only for perceivable objects and only for objects 
within the national borders of the Higherians’ country.  When a Higherian can perceive two 
objects at the same time then that person can perceive whether they are in the right perceptually 
distinguishable relation to one another.  In addition, every Higherian can determine the ray that 
connects any two perceivable objects and can determine whether any two rays are parallel.  
Thus, if a Higherian can perceive object A and he can perceive object B (not necessarily 
simultaneously), then he can determine whether the ray that connects them is parallel to Standard 
Up.  Assume that the Higherians do not know that their concept is inconsistent because when 
they can perceive two objects at the same time, they employ the perceptual criterion and when 
they cannot, they employ the conceptual criterion.  Assume also that whether one object is up 
above another does not depend on any of the Higherians taking them to be in this relation and 
that the notion of warrant is not relative to anyone’s epistemic situation.  Finally, assume that 
there is no difference between the Higherians’ idiolects and their common language, that there is 
no conversational implicature associated with statements containing ‘up above’, and that the 
conventions governing ‘up above’ are common knowledge (i.e., there is no division of linguistic 
labor for this expression). 
  If the Higherians live on the surface of a spherical planet, and their nation consists of 
more than just a single point, then ‘up above’ is inconsistent.  If A and B are two objects that are 
located some distance from where Standard Up intersects the surface of their sphere and are in 
the right perceptually distinguishable relation then both ‘A is up above B’ and ‘A is not up above 
B’ will count as warranted because they are in the right perceptually distinguishable relation, but 
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 the ray connecting them is not parallel to Standard Up.  However, if the Higherians’ country is 
confined to one flat surface of a rectangular solid, then ‘up above’ is consistent because it is 
defined only within their national borders.  Hence, up above is an empirically inconsistent 
concept in the case where the Higherians live on the surface of a sphere.   
It might seem impossible for a concept to be inconsistent without the employers of that 
concept knowing that it is inconsistent, but empirically inconsistent concepts should dispel this 
impression.  The rules for the employment of a concept often incorporate features of the 
environment in which it is used; if the employers of a concept are ignorant or mistaken about 
some features of their environment, then the concept in question can be inconsistent without their 
knowledge.  No amount of “reflection on their concepts” will inform them that their concept is 
inconsistent; they have to go out into the world and learn empirical facts to discover the 
conceptual inconsistency.  Consider the history of human inquiry—we (humans) discover false 
empirical beliefs alarmingly often.  Given the degree of our ignorance and error, there is a good 
chance that many, perhaps most, of our concepts are empirically inconsistent.  That sobering 
thought should lend urgency to the task of constructing an adequate theory of inconsistent 
concepts and a descriptively complete and descriptively correct semantic theory for inconsistent 
concepts.11
 
 
4.3  POLICIES FOR HANDLING INCONSISTENT CONCEPTS 
 
 
What should a person do if she discovers that she employs an inconsistent concept?  What should 
a person do if he discovers that someone else employs an inconsistent concept?  I address the 
                                                 
11 One can construct a concept that is inconsistent by virtue of the natural laws of the world in which it is used (e.g., 
the pre-relativistic concept of simultaneity).  I suggest the term ‘nomically inconsistent’ for such concepts. 
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 second question in Chapters Five and Six.  Here I want to discuss three potential answers to the 
first one.  To have a concrete example, assume that Troy is a person who has discovered that one 
of his dearly beloved concepts, concept X, is inconsistent.  I do not address the difficult issue of 
how one discovers such a thing.   
 
 
4.3.1  THE REINTERPRETATION POLICY 
 
 
Suspicions of conceptual inconsistency are invariably accompanied by efforts to reinterpret the 
conceptual employment in question.  The reinterpretation policy makes this reaction the official 
strategy for dealing with inconsistent concepts.  In my example, one thing Troy could do is 
reinterpret his past actions and beliefs so that either he never employed X or X is not 
inconsistent.  The first option leaves X alone and posits a consistent concept, Y, as the one Troy 
was using all along.  The second option reinterprets X.  The sort of reinterpretation I have in 
mind here is similar to the maneuvers found in Kripke’s rule-following argument12, Quine’s 
argument for indeterminacy of translation13, and Goodman’s new riddle of induction14.  I do not 
doubt that such a reinterpretation is possible, but I do question the legitimacy of the 
reinterpretation policy as a way of dealing with the discovery of an inconsistent concept.  It 
seems to me that it would not be hard to construct situations of inconsistent concept employment 
that would force very strange and uncharitable reinterpretations.  It is far better to have an 
account ready to hand that can be used in the event of such a discovery.  I want to emphasize that 
I have no argument to show that the reinterpretation strategy is impossible or that people do not 
                                                 
12 Kripke (1982) contains an example where someone reinterprets plus as quus. 
13 Quine (1960) contains an example where someone reinterprets rabbit as undetached-rabbit-part or rabbit 
stage. 
14 Goodman (1955) contains an example where someone reinterprets green as grue. 
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 use it.  On the contrary, it is the most common response.  My qualm is with having it as a general 
strategy for dealing with inconsistent concepts.  I discuss it more in Section 6.7 of Chapter Six. 
 
 
4.3.2  THE CONTAINMENT POLICY 
 
 
According to the containment policy, we should identify the overdetermined items for concept X 
and treat them in a way so as to render them benign.  That means we should determine which 
objects are in X’s overdetermination set and avoid applying or disapplying X to them.  We 
should refrain from asserting sentences associated with these employments of X and avoid 
having propositional attitudes associated with them as well.  (For example, if R is a red table, 
then we should assert neither ‘R is a rable’ nor ‘R is not a rable’ and we should believe neither 
that R is a rable nor that R is not a rable.  A number of prominent philosophers have advocated 
one form or another of the containment policy for dealing with the aletheic paradoxes (e.g., the 
liar), including Katsoff, Popper, van Bentham, Chihara, and Yablo.15  It is also a common view 
among non-philosophers who are presented with paradoxes that arise in connection with 
inconsistent concepts. 
I have several reservations about the containment policy.  First, it can turn out to be 
difficult or impossible to avoid either uttering paradoxical sentences or entertaining attitudes 
toward the propositions they express (if such propositions are possible).  In the case of truth, the 
knowledge required to determine whether a particular sentence is paradoxical goes far beyond 
that which any normal speaker has in everyday situations, and in some cases it is beyond 
anyone’s knowledge.  Of course, sometimes we can figure out whether a sentence is paradoxical, 
but in general, determining whether any given sentence is paradoxical is incredibly difficult 
                                                 
15 See Katsoff (1953), Popper (1954), van Bentham (1978), Chihara (1979, 1984), Yablo (1985, 1989). 
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 because it can depend on the semantic properties of sentences to which we no longer have 
access.  Likewise, in many cases it is far too demanding to restrict people from applying or 
disapplying an inconsistent concept to paradoxical items (see Appendix B for a discussion of this 
issue). These problems take on a prominent role in the case of truth in Chapter Seven. 
My biggest concern about the containment policy is that does not get to the root of the 
problem.  The problem is that an inconsistent concept is defective.  There is a sense of ‘ought’ in 
which defective concepts ought to be replaced or retired.  It is the same sense as the ‘ought’ in 
‘one ought to avoid moral dilemmas’.  Because the employer of an inconsistent concept 
undertakes incompatible commitments (i.e., undertakes commitments to follow the rules for 
employing the concept in question), one ought to refrain from employing an inconsistent 
concept.  However, a proponent of the containment policy tries to deal with the problems that 
result from the continued employment of the inconsistent concept.  In an important sense, the 
containment policy treats the symptoms instead of the disease.   
I think that there is a limited place for the containment policy in an effective 
paradoxicality response program.  The containment policy is an important first step in the 
eventual replacement of an inconsistent concept.  While we (humans) are deciding what changes 
to make to our conceptual repertoire, the containment policy is the best one for the interim.  
Nevertheless, we must actually go on to alter our concepts so as to remove the inconsistency.   
 
 
4.2.3  THE REPLACEMENT POLICY 
 
 
I advocate the replacement policy for inconsistent concepts.  According to it, we should 
determine the best way to replace an inconsistent concept with consistent ones, and do so.  That 
means we should stop employing an inconsistent concept and begin employing a different 
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 concept or group of concepts.  One difficult issue with pursuing the replacement policy is the 
choice of replacement(s).  I say very little on how to go about choosing a replacement(s) for an 
inconsistent concept and I am not sure that it is possible to provide a strategy that will result in 
the best replacement(s) each time.  It seems to me that judging the best replacement(s) involves 
the weighing of factors that are not easily quantifiable, as in considerations of simplicity, 
economy, and charity. 
I want to address one objection to the replacement policy.  It is that an inconsistent 
concept might be indispensable.  That is, it might be so important that we cannot get along 
without it.  Alternatively, it might be so ubiquitous that the replacement policy itself depends on 
it.  It might even turn out to be impossible for any combination of consistent concepts to do the 
work of the inconsistent one.  These three varieties of indispensability claims are problematic for 
the advocate of the replacement policy.  I can offer no guarantee that the replacement policy will 
be successful for every inconsistent concept.  Indispensable inconsistent concepts, if such 
monsters exist, would be rather troubling and I am afraid that I have nothing helpful to say on the 
matter.  However, the mere possibility of indispensable inconsistent concepts does not 
undermine the replacement policy or offer a justification for the containment policy as an 
alternative.  The containment policy would be an acceptable alternative to the replacement policy 
only if good reasons were marshaled for the claim that a particular concept is both inconsistent 
and indispensable.  Moreover, the replacement policy would still be the favored one in the 
general case.  The containment policy would only serve as a fallback position for particularly 
recalcitrant cases. 
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 4.4  INCONSISTENT CONCEPTS ARE CONFUSED 
 
 
So far in this chapter I have given a definition of ‘inconsistent concept’, introduced several types 
of inconsistent concepts and discussed three policies for handling conceptual inconsistency.  In 
this section, I advocate a particular explanation of inconsistent concepts.  On my view, 
inconsistent concepts are confused concepts.  To carry out this explanatory strategy, I owe an 
account of confused concepts.  In the remainder of this chapter I discuss confused concepts and 
provide some examples.  In Chapter Five, I endorse Joseph Camp’s theory of confusion and his 
logic for confused singular terms.  In Chapter Six, I extend Camp’s theory of confusion to 
concepts and I use it to construct a semantic theory for confused concepts.  Chapter Six also 
includes the full explanation of inconsistent concepts in terms of confused concepts.   
It is perhaps easiest to say what it is for a person to be confused.  Roughly, a person is 
confused if and only if he or she thinks that two or more distinct entities are identical.16  The 
entities in question can be objects, properties, relations, concepts, propositions, etc.  One can 
then define a confused singular term as one that is used by a person who thinks that two or more 
distinct objects are identical, where that person uses the singular term in an attempt to refer to the 
one object she thinks exists.  In the next chapter I discuss an example of Camp’s where Fred is a 
person who owns an ant farm and mistakenly believes that it contains only one big ant when in 
fact it houses two big ants.  Fred uses the name ‘Charlie’ in an attempt to refer to what he thinks 
is the sole big ant in the ant farm.  In this example, Fred is confused because he thinks that two 
distinct objects (the two big ants) are identical.  ‘Charlie’ as used by Fred is a confused singular 
term because a confused person uses it in an attempt to refer to the one object he thinks exists.   
                                                 
16 In this formulation ‘thinks that’ is not synonymous with ‘believes that’.  In the next chapter I discuss this use of 
‘thinks that’.  For now I leave it at an intuitive level. 
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 If we assume that predicates are used to express concepts and to designate properties, 
then we can define a confused predicate as one that is used by a person who thinks that two or 
more distinct properties are identical, where that person uses the predicate to designate the one 
property he thinks exists.17  A confused concept is one that is expressed by a confused predicate.  
The components of a confused concept are the distinct concepts expressed by the predicates that 
designate the properties thought to be identical by the confused person in question.  I sometimes 
say that a confused concept is a fusion or an amalgam of its components.   
An example of conceptual confusion popularized by Field is the Newtonian concept of 
mass.  In Newton’s physics, physical objects have a single physical quantity: mass.  According to 
this theory, mass obeys the two laws (which are considered equally fundamental): (i) mass = 
momentum / velocity, and (ii) the mass of an object is the same in all reference frames.  In 
Einstein’s physics, physical objects have two different “kinds” of mass: proper mass and 
relativistic mass.  An object’s proper mass is its total energy divided by the square of the speed 
of light; an object’s relativistic mass is its non-kinetic energy divided by the square of the speed 
of light.  Although relativistic mass = momentum / velocity, the relativistic mass of an object is 
not the same in all reference frames.  Contrariwise, proper mass ≠ momentum / velocity, but the 
proper mass of an object is the same in all reference frames.  Thus, relativistic mass obeys one of 
the laws for the Newtonian concept of mass and proper mass obeys the other.   
Field argues that the Newtonian concept of mass is a confused concept (although he does 
not use the term ‘confused’).  That is, an employer of mass thinks that two distinct physical 
quantities (relativistic mass and proper mass) are identical.  Field argues that ‘mass’ as used by 
the Newtonian physicist did not designate relativistic mass and did not designate proper mass; it 
                                                 
17 This use of ‘designate’ can be found in those who follow Kripke in calling some predicates ‘rigid designators’ 
(see Kripke 1972 and Soames 2002).  I use it out of convenience; one could instead define confused predicates in 
terms of extensions. 
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 did not designate some other quantity and it did not fail to designate anything at all.  Instead, 
Field claims that it partially designated both relativistic mass and proper mass.18  In the next 
chapter I take up the issue of how best to interpret confused concepts like this one. 
According to my theory of inconsistent concepts, an inconsistent concept is a confused 
concept.19  Thus, an employer of an inconsistent concept is confused.  Hence, an employer of an 
inconsistent concept that is expressed by a predicate thinks that two or more distinct properties 
are identical and uses a confused predicate in an attempt to designate the one property he or she 
thinks exists.  That explanation imposes conditions on attributions of conceptual inconsistency.  
For instance, the claim that a certain concept is inconsistent implies that it is a fusion of two or 
more concepts.  This account dovetails with the replacement strategy for dealing with 
inconsistent concepts because the component concepts for an inconsistent concept are usually 
ideal candidates for the replacements.   
 
 
4.5  CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this chapter, I presented an account of inconsistent concepts, on which an inconsistent concept 
is one whose constitutive rules for employment are incompatible.  I defined several types of 
inconsistent concepts and discussed policies for handling them.  Of particular importance is the 
distinction between application-inconsistent and range-inconsistent concepts, and the distinction 
                                                 
18 See Field (1973, 1974). 
19 Notice that not all confused concepts are inconsistent.  For example, let A be a concept that applies to objects α 
and β and disapplies to objects γ and δ.  One can think of A as a confused concept whose components are B, which 
applies to α and disapplies to γ, and C, which applies to β and disapplies to δ.  A is neither application-inconsistent 
nor range-inconsistent.   
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 between empirically inconsistent and intrinsically inconsistent concepts.  I also proposed to 
explain inconsistent concepts in terms of confused concepts. 
I have not argued for the claim that inconsistent concepts are confused concepts and I do 
not intend to.  That claim is the basis for my theory of inconsistent concepts and I justify my 
theory by appeal to how well it works.  In Appendix E, I consider several different theories of 
inconsistent concepts and I argue that mine is preferable to all the competitors. 
To my knowledge, no one has advocated an explanation of inconsistent concepts in terms 
of confusion, but we do find some connection between them in the literature.  In particular, 
confused concepts and inconsistent concepts have provoked similar worries and they have been 
explained in similar ways.  For example, Field advocates a semantic theory based on 
supervaluations for confused concepts in the paper from which the mass example is taken.  
However, Field does not actually use the term ‘confusion’ to describe the phenomenon.  Instead, 
he talks about referential indeterminacy.  For Field, referential indeterminacy is a broader 
category intended to capture vagueness as well.  Supervaluations have been used in semantic 
theories for truth as well.  Indeed, Eklund argues that truth is an inconsistent concept and he uses 
a variant of the supervaluation approach in his semantic theory for truth.  Furthermore, Field 
argues that confused concepts pose a serious threat to certain theories of meaning, while Gupta 
and Eklund (independently) argue that inconsistent concepts pose similar threats to theories of 
meaning.  The novelty in my approach consists in the direct link between confusion and 
inconsistent concepts and the extension of Camp’s theory of confusion and his logic for confused 
names to a semantic theory for confused concepts. 
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5.0  A THEORY OF CONFUSION 
 
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
I claim that truth is an inconsistent concept.  In the preceding chapter, I discussed inconsistent 
concepts and committed myself to explaining them in terms of confused concepts.  This chapter 
contains my preferred theory of confusion, which Joseph Camp recently presented.  In the first 
section of this chapter, I discuss several of Camp’s arguments for conditions on theories of 
confusion.  In the second section, I explain the logic he advocates for confused names (although 
he really defines it only for confused sentences).  In Chapter Six, I extend Camp’s theory in 
several ways and complete my explanation of inconsistent concepts in terms of confusion. 
 
5.2  CAMP’S THEORY OF CONFUSION 
 
 
Consider a person, Fred, who buys an ant farm and dumps some ants into it.  Although two large 
ants fall into the ant farm, Fred sees only one of them go in.  Fred does not know that there are 
two ants in the ant farm and, due to some fact about large ant behavior, they are never visible 
together. One day when Fred is away from his ant farm he decides to use ‘Charlie’ as a name for 
what he takes to be the only big ant in the ant farm.  (The condition that he is not in close 
proximity to the ant farm combats the temptation to assume that ‘Charlie’ refers to whichever big 
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 ant Fred perceived when he coined the name.)  Fred routinely studies the two big ants and uses 
the name ‘Charlie’ to keep track of his findings; but he never discovers that there are two big 
ants in the farm. To help clarify matters, I use the names ‘Ant A’ and ‘Ant B’ for the two big 
ants in the ant farm.  One can characterize Fred’s confusion by saying that Fred has confused Ant 
A with Ant B, or that Fred thinks that Ant A is Ant B.1   
A theory of confusion has implications for the inferential rationality of confused people.  
In other words, when one adopts a certain theory of confusion one decides how to treat a 
confused person’s reasoning practice.  For instance, a theory of confusion should specify a logic 
for arguments that contain confused expressions.  A logic is a theory that specifies which of the 
arguments in some class are valid.  Thus, when one adopts a theory of confusion, one undertakes 
a commitment to evaluate confused arguments according to a certain standard and to treat 
confused people as if they should reason according to that standard.   
Perhaps the most fundamental of Camp’s assumptions is that a theory of confusion 
should be inferentially charitable.  It should not imply that confused people are poor reasoners.  
Prior to his acquisition of the ant farm, Fred knew how to construct valid arguments and how to 
evaluate arguments for validity (we can even assume that Fred is an eminent logician).  He knew 
how to follow inference rules and how to weigh evidence for and against a claim.  The 
acquisition of the ant farm does not change these facts.  If a theory of confusion implies that Fred 
no longer has these abilities after his acquisition of the ant farm, then that theory is false.  This 
inferential charity requirement on theories of confusion is at the heart of several of Camp’s 
arguments for four further conditions on theories of confusion: confusion should not be 
explained in terms of ambiguity, confusion should not be explained in terms of belief, sentences 
with confused expressions do not have truth-values, and a logic for confused expressions ought 
                                                 
1 Camp (2002: 27-29). 
 143
 to be one that the confused person has a reason to obey.  I consider each of these conditions in 
the next four subsections. 
 
 
5.2.1  THE AMBIGUITY CONDITION  
 
 
Camp distinguishes between confusion and ambiguity, and refuses to explain the former in terms 
of the latter.  An ambiguous expression is one that has more than one distinct semantic value.  
‘Semantic value’ is a generic term for the contribution an expression makes to the meaning of the 
sentences in which it occurs (e.g., reference, meaning, etc.).  A typical example of an ambiguous 
word is the English word ‘bank’.  On some occasions it is synonymous with ‘side of a river’, 
while on others it has a meaning similar to that of ‘financial institution’.  Someone who explains 
confusion in terms of ambiguity holds that a confused expression has more than one semantic 
value.  In the case of Fred, the most natural explanation of this sort is that sometimes ‘Charlie’ 
refers to Ant A and other times it refers to Ant B.  An explanation of confusion in terms of 
ambiguity should specify a disambiguation rule, which determines the referent of any given 
occurrence of ‘Charlie’.  Presumably, this theory of confusion would also use a classical logic to 
evaluate Fred’s confused arguments (so long as such a logic is appropriate for Fred’s other 
arguments).   
Any explanation of confusion in terms of ambiguity will treat some of Fred’s arguments 
as equivocations.  An equivocation is an invalid argument that contains multiple occurrences of 
an ambiguous expression where some occurrences have one semantic value and others have 
another one.  For example, Fred presents the following argument: 
(i) Charlie is angry. 
(ii) Charlie is hungry. 
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 (iii) Charlie is an ant. 
(iv) If an ant is angry and hungry, then it is dangerous. 
  ∴ (v)  Charlie is dangerous. 
If the rule for disambiguating ‘Charlie’ specifies that in (i) ‘Charlie’ refers to Ant A and in (ii) 
‘Charlie’ refers to Ant B, then this argument is invalid because it is an equivocation.  Because 
Fred does not know that ‘Charlie’ is ambiguous, he will invariably assert arguments that count as 
equivocations no matter what rule is used to disambiguate ‘Charlie’.   
A theory of confusion that treats Fred as if he endorses equivocal arguments is not 
inferentially charitable.  Equivocations are serious fallacies and someone who commits them is a 
poor reasoner.  However, acquiring the ant farm should not affect Fred’s capacity to reason 
properly.  Thus, a theory of confusion should not explain confusion in terms of ambiguity.2, 3
 
 
5.2.2  THE BELIEF CONDITION 
 
 
Although it might be tempting to claim that Fred counts as confused because he holds the false 
belief that there is exactly one big ant in the ant farm or that he holds the false belief that Ant A 
is identical to Ant B, Camp argues that confusion should not be explained in terms of belief.  
Camp’s argument divides into two cases: confusion as de dicto belief and confusion as de re 
belief.  Camp’s argument that confusion is not a matter of de dicto belief is that Fred might hold 
any particular de dicto beliefs for reasons that are independent of his interactions with Ant A and 
                                                 
2 Camp considers the objection that a defender of the ambiguity account could specify that the confused person 
should not be held responsible for the equivocations.  Camp’s reply is that calling someone’s argument an 
equivocation but refusing to hold that person responsible for the error is not being inferentially charitable—it is 
treating the person as if he is a poor reasoner and then treating him as if he is too stupid to be held accountable for 
his mistakes, which is even worse.  See Camp (2002: 50-54). 
3 It seems to me that this argument compliments Kripke’s claim that positing ambiguity is the lazy person’s way to 
do philosophy.  Not only is it lazy, it is uncharitable.  See Kripke (1977: 19).    
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 Ant B.  Thus, while having certain beliefs might count as a necessary condition for confusion, it 
is not sufficient.  For example, one might hold that Fred is confused if and only if he believes 
that there is only one big ant in the ant farm.  However, it is possible that Fred believes that there 
is only one big ant in the ant farm without being confused (for example, if he pays no attention to 
how many big ants are in it and someone he trusts tells him that there is only one big ant in it).  A 
similar criticism holds for the claim that Fred is confused if and only if he believes that the ant 
that he saw at 1pm is identical to the ant he saw at 2pm (or any other identity claim of this type).   
Camp’s argument that confusion is not a matter of de re belief is based on the claim that 
attributing to Fred the de re belief that Ant A is identical to Ant B represents Fred as someone 
who can distinguish between Ant A and Ant B, which is false.  Thus, Fred has no such de re 
beliefs.4   
I endorse both these arguments but in my experience, some people find them 
unconvincing.  Instead of reassuring the reader, I want to present a different argument that Camp 
hints at but does not give.  Confusion should not be explained in terms of a false belief or false 
set of beliefs because, as I argue in the next subsection, the sentences a confused person uses to 
express his beliefs have no truth-values.  Thus, the beliefs expressed by these sentences have no 
truth-values.  Hence, they are not false (that ‘not’ expresses exclusion negation).  Therefore, 
confusion should not be explained in terms of false beliefs.  This argument assumes that the 
beliefs expressed by confused sentences (i.e., those sentences that contain confused expressions) 
are the ones that would be used as a basis for the explanation of confusion and that if a sentence 
has no truth-value then the belief it expresses has no truth-value either.  These assumptions are 
plausible enough that I do not want to linger over them any further.  Instead, I move directly to 
the main assumption of this argument—that confused sentences have no truth-values. 
                                                 
4 A similar argument can be found in Dennett (1981).   
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5.2.3  THE TRUTH-VALUE CONDITION 
 
 
The third condition on theories of confusion is that confused sentences have no truth-values.  To 
make his case for this condition, Camp uses the notion of calibration.  A person is well 
calibrated with respect to some event if the subjective probability she assigns to the event is 
close to its objective probability.  The argument is that if one assigns truth-values to Fred’s 
confused sentences, then one treats Fred as if he is poorly calibrated when he is not.  Calibration 
is largely a matter of being able to weigh evidence for and against some claim and make 
judgments accordingly.  A poorly calibrated person is not good at inductive reasoning on the 
topic in question.  Thus, if confused sentences have truth-values, then the confused person is 
poorly calibrated, and a poorly calibrated person is a poor inductive reasoner.  Therefore, 
assigning truth-values to confused sentences is inductively uncharitable.   
Consider Camp’s example in which Ant A has just come down with the sniffles and Ant 
B has had them for three days.  Fred knows that sniffling ants continue to sniffle for an average 
of 2.63 days.  He inspects Ant B and discovers that it has the sniffles.  Fred endorses the 
following argument:  
(i) Charlie has the sniffles. 
  ∴ (ii) Charlie will continue to sniffle for an average of 2.63 days.   
Both ants have the sniffles so if one assigns truth-values on the basis of supervalutions, the 
premise is true but the conclusion is false.  Or at least, if one treats it as true, an utterance of the 
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 same token will be false on average, in less than 2.63 days.  However, just as with his deductive 
arguments, Fred is good at reasoning.  He is just confused.5   
I endorse the calibration argument, but I want to present another argument for the same 
conclusion based on the claim that confused expressions are defective.  Some remarks of 
Dummett’s on concepts will serve to make a point about defective concepts.  In the passage 
below, Dummett comments on the distinction between the circumstances of application and the 
consequences of application for a given concept (an account of concepts that employs this 
distinction is analogous to Gentzen’s account of logical connectives that employs introduction 
and elimination rules).6   
The distinction is thus meant as no more than a rough and ready one, whose 
application, in a given case, will depend in part on how we choose to slice things 
up.  It remains, nevertheless, a distinction of great importance, which is crucial to 
many forms of linguistic change, of the kind we should characterize as involving 
the rejection or revision of concepts.  Such change is motivated by a desire to 
attain or preserve a harmony between the two aspects of an expression’s meaning.  
A simple case would be that of a pejorative term, e.g., ‘Boche’.  The condition for 
applying the term to someone is that he is of German nationality; the 
consequences of its application are that he is barbarous and more prone to cruelty 
than other Europeans.  …  Someone who rejects the word does so because he does 
not want to permit a transition from the grounds for applying the term to the 
consequences of doing so, (Dummett 1973: 454). 
 
One important feature of Dummett’s model is that it permits a characterization of defective 
concepts like Boche.  I possess this concept; however, I do not employ it.  I do not employ this 
                                                 
5 Camp hints at a different argument that is more epistemological in nature.  He claims that truth attributions have 
epistemological consequences.  If Uter asserts ‘Fred’s assertion that Charlie is asleep is true’, and Adil hears him, 
then Adil will assume that Uter believes the same thing Fred believes.  If Uter knows that Fred is confused, and he 
cares about his own cognitive well being, then he should not accept Fred’s belief, nor should he defer to Fred.  Uter 
knows that Fred is untrustworthy with respect to ‘Charlie’ talk.  Hence, he should not attribute truth to Fred’s 
confused sentences.  I am less sympathetic to this argument.  Camp’s point seems to be that if confused sentences 
have truth-values, then surely we should be able to say so.  However, when we attribute truth-values to them, our 
attributions carry dubious epistemological considerations in their wake.  Hence, we should not attribute truth-values 
to confused sentences.  Thus, they do not have truth-values.  It seems to me that the epistemological consequences 
of truth attributions might well be a case of conversational implicature.  If so then it might be perfectly fine to 
attribute truth-values to confused sentences so long as one is careful to prevent the implicature.   
6 See Gentzen (1969).  See also Brandom (1994: 116-130) for a similar account of concepts.   
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 concept because I disagree with it in some sense.  In particular, I reject the inference from its 
conditions of application to its consequences of application.  That is, I do not endorse the 
inference from ‘α is of German ancestry’ to ‘α is barbarous and more prone to cruelty than other 
Europeans’.  Even if α is German, it is inappropriate to assert ‘α is Boche’ because it follows 
that α is barbarous and more prone to cruelty than other Europeans.  Likewise, it is inappropriate 
to assert ‘α is not Boche’ because it follows that α is not of German descent.  Thus, it is 
inappropriate to employ Boche.  However, I certainly possess it.  I can attribute it to others and I 
understand claims made with it.  The same distinction is important for confused concepts.  
Without the ability to distinguish between concept employment and concept possession, it is 
impossible to give a plausible account of how one person can attribute a confused concept to 
another without falling into confusion herself.  See Appendix E for more discussion of this issue. 
If it is inappropriate to employ a defective concept like Boche, then it is inappropriate to 
attribute truth-values to sentences that express it.  If it is inappropriate to assert ‘α is Boche’, 
then it is inappropriate to assert ‘‘α is Boche’ is true’, because the former follows from the latter 
on any account of truth that is remotely plausible.  Likewise, it is inappropriate to assert ‘‘α is 
Boche’ is false’ because ‘α is not Boche’ follows from it.  If it is inappropriate to attribute truth 
values to sentences that express defective concepts, then these sentences do not have truth-
values.  (These points hold for beliefs whose content involves defective concepts as well.)  I 
suppose that one could endorse the view that such sentences secretly have truth-values but we 
cannot know what they are and cannot find out, but this sort of view is implausible.  As I use the 
term ‘truth-value’, if a sentence has a particular truth-value, then it is appropriate to say and 
believe that it does. 
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 I still need to show that confused concepts are defective in the same way that Boche is.  
The easiest way to see this is to consider the example from the previous chapter of mass.  If I 
assert that a particular object has mass then I am committed to the claim that its momentum 
divided by its velocity is the same in all reference frames, which is false.  If I assert that that 
object has no mass, then I am committed to the claim that it has no momentum in any reference 
frame, which is false as well.  Thus, it is inappropriate for me to assert of any object that it has 
mass or that it does not have mass.  That is, it is inappropriate for me to employ mass.  Mass is a 
defective concept.  Thus, sentences that express it have no truth-value.  
It is important to realize that my view is not that whether a sentence has a truth-value is 
relative to a person or group of people.  Truth-values and defectiveness are objective on my 
account.  However, we can be wrong about which sentences have truth values and which ones do 
not, just as we can be wrong about which sentences are true and which are false.  If confused 
sentences have truth-values, then it is appropriate for even unconfused people to attribute truth-
values to them.  If it is appropriate to attribute truth-values to them, then it is inappropriate for 
someone to refuse to employ the confused concept in question.  However, I have argued that it is 
appropriate to refuse to employ confused concepts.  Hence, confused sentences have no truth-
values.   
 
 
5.2.4  THE NORMATIVITY CONDITION 
 
 
Here is Camp’s formulation of the normativity condition (not his term) on the logic for confused 
expressions that follows from a theory of confusion: “Roughly, the requirement is that the person 
must be moved by the fact that the conclusion of an argument does or does not follow from the 
premises.  The person must care, in principle, whether an argument is valid,” (Camp 2002: 79).  
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 This might seem like an odd constraint on a logic.  After all, the validity of an argument does not 
depend on whether the person who presents it can tell whether it is valid.  It seems like the 
mental state of the person in question is irrelevant to the validity of his or her arguments.  Why 
should the validity of a person’s arguments be held hostage to what the person cares about?   
Camp does not offer much in the way of argument for the normativity condition, but does give us 
a clue as to why someone might hold it: “A similar requirement applies to many other norms of 
practice; there is nothing special about logical norms here.  For example, to be moral a person 
must do what is right (mostly), and must care, in principle, whether a prospective action is right,” 
(ibid).  I want to spell out what I take to be the bigger issues behind the normativity condition so 
that it does not seem so counterintuitive.  
The first point I want to make is that when one formulates a validity criterion for the 
arguments that display some vocabulary, one specifies how rational agents who use that 
vocabulary should reason.  It is a specification of the inferential norms that have authority over 
those rational agents.  In particular, a theory of confusion that specifies a certain logic for 
confused arguments is a characterization of the inferential rationality of the confused.  The 
confused are not irrational.  If a theory of confusion entails that a confused person is irrational, 
then that theory is false.  That is the problem (in general terms) with the claim that confused 
expressions are ambiguous and with the claim that confused sentences have truth-values—these 
claims entail that confused people are irrational.   
  There is a view of normativity, the Kantian conception, according to which the authority 
that norms have over rational agents derives from the fact that rational agents accept or endorse 
those norms in a certain way.  The debates about normative authority take place primarily over 
the source of practical normativity, but the same points can be made for theoretical contexts.  
 151
 The following is a passage in which Robert Brandom endorses the Kantian conception as a 
general constraint on accounts of rationality: 
[Kant] characterizes [normative compulsion] substantively as acting according to 
a conception or representation of a rule, rather than just according to a rule.  
Shorn of the details of his story about the nature of representations and the way 
they can affect what we do, the point he is making is that we act according to our 
grasp or understanding of rules.  The rules do not immediately compel us, as 
natural ones do.  Their compulsion is rather mediated by our attitude toward those 
rules.  What makes us act as we do is not the rule or norm itself but our 
acknowledgement of it, (Brandom 1994: 31).7   
 
With respect to a theory of confusion, the logic for confused expressions that is part of such a 
theory is a specification of the inferential norms that bind those who employ confused 
expressions.  If a theory of confusion entails that someone who employs a confused expression 
has no reason to adopt the inferential norms specified by that theory, then the person who 
employs the confused expression is irrational according to that theory.  This is not the place for a 
detailed discussion and defense of the Kantian conception of normativity.  However, identifying 
it as one possible basis for Camp’s normativity constraint should eliminate much of the mystery 
surrounding the constraint. 
Another doctrine familiar in debates over practical rationality is practical internalism.  
Practical internalism is the view that there is a necessary connection between practical reasons 
and motivation.8  Here is a formulation of practical internalism due to Setiya: “If the fact that p is 
a reason for A to φ then: if A is not disposed to be moved to φ if she judges that p, A is in that 
respect practically irrational,” (Setiya 2004: 268).  If we transplant practical internalism from 
                                                 
7 See Korsgaard (1996) for an example of this position in meta-ethics and Harman (1986, 1995) for discussions of 
these issues as they arise in theoretical contexts. 
8 I modify ‘internalism’ with ‘practical’ to distinguish the doctrine under consideration from other types of 
internalism (e.g., epistemological internalism—the doctrine that if a belief counts as knowledge then the believer 
must know that it does—and semantic internalism—the doctrine that the meanings of one’s terms and the contents 
of one’s mental states are independent of the physical and social environment one inhabits).  There are other 
doctrines that go by the name ‘internalism’ and pertain to practical rationality.  I do not have the space to discuss 
them here. 
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 the context of practical rationality into our context (inferential rationality and the relation 
between a theory of confusion and the capacity of the confused to care whether a confused 
argument is valid according to that theory), then we arrive at the following doctrine.  If the fact 
that an inferential norm is valid is a reason for a confused person to reason in accordance with 
that norm then: if the confused person is not disposed to be moved to reason in accordance with 
that norm if she judges that that norm is valid, the confused person is in that respect irrational.9  
In other words, if a confused person recognizes that a certain inferential norm is valid but is not 
motivated to infer according to it, then that person is irrational.  From this doctrine, we can 
derive the normativity constraint.  If a theory of confusion specifies a certain logic for confused 
expressions and someone who employs a confused expression can recognize when arguments are 
valid according to that logic, but that person is not motivated to infer according to that logic, then 
that person is irrational according to that theory of confusion.  However, confused people are not 
irrational.  Thus, a theory of confusion with this property is false.   
I do not take a stand on whether it is the Kantian conception of normativity or a version 
of practical internalism that motivates Camp’s normativity constraint (although there are 
important connections between the Kantian conception and practical internalism, they are 
distinct doctrines).  Nor do I attempt to defend one of these doctrines.  I do accept the 
normativity constraint on theories of confusion and I accept it because I accept a Kantian 
conception of normativity.  Given that either the Kantian conception of normativity or a version 
of practical internalism will justify the normativity constraint, the reader should feel free to think 
of this disjunction as one of my assumptions. 
                                                 
9 Setiya goes on to criticize a version of practical internalism, but that criticism does not apply to the version of the 
doctrine I formulated because Setiya’s criticism applies to practical internalism for objective reasons and my version 
appeals to subjective reasons.  A formulation of practical internalism for inferential rationality that appeals to 
objective reasons is not plausible in the case of confusion.  See Setiya (2004: 271-272). 
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5.2.5  SEMANTIC STANCES 
 
 
Camp explains confusion in terms of adopting a certain semantic stance.10  When a person 
(Ginger, for example) utters ‘Fred thinks that Ant A is Ant B’, she is not attributing some mental 
state to Fred.  Instead, she adopts a semantic stance toward Fred and his confused sentences.  
When Ginger adopts a semantic stance toward Fred, she alters what she counts as a correct 
inference; she decides to be inferentially charitable to Fred in a certain way.  I call the particular 
stance that one should adopt when interpreting a confused person the confusion stance.  
According to Camp’s theory of confusion, a person is confused if and only if it is appropriate to 
adopt the confusion stance toward that person.  By characterizing the confusion stance, we arrive 
at a logic for confused expressions.   
Camp’s theory of confusion explains what it is to be confused in terms of what it is to 
treat someone as confused.  That theory implies that confusion is a status that a person, concept, 
expression, sentence, or argument can have.  I want to emphasize that his theory employs a 
particular explanatory strategy; it does not imply that a concept is confused because someone 
takes it to be confused; it does not imply that confusion is relative to an interpreter; it does not 
imply that confusion is not “real” or objective.  Explaining a status in terms of attributing that 
status or treating something as if it has that status is compatible with the claim that something 
can have that status despite the fact that no one treats it that way.   
Camp is silent on the issues of what it is to adopt a semantic stance and when it is 
appropriate to adopt the confusion stance in particular.  In the next chapter I address the first 
                                                 
10 Camp uses the term ‘semantic position’ instead.  It seems to me that the notion of a stance is more familiar.  See 
Dennett (1987) and Brandom (1994: 55-64; 2002: 1-17).   
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 issue, but I have nothing to say on the second.  How we (humans) actually decide to treat 
something as confused is an issue for psychology, not a theory of confusion.  
 
5.3  CAMP’S LOGIC FOR CONFUSED SENTENCES 
 
 
Camp advocates a particular logic by which one should evaluate the inferences of the confused.  
Because Camp argues that confused sentences have no truth-values, he must present an 
inferential standard by which one can evaluate a confused person’s inferences that does not 
define validity in terms of truth preservation.  Instead, he defines validity in terms of profitability 
preservation.  A sentence is profitable if and only if believing it will contribute to the 
achievement of one of the believer’s goals.11  Despite the fact that he is confused, Fred’s beliefs 
still have the same causal role in producing his actions and some of his confused beliefs will be 
more profitable than others in the sense that acting on a profitable one is more likely to satisfy 
Fred’s desires than acting on an unprofitable one.  (For example, if both ants are angry and Fred 
desires that he stay away from Charlie when Charlie is angry, then Fred’s belief that Charlie is 
angry is more profitable than the belief that Charlie is not angry—despite the fact that neither of 
these beliefs have truth-values.)  We can say that a confused argument is valid if and only if it 
preserves profitability. 
Camp uses Belnap’s useful four-valued logic to track profitability.12  This logic uses four 
semantic values: Y, N, ?, and YN.  Camp uses a story about two people, Sal and Sam, who are 
authorities on the properties of the ant farm (e.g., they are not confused about Ant A and Ant B), 
                                                 
11 Camp (2002: 122-124). 
12 See Belnap (1976a, 1976b) and Dunn (1966).  Belnap advocates using the logic for the inferences one should 
draw from a database with inconsistent information.   
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 to illustrate the intended interpretation of these semantic values.  The idea is that their opinions 
are indicators of profitability for Fred.  Let us rejoin Ginger in her attempt to find a way to be 
inferentially charitable to Fred.  Ginger should begin by assigning semantic values to Fred’s 
sentences in the following way.  Assume that Fred utters a confused sentence, p, with the term 
‘Charlie’ in it.  Ginger should substitute ‘Ant A’ for ‘Charlie’ and ask Sal to evaluate the 
resulting sentence.  If Sal agrees with the resulting sentence, he says, “Yes”; if not, he says, 
“No.”  If he does not have enough information on which to evaluate the sentence, he says, “I 
don’t know.”  Ginger should substitute ‘Ant B’ for ‘Charlie’ in Fred’s sentence and ask Sam to 
evaluate it as well.  If both Sal and Sam say, “Yes” or one says, “Yes” and the other says, “I 
don’t know,” then Ginger should assign Y to Fred’s sentence.  If both say, “No” or one says, 
“No” and the other says, “I don’t know,” then Ginger should assign N to Fred’s sentence.  If both 
say, “I don’t know,” then Ginger should assign ? to Fred’s sentence.  If one says, “Yes” and the 
other says, “No,” then Ginger should assign YN to Fred’s sentence. 
The semantic values are grouped as follows: if a sentence is Y or YN, then it is at-least-Y 
and if a sentence is N or YN, then it is at-least-N (we can say that Y and YN are designated).  
Ginger can now use the following standard to evaluate Fred’s arguments: an argument is valid 
just in case it preserves at-least-Y (i.e., if the premises are at-least-Y, then the conclusion is at-
least-Y) and the absence of at-least-N (i.e. if the conclusion is at-least-N, then one of the 
premises is at-least-N).   
We have a way of assigning semantic values to Fred’s confused sentences, we have an 
interpretation of the semantic values, and we have a validity criterion based on the interpretation 
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 of the semantic values.  We still need to introduce logical connectives.13  The following are the 
tables for negation (~), conjunction (∧), and disjunction (∨).14
p │ ~ p      ∧ │ ?  Y YN N  ∨ │ ? Y YN  N 
? │    ? ? │     ?  ?   N N ? │ ? Y  Y   ? 
Y │   N Y │     ?  Y YN N Y │ Y Y  Y  Y 
YN │  YN YN │ N YN YN N YN │ Y Y YN YN  
N │   Y N │ N  N   N N N │ ? Y YN  N 
 
These tables are constructed according to the following rules: 
〈~ p〉 is at-least-Y if and only if 〈p〉 is at-least-Y. 
〈~ p〉 is at-least-N if and only if 〈p〉 is at-least-N. 
〈p ∧ q〉 is at-least-Y if and only if both 〈p〉 and 〈q〉 are at-least-Y. 
〈p ∧ q〉 is at-least-N if and only if either 〈p〉 or 〈q〉 are at-least-N. 
〈p ∨ q〉 is at-least-Y if and only if either 〈p〉 or 〈q〉 is at-least-N. 
〈p ∨ q〉 is at-least-N if and only if both 〈p〉 and 〈q〉 are at-least-N. 
Given that at-least-Y is designated, these rules are extensions of the classical rules for negation, 
conjunction, and disjunction. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 We cannot allow the semantic value assignment and the validity criterion to do all the work.  Consider an 
example.  Ant A is hungry but not sleepy and Ant B is sleepy but not hungry.  Fred argues: Charlie is hungry; 
Charlie is sleepy; hence, Charlie is sleepy and hungry.  The value assignment for this argument will be YN, YN and 
N, respectively.  Thus, the argument is invalid according to the validity criterion.  However, this argument is an 
instance of conjunction introduction, which should be valid.  Thus, as far as the logical constants of Fred’s language 
go, we need to take them out of the hands of Sam and Sal.   
14 Camp (2002: 125-157). 
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 The following diagram displays the inferential relations between the semantic values: 
 
 
 
Y
N
?YN
 
Figure 5.1  (Four Valued Logic) 
 
 
 
The lines in the diagram indicate implication.  If we think of the semantic values as ordered from 
bottom to top, and write ‘v(〈p〉) ≤ v(〈q〉)’ for ‘the semantic value of 〈p〉 is less than or equal to the 
semantic value of 〈q〉’ then 〈p〉 entails 〈q〉 if and only if v(〈p〉) ≤ v(〈q〉) for every assignment of 
values to 〈p〉 and 〈q〉  We can think of conjunction as “meet”; thus, the value of 〈p ∧ q〉 is the 
greatest lower bound of the values of 〈p〉 and 〈q〉 (e.g., if 〈p〉 is YN and 〈q〉 is ?, then 〈p ∧ q〉 is N, 
which is the greatest value that is less than or equal to each).  We can think of disjunction as 
“join”; thus, the value of 〈p ∨ q〉 is the least upper bound of the values of 〈p〉 and 〈q〉 (e.g., if 〈p〉 
is YN and 〈q〉 is ?, then 〈p∨q〉 is Y, which is the least value that is greater than or equal to 
each).15   
So far I have discussed only negation, conjunction, and disjunction.  We can add an 
additional connective ‘→’ such that 〈p → q〉 stands for 〈p entails q〉.  It is only defined for 
sentences that do not contain ‘→’.  Dunn proved that 〈p → q〉 is valid in this logic if and only if 
                                                 
15 We can summarize this paragraph by saying that the lattice of semantic values is a DeMorgan lattice. 
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 〈p → q〉 is a theorem of the relevance logic Rfde (the logic of first-degree implications).16  An 
axiomatization of Rfde uses the following axioms and rules:17
Axioms:  p → ~ ~ p 
  ~ ~ p → p 
(p ∧ q) → p 
  (p ∧ q) → q 
  p → (p ∨ q) 
  q → (p ∨ q) 
  (p ∧ (q ∨ r)) → ((p ∧ q) ∨ r) 
 
Rules:   p → q, q → r ├  p → q 
  p → q, p → r ├  p → (q ∧ r) 
  p → r, q → r ├  (p ∨ q) → r 
  p → q ├  ~ q → ~ p 
 
The connection between the 4-valued logic presented above and Rfde is a significant result.  It 
means that the appropriate logic for evaluating confused arguments is a relevance logic.   
Relevance logics are so named because they require that an argument’s premises must be 
relevant to its conclusion for it to count as valid.  A related point is that in relevance logics, the 
antecedent and the consequent of a conditional must be relevant for the conditional to be true.  
According to classical logic, one can add premises to a valid argument without changing it from 
valid to invalid even if the premises are not used to derive the conclusion.  Likewise, according 
to the semantics for the material conditional of classical logic, ‘if 0=1, then I am president of the 
United States’ is true because the antecedent is false.  However, many people find these results 
counterintuitive because the premises and conclusion in the argument and the antecedent and the 
consequent of the conditional have nothing to do with one another.  There are a variety of 
relevance logics that differ over how they spell out the connection between premises and 
                                                 
16 Dunn (1966).  See Dunn and Restall (2001: 54).  Note that Anderson and Belnap use ‘Efde’ instead of ‘Rfde’.  I 
should note that Camp does not explicitly endorse the introduction of ‘→’ into the logic, but he does say that the 
class of implications in the 4-valued logic are those valid in Rfde (Camp 2002: 157).  Presumably, he would not 
object to the introduction of ‘→’. 
17 See Dunn and Restall (2001: 27-28) and Anderson and Belnap (1975).  In the inference rules ‘├’ should be read 
as ‘implies’. 
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 conclusion of an argument and the relation between antecedent and consequent of a conditional.  
One thing that is common to all of them is that they are non-classical.  That is, some forms of 
inference that are valid in classical logic are invalid in relevance logics (e.g., disjunctive 
syllogism—for any two sentences p and q, ⎡~q⎤ follows from ⎡p or q⎤ and ⎡~p⎤).  I discuss 
relevance logics more in the next chapter. 
 
 
5.4  CONCLUSION 
 
 
My goal in this chapter is to present the theory of confusion I endorse.  Although I accept the 
four conditions on theories of confusion, they are not arguments for the claim that confusion 
should be explained in terms of adopting a semantic stance or the claim that a relevance logic is 
the best one for evaluating the arguments of the confused.  However, I offer no more justification 
for Camp’s theory of confusion.  If one is not convinced that Camp’s theory is preferable to other 
accounts of confusion, then one should replace my claim that inconsistent concepts are confused 
with the claim that a theory of inconsistent concepts should be based on Camp’s theory of 
confusion.  That is, because I offer a justification for the theory of inconsistent concepts I 
develop, I have no need to justify Camp’s theory of confusion.  The arguments in section one are 
intended to give the reader an idea of my reasons for accepting Camp’s theory, not as conclusive 
reasons to accept it.   
As a theory of confusion, Camp’s theory remains incomplete.  First, despite the fact that 
Camp endorses his theory as an account of confused concepts, his logic is applicable only to 
confused sentences.  If it is to serve as a theory of confused concepts, then it must be able to 
handle confused concepts whose components are partial concepts.  Second, the relevance logic 
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 that Camp presents is a sentential logic (i.e., it treats atomic sentences as single units), but it does 
not even include an embeddable conditional.  It needs to be fitted with a suitable conditional and 
extended to a first-order predicate logic.  Third, someone who thinks that three distinct entities 
are identical is confused as well, but Camp’s theory works only for confusions associated with 
two entities.  It ought to be extended so that it can handle confusions involving any finite number 
of entities.  Fourth, Camp presents a logic for confused expressions, but not a semantic theory for 
confused expressions.  That is, his theory can tell us when an argument that contains a confused 
expression is valid, but it does not specify the meanings of the sentences that contain confused 
expressions.  It should be extended to a full semantic theory for confused expressions.  In the 
next chapter, I take up each of these tasks and apply the extended theory to inconsistent concepts. 
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6.0  CONCEPTUAL CONFUSION AND CONCEPTUAL INCONSISTENCY 
 
 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In this chapter I extend Camp’s theory of confusion so that it can serve as the basis for a theory 
of inconsistent concepts.  The resulting theory of confusion is extended from Camp’s theory in 
four ways: it applies to n-component confusion, it applies to partially defined confused concepts, 
it employs a quantified relevance logic, and it specifies a semantic theory for confused 
expressions that is based on Brandom’s theory of meaning.  After presenting these extensions, I 
consider the consequences of explaining inconsistent concepts in terms of confused concepts and 
provide replies to some objections. 
 
 
6.2  FIRST-ORDER LOGIC FOR CONFUSION 
 
 
Two things need to get accomplished in this subsection.  First, I need to provide a conditional 
that can be added to the sentential logic Rfde I discussed in Chapter Five; that will yield a full 
sentential logic for confused sentences.  Second, I need to present a first-order predicate logic 
that is a natural extension of the sentential logic; that will yield a first order logic for confused 
expressions.  I take up these two tasks in order. 
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 6.2.1  CONDITIONALS 
 
 
In Chapter Five, I suggested that we add a conditional to the 4-valued logic Camp advocates for 
the evaluation of confused arguments.  I call this 4-valued logic without a conditional 2-
component logic (this choice of term will become clear in Section 6.3).  Rfde is the result of 
adding ‘→’ to 2-component logic.  However, this conditional is not very useful because it is not 
embeddable (i.e., the antecedent and consequent cannot contain ‘→’).  There are two sentential 
logics that are obvious choices for extending 2-component logic with a conditional: R and E.  
Both R and E are relevance logics.  R is the logic of relevant implication (as opposed to material 
implication, which is found in classical logic), while E is the logic of entailment.  The traditional 
story is that entailment differs from implication in that implication is a relation between a set of 
sentences (premises) and a sentence (conclusion) that can hold contingently, whereas entailment 
is just like implication except that entailment holds necessarily.  This explanation might lead one 
to assume that entailment is necessary relevant implication.  In other words, it might seem that 
we could add a necessity operator (□) to R (the logic of relevant implication) and arrive at E (the 
logic of entailment).  Unfortunately, it turns out that R with a necessity operator (called NR) has 
a theorem that is not a theorem of E.  Nevertheless, there is an important sense in which E is 
stronger than R.1  For this reason, I suggest that an expression for relevant implication be added 
to 2-component logic to arrive at a 4-valued logic that is equivalent to R.  Because the extended 
4-valued logic and R are equivalent, it does not matter whether one shows how to add a 
conditional to 2-component logic to arrive at the extended 4-valued logic or to Rfde to arrive at R.  
Below is an axiomatixation of R:2
                                                 
1 See Mares (2004) for details. 
2 This axiomatization is due to Mares; see Mares (2004: 208-9). 
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 Axioms:  p → p 
 (p → q) → ((q→ r) → (p → r))  
 p → ((p → q) → q) 
 (p → p → q)) → (p → q) 
 (p ∧ q) → p  
 (p ∧ q) → q  
 p → (p ∨ q) 
 q → (p ∨ q) 
 ((p → q) ∧ (p → r)) → (p → (q ∧ r)) 
 (p ∧ (q ∨ r)) → ((p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ r)) 
 ~ ~ p → p 
 (p → ~ q) → (q → ~ p) 
 
Rules: p, q ├ p ∧ q 
 p → q, p ├ q 
 
I assume that if one had a reason to prefer E to R, then one could add an entailment connective to 
Rfde and use E to evaluate confused arguments for validity because the first-degree fragment of R 
is equivalent to the first-degree fragment of E.3
 
 
6.2.2  QUANTIFIERS 
 
 
A sentential logic for confused arguments is an important step, but much of the reasoning that 
humans use involves quantifiers.  To extend our sentential logic to a first-order logic, we have 
two choices.  First, we can develop a predicate logic that is an extension of the 2-component 
logic (the one with 4 values) or we can develop a predicate logic that is an extension of R.  These 
two options might turn out to be different.  I present both in this subsection.   
The first-order extension of R is called RQ.  Assume that we have the usual language 
with quantifiers (universal and existential), n-place predicates, individual constants, variables, 
and the sentential connectives of R.  Assume that the elements of the language are assigned 
                                                 
3 See Anderson and Belnap (1975). 
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 members and subsets of members of a domain D in the usual way.  The following is an 
axiomatization of RQ:4
 Axioms:  all the axioms of R 
   ∀xA → A(c/x) 
   ∀x(A→B) → (∀x A → ∀xB) 
   ∀x(A ∨ B) → (A ∨ ∀xB), where x is not free in A 
 
 Rule:  A ├ ∀xA 
 
The semantics for RQ can be found in Fine (1988).   
To extend 2-component logic with relevant implication to first-order 2-component logic 
with relevant implication, assume that we have a language with quantifiers (universal and 
existential), n-place predicates, individual constants, variables, and the sentential connectives of 
2-component logic with relevant implication.  Define a domain D of objects and assign each 
individual constant an member of the domain and each n-place predicate a pair of subsets of Dn 
(Dn is the set of n-tuples of elements of D) such that these subsets jointly exhaust Dn.5  One of 
the subsets assigned to a predicate P is the extension of P and the other is the antiextension of P.  
An atomic sentence of the form 〈Pa1…an〉 is at-least-Y if and only if the set of n-tuples <b1, …, 
bn> is a member of the extension of P where bi is the member of D assigned to ai.  Likewise, an 
atomic sentence of that form is at-least-N if and only if the relevant set of n-tuples is a member 
of the antiextension of P. 
The connectives are handled just as they are in the sentential logic.  We define the 
quantifiers so that universal quantification is analogous to infinite conjunction and existential 
quantification is analogous to infinite disjunction.   
                                                 
4 Again based on Mares (2004: 214). 
5 The last assumption might seem odd in this context because most interpretations of 4-valued logics like 2-
component logic take ? to act like a gap (neither true nor false).  However, on our interpretation, ? acts like a lack of 
information.  In section four, I introduce a family of partial n-component logics that allows for gaps. 
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 〈∀xφx〉 is at-least-Y if and only if for every member α of D, the result of substituting the 
name of α for ‘x’ in 〈φx〉 is at-least-Y 
 
〈∀xφx〉 is at-least-N if and only if for some member α of D, the result of substituting the 
name of α for x in 〈φx〉 is at-least-N.   
 
〈∃xφx〉 is at-least-Y if and only if for some member α of D, the result of substituting the 
name of α for ‘x’ in 〈φx〉 is at-least-Y 
 
〈∃xφx〉 is at-least-N if and only if for every member α of D, the result of substituting the 
name of α for ‘x’ in 〈φx〉 is at-least-N.   
 
Given that at-least-Y is the designated value, these quantifier rules are extensions of the classical 
rules for quantified sentences.  I call this logic first-order 2-component logic. 
I will not speculate on the relation between first-order 2-component logic and RQ.  If 
they are not equivalent, then further work needs to be done to determine which one is more 
appropriate for use as a first-order logic for confused arguments. 
 
6.3  N-COMPONENT CONFUSION 
 
Up to this point, I have discussed only 2-component logic.  We can think of this logic as one 
whose semantic values have at most two components (out of Y, N and ?).  We can also think of it 
as the logic that is appropriate for confusion in which two things are thought to be identical.  In 
this section, I introduce a family of logics that can be called n-component logics.   
Let us say that a confused expression with n components is n-component confused.  In its 
current state, Camp’s theory applies only to 2-component confused expressions because it uses 
2-component logic.  Keeping in mind the example of Fred and the ant farm, I introduce some 
terminology.  Let a query value be one of the ways an expert (e.g., Sal or Sam) can answer when 
asked to evaluate a sentence.  Thus, the query values are: Y, N, and ?.   Let a response value be 
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 the group of query values assigned to a particular confused sentence.  In the 2-component case, 
the response values are: YY, YN, Y?, NN, N?, and ??.  Let a semantic value be one of the values 
assigned to each sentence by the logic.  The response values are grouped into semantic values.  
In the 2-component case, the semantic values are: Y, N, YN, and ?.   
If there were three big ants (Ant A, Ant B, and Ant C) in the ant farm instead of two, then 
‘Charlie’ would be a 3-component confused expression.  We would still use the same query 
values, but to evaluate Fred’s confused arguments, we would need three experts and each 
confused sentence would be assigned a response value consisting of three query values.  For 
example, if Fred utters ‘Charlie is tired’ and Ant A is tired, Ant B is tired, and Ant C is not tired, 
we ask the expert on Ant A whether Ant A is tired, we ask the expert on Ant B whether Ant B is 
tired, and we ask the expert on Ant C whether Ant C is tired.  In this case, the response value for 
‘Charlie is tired’ would be YYN.  Once we have response values for Fred’s sentences, we need a 
way of grouping them into semantic values and a way of evaluating his arguments for validity 
based on the semantic values of the sentences they contain.   
Here are my suggestions.  A 3-component logic has the following ten response values: 
Y??, YY?, YYY, N??, NN?, NNN, YYN, YNN, YN?, ???.  These should be grouped in the same 
way as the response values for 2-component logic.  That is, Y??, YY?, YYY are all Y; N??, 
NN?, NNN are all N; ??? is ?, YN? is YN; YNN is YNN; and YYN is YYN.  That makes six 
semantic values: Y, N, YN, YYN, YNN, and ?.  Thus, a 3-component confused expression 
requires a 3-component logic with six semantic values.  A 4-component confused expression 
generates 15 response values and requires a 4-component logic with nine semantic values.  In 
general, an n-component confused expression generates (n + 1)(n + 2)/2 response values and 
requires a logic with 3 + n(n – 1)/2 semantic values.  However, some of these semantic values 
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 are redundant.  For example, in 4-component logic, the value YYNN is equivalent to YN 
because these logics deal only with the ratio of Ys to Ns.  Likewise, in a 6-component logic, 
YYYYNN is equivalent to YYN and YYNNNN is equivalent to YNN.   
Recall the diagram for the semantic values of 2-component logic: 
 
 
 
Y
N
?YN
 
Figure 6.1  (2-component logic) 
 
 
 
The following are the diagrams of the semantic values for 3-component logic and 4-component 
logic.   
 
 
 
 
Y
N
?YN
YNN
YYN
 
Y
N
?YN
YNN
YYN
YYYN
YNNN
 
 Figure 6.2 (3-component logic)  Figure 6.3 (4-component logic) 
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 In these diagrams, implication goes from bottom to top.6  If a line connects two semantic values, 
then a sentence with the semantic value nearer the bottom of the diagram implies a sentence with 
the semantic value nearer the top of the diagram.  Thus, if every assignment of values to an 
argument with one premise assigns a value to the premise that is less than or equal to the value of 
the conclusion, then the argument is valid.   
The justification for positing these relations between the semantic values of the 3-
component logic and  4-component logic are as follows.  In the case of 2-component logic, the 
four epistemic values are placed in the following groups: Y and YN are at-least-Y, N and YN are 
at-least-N.  Valid arguments preserve at-least-Y and the absence of at-least-N (i.e., if an 
argument is valid and its premises are all at-least-Y, then its conclusion must be at-least-Y; if an 
argument is valid and its conclusion is at-least-N, then one of its premises must be at-least-N).  
In the 3-component case we have six semantic values: ?, Y, YYN, YN, YNN, and N.  The 
relations between Y, N, YN, and ? should remain the same no matter how many extra semantic 
values are added.  The problem is how to interpret arguments whose sentences are YYN or 
YNN.  Grouping them into at-least-Y and at-least-N will not work because YN and YYN are 
both at-least Y and at-least N so if every assignment of values to a one-premise argument assigns 
YYN to the premise and YN to the conclusion then the argument would count as valid 
(according to validity for 2-component logic).  But intuitively such an argument is invalid 
because YYN is “above” YN.  According to our interpretation, a sentence assigned YYN has 
been endorsed by two of three experts and rejected by one, while a sentence assigned YN has 
been endorsed by one of three experts and rejected by one (the third is silent).  Thus, an 
assignment of YYN to a sentence indicates greater profitability than an assignment of YN.  
                                                 
6 Note that we cannot think of these lattices as approximation lattices in the way that Belnap suggests for the lattice 
for 2-component logic is an approximation lattice; see Belnap (1976b, 509-10) for more on this issue. 
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 Similar considerations show that in an n-component logic, when two semantic values are 
combinations of ‘Y’s and ‘N’s, the one with a higher ratio of ‘Y’s to ‘N’s is above the other.  
Furthermore, if a semantic value has a combination of ‘Y’s and ‘N’s then it is incomparable to ?.   
In an n-component logic, we want a valid argument to preserve the “height” of the 
semantic values.  In other words, an argument is valid if and only if for every assignment of 
values, the premises are assigned semantic values that are “lower” than or equal to the semantic 
value assigned to the conclusion.  To make this definition a bit more rigorous, I say that in an n-
component logic, the pure semantic values are Y, N, and ?, while all the other semantic values 
are mixed.  A mixed semantic value has a Y-value equal to the number of ‘Y’s in the name of the 
semantic value divided by the total number of letters in the name of the semantic value.  The 
relations between the pure semantic values are: N<Y, ?<Y, N<?.  Among the mixed values, if α 
and β are mixed values and α has a Y-value that is greater than or equal to the Y-value of β, then 
β ≤ α.  Finally, if α is a mixed value then N<α and α< Y.  If υ is a map from a set of sentences 
into the set of semantic values for an n-component logic, then an argument composed of 
sentences from that set is valid if and only if for every valuation the semantic values assigned to 
the premises are less than or equal to the value assigned to the conclusion. 
We can define negation, conjunction, and disjunction for n-valued logics as well.  For 
negation we use the same definition as in 2-component logic but add that if 〈p〉 has a mixed 
semantic value with a Y-value of k, then 〈~ p〉 has a mixed semantic value with a Y-value of 1-k.  
For example, if 〈p〉 is YYN, then 〈~ p〉 is YNN; if 〈p〉 is YYYNN, then 〈~ p〉 is YYNNN.  We 
allow conjunction and disjunction to work the same way they do in 2-component logic.  That is: 
υ(〈p ∧ q〉) = greatest lower bound of υ(〈p〉) and υ(〈q〉). 
υ(〈p ∨ q〉) = least upper bound of  υ(〈p〉) and υ(〈q〉). 
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 In less rigorous terms, to determine the semantic value of a conjunction in an n-component logic, 
follow the lines downward in the diagram of the semantic values for that logic; where they meet 
is the semantic value of the conjunction.  For example, if 〈p〉 is YYN and 〈q〉 is ?, then 〈p ∧ q〉 is 
N.  To determine the semantic value of a disjunction in an n-component logic, follow the lines 
upward in the diagram for the semantic values of that logic; where they join is the semantic value 
of the disjunction.  For example, if 〈p〉 is YNN and 〈q〉 is ?, then 〈p ∨ q〉 is Y.  The following are 
truth tables for negation, conjunction, and disjunction in 3-component logic: 
p │ ~ p       ∧ │ ? Y YYN YN YNN N   
? │    ? ? │    ? ? N N N N  
Y │   N Y │    ? Y YYN YN YNN N  
YYN │ YNN YYN │ N YYN YYN YN YNN N 
YN │  YN YN │ N YN YN YN YNN N  
YNN │ YYN YNN │ N YNN YNN YNN YNN N 
N │   Y N │ N  N   N N N N 
 
 
∨ │ ? Y YYN YN YNN N   
? │    ? Y Y Y Y ?  
Y │    Y Y Y Y Y Y 
YYN │ Y Y YYN YYN YYN YYN 
YN │ Y Y YYN YN YN YN 
YNN │ Y Y YYN YN YNN YNN 
N │ ? Y YYN YN YNN N 
 
The truth tables for n > 3 are straightforward to construct as well. 
An important issue is: what is the relation between n-component logics and relevance 
logics?  To show that 2-component logic is equivalent to Rfde, we made use of a result of Dunn’s.  
Define 〈p → q〉 to be valid if and only if for every valuation υ in a de Morgan lattice, υ(〈p〉) ≤ 
υ(〈q〉).  Dunn proved that 〈p → q〉 is valid if and only if 〈p → q〉 is a theorem of Rfde.  The 
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 semantic values of an n-component logic constitute a de Morgan lattice.7  Thus, Dunn’s theorem 
shows that the first-degree entailments of an n-component logic are theorems of Rfde.   
We can extend an n-component logic to a full sentential logic or to a first-order predicate 
logic in the same way that we extended 2-component logic in section one.  I will not go through 
the details.  Instead, I want to move on to a much more difficult problem: how to deal with 
partial components.8   
 
6.4 PARTIAL COMPONENTS 
 
Recall that a partial concept is one whose range of applicability does not exhaust the domain in 
question.  For example, it seems that numbers are not in the range of applicability of ‘green’; 
hence, ‘green’ neither applies nor disapplies to numbers.  We can say that applying or 
disapplying a partial concept to an object outside its range of applicability is a category mistake.  
Because many concepts are partial, an adequate theory of confused concepts needs to be 
applicable to confused concepts whose components are partial.9   
                                                 
7 See Dunn and Restall (2001: 50-55) for a discussion of lattices in the context of relevance logic. 
8 There are other ways to extend the logic to n-components.  I offer no assurance that the one presented in the text is 
the most intuitive.  Another way of constructing n-component logics is to say that if 〈p〉 is ? and 〈q〉 has a mixed 
semantic value whose Y-value is greater than .5 then 〈p〉 implies 〈q〉, and if 〈p〉 has a mixed semantic value whose Y-
value is less than .5 and 〈q〉 is ?, then 〈q〉 implies 〈p〉.  One might be motivated to set up the logic in this alternative 
way if one believes that a sentence assigned a mixed semantic value whose Y-value is >.5 is more profitable than a 
sentence that is ? and that a sentence that is assigned a mixed semantic value whose Y-value is <.5 is less profitable 
than a sentence that is ?.  The idea is that if more experts tell you “Yes” than tell you “No”, then you are better off 
than if you were told nothing; if more experts tell you “No” than tell you “Yes” then you are worse off than if you 
were told nothing.  I personally would rather be told nothing than be given conflicting advice by people I trust 
equally.  It seems to me that this is a matter of personal preference.     
9 Camp suggests that one can explain category mistakes in terms of confusion, but he does not provide any details 
for how this can be done.  If it could be done without an account of confused concepts with partial components, then 
one could use the theory of confusion at two different levels to explain confused concepts with partial components.  
However, I see little hope for this explanatory strategy.  Instead, I provide a logic for confused concepts with partial 
components directly.  It seems to me that this theory might be useful for explaining category mistakes, but I do not 
pursue that project here.  See Camp (2002: ch. 19). 
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 To have an example of conceptual confusion, consider Gil, who uses the term ‘jade’.  
Unbeknownst to Gil, there are two “kinds” of jade: jadeite and nephrite.10  Assume that Gil lives 
in a community where no one knows that ‘jade’ is confused.  To justify the claim that ‘jade’ as it 
is used by Gil is actually confused, assume that Gil treats claims p and q as equally important in 
his use of ‘jade’, where the result of substituting ‘nephrite’ for ‘jade’ in p is true, but the result of 
substituting ‘jadeite’ for ‘jade’ in p is false, and vice versa for q.     
If we assume that ‘jadeite’ and ‘nephrite’ are partial concepts whose ranges of 
applicability are the set of physical objects, then it makes sense to think of ‘jade’ as a partial 
concept with the same range of applicability.  To simplify the discussion, I say that two concepts 
with identical ranges of applicability are congruent.  It seems to me that if any two component 
concepts of a confused concept are congruent, then the confused concept and any one of its 
component concepts are congruent.  I call such a confused concept application-confused.  We 
still have no way of applying the theory of confusion to application-confused concepts because 
we have no query value for cases where the components neither apply nor disapply to an object, 
but it seems that one can adopt one’s favored account of partial concepts and use it in 
conjunction with the theory of confused concepts.  (The most intuitive account is that the 
sentences in question are truth-value gaps.11) However, if we assume that the range of 
applicability for ‘jadeite’ is the set of physical objects in China, while the range of applicability 
for ‘nephrite’ is the set of physical objects, then we run into trouble.  I call a confused concept 
whose component concepts have different ranges of applicability range-confused.  (Notice that 
the distinction between application-confused concepts and range-confused concepts is very 
                                                 
10 Laporte (2004) casts doubt on the historical accuracy of this example. 
11 The weak Kleene scheme works well for accounts like this. 
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 similar to the distinction between application-inconsistent concepts and range-inconsistent 
concepts—that is not a coincidence.) 
Here is the problem range-confused concepts pose for my theory of confused concepts.  
Assume that ‘jade’ is range-confused in the way described above and that Gil presents an 
argument one of whose premises is ‘the statue of liberty is jade’. Because ‘jade’ is a 2-
component confused concept, we use a 2-component logic with four semantic values to evaluate 
Gil’s confused arguments that contain occurrences of ‘jade’.  Assume that our expert on jadeite 
is Jim and our expert on nephrite is Nancy.  To assign a response value to the sentences of Gil’s 
argument, we ask Jim to evaluate ‘the statue of liberty is jadeite’.  As I have defined ‘jadeite’, the 
statue of liberty is outside its range of applicability.  As long as Jim is limited to Y, N, and ?, he 
have a difficult time providing a query value.  It is inappropriate for him to evaluate the sentence 
in question in any of these ways.  I suggest that we use a new query value: G.  An expert replies 
to a query with G if and only if the object in question is outside the range of applicability of the 
concept.  With this new option, Jim replies to our query with G.  We ask Nancy whether the 
statue of liberty is nephrite and she replies with N.  Thus, the response value for ‘the statue of 
liberty is jade’ is NG.     
How should we evaluate Gil’s argument?  One suggestion is to treat any confused 
sentence whose response value name includes a ‘G’ as a category mistake.  On this view, a 
range-confused concept has a range of application that is the intersection of the ranges of 
application of its component concepts.  Accordingly, for any range-confused concept, one can 
construct an application-confused concept that has the same application set, disapplication set, 
and range of applicability by defining component concepts that are analogous to the components 
of the original concept, but whose ranges of applicability are all the same.  Thus, this approach to 
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 range-confused concepts assimilates range-confusion to application-confusion.  However, these 
two types of confusion are distinct and should be treated as such.  We need a way of evaluating 
arguments like Gil’s that involve range-confused concepts.  I call an n-component logic that 
allows G as a query value a partial n-component logic. 
I propose to construct a logic for a 2-component range-confused concept and then 
generalize my findings to the family of partial n-component logics.  For a 2-component range-
confused concept, the response values will be: YY, YN, Y?, YG, NN, N?, NG, ??, G?, and GG.  
It makes sense to group them into the following semantic values: Y (YY and Y?), N (NN and 
N?), ? (??), G (GG and G?), YN, YG, and NG.  Group the semantic values into the regular 
values—Y, N, ?, and YN—and the irregular values—G, YG, and NG.  The most important 
principle for constructing a partial n-component logic is that it should preserve the implications 
present in the corresponding n-component logic.  A second principle for deciding on the relations 
between these values is that if 〈p〉 is regular-valued and 〈q〉 is irregular-valued, then 〈p〉 does not 
imply 〈q〉.  The justification is that we never want to introduce category mistakes into our 
reasoning—even if they are in the component concepts of our confused concepts.  For certain 
values, we can allow 〈p〉 to imply 〈q〉 when p is irregular-valued and q is regular-valued.  I 
assume that there are many ways of defining implications between irregular-valued sentences 
and regular-valued sentences, but the one I adopt is: if we replace the ‘G’ in the name of the 
semantic value with a ‘Y’, then a sentence with the original semantic value (before replacement) 
implies a sentence with the resulting semantic value (after replacement).   
To make these claims more rigorous define the Y-value of a sentence as above, the N-
value of a sentence as the number of ‘N’s in the name of its semantic value divided by the 
number of letters in the name of its semantic value, and the G-value of a sentence as the number 
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 of ‘G’s in the name of its semantic value (notice that the G-value is not analogous to either of the 
other two).  A sentence with semantic value ? has no Y-value, N-value, or G-value.  The first 
principle is that if the G-values of 〈p〉 and 〈q〉 are zero, then they behave just as they do on the 
corresponding n-component logic.  The second principle is that if the G-value of 〈p〉 is less than 
the G-value of 〈q〉 then 〈p〉 does not imply 〈q〉.  The third principle is that for 〈p〉 and 〈q〉 that have 
semantic values other than G, if the G-value of 〈p〉 is greater than or equal to the G-value of 〈q〉 
and the Y-value of 〈p〉 is less than or equal to the Y-value of 〈q〉 and the N-value of 〈p〉 is greater 
than or equal to the N-value of 〈q〉, then 〈p〉 implies 〈q〉; otherwise, 〈p〉 does not imply 〈q〉.  Using 
these rules, we can construct a diagram of the semantic values for a partial n-component logic.  
The following is the diagram for partial 2-component logic: 
 
 
 
Y
N
?YN
YG
G
NG
 
Figure 6.4 (Partial 2-Component Logic) 
 
  
 
We can define the validity of an argument in partial 2-component logic in the familiar way: an 
argument is valid if and only if for every assignment of semantic values, the values of its 
premises are less than or equal to the value of its conclusion.   
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 We define negation, conjunction, and disjunction as before: 
p │ ~ p      ∧ │  ?  Y YN N YG NG G 
? │    ? ? │    ?  ?   N N G G G 
Y │   N Y │    ?  Y YN N YG NG G 
YN │  YN YN │ N YN YN N NG NG G 
N │   Y N │ N  N   N N G G G 
YG │  NG YG │ G YG YN G YG NG G 
NG │  YG NG │ G NG NG G NG NG G 
G │   G G │ G G G G G G G 
 
∨ │ ? Y YN  N YG NG G 
? │ ? Y  Y   ? Y Y G  
Y │ Y Y  Y  Y Y Y G 
YN │ Y Y YN YN Y YN G 
N │ ? Y YN  N Y NG G 
YG │ Y Y Y Y YG YG G 
NG │ Y Y YN YN YG NG G 
G │ G G G G G G G 
 
These tables for conjunction and disjunction are defined in the same way that all the others have 
been: υ(〈p ∧ q〉) = greatest lower bound of υ(〈p〉) and υ(〈q〉); and υ(〈p ∨ q〉) = least upper bound 
of υ(〈p〉) and υ(〈q〉).  The only exception is when one of the components of a disjunction is G, 
the entire disjunction is G.  Thus, I have deviated somewhat from the standard account because 
of my interpretation of G.  Negation is determined separately for each class of sentences with the 
same G-value: 〈p〉 has G-value k and Y-value m if and only if 〈~ p〉 has G-value k and Y-value 1-
m.   
Unfortunately, the semantic values of the partial n-component logics do not constitute de 
Morgan lattices; thus, Dunn’s theorem cannot be used to demonstrate their relation to relevance 
logics.  Of course, we can show that they have many of the properties of a relevance logic.  For 
example, disjunctive syllogism is invalid and both the following inference rules are invalid:  
p ∧ ~p ├ q 
 177
 q ├ p ∨ ~ p.   
We can introduce a conditional into a partial n-component logic in the same way that we 
introduced a conditional into n-component logics.  A partial n-component logic can also be 
extended to a first-order predicate logic with universal and existential quantification defined as 
generalized conjunction and disjunction.12  
The following are the diagrams of partial 3-component logic and partial 4-component 
logic:   
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Figure 6.5 (Partial 3-Component Logic    Figure 6.6 (Partial 4-Component Logic) 
 
As n increases, the number of irregular values increases faster than the number of regular values.   
                                                 
12 For the predicate logic we would allow the union of the extension and antiextension of an n-place predicate to be a 
proper subset of Dn. 
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 There are no doubt other ways of constructing partial n-component logics.  According to my 
account, the relation between an n-valued logic and a partial n-valued logic is similar to the 
relation between classical logic and a 3-valued logic with a weak Kleene scheme.  According to 
the weak Kleene scheme, if a compound sentence has a component with value G, then the 
compound has value G.  There is a 3-valued scheme called the strong Kleene scheme that does 
not have this feature.  One could construct a family of partial n-component logics that are 
analogous to the strong Kleene 3-valued logic.  Below are the diagrams for the “strong” versions 
of partial 2-valued logic and partial 3-valued logic. 
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 Figure 6.7 (“Strong” Partial 2-Component Logic)  Figure 6.8 (“Strong” Partial 3-Component Logic) 
 
 
 
 
 
6.5  A SEMANTIC THEORY FOR CONFUSED CONCEPTS 
 
As we have seen, Camp presents a logic for confused expressions, but not a semantic theory for 
confused expressions.13  In other words, Camp tells us which arguments that contain confused 
expressions are valid, but he does not tell us the meanings of the sentences that contain confused 
                                                 
13 See Camp (2002: 220n4). 
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 expressions.  That is not meant to be a criticism of Camp.  For my purposes, I need a semantic 
theory for confused expressions because I am trying to show that if one treats truth as an 
inconsistent concept, then one can have an internalizable semantic theory for truth.  My view is 
that inconsistent concepts are confused.  Thus, in order to construct a semantic theory for truth, I 
need a semantic theory for confused expressions.   
In order to construct a semantic theory for confused expressions, I make use of 
Brandom’s theory of meaning, which is an inferential role theory of meaning; it explains the 
meaning of a sentence in terms of its role in inferences and it explains the meanings of 
subsentential expressions in terms of their contribution to the inferential roles of the sentences in 
which they occur.  I have two reasons for choosing an inferential role theory as the basis for a 
semantic theory for confused expressions: (i) confused sentences have no truth-values, which 
makes it difficult to use a truth conditional theory of meaning, and (ii) I have already endorsed a 
particular logic for confused expressions, which can be used to determine the inferential role of 
confused sentences.   
 
 
6.5.1  BRANDOM’S THEORY OF MEANING 
 
 
The heart of Brandom’s Making It Explicit is a theory of discursive practice.  We are all familiar 
with discursive practices, for they are the practices in which participants behave in a way that is 
sufficient to confer content on some of their performances, mental states, and products.  
Although ‘content’ could use a sharp definition, I am not going to provide one.  Suffice it to say 
that ‘content’ is used in a way that is similar to the way ‘meaning’ is used, except that where 
‘meaning’ applies to linguistic entities alone, ‘content’ applies to mental ones as well (e.g. 
mental states, attitudes, etc.).   
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 Brandom divides his theory of content into two parts: a theory of semantic phenomena 
and a theory of pragmatic phenomena.  One of his fundamental commitments is that one should 
explain the former in terms of the latter, which is a descendant of the view that meaning should 
be explained in terms of use.  Thus, semantic phenomena (content, truth, reference, validity) are 
explained in terms of the way the things that bear content are used.14   
I address Brandom’s semantic theories and pragmatic theories in turn.  As I mentioned, 
his semantic theory belongs to a family called conceptual role semantics.  Members of this 
family explain meaning or content in terms of the conceptual role of the thing that bears the 
meaning or content.  Brandom’s version takes the conceptual role of a content-bearer to be its 
role in inference.  He takes the primary content-bearers to be sentence tokens and the primary 
notion of inference to be material inference, which is a relation between two content-bearers that 
holds (in part) because of the content they bear (as opposed to formal inference which holds 
because of the form of the content-bearers).  Thus, the content of a sentence token is its 
inferential role.   
Brandom distinguishes between three types of inferential relations: commissive, 
permissive, and incompatibility (I explain these terms when I turn to his pragmatic theory).  
Accordingly, the inferential role of a sentence has three parts—one for each of the inferential 
relations in which it participates.  We can think of the incompatibility role as a set of ordered 
pairs of sentences that are incompatible.  The commissive and permissive parts can each be 
thought of as sets of inferential antecedents and inferential consequents.  The antecedents of a 
sentence are the sentences from which one can infer the sentence in question (let us call it p) and 
the consequents are the sentences that one can infer from it.  The antecedents of p form a set 
whose members are sets of sentences from which p follows.  The consequents of p form a set of 
                                                 
14 See Brandom (1994: chs. 1-2). 
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 ordered n-tuples.  The first member of each n-tuple is a sentence that follows from p and the 
other members of each n-tuple are the premises besides p needed to derive the first member.  
Thus, the inferential role of a sentence p, will be: {p’s commissive antecedents, p’s commissive 
consequents, p’s permissive antecedents, p’s permissive consequents, p’s incompatibilities}.  
The inferential role of a sentence depends on both which sentences are available to serve as 
auxiliary premises and which inferences are correct.  Brandom assumes that each member of a 
discursive practice takes everyone else to agree on the latter.15  (I reject this assumption later in 
this chapter.) 
Brandom’s pragmatic theory takes as primitives the notions of deontic status and deontic 
attitude.  Statuses come in two flavors: commitments and entitlements.  The former are similar to 
obligations and the latter are similar to permissions.  There are three types of attitudes: 
attributing, undertaking, and acknowledging.  One may attribute, undertake, and acknowledge 
various commitments and entitlements.   
There are several different kinds of commitments that correspond to aspects of discursive 
practice.  Doxastic commitments correspond to assertions and beliefs, inferential commitments 
correspond to reasons, and practical commitments correspond to actions.  The members of a 
discursive practice keep track of each other’s commitments and entitlements.  Brandom adopts 
Lewis’s explanation of this behavior in terms of scorekeeping.16  At a given moment in a 
conversation, the score is just the commitments and entitlements associated with each 
participant.  Each member of the conversation keeps score on all the participants (including 
herself).  Every time one of the participants undertakes (implicitly adopts), acknowledges 
                                                 
15 Brandom (1994: ch.2). 
16 See Lewis (1979). 
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 (explicitly adopts), or attributes (takes another as if he adopts) a commitment or entitlement, it 
changes the score.  I will refer to these as scorekeeping actions.   
Brandom bases his pragmatic theory on the idea that the use of a linguistic item is the 
way it changes the score of a conversation.  Because Brandom emphasizes the normative 
dimension of content, he defines the pragmatic significance of a sentence as the way it should 
affect the score of a conversation in which someone utters it.  Pragmatic significance has two 
aspects—the circumstances of application and the consequences of application.  The former 
consists of the scores of conversations in which it is legitimate to utter the sentence in question.  
The latter is the scores that should result from a legitimate utterance of it.17   
There are two important senses in which Brandom’s semantics answers to his pragmatics.  
First, the inferences that constitute the content of a sentence are explained in terms of 
commitments and entitlements.  A commissive inference is one for which if one is committed to 
its premises, then one should be committed to its conclusion as well.  If one is entitled to the 
premises of a permissive inference, then one should be entitled to its conclusion too.  Two 
sentences are incompatible if commitment to one precludes entitlement to the other.  The 
participants of an inferential practice acknowledge inferential commitments by using some 
sentences as reasons for others.  Second, given the force of an utterance, the content of the 
sentence uttered determines its pragmatic significance.  That is, once the members of a discursive 
practice determine that a given utterance has a certain force, they can use the content of the 
sentence uttered (its inferential role) to determine how it should change the score of the 
conversation (its pragmatic significance).   
                                                 
17 Brandom (1994: 180-198).  Recall that these notions figure in my argument that confused sentences have no truth-
values in section 5.2.3 of Chapter Five. 
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 For Brandom, the paradigmatic use of a sentence is an assertion.  Consequently, his 
model of discursive practice is one in which the members make various assertions.  He assumes 
that this model can be extended to include all the other types of speech acts.  When a person 
makes an assertion, she sets off a chain reaction of scorekeeping actions by each member of the 
conversation.  Three important features of assertions govern these scorekeeping actions.  First, 
when someone makes an assertion, she acknowledges a doxastic commitment.  She also 
undertakes all the commitments and entitlements that follow from the one acknowledged.  
Second, a successful assertion (i.e., one in which the asserter is entitled to the commitment 
acknowledged) entitles other members of the conversation to undertake the same commitment.  
Successful assertions present commitments for public consumption.  Third, the asserter takes 
responsibility to justify the assertion by giving reasons for it should the need arise.  In general, 
assertion displays a default and challenge structure in which many assertions carry default 
entitlement that another member of the conversation can challenge.18
  Brandom extends his basic model in several different ways.  He accounts for the 
commitments undertaken and acknowledged in perception by explaining perceptual reliability in 
terms of a special kind of inference.  To account for action, Brandom introduces practical 
commitments, which are involved in inferences and can have entitlement associated with them.  
He treats actions as acknowledgments of practical commitments and presents a rudimentary 
action theory in terms of this idea.  He uses a notion of substitution to extend his account of 
inferential role from sentences to subsentential expressions and a notion of recurrence to extend 
it from subsentential expressions to context-sensitive performances.  He also introduces 
                                                 
18 Brandom (1994: 167-179). 
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 scorekeeping actions to account for all of these subsentential semantic phenomena.19  In this 
chapter, I can deal only with the sentential level. 
 
 
6.5.2  A PRAGMATIC THEORY FOR CONFUSION 
 
 
The point of this subsection is to present an extension of Brandom’s theory of content.  At the 
semantic level, the extension allows members of a discursive practice to disagree about which 
inferences are correct.  It will also allow them to adopt different semantic stances (i.e., use 
different standards when evaluating inferences).  At the pragmatic level, the extension allows 
scorekeepers to acknowledge, undertake, and attribute inferential commitments to one another.  
Although Brandom’s model already includes inferential commitments, he assumes (to simplify 
the theory) that each member of a discursive practice attributes the same ones to everyone else.  
The extension also introduces a new type of status: scorekeeping commitments.  These allow 
scorekeepers to change the way they keep score on one another.   
These additions allow Brandom’s model of content to explain what it is to adopt a 
semantic stance.  When a person adopts a semantic stance, one commits oneself to an inferential 
standard for use in assessing someone’s inferential behavior.  I explain adopting semantic stances 
in terms of acknowledging scorekeeping commitments.  The reason for this strategy is, of course, 
to comply with his principle that pragmatic phenomena should explain semantic ones.  Once 
complete, the extension of Brandom’s theory of content will yield a pragmatic version of Camp’s 
theory of confusion and it will provide a semantic theory for confused concepts. 
I present the extension of Brandom’s theory of content in two parts: the account of 
inferential commitments and the account of scorekeeping commitments.  They are combined to 
                                                 
19 See Brandom (1994), chapters 4, 6, and 7, respectively. 
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 explain what it is to adopt a semantic stance in general and the semantic stance appropriate for 
the confused in particular.  The following are two reasons his theory needs the extension. 
First, people disagree on which inferences are correct.  Brandom explains this 
disagreement in terms of differences in beliefs.  According to Brandom, people disagree about 
which sentences follow from a given sentence not because they accept different inferences but 
because they accept different potential premises.  One’s views on what follows from some claim 
will depend on both the inferences one endorses and the sentences one has available to use as 
premises.20  However, people also disagree about which inference rules are correct.  One cannot 
explain this disagreement in terms of differences in beliefs.  If Brandom’s theory of content is to 
describe actual discursive practices then it will have to allow practitioners to endorse different 
inferential standards. 
Second, discursive practitioners adopt semantic stances with respect to one another.  We 
do not hold each other to the same inferential standards.  The standard one uses for assessing 
inferences varies from person to person and context to context.  If Brandom’s account of 
discursive practice is to be realistic, it must capture this important aspect of our inferential 
behavior.  There is a difference between treating someone as if he is inferring incorrectly 
according to his own standards and treating him as if he has adopted the wrong standards.  One 
needs to look no further than common philosophical debates for evidence of this phenomenon.  
For example, it is appropriate for a classical logician to treat an intuitionist as if he has made a 
simple logical error if the intuitionist’s argument employs double negation, even though the 
classical logician accepts this inference rule.  On the other hand, it is inappropriate for an 
intuitionist to treat a classical logician as if she has made a simple logical error if the classical 
logician’s argument employs double negation, even though the intuitionist rejects this rule.  The 
                                                 
20 Brandom (1994: 357). 
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 debate between intuitionists and classical logicians that we find in the philosophical literature is 
one in which each finds faults with the other’s inferential behavior.  However, they take one 
another to have adopted the wrong inferential standards.  An account of adopting a semantic 
stance allows Brandom’s model of discursive practice to explain this phenomenon. 
The two reasons given above are related.  I argued that if Brandom’s theory is to account 
for the fact that humans endorse different inferences, then it has to allow scorekeepers to 
acknowledge, undertake, and attribute inferential commitments to one another.  Further, not only 
do people endorse different inferences, but we also evaluate others according to different 
standards of what counts as a good inference.  The two phenomena go hand in hand.  If I can 
attribute inferential commitments to you that are different from those I acknowledge, then I need 
a way of judging whether you have followed your own inferential commitments.  Semantic 
stances fit the bill.  By adopting a semantic stance on you, I assess your arguments according to 
inferential standards that I might not accept.  Thus, allowing scorekeepers to disagree about 
inferential correctness and allowing them to adopt semantic stances go hand in hand.  A 
discursive practice in which scorekeepers acknowledge, undertake, and attribute inferential 
commitments is one in which scorekeepers adopt semantic stances.   
  
6.5.2.1  INFERENTIAL COMMITMENTS   
My goal in this subsection is to extend Brandom’s scorekeeping pragmatics to conversations in 
which participants endorse different inferences.  The way to accomplish this is to permit 
scorekeepers to keep track of each other’s inferential commitments.  An inferential commitment 
is a type of deontic status that one can undertake, acknowledge, or attribute; it is just like a 
doxastic commitment or a practical commitment in this respect.  One can be entitled to 
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 inferential commitments as well.  There are, of course, differences between inferential 
commitments and doxastic commitments.  One expresses a doxastic commitment by uttering an 
assertion, while one expresses an inferential commitment by treating one doxastic commitment 
as a good reason for another.  It might seem that one could express an inferential commitment by 
asserting that one sentence follows from another.  Although I do not want to rule this out, I do 
not want the possibility of expressing inferential commitments to depend on the presence of 
logical vocabulary.  I want a model of scorekeeping that incorporates differences of opinion 
about inferential commitments from the start.   
I need to address a number of other issues surrounding inferential commitments.  First, do 
they participate in inferential relations?  That is, can one infer one inferential commitment from 
another?  It seems to me that the answer is yes.  For example, an inferential commitment 
expressed by <<something is flat ∴something is flat>>21 follows from the inferential 
commitment expressed by <<something is flat and brown ∴something is flat>>.  This issue is 
important for formulating the norms that govern scorekeeping practice.  For example, Apu might 
want to say that if Manjula is a reliable observer of red things, then he is too.  Recall that 
inferential commitments explain the status of observational reliability.  Thus, Apu’s formulation 
of the scorekeeping norm expresses an inferential commitment that holds between two inferential 
commitments.  The fact that inferential commitments participate in inferences implies that 
scorekeepers must keep track of the inferential commitments acknowledged and those 
undertaken by each member of a conversation. 
Another issue is the way in which one can come to be entitled to an inferential 
commitment.  We can extend the default and challenge structure to them in a straightforward 
                                                 
21 The double angle convention is used to construct names for arguments. 
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 way.  When someone makes an assertion, is challenged on it, and makes another assertion that is 
intended to serve as a reason for the first, a member of the audience can challenge the asserter in 
two different ways.  An audience member can make a doxastic challenge in which he challenges 
the asserter to demonstrate entitlement to the doxastic commitment expressed by his second 
assertion; or an audience member can make an inferential challenge in which he challenges the 
asserter to demonstrate entitlement to the inferential commitment expressed by his use of the 
second assertion as a reason for his first.  There will be at least two types of inferential challenge.  
One would challenge the speaker’s inferential standards, while the other is for the case where the 
speaker violated his own professed standards. 
One might make a case for the claim that one can have default entitlement to an 
inferential commitment based on one’s status as a reliable reporter.  However, it seems doubtful 
that a member of a discursive practice that does not contain logical vocabulary will be able to 
provide a satisfactory response to an inferential challenge.  Nevertheless, a scorekeeper in such a 
discursive practice can register the fact that he does not endorse the inferential commitment 
undertaken by the asserter.  In a more advanced discursive practice, one can justify inferential 
commitments and inherit them by testimony.  (Debates about intuitionism and relevantism 
provide a number of good examples of each of these discursive phenomena.) 
One important consequence of this addition to Brandom’s scorekeeping pragmatics is 
that propositional content will be doubly perspectival.  Brandom is already committed to the 
view that people who acknowledge different doxastic commitments will disagree about the 
inferential role of a claim (i.e. its content).  If one accepts the claim that scorekeepers can differ 
on which inferences they endorse as well, then propositional content will be relative to a set of 
doxastic commitments and to a set of inferential commitments.   
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6.5.2.2  SCOREKEEPING COMMITMENTS   
I need to introduce a new type of commitment into Brandom’s pragmatic theory to explain what 
a scorekeeper is doing when she adopts a semantic stance.  A scorekeeping commitment is a type 
of practical commitment—a commitment to action.  That is, one performs an action by 
acknowledging a practical commitment.  By acknowledging a scorekeeping commitment, one 
performs a special type of action—one keeps score.  Undertaking a scorekeeping commitment is 
a way of saying, “I am going to keep score in such and such a way.”  It is a commitment to future 
scorekeeping actions.  One can, of course, change the way one keeps score.  In this case, one 
acknowledges a new scorekeeping commitment.   
For the most part, scorekeeping commitments obey the rules for practical commitments.  
Thus, one can acknowledge, undertake, and attribute scorekeeping commitments.  They 
participate in inferences and are susceptible to entitlement as well.  The fact that scorekeeping 
commitments participate in inferences implies that scorekeepers will have to keep track of the 
scorekeeping commitments acknowledged and those undertaken by each member of a 
conversation. 
 One can distinguish several different types of scorekeeping commitments.  There are 
those that affect how one keeps score on oneself and those that affect how one keeps score on 
others.  (Example of a change in the latter: “I’m going to pay more attention to Otto’s attitudes 
toward Becky.”)  There are those that affect the way one inherits commitments and entitlements 
from others.  (Example: “I’m going to be less gullible.”)  Some scorekeeping commitments 
pertain to the relation between different types of commitments.  For example, one can 
acknowledge a scorekeeping commitment to treat only those who accept the claim that monkeys 
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 do not grow on trees as possessors of the concept of a monkey.  That is, a scorekeeper might 
interpret a person’s use of ‘monkey’ as meaning monkey only if the scorekeeper attributes to this 
person the doxastic commitment associated with the claim that monkeys do not grow on trees.  
Otherwise, the scorekeeper will treat the person’s term ‘monkey’ as if it means something else 
(or nothing at all).  One acknowledges one of these scorekeeping commitments when one calls a 
sentence “meaning-constitutive”.  Similar scorekeeping commitments pertain to attributions of 
analyticity, definition, etc.  There are scorekeeping commitments that are appropriate only for the 
one who undertakes them and those that are appropriate for everyone in a particular situation.  
For example, if one member of a three-person conversation realizes that one of the other 
members is confused on some topic, and realizes that the third member recognizes the confusion 
as well, then the first will adopt a scorekeeping commitment with respect to how to assess the 
confused person’s inferences.  Moreover, the first treats this scorekeeping commitment as one 
the other (non-confused) member of the conversation ought to adopt as well.  The semantic 
stance associated with confusion is one that is appropriate for anyone who deals with a confused 
person.  This list is far from complete but I hope it helps flesh out the idea of a scorekeeping 
commitment. 
An important issue is entitlement to scorekeeping commitments.  As with all 
commitments, there should be a default and challenge structure associated with scorekeeping 
commitments.  For example, Camp presents a reading of Locke according to which he is 
confused.22  A participant in a conversation with Camp might say to him, “Locke does not 
confuse acts and objects, so stop treating him as if he does.”  Camp would then have an 
opportunity to justify his scorekeeping commitment.  The way entitlements to scorekeeping 
commitments are passed from person to person will be a bit tricky.  Since scorekeeping 
                                                 
22 Camp (2002: 191-217). 
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 commitments are practical commitments, it will depend on the role entitlement plays for 
practical commitments.  I remarked at the end of the previous paragraph that some scorekeeping 
commitments will have inheritance structures such that if one member of a conversation entitles 
himself to one of these scorekeeping commitments, then the others are entitled to endorse it as 
well.  I will have to leave the details for some other occasion. 
 
6.5.2.3  SEMANTIC STANCES  
Semantic stances involve standards by which one assesses arguments for validity.  (I restrict my 
attention to deductive inferences.)  I should mention that when someone treats another as 
confused, she adopts one type of semantic stance, and when someone adopts a semantic stance, 
he acknowledges one type of scorekeeping commitment.  There are many other types of 
scorekeeping commitments and many other types of semantic stances. 
When a member of a discursive practice adopts a semantic stance, she acknowledges a 
scorekeeping commitment.  The content of her scorekeeping commitment is that she will 
evaluate the inferences of some other scorekeeper according to some standard.  Obviously, 
scorekeepers always employ some set of inferential commitments to assess inferences.  Thus, 
scorekeepers always employ some semantic stance or other.  We can think of the most common 
one as a default stance.  Most likely, the default stance will be one that takes everyone to endorse 
the same inferential commitments.  The default stance corresponds to a scorekeeping 
commitment to assess others’ inferences according to one’s own inferential commitments.  When 
a scorekeeper adopts a different semantic stance, she acknowledges a new scorekeeping 
commitment.  She commits herself to evaluate the inferences of another according to some 
inferential standard that she might not endorse.   
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6.5.2.4  PRAGMATICS FOR CONFUSION   
On Camp’s account of confusion, someone who interacts with a confused person should adopt a 
semantic stance according to which she does not attribute truth-values to the confused sentences, 
and she assesses them according to whether they preserve profitability.  The person adopting the 
new semantic stance uses one of the n-component logics to track profitability.  At the pragmatic 
level, adopting this semantic stance corresponds to acknowledging a specific scorekeeping 
commitment.   
In the interest of space, I do not present any of the substitution and recurrence structures 
that allow Brandom to extend his theory of content from the sentential level to the subsentential 
level.  Thus, although confusion is essentially a subsentential phenomenon in that confusion 
pertains to subsentential expressions, I deal with confused sentences only.     
Let us return to Fred, Ginger, and the ants.  Assume that Ginger has decided that Fred is 
confused.  Any sentence Fred utters containing ‘Charlie’, ‘the big ant’, etc. will count for Ginger 
as a confused sentence.  Any argument that contains confused sentences is a confused argument.  
In semantic terms, once Ginger has decided that Fred is confused, she adopts a particular 
semantic stance toward him.  I refer to it as the confusion stance.  When Ginger adopts the 
confusion stance, she decides not to attribute truth-values to Fred’s confused sentences.  (Recall 
that no such assignment can be inferentially charitable.)  Further, she assigns semantic values 
from the 2-component logic to Fred’s confused sentences in an effort to assess his arguments for 
profitability preservation.  To do so, she must either have the authority to play the roles of Sal 
and Sam or else have access to someone who does.  Once Ginger assigns the semantic values, 
she can evaluate Fred’s confused arguments for validity.   
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 In pragmatic terms, once Ginger has decided that Fred is confused, she acknowledges a 
scorekeeping commitment.  It is a commitment to keep score on Fred in a certain way.  In order 
to demonstrate the content of this commitment, assume that Fred utters a sentence, p, as the 
conclusion of an argument whose only premise is q.  Assume also that Ginger has decided that p 
and q are confused sentences.  Ginger decides that p is an assertion.  She understands its content 
and attributes to Fred a doxastic commitment that corresponds to it.  Assume that Fred is not 
default entitled to it and he has not acquired it by testimony.  Ginger must decide whether Fred’s 
argument, <<q∴p>>, entitles him to p.   
The scorekeeping commitment Ginger acknowledges has four aspects.  First, she refuses 
to attribute truth-values to Fred’s confused sentences.  For Brandom’s pragmatic theory, this 
amounts to a refusal to acknowledge either the doxastic commitments she attributes to Fred 
(even if he turns out to be entitled to them) or the doxastic commitments that correspond to their 
negations.  Thus, she must disengage from an important part of what it is to treat an utterance as 
an assertion.  Although Fred is making assertions, his commitments are not fit for public 
consumption.  Second, Ginger treats Fred as if he has undertaken new inferential commitments.  
These inferential commitments correspond to those deemed valid by the 2-component logic.  
These inferential commitments will most likely be different from the ones Ginger acknowledges.  
Note that Fred would probably not acknowledge these inferential commitments either.  However, 
by virtue of being confused, he has undertaken them (according to Ginger).  Third, she uses these 
inferential commitments to assess Fred’s confused arguments.  To do so, she must acknowledge 
a doxastic commitment to the effect that she has access to an authority on the topic about which 
Fred is confused.  She now consults this authority (which might just be her) and acknowledges 
doxastic commitments that correspond to the substitutional variants of Fred’s confused sentences 
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 (the sentences that result from replacing ‘Charlie’ with ‘Ant A’ or ‘Ant B’).  She uses these 
doxastic commitments to attribute epistemic values from the 2-component logic to Fred’s 
confused sentences.  She then evaluates Fred’s argument (<<q∴p>>) according to the inferential 
commitments she attributed to him in the second stage.  Fourth, she uses the results of the 
previous two stages to determine whether she should attribute entitlement to p.  If she takes Fred 
to be entitled to q, and she takes <<q∴p>> to be valid by the logic in question, then she takes 
Fred to be entitled to p.  Remember that she does not take this attribution of entitlement to 
authorize anyone else to acknowledge p.  (One consequence of this account of the pragmatics of 
confusion will be that the notion of entitlement is split into a weak version that does not entitle 
others to adopt the same commitment and a strong version that does.) 
It is essential to appreciate that the scorekeeping commitment Ginger acknowledges 
undermines an important aspect of assertion.  Camp argues that when interpreting the confused, 
there is a tension between two aspects of understanding: assessing reasons and assessing beliefs.  
Brandom’s model of assertion fuses these two components of understanding.  He emphasizes the 
fact that, in general, understanding someone’s belief requires not only deciding whether to adopt 
it, but also appreciating his reasons for it as well.  For Brandom, if I think you have a good 
reason for your belief, then I have good reason to accept it too (other things being equal).  In 
other words, Brandom builds inferential and doxastic charity into his model of assertion.  
However, in the confusion example, Ginger can think that Fred has a good reason for his 
confused belief only if she refuses to even consider whether she should accept it or reject it.  
Inferential and doxastic charity are incompatible in the presence of confusion.  If Brandom’s 
model of assertion is correct, then inferential and doxastic charity must coincide in general.  That 
is, one cannot attribute confusion to everyone and still be participating in a discursive practice.  
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 Thus, scorekeeping commitments for confusion must be exceptions to the norm.  Adopting the 
confused position is a discursively advanced thing to do.23      
 
 
6.5.3  A SEMANTIC THEORY FOR CONFUSION 
 
 
I have followed Camp’s theory of confusion by endorsing a relevance logic as the standard by 
which one ought to interpret the claims of the confused and I have presented several alterations 
of Brandom’s pragmatic theory that allow one to explain in scorekeeping terms what is done by 
an interpreter who takes another to be confused.  This is a pragmatics for confusion attributions 
in the sense that it provides an account of how language users should treat utterances that they 
take to be confused.  It is not an account of how language users should use confused concepts.  I 
hope that no such account is necessary (aside from saying exactly how one goes about discarding 
a concept and replacing it with new ones).  The logic Camp advocates for confusion is a logic for 
confused sentences in the sense that it specifies which confused arguments are valid.  It is not a 
logic for confusion attributions in the sense of specifying which arguments that contain 
confusion attributions are valid.  I have already said that I do not provide a pragmatics for 
confused expressions because I do not anticipate any use for such a thing.  I can also say that I 
will not provide a logic for confusion attributions, not because I do not anticipate any use for 
one, but because they do not seem to call for special treatment.  Likewise, I do not present a 
semantics for confusion attributions, mostly because I do not anticipate any big problem with 
them.  The semantics I present in this section is a semantics for confused expressions.     
 
                                                 
23 See Camp (2002: ch. 18). 
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 6.5.3.1  BRANDOM’S SUBSTITUTION SEMANTICS   
I find chapter six of Brandom’s Making It Explicit to be the most difficult in the book.  
Unfortunately, my confusion semantics depends on some of the tools forged in Brandom’s 
foundry.  Thus, I first explain what goes on in the first section of chapter six.  I do not have a 
good term for the theory that is presented there, so I have just called it Brandom’s Substitution 
Account.  It allows one to extract several different notions of content for the sentences of some 
bit of discourse from a logic for these sentences.  
The first thing we need is a distinction between designated value and multivalue for 
multivalue logic.  Most of us are familiar with classical logic that uses two truth values, true and 
false.  These are multivalues.  One can construct logics with lots of multivalues.  I call them 
truth-values throughout this dissertation.  Designated values are also familiar but not as distinct 
from multivalues.  Truth is designated in classical logic; however, one can construct a multivalue 
logic in which more than one multivalue is designated.  A multivalue is designated if it is prized 
in some sense.  We want our assertions to be true and our inferences to preserve truth; thus, truth 
is designated.  Brandom’s use of multivalue logic requires a notion of designated value, instead 
of just designatedness.  Even in logic with more than two multivalues, there are almost always 
only two designated values: designated and not designated.  In classical logic, there are two 
multivalues, true and false, and two designated values, designated and not designated.  Truth is 
designated, falsity is not designated.  One can construct a logic with three multivalues, true, 
false, and gappy, in which true is designated and gappy and false are not designated (this is the 
standard way to do three valued logic).  In Brandom’s account there can be more than two 
designated values.  This is a hard thing to grasp because we are used to thinking of multivalues 
as having their designatedness “built in.”  That is, we often think of multivalues as being 
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 designated or not designated.  Nevertheless, the substitution account depends on a system with 
lots of multivalues and lots of designated values.   
Formal logic is formal in one sense because the sentences involved display their semantic 
features syntactically.  Many logics deal with sentences whose multivalues are determined by the 
multivalues of their components.  Most also include a notion of validity according to which a 
sentence is valid if and only if it is designated no matter what the multivalues of its components.  
In classical logic, validity is logical truth.  A sentence is a logical truth if and only if it is true no 
matter whether its components are true or false.  Here, truth plays the role of a multivalue and a 
designated value.  In the general case, one must distinguish between the multivalue and the 
designated value.   
The substitution account is designed to apply to any linguistic item that has linguistic 
items as components.  Thus, it applies to sentences that have other sentences as components, it 
applies to sentences that have words as components, and it applies to arguments that have 
sentences as components.  The normal way to do things is bottom-up.  That is, one specifies the 
multivalues of the components and then calculates the designated values of the compounds.  The 
substitution account is top-down in the sense that one calculates the multivalues of the 
components from the designated values of the compounds.  The essence of the account is that 
two components have the same multivalue if substituting one for the other does not change the 
designated value of the compound.  We assume that designated values are attached to 
multivalues in the sense that if two items have the same multivalue then they have the same 
designated value as well.   
The first task is to distinguish freestanding from ingredient content and use the former to 
derive the latter.  Both pertain to sentences; freestanding content is the content that a sentence 
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 has when it is on its own, and ingredient content is the content of a sentence when it serves as a 
component in some larger compound.  A sentence’s ingredient content is the contribution it 
makes to the freestanding content of the compound in which it is a component.  Let S be a set of 
compound sentences, s1-sn, and C be a set of atomic sentences, c1-cm, that are the components of 
the sentences in S; assume that all belong to the same language.  If we are given the designated 
values for s1-sn, then we can derive their multivalues in the following way.  For any two 
sentences ci and cj of C, they have the same multivalue if and only if for every sentence sk of S, 
substituting ci for cj or cj for ci in sk does not change the designated value of sk.  Let the 
designated values of the members of S be their freestanding contents and the multivalues of the 
members of C be their ingredient contents.  Ingredient contents are equivalence classes of 
sentences on this account.  Obviously, the ingredient contents will depend on the embedding 
contexts available.   
Let us turn our attention toward arguments now.  Think of an argument as a compound 
whose components are sentences.  Let A be a set of arguments and S be a set of sentences that 
feature in those arguments.  Assume that all the arguments in A are composed of sentences from 
S.  If we are given the designated values of the arguments in A then we can extract the 
multivalues of the sentences in S using the substitution account.  Any two sentences si and sj 
have the same multivalue if and only if for every argument in A, substituting one for the other 
does not change its designated value.  If we use two designated values (correct, incorrect) for the 
members of A then the multivalues are freestanding inferential contents of the sentences of S.  
We can then generate the ingredient inferential contents of the components of those sentences of 
S that are compounds by using the substitution account one more time.  Just as above, let the 
compound sentences of S be S′ and the compounds that are contained in them be C.  Let the 
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 designated values be the freestanding inferential contents of the members of S′ and the 
multivalues be the ingredient inferential contents of the members of C.  Obviously, the 
freestanding inferential contents will depend on which argument contexts are found in the 
members of A and the ingredient inferential contents will depend on which embedding contexts 
are found in the members of S′.   
The substitution account allows Brandom to construct two hierarchies.  The assertional 
hierarchy has two levels and consists of sentences and their freestanding assertional content on 
the top level and sentences and their ingredient assertional content on the bottom level.  The 
inferential hierarchy has three levels, with the arguments and their designated values on the top 
level, sentences with freestanding inferential contents on the middle level, and sentences with 
ingredient inferential contents on the bottom level.  Note that the freestanding inferential content 
of a sentence need not be the same as its freestanding assertional content and its ingredient 
inferential content need not be the same as its ingredient assertional content.  Brandom does 
claim that if two sentences have the same ingredient inferential content, then they will have the 
same ingredient assertional content.24   
 
6.5.3.2  SEMANTICS FOR CONFUSION   
I want to use the substitution account to generate contents for confused sentences.  Let us revisit 
Fred and Ginger.  Assume that Ginger is just where we left her—she has decided that Fred is 
confused and she has identified the confused sentences of Fred’s.  She has also adopted a 
semantic stance on Fred and she has performed a plethora of scorekeeping actions to keep track 
of Fred’s confused sentences in accordance with the inferential standard she has adopted for 
                                                 
24 Brandom (1994: 351). 
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 them.  The task now is to provide meanings for Fred’s sentences.  Given the substitution account 
and the designated values of Fred’s confused arguments, it is fairly straightforward.  Ginger 
should assign Fred’s confused sentences multivalues based on whether substitution changes the 
designated value of the argument in which they occur.  Obviously, Ginger should construct every 
argument possible using some specified set of confused sentences, assign them designated values 
based on the 2-component logic, determine the multivalues of the confused sentences using the 
substitution account, and treat multivalues as freestanding inferential contents.  If she so chooses, 
she can extract ingredient inferential content by using the substitution account once more.   
Obviously, this account of the semantics for Fred’s confused sentences will not generate 
freestanding assertional contents.  It seems to me that Ginger could determine such things, but 
they will have to be derived from the confusion logic and the confusion semantics.  Any 
confused sentence to which Fred is entitled according to Ginger’s confusion logic will be 
assertible.  Obviously, Fred and Ginger will differ on which sentences are assertible and on 
which arguments are correct.  One can use the substitution account to generate whatever one 
wants in terms of content for him, content for her, assertibility for him, assertibility for her, etc.  I 
do not want to come down on which ones of these will count as the best way for her to proceed.  
Rather, I want to present a set of tools that can be used in the face of confusion. 
 
6.6  CONFUSED CONCEPTS AND INCONSISTENT CONCEPTS 
 
Now that I have presented and extended the theory of confused concepts, I make six points about 
inconsistent concepts.  First, conceptual inconsistency is explained in terms of conceptual 
confusion and conceptual confusion is explained in terms of conceptual confusion attributions.  
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 Thus, conceptual inconsistency is explained in terms of what it is to treat something as 
conceptually inconsistent.  Hence, a concept is inconsistent if and only if it is appropriate to 
adopt a certain semantic stance toward the employer of that concept.  We now have an account 
of what it is to adopt a semantic stance, which is explained in terms of scorekeeping pragmatics.   
Second, when one adopts the semantic stance appropriate for conceptual inconsistency, 
one uses a certain logic to evaluate the confused arguments in question and one keeps score on 
the confused in a certain way.  Using these methods, one can attribute meanings to the confused 
sentences in question and determine whether assertions of confused sentences are warranted or 
unwarranted.25
Third, because I have extended the theory of confusion to handle n-component confusion 
and partial components, my theory of inconsistent concepts is applicable to both application-
inconsistent concepts and range-inconsistent concepts and it is applicable to inconsistent 
concepts with more than two components.  I have advocated a certain family of logics for 
confused expressions and these carry over to inconsistent expressions well.  In the simplest case, 
an inconsistent concept will have two components that are both completely defined (i.e., they 
have empty ranges of inapplicability).  In this case, a 2-component logic is the appropriate one.  
In cases where an inconsistent concept has n components (n>2), a logic with more semantic 
values will be appropriate (e.g., 3 components requires 6 semantic values, and 4 components 
requires 8 semantic values).  In cases where an inconsistent concept has partial components, 
more complex logics are required.  If all the components of an inconsistent concept are partial 
but have identical ranges of applicability, then one needs to add only one semantic value (G) to 
the logic for category mistakes.  However, if an inconsistent concept is range-inconsistent (i.e., it 
                                                 
25 Although I have not argued for this claim, one can use the same methods to attribute content to the mental states 
of the confused.  I leave the account of this for future work. 
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 has components that are partial and have different ranges of applicability), then the logic 
required is even more complicated.  For 2 components, one needs 7 semantic values; for 3 
components, one needs 14 semantic values; for 4 components, one needs 25 semantic values. 
Fourth, inconsistent concepts are fusions of other concepts.  I provide no account of how 
to choose the component concepts for a given inconsistent concept.  I have already said that this 
choice might not be amenable to theory given that it will depend on considerations of overall 
simplicity and economy.  Furthermore, it seems to me that there might be cases where two 
different sets of component concepts can be equally good candidates for a single inconsistent 
concept.  If so, then which concepts constitute the component concepts of a given inconsistent 
concept is to some degree indeterminate.  Although I do not argue for this claim, I suggest that 
inconsistent concepts are fusions of consistent concepts.  That suggestion is an expression of 
optimism on my part.  If it is true, then for any inconsistent concept we encounter, there will be a 
group of consistent concepts in terms of which it can be explained.   
Fifth, the consistent concepts that are components of a given inconsistent concept will be 
natural candidates for replacing the inconsistent concept in question.  Given the considerations I 
present in Appendix A, for a group of consistent concepts to qualify as replacements for an 
inconsistent concept, it must be possible to introduce a generic concept for that group.  For 
example, jadeite and nephrite are the replacement concepts for the confused concept jade.  To 
avoid the problems I present in Appendix A, it must be possible to introduce a generic concept, 
say, jadeg, such that x is jadeg if and only if x is jadeite or x is nephrite.  The generic concept is 
handy for people who do not know that jade is confused but are part of a linguistic community in 
which others do have this knowledge.  One can say that such a person employs the generic 
concept by virtue of the division of linguistic labor.   
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 Sixth, my theory of inconsistent concepts constitutes a much-needed alternative to 
dialetheism.  Dialetheism is the doctrine that some sentences are both true and false, or 
alternatively, that some contradictions are true.  It has several historical precursors, but the 
contemporary version was proposed by Priest in the late 1970s.26  One common worry about 
accounts of inconsistent concepts is that they require dialetheism.  Not so.  I reject dialetheism 
for the simple reason that no sentences are both true and false.  The following is a quote from 
David Lewis that summarizes my position exactly: 
The reason we should reject [dialetheism] is simple.  No truth does have, and no 
truth could have, a true negation.  Nothing is, and nothing could be, literally both 
true and false.  This we know for certain, and apriori, and without any exception 
for especially perplexing subject matters. …  That may seem dogmatic.  And it is: 
I am affirming the very thesis that Routley and Priest have called into question 
and – contrary to the rules of debate – I decline to defend it.  Further, I concede 
that it is indefensible against their challenge.  They have called so much into 
question that I have no foothold on undisputed ground.  So much the worse for the 
demand that philosophers always must be ready to defend their theses under the 
rules of debate, (Lewis 1982: 101).   
 
The reason that dialetheism does not follow from my account of inconsistent concepts is that 
conceptually inconsistent sentences do not have truth-values.  Hence, the sentences that 
dialethists claim are both true and false have no truth-values on my account.   
For example, ‘R is a rable and it is not the case that R is a rable’ is a sentence that a 
dialethist might want to call both true and false.  It is certainly a contradiction (in the sense that it 
has the form ⎡p & ~p⎤, but not in the sense that it is false in all possible worlds, or in the sense 
that it is false by virtue of its logical form, or in the sense that any sentence follows from it).  
However, it has no truth-value according to my theory.  Hence, some contradictions are not false.  
That is a long way from saying that some contradictions are true.   
 
                                                 
26 See Priest (1979, 1989, 1998).  
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6.7  OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 
 
Objection 1:  The theory of confusion explains confusion in terms of what it is to take or treat a 
person or expression or concept as confused.  However, in the examples cited (mass, jade, etc.) 
these concepts were confused when no one knew that they were.  An adequate theory of 
confusion has to be able to explain cases of hidden confusion like these.   
Reply 1:  It is a mistake to think that because a theory of X explains X in terms of what it 
is to treat something as an X, the theory cannot explain cases of hidden X-ness.  In particular, the 
theory of confusion I endorse can explain cases of hidden confusion.  For example, prior to 1863, 
no one knew that jade was a confused concept.  However, because of a certain fact (namely, that 
people prior to 1863 were applying jade to both nephrite and jadeite without distinguishing 
between the two) it was appropriate to treat the people in question as confused.  Unfortunately, 
no one at the time had this knowledge because they were ignorant of certain empirical facts.  
Thus, the theory of confusion I endorse handles cases of hidden confusion perfectly well.27
Objection 2:  Camp’s theory of confusion is just as inferentially uncharitable as the 
ambiguity theory and the theories that attribute truth-values to confused sentences.  To continue 
Camp’s example, Fred does not know that he is confused.  If we assume that Fred usually 
reasons according to classical logic, then he will reason according to classical logic when using 
‘Charlie’ as well.  According to Camp’s theory of confusion, a relevance logic is appropriate for 
                                                 
27 See Field (1994b, 1998, 2000, 2001g, 2001h), Leeds (1997, 2000), Schiffer (1998), and Akiba (2002a, 2002b) for 
discussions of issues surrounding hidden conceptual defectiveness.  Again, Leport (2004) casts doubt on the 
historical accuracy of the jade example. 
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 evaluating Fred’s arguments that contain ‘Charlie’.  Some arguments that are valid according to 
classical logic are invalid according to relevance logic (e.g., those that depend on disjunctive 
syllogism).  Because Fred does not know that he is confused, he will present and endorse some 
arguments that are valid according to classical logic but invalid according to relevance logic.  
Thus, Camp’s theory of confusion will treat Fred as if he is a poor reasoner.  Therefore, it fails to 
meet its own standard of inferential charity.   
Reply 2:  Because Fred does not know that he is confused, he will certainly present and 
endorse arguments that are classically valid but are invalid according to Camp’s theory of 
confusion.  Thus, Camp’s theory implies that some of his arguments are invalid even though he 
has every reason to think they are valid.  However, that is not the same as treating Fred as if he is 
irrational.  Camp’s theory implies that Fred endorses some inference rules that he should not 
endorse.  However, the ambiguity account and the accounts that attribute truth-values to 
confused sentences imply that Fred does not know how to follow the inference rules he 
endorses—they treat him as if he makes trivial logical mistakes.  There is an important difference 
between correctly following an inference rule one accepts that happens to be invalid in the 
context in which one employs it, and incorrectly following an inference rule one accepts.28  
Perfectly reasonable people can disagree about which inference rules are valid in certain 
circumstances (for examples, look at debates between intuitionists and classical mathematicians, 
or any discussion between advocates and opponents of non-classical logics).  According to 
Camp’s theory, Fred is perfectly reasonable but is correctly following inference rules that are 
inappropriate for his arguments that contain ‘Charlie’.  According to the ambiguity account and 
the accounts that attribute truth-values to Fred’s confused sentences, Fred is irrational because he 
                                                 
28 Camp’s theory does imply that the inference rules we ought to endorse are (in part) dictated by the physical 
environment in which one finds oneself even if one is ignorant of the relevant environmental features. 
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 is not correctly following the inference rules he endorses.  Therefore, although Camp’s theory is 
implies that some of the inference rules Fred accepts are invalid, it does not treat Fred as if he is 
irrational.    
Objection 3:  There are no inconsistent concepts.  All the attempts in this dissertation to 
define inconsistent concepts fail to define any concept at all.  The reason that there are no 
inconsistent concepts is that interpretation requires one to use the logic one endorses when 
interpreting another.  Thus, it is inappropriate to ever attribute an inconsistent concept to 
someone, since the interpreter would have to attribute something that defies the logic she 
endorses.29
Reply 3:  First, the claim that we interpret others as if they endorse our logical standards 
is simply false.  If it were true then there would be no distinction between criticizing someone for 
failing to follow her own inference rule and criticizing someone for endorsing the wrong 
inference rules.  It is obvious that there is such a distinction and it plays an important role in 
philosophical discussions.  Second, charity can cut both ways.  One might simply introduce an 
inconsistent concept, begin using it, and describe it as inconsistent.  It seems to me that it would 
be quite difficult to go on interpreting someone who does this as if they had misunderstood their 
own stipulative definition and their claims about it.  Indeed, one might give an account of all the 
relevant factors in charitable interpretation and present two situations, one in which the weighted 
sum of all the factors is higher than that of the second, while in the first one attributes an 
inconsistent concept, but in the second one does not.  The point here is that attributing an 
inconsistent concept is sometimes the most charitable thing to do.  No matter what constraints 
one imposes on charitable interpretation (except of course, a conceptual consistency constraint), 
there will be situations in which it is more charitable to attribute an inconsistent concept.   
                                                 
29 One can find a similar objection in Stebins (1992). 
 207
 Objection 4: Inconsistent concepts are unemployable because every object in the domain 
in question is in both the application set and the disapplication set of an inconsistent concept.  
For example, assume that β is a member of the overdetermination set for ‘rable’ and that α is any 
other object.  Because β is a member of the overdetermination set for ‘rable’, β is a rable.  
Hence, either β is a rable or α is a rable.  It also follows from the assumption that β is not a rable.  
Therefore, α is a rable.  Analogous reasoning leads to the claim that α is not a rable.  Therefore, 
if the overdetermination set for ‘rable’ is not empty, then it is the universal set.30   
Reply 4: According to my theory of inconsistent concepts, this argument is invalid.  
Assume that we treat ‘x is a rable’ as confused and that its components are ‘x is a table’ and ‘x is 
not red’.  Since there are only two components, use the 2-component logic with the epistemic 
values to evaluate arguments involving ‘rable’.  We substitute ‘x is a table’ and ‘x is not red’ 
alternatively for ‘x is a rable’ and use the validity condition to evaluate the argument.  The result 
is that it is invalid.  This should not come as a surprise because it employs disjunctive syllogism, 
which is not a valid inference rule in most relevance logics.  Note that I am not invoking 
relevance logic in some ad hoc way just to deal with this objection.  It is dictated by my theory of 
inconsistent concepts.  I discuss a different version of this objection to my inconsistency theory 
of truth in Chapter Seven.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 One can find similar objections in Gupta and Belnap (1993).  See Chihara (1984) for a discussion as well.  This 
argument is known as Lewis’s argument.  It is unclear who first used it; see Dunn and Restall (2001) and Mares 
(2004) for discussion. 
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 6.8  CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter completes my theory of inconsistent concepts.  In Chapter Four, I presented the 
outlines of the theory, on which a concept is inconsistent if and only if its constitutive rules for 
employment are incompatible.  I discussed several types of inconsistent concepts and presented 
several examples.  Of particular importance was my commitment to explaining inconsistent 
concepts in terms of confused concepts.  Accordingly, in Chapter Five, I presented my preferred 
theory of confusion and the logic for confused expressions associated with it.  In Chapter Six, I 
extended Camp’s theory of confusion to include confused concepts with more than two 
components and those that have partial concepts as components.  I extended the logic to include 
conditionals and quantifiers.  I also presented Brandom’s theory of meaning and used it to 
construct a pragmatic theory for confusion and a semantic theory for confused expressions.  
Using this extended theory of confusion as a basis for my theory of inconsistent concepts, I am 
now ready to apply my theory of inconsistent concepts to truth.  That is the topic of the next 
chapter. 
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7.0  AN INCONSISTENCY THEORY OF TRUTH 
 
 
 
 
7.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In this, the final chapter of the dissertation, I apply the theory of inconsistent concepts from 
Chapters Four, Five, and Six to truth.  The goal is to arrive at a theory of truth and a semantic 
theory for truth that do not generate revenge paradoxes or self-refutation problems; such a theory 
of truth does not need to be restricted in any way.  Thus, the goal is a theory of truth that can 
serve as the basis for a descriptively correct semantic theory for truth that satisfies the strong 
internalizability requirement defended in Chapter Two.   
In the next two sections of this chapter, I discuss deflationism and partial truth predicates 
in an effort to sort out several issues before presenting the inconsistency theory of truth.  The 
major issue for an inconsistency theory of the sort I advocate is the choice of components.  I 
advocate an inconsistency theory on which truth has six component concepts.  I present them and 
my reasons for choosing them in the first part of section four.  The rest of section four is devoted 
to a logic, a pragmatic theory, and a semantic theory for truth.  That completes the inconsistency 
theory of truth I advocate for our everyday notion of truth.  Of course, I also endorse the 
replacement policy for inconsistent concepts.  Thus, I claim that we should stop using our 
everyday concept of truth and replace it with one or more consistent concepts.  Hence, the 
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 inconsistency theory of truth I present is a theory I hope to render obsolete with a change in our 
linguistic practice.  In section five, I present what I take to be an adequate team of replacement 
concepts for our everyday concept of truth.  These replacements turn out to be the six component 
concepts of truth.  It is important to keep in mind that I propose two distinct theories of truth.  
The first is a descriptive theory on which our concept of truth is an inconsistent concept.  The 
second is a revisionary theory that stipulates how we should change our linguistic practice.  I 
close the chapter by considering some objections. 
 
7.2  DEFLATIONIST TRUTH 
 
 
Deflationists agree that truth should not be explained in terms of some substantive notion like 
correspondence, coherence, or utility.  Of course, deflationists offer more than this negative 
claim, but there are at least half a dozen different theories that are currently popular with 
philosophers who consider themselves deflationists, and certainly several times that many 
deflationist theories are no longer endorsed by those concerned with truth.  I do not intend to 
provide a detailed discussion of the varieties of deflationism here.  I should say that my approach 
to the nature of truth is broadly deflationist, but I qualify that in several different ways as I 
present the theory.  For now, it means that I do not subscribe to any of the alternative analyses of 
truth (correspondence, coherence, epistemic, pragmatic), and truth, for me, is aptly called a 
logical predicate. 
According to one type of deflationism, for any sentence, 〈p〉, 〈p〉 and 〈〈p〉 is true〉 have the 
same content.  When I say that they have the same content, I mean exactly that—they have the 
same content.  They have all the same semantic features that depend on content.  If one holds 
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 that biconditionals whose components have the same content are metaphysically necessary, then 
〈〈p〉 is true if and only if p〉 is metaphysically necessary.  If propositional attitudes are 
individuated no more finely than content is individuated, then one believes that p if and only if 
one believes that 〈p〉 is true.  If assertions are individuated no more finely than content is 
individuated, then one asserts that p if and only if one asserts that 〈p〉 is true.  And so on.  Just to 
avoid confusion, I will use ‘trueD’ for a truth predicate with these features. 
Although there has been some debate about this in the literature, it seems to me that some 
have failed to recognize that ‘trueD’ is not a “real” predicate.  By this I do not mean that ‘trueD’ 
does not behave like a predicate; it does.  It has the surface grammar of a predicate.  However, 
sentences of the form 〈〈p〉 is trueD〉 do not attribute any property to 〈p〉.  The reason?  Consider an 
example.  If we disregard the truth rules (i.e., 〈p〉 ┤├  〈〈p〉 is true〉) for a moment, then from ‘my 
dog is asleep’ nothing follows about ‘my dog is asleep’.  Likewise, nothing follows about ‘my 
dog is asleep’ from ‘‘my dog is asleep’ is trueD’.  Although the latter’s surface grammar makes it 
seem like ‘there exists something identical to ‘my dog is asleep’’ follows from it, it does not.  
The reason is that it does not follow from ‘my dog is asleep’.  There is no property that is being 
attributed to ‘my dog is asleep’ when one asserts ‘‘my dog is asleep’ is trueD’.  Note that I am not 
claiming that all philosophers who answer to the term ‘deflationist’ think that ‘trueD’ captures 
our truth predicate in English.   
There is an analogous deflationist use of ‘false’, which I label ‘falseD’; 〈it is not the case 
that p〉 and 〈〈p〉 is falseD〉 have the same content.  The same point holds for ‘falseD’; i.e., falseD 
attributions are not “real” attributions—they are not used to attribute a property.  ‘trueD’ and 
‘falseD’ are mere logical devices that one can use to do whatever one might want to do with 〈p〉, 
but without using 〈p〉.     
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 There are several different ways of explaining the content of sentences that contain 
‘trueD’ and ‘falseD’, but I prefer an anaphoric account whereby sentences in which these terms 
occur inherit their content from antecedents.  Grover, Camp, and Belnap introduced the 
prosentential theory of truth in an attempt to explain our everyday concept of truth in terms of an 
expression that functions anaphorically.1  I prefer Brandom’s version of the prosentential theory, 
according to which ‘is trueD’ is treated as a prosentence-forming operator.2  If there is no 
sentence from which a sentence containing ‘trueD’ inherits its content, then the sentence is 
without content, just like ‘he is a good guy’ would be if ‘he’ was used anaphorically but had no 
antecedent.  It seems to me that one could borrow the distinction between meaning and content 
from accounts of indexicals and say that such a sentence has a meaning, but no content.3    
I want to point out that, on this explanation, ‘trueD’ and ‘falseD’ do not give rise to 
aletheic paradoxes.  Consider the versions of the sentences common to aletheic paradoxes that 
contain ‘trueD’ and ‘falseD’.   
(1)  (1) is falseD. 
Sentence (1) is a prosentence whose content is a function of the content of its antecedent.  Which 
antecedent?  Well, its antecedent is supposed to be (1).  Obviously, ‘(1)’ is ambiguous (i.e., there 
are lots of sentences named ‘(1)’).  I assume that in the context at hand, the token of ‘(1)’ in (1) 
refers to sentence (1) in this chapter and not some other sentence (1).  Now that we have 
determined its antecedent, we can determine its content, which should be a function of the 
content of its antecedent.  There seem to me to be at least two alternatives here.  First, we could 
say that the string of symbols that begins with ‘(1)’ on the fourth line of this paragraph is false, 
                                                 
1 Grover, Camp, and Belnap (1976). 
2 Brandom (1994). 
3 Note that although I have endorsed Brandom’s version of the prosentential theory of truth here, I have not 
endorsed his preferred way of dealing with the aletheic paradoxes (Kripke’s semantics).  
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 because it implies that two sentences have the same content even though one is the negation of 
the other.  If so, then the sentence used to introduce the name of the sentence I have been calling 
sentence (1) failed.  Hence, either ‘sentence (1)’ refers to some other sentence or it fails to refer.  
If it refers to some other sentence, then the content of sentence (1) is a function of the content of 
that other sentence.  If it fails to refer, then it has no content.  Recall that we can say that it still 
has a meaning (just like a sentence that contains an indexical, but is not uttered in a context that 
is sufficient to determine a content).  The other option is to say that sentence (1) fails to have 
content because it does not inherit content from a sentence that actually has content.  Again, it 
has meaning, but no content.  It is akin to ‘it is false’ when ‘it’ is used anaphorically and fails to 
have an antecedent.  I prefer the second alternative, but each implies that the liar paradox is not 
an issue for a deflationist truth predicate. 
A person confronted with sentence (1) might present the following sentences as an 
argument: 
(a)  Assume that (1) is trueD. 
(b)  ‘(1) is falseD’ is trueD. 
(c)  (1) is falseD. 
(d)  Hence, if (1) is trueD, then (1) is falseD.
(e)  Assume that (1) is falseD.
(f)  ‘(1) is falseD’ is trueD. 
(g)  (1) is trueD. 
(h)  Hence, if (1) is falseD, then (1) is trueD. 
(i)  Therefore, (1) is trueD if and only if (1) is falseD. 
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 However, none of these sentences is truth-valued; they all suffer from the same problem as (1).  
Hence, they do not constitute an argument because they have no content.   
Three further issues deserve comment.  First, one cannot use ‘trueD’ or ‘falseD’ to 
describe the semantic features of paradoxical sentences.  Indeed, one cannot use ‘trueD’ or 
‘falseD’ to describe the semantic features of anything unless the anaphoric antecedent of the 
sentence in which they occur does so.  Second, it will be impossible to determine whether some 
sentences containing ‘trueD’ and ‘falseD’ have content.  I do not see this as a problem, because in 
these cases, we would not be able to determine what their content was even if they had it.  
However, we can always determine their meaning.  If, for example, Jack asserts ‘everything 
Aristotle said the day he died is trueD’, then it is impossible for either Jack or anyone who hears 
him to determine the content of the sentence he uttered.  However, if one can determine the 
antecedent(s) of a sentence that contains ‘trueD’ or ‘falseD’ and determine their content, then one 
can determine the content of the sentence in question.  Third, I do not think that this variety of 
deflationism can explain our expression ‘true’ in English for at least two reasons: (i) we 
sometimes use ‘true’ to attribute a property to truth bearers instead of as a prosentence-forming 
operator, and (ii) this version of deflationism cannot explain ungrounded but non-paradoxical 
sentences (i.e., ‘every sentence is either true or false’) because it implies that they are 
contentless. 
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 7.3  PARTIAL TRUTH 
 
  
In this section, I discuss several partial concepts of truth.  Partial concepts came up in Chapter 
Four when I presented several examples of inconsistent concepts.  There I gave Soames’ 
example of a partial concept:  
(2a) ‘smidget’ applies to x if x is greater than four feet tall. 
(2b) ‘smidget’ disapplies to x if x is less than two feet tall.4
The union of the application set and the disapplication set for a partial concept do not exhaust the 
domain in question.  
We have good reason to believe that truth is a partial concept because we have good 
reason to believe that: (i) something is true if and only if it is a member of the application set of 
truth, (ii) something is false if and only if it is a member of the disapplication set for truth, and 
(iii) there are things that are neither true nor false (e.g., acorns).  Of course, that is not a 
conclusive argument for the claim that truth is a partial concept, and there are philosophers who 
claim that it is not partial.5  I do not take issue with them here.   
In the first subsection, I discuss the distinction between strong truth and weak truth, 
which arises for accounts of truth that treat truth as a partial concept.  I argue that we need to 
introduce a third notion of truth, dual truth, in addition to strong and weak truth.  In the second 
subsection, I propose to explain strong truth and dual truth in terms of weak truth.  The 
distinction between these notions of truth and the explanation I offer plays an important role in 
the account of the components of our inconsistent concept of truth. 
 
                                                 
4 Soames (1999). 
5 See Williamson (1997); see Glanzberg (2003) for discussion. 
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 7.3.1  WEAK TRUTH, STRONG TRUTH, AND DUAL TRUTH 
 
In classical logic, all the predicates are completely defined.  Once one abandons this assumption, 
things become more complicated.  In languages with partially defined predicates, there are 
several competing intuitions about the behavior of truth.  In particular, if the truth predicate is 
itself partially defined, then there are two incompatible principles for how to handle truth 
attributions.  For example, assume that p is a sentence and that it is a truth-value gap.  What is 
the truth-status of ‘p is true’?  On one intuition, ‘p is true’ should have the same truth status as p; 
hence, ‘p is true’ should be a gap as well.  On the other intuition, ‘p is true’ says of p that it is 
true, but p is not true—it is a gap; hence, ‘p is true’ should be false.  A concept of truth that 
conforms to the first intuition is a weak concept of truth, while one that obeys the second is a 
strong concept of truth (this distinction surfaced in Chapter Two during the discussion of 
Kripke’s semantic theory for truth).  Yablo seems to have been the first to draw this distinction 
explicitly:  
To call a true sentence true is to say something true, and to call an untrue sentence 
true is to say something false; this is what is meant by the assertion that truth is 
strong.  On a competing conception of truth, which may be dubbed the weak 
conception, the statement that φ is true simply inherits φ’s truth-status, whatever it 
may be.  Thus, if φ is neither true nor false, then to call it true is, on the weak 
conception, to say something neither true nor false; and if φ is for some reason 
both true and false, then to call it true is to say something itself both true and 
false, (Yablo 1985: 301). 
 
Since Yablo presented his distinction, it has become a staple of discussions of the aletheic 
paradoxes and the nature of truth.   
Strong truth and weak truth agree on the sentences that have truth values; it is only on the 
truth-value gaps that they differ: 
(Weak Truth) If p is true, then ‘p is true’ is true. 
 If p is false, then ‘p is true’ is false. 
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  If p is a gap, then ‘p is true’ is a gap. 
 
(Strong Truth) If p is true, then ‘p is true’ is true. 
 If p is false, then ‘p is true’ is false. 
 If p is a gap, then ‘p is true’ is false. 
 
One can define weak falsity and strong falsity in analogous ways.  Before moving on, I want to 
discuss this distinction a bit more.  It is surprisingly subtle.   
The first thing to notice is that both weak truth and strong truth are partial concepts.  That 
is, both concepts admit of truth-value gaps.  I have already assumed that our everyday concept of 
truth is partial on the set of objects because most of us feel strongly that non-linguistic objects 
are not true and not false.  Moreover, our everyday concept of truth is partial on the set of 
sentences as well because most of us feel strongly that imperatives and interrogatives are not true 
and not false.  Some philosophers claim that our everyday concept of truth is completely defined 
on the declarative sentences; that is, they claim that every declarative sentence is either true or 
false.  This claim is also known as the principle of bivalence.  There are plenty of debates about 
this principle, and I am not going to enter into them here.  I want to point out that one can draw 
different distinctions between weak truth and strong truth depending on how one draws the line 
between their ranges of applicability and their ranges of inapplicability.  If both are completely 
defined on the set of declarative sentences, then they differ only on the non-declarative 
sentences.  That is not very interesting only because humans rarely call non-declarative sentences 
true or false.   To get an interesting distinction, one must assume that one or both are partial on 
the set of declarative sentences.  Some philosophers have argued that truth is not only partial on 
the set of declarative sentences, but on the set of truth-sentences as well.  That is, they claim that 
some sentences that contain truth predicates are not true and not false.  Indeed, Kripke’s 
semantic theory implies that the liar sentence is one of these.     
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 The next thing to notice is that in the definitions (Weak Truth) and (Strong Truth), the 
words ‘true’, ‘false’, and ‘gap’ occur.  One might wonder which type of predicates these are.  Is 
‘true’ in these definitions a weak truth predicate or a strong truth predicate?  Surprisingly, there 
are no discussions of which I am aware that address this question.  Once we begin to offer 
answers to it, we find that there are a good many ways to draw the distinction between weak 
truth and strong truth. 
It seems obvious to me that one should be able to treat the ‘true’ in the definition of weak 
truth as a weak truth predicate, and one should be able to treat the ‘true’ in the definition of 
strong truth as a strong truth predicate.  Given that these two concepts are distinct, one must also 
keep track of the different types of gaps (i.e., weak gaps and strong gaps).  A sentence is a weak 
gap iff it is in the range of inapplicability for weak truth.  A sentence is a strong gap iff it is in the 
range of inapplicability for strong truth.  Things become even more complex when considering 
mixed truth attributions (e.g., ‘‘p is strong true’ is weak false’).   
Because the potential for confusion and misunderstanding is already high, for the rest of 
this discussion I refrain from using unmodified ‘true’, ‘false’, or ‘gap’.  Instead, I use ‘WT’ for 
weak truth, ‘ST’ for strong truth, ‘WF’ for weak falsity, ‘SF’ for strong falsity, ‘WG’ for weak 
gaphood, and ‘SG’ for strong gaphood.  In addition, when defining the relations between these 
notions, I use set theoretic terminology instead of using these notions in both the definiens and 
the definiendum.  I use Arial bold type for the corresponding sets (i.e., ‘WT’, ‘ST’, ‘WF’, ‘SF’, 
‘WG’, and ‘SG’).6  The following are the principles governing weak truth, weak falsity, strong 
truth, and strong falsity predicates: 
If p ∈ WT, then ‘p is WT’ ∈ WT and ‘p is WT’ ∈ ST. 
If p ∈ WF, then ‘p is WT’ ∈ WF and ‘p is WT’ ∈ SF. 
                                                 
6 ‘p is WT’ and ‘p ∈ WT’ are different claims.  The first can be a gap, but the second cannot. 
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 If p ∈ WG, then ‘p is WT’ ∈ WG and ‘p is WT’ ∈ SF. 
If p ∈ ST, then ‘p is WT’ ∈ WT and ‘p is WT’ ∈ ST. 
If p ∈ SF, then ‘p is WT’ ∈ WF and ‘p is WT’ ∈ SF. 
If p ∈ SG, then ‘p is WT’ ∈ WG and ‘p is WT’ ∈ SF. 
 
If p ∈ WT, then ‘p is WF’ ∈ WF and ‘p is WF’ ∈ SF. 
If p ∈ WF, then ‘p is WF’ ∈ WT and ‘p is WF’ ∈ ST. 
If p ∈ WG, then ‘p is WF’ ∈ WG and ‘p is WF’ ∈ SF. 
If p ∈ ST, then ‘p is WF’ ∈ WF and ‘p is WF’ ∈ SF. 
If p ∈ SF, then ‘p is WF’ ∈ WT and ‘p is WF’ ∈ ST. 
If p ∈ SG, then ‘p is WF’ ∈ WG and ‘p is WF’ ∈ SF. 
 
If p ∈ WT, then ‘p is ST’ ∈ WT and ‘p is ST’ ∈ ST. 
If p ∈ WF, then ‘p is ST’ ∈ WF and ‘p is ST’ ∈ SF. 
If p ∈ WG, then ‘p is ST’ ∈ WG and ‘p is ST’ ∈ SF. 
If p ∈ ST, then ‘p is ST’ ∈ WT and ‘p is ST’ ∈ ST. 
If p ∈ SF, then ‘p is ST’ ∈ WF and ‘p is ST’ ∈ SF. 
If p ∈ SG, then ‘p is ST’ ∈ WG and ‘p is ST’ ∈ SF. 
 
If p ∈ WT, then ‘p is SF’ ∈ WF and ‘p is SF’ ∈ SF. 
If p ∈ WF, then ‘p is SF’ ∈ WT and ‘p is SF’ ∈ ST. 
If p ∈ WG, then ‘p is SF’ ∈ WG and ‘p is SF’ ∈ SF. 
If p ∈ ST, then ‘p is SF’ ∈ WF and ‘p is SF’ ∈ SF. 
If p ∈ SF, then ‘p is SF’ ∈ WT and ‘p is SF’ ∈ ST. 
If p ∈ SG, then ‘p is SF’ ∈ WG and ‘p is SF’ ∈ SF. 
 
Notice that they differ when p is a member of WG or SG.  Notice also that no strong truth or 
strong falsity attributions are members of SG, but some are members of WG.  Thus, the ranges 
of applicability for weak truth and strong truth are different.  Some sentences that are weak truth 
gaps are not strong truth gaps.   
Given that their ranges of applicability are different, one issue is whether they are both 
partially defined on the declarative sentences.  If strong truth is completely defined on the 
declarative sentences, then the only strong truth gaps are non-declarative sentences, which is not 
very interesting.  I assume that they are both partially defined on the declarative sentences.  If 
one desires an account on which strong truth is completely defined on the declarative sentences, 
then that will be easy to accommodate.   
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 Note that the application set of weak truth (WT) and the application set of strong truth 
(ST) are identical.  That should seem odd.  Usually when one distinguishes between a strong 
version and a weak version of a concept, it means that the application set of the strong concept is 
a proper subset of the application set of the weak concept.  That is not the case with weak truth 
and strong truth.  One could, of course, define two notions of truth so that the application set of 
one is a proper subset of the application set of the other (and one can even name them ‘weak 
truth’ and ‘strong truth’), but my point is that one need not do so in order to satisfy the 
definitions given above.  Moreover, provided that both concepts of truth are partial, one would 
have to draw a weak truth/strong truth distinction for each one.   
One might object that weak truth and strong truth do have different application sets for 
the following reason.  Let p be a gap.  If ‘true’ expresses weak truth, then ‘p is not true’ is a gap 
as well.  However, if ‘true’ expresses strong truth, then ‘p is not true’ is true.  Thus, ‘p is not 
true’ is in the range of inapplicability for weak truth and in the application set for strong truth.  
Hence, they have different application sets.   
My reply is that one must distinguish between weak truth and strong truth throughout the 
argument.  If p is a weak gap, then ‘p is not weak true’ is a weak gap as well, while ‘p is not 
strong true’ is strong true.  Thus, if we are treating ‘true’ in ‘p is not true’ as ambiguous, then it is 
correct that this sentence will be in the range of inapplicability for weak truth and in the 
application set for strong truth, but the meaning of ‘true’ in these two sentences differs.  It is 
synonymous with ‘weak true’ in one and with ‘strong true’ in the other.  Thus, the objection is 
like saying that ‘First National is a bank’ is both true and false because on one reading of ‘bank’ 
it is true and on another it is false.  Once one distinguishes between the two notions of truth, the 
argument is invalid. 
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 In situations where the distinction between weak truth and strong truth is appropriate, it is 
helpful to have another concept of truth as well.  This notion of truth has not received any 
attention in the literature as far as I can tell; for lack of a better term, I call it dual truth.  One can 
define it in the following way: 
(Dual Truth)  If p is true, then ‘p is true’ is true. 
If p is false, then ‘p is true’ is false. 
If p is a gap, then ‘p is true’ is true. 
 
Because we treat truth as designated and we treat falsity and gaphood as undesignated, we have 
little use for this notion of truth.  That probably accounts for the lack of attention.  However, we 
do have a use for the accompanying notion of falsity.  There are situations when one would like 
to employ a notion of falsity, but neither weak falsity nor strong falsity will do.  In these cases, 
one needs dual falsity.  If p is a sentence to which one wants to attribute some notion of falsity, 
but one does not want both p and ⎡~p⎤ to be this kind of false, and one wants to utter a sentence 
that is going to be either this kind of false or this kind of true, then one wants to attribute dual 
falsity to p.  The following are the principles governing dual truth (‘DT’) attributions and dual 
falsity (‘DF’) attributions: 
If p ∈ WT, then ‘p is DT’ ∈ WT, and ‘p is DT’ ∈ ST, and ‘p is DT’ ∈ DT. 
If p ∈ WF, then ‘p is DT’ ∈ WF, and ‘p is DT’ ∈ SF, and ‘p is DT’ ∈ DF. 
If p ∈ WG, then ‘p is DT’ ∈ WG, and ‘p is DT’ ∈ SF, and ‘p is DT’ ∈ DT. 
If p ∈ ST, then ‘p is DT’ ∈ WT, and ‘p is DT’ ∈ ST, and ‘p is DT’ ∈ DT. 
If p ∈ SF, then ‘p is DT’ ∈ WF, and ‘p is DT’ ∈ SF, and ‘p is DT’ ∈ DF. 
If p ∈ SG, then ‘p is DT’ ∈ WG, and ‘p is DT’ ∈ SF, and ‘p is DT’ ∈ DT. 
If p ∈ DT, then ‘p is DT’ ∈ WT, and ‘p is DT’ ∈ ST, and ‘p is DT’ ∈ DT. 
If p ∈ DF, then ‘p is DT’ ∈ WF, and ‘p is DT’ ∈ SF, and ‘p is DT’ ∈ DF. 
If p ∈ DG, then ‘p is DT’ ∈ WG, and ‘p is DT’ ∈ SF, and ‘p is DT’ ∈ DT. 
 
If p ∈ WT, then ‘p is DF’ ∈ WF, and ‘p is DF’ ∈ SF, and ‘p is DF’ ∈ DF. 
If p ∈ WF, then ‘p is DF’ ∈ WT, and ‘p is DF’ ∈ ST, and ‘p is DF’ ∈ DT. 
If p ∈ WG, then ‘p is DF’ ∈ WG, and ‘p is DF’ ∈ SF, and ‘p is DF’ ∈ DT. 
If p ∈ ST, then ‘p is DF’ ∈ WF, and ‘p is DF’ ∈ SF, and ‘p is DF’ ∈ DF. 
If p ∈ SF, then ‘p is DF’ ∈ WT, and ‘p is DF’ ∈ ST, and ‘p is DF’ ∈ DT. 
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 If p ∈ SG, then ‘p is DF’ ∈ WG, and ‘p is DF’ ∈ SF, and ‘p is DF’ ∈ DT. 
If p ∈ DT, then ‘p is DF’ ∈ WF, and ‘p is DF’ ∈ SF, and ‘p is DF’ ∈ DF. 
If p ∈ DF, then ‘p is DF’ ∈ WT, and ‘p is DF’ ∈ ST, and ‘p is DF’ ∈ DT. 
If p ∈ DG, then ‘p is DF’ ∈ WG, and ‘p is DF’ ∈ SF, and ‘p is DF’ ∈ DT. 
 
The relations between dual truth and the other two types of truth are fairly straightforward.  WT 
and ST are identical.  WF and DF are identical.  DG and SG are identical.  All the members of 
WG – DG (which is identical to WG – SG) are members of DT and members of SF.  Any truth 
attribution to any type of truth-value gap is in WG ∩ SF ∩ DT.   
One attributes weak truth if one wants one’s sentence to have the same weak truth-status 
as the target.  One attributes strong truth if one wants one’s sentence to be in ST only if the 
target is in ST; otherwise one’s sentence in SF.  One attributes strong falsity if one wants one’s 
sentence to be in ST only if the target is in WF; otherwise, one’s sentence is in SF.  A sentence 
attributing strong truth or strong falsity to a sentence in WG is in SF.  One attributes dual truth if 
one wants one’s sentence to be in DT if the target is in either WG or WT.  One attributes dual 
falsity if one wants one’s sentence to be in DT only if the target is in WF; otherwise, one’s 
sentence is in DF.  A sentence attributing dual truth or dual falsity to a member of WG is in DT.     
One might find the following to be more helpful definitions of weak truth, strong truth, 
and dual truth for name-predicate sentences. 
(Weak Truth) For any predicate ‘H’ and any object α:  
 If α ∈ HE, then ‘α is H’ ∈ WT. 
 If α ∈ HA, then ‘α is H’ ∈ WF.  
 If α ∈ HI, then ‘α is H’ ∈ WG. 
 
(Strong Truth) For any truth predicate ‘H’ and any declarative sentence α:  
If α ∈ HE, then ‘α is H’ ∈ ST. 
If α ∈ HA, then ‘α is H’ ∈ SF.  
If α ∈ HI, then ‘α is H’ ∈ SF. 
 
For any other predicate ‘H’ and any declarative sentence α: 
If α ∈ HE, then ‘α is H’ ∈ ST. 
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 If α ∈ HA, then ‘α is H’ ∈ SF.  
If α ∈ HI, then ‘α is H’ ∈ SG. 
 
(Dual Truth) For any truth predicate ‘H’ and any declarative sentence α:  
If α ∈ HE, then ‘α is H’ ∈ DT. 
If α ∈ HA, then ‘α is H’ ∈ DF.  
If α ∈ HI, then ‘α is H’ ∈ DT. 
 
For any other predicate ‘H’ and any declarative sentence α: 
If α ∈ HE, then ‘α is H’ ∈ DT. 
If α ∈ HA, then ‘α is H’ ∈ DF.  
If α ∈ HI, then ‘α is H’ ∈ DG. 
 
In the above definitions, ‘HE’ ‘HA’ ‘HI’ designate the application set of ‘H’, the disapplication set 
of ‘H’, and the range of inapplicability for ‘H’, respectively.  For example, assume that ‘red’ is 
the predicate in question and ‘1’ is the name in question.  Assume as well that the number 1 is in 
the range of inapplicability for ‘red’.  Thus, ‘1 is red’ is a member of WG, SG, and DG; that is, 
it is a weak gap, a strong gap, and a dual gap.  All three truth predicates agree on whether 
sentences that do not contain truth predicates are gaps.  They disagree on how to classify 
sentences that do contain truth predicates.  To continue the example, let ‘p’ be the name of ‘1 is 
red’.  The sentence ‘p is weak true’ is a member of WG, but it is not a member of SG or DG.  
Instead, it is a member of SF and DT.  ‘p is weak false’ is also a member of WG, SF, and DT.  
‘p is strong true’ and ‘p is strong false’ are members of WG, SF, and DT.  On the above 
definitions, all sentences can be assigned three different types of truth-statuses: a weak truth-
status, a strong truth-status, and a dual truth-status.  For any sentence p that does not contain a 
truth predicate (or falsity predicate), the weak truth-status, the strong truth-status, and a dual 
truth-status of p are the same.  Thus, one can speak of the truth-status (simpliciter) of sentences 
that do not contain truth predicates.  The truth-statuses of sentences that do contain truth 
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 predicates will differ.7  (Notice that if one is of the opinion that strong truth and dual truth are 
completely defined on the declarative sentences, then one can alter the above definitions so that 
what would have been the members of SG and DG are members of SF and ST, respectively.)   
 
7.3.2  PARTIAL TRUTH PREDICATES 
 
In this subsection, I explain strong truth and dual truth in terms of weak truth.  At this point, I 
would like to argue that strong truth and dual truth can be defined in terms of weak truth with the 
help of exclusion negation.  One way to argue for such a claim would be to define a 3-valued 
language L with the usual sentential operators and exclusion negation and extend it to L′ by 
adding a weak truth predicate (i.e., ‘WT-in-L′’) to L′ and prove that one can define a strong truth 
predicate (i.e., ‘ST-in-L′ ’) and a dual truth predicate (i.e., ‘DT-in-L′’) in L′.  Unfortunately, there 
are several problems with this strategy.   
The first problem is that the best a formal setting could do is show that one can define 
‘strong truth-in-L’ and ‘dual truth-in-L’ in terms of ‘weak truth-in-L’, where ‘L’ is the name of a 
formal language.  That is not good enough for my purposes, because I am interested in the 
unrestricted weak, strong, and dual truth predicates.  Still, the formal account would provide 
some evidence that the same relation holds between the unrestricted versions.   
The second problem is more pressing.  Tarski showed that no language in which the 
classical inference rules are valid and which has the capacity to represent its own syntactic 
                                                 
7 One can say that the weak truth predicate is tolerant in the sense that it does not force ‘α is H’ to be either true or 
false when α is outside the range of applicability for ‘H’.  The strong truth predicate and the dual truth predicate are 
tolerant with respect to the sentences that do not contain truth predicates, but they are intolerant with respect to the 
sentences that contain truth predicates (think of a lawyer forcing a witness to answer a “yes/no” question whose 
presuppositions fail).  One can define different notions of weak truth, strong truth, and dual truth that have different 
ranges of tolerance and intolerance, and there are some interesting results in this area.  Unfortunately, they will have 
to wait for some other occasion. 
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 features can contain its own truth predicate without being inconsistent.8  That result does not 
affect my proposal because L′ would not be a classical language.  There are many proposals for 
how to construct non-classical languages that contain their own truth predicates.  The most 
influential is Kripke’s theory of truth.  Kripke begins with a classical first-order language and 
adds a partial truth predicate.  He constructs a sequence of languages such that in each one, more 
and more sentences of the language are placed in either the extension or the anti-extension of the 
truth predicate that belongs to that language.  Kripke shows that this procedure eventually 
reaches a language in which no more sentences are added to either.  A language with this 
property is called a fixed point.  For Kripke’s procedure to result in a fixed point, the sequence of 
languages must be monotonic; i.e., if L2 is a language that comes later in the sequence than L1, 
and p is in the extension (anti-extension) of ‘true’ in L1, then p is in the extension (anti-
extension) of ‘true’ in L2.9  Roughly, once a sentence gets a truth-value, it keeps that truth-value 
throughout the construction.  One can show that if the sequence of languages is monotonic, then 
they do not contain any non-monotonic sentential operators.  A sentential operator is monotonic 
if and only if changing one of the components from a gap to a truth-value does not change the 
compound from one truth-value to the other or from a truth-value to a truth-value gap.  Roughly, 
one can “fill in” the gaps with truth-values without affecting the truth-value of the compound so 
long as it has a truth-value.  In a sentential compound whose sentential operator is monotonic, 
the truth-value of the compound (if it has one) is determined by the truth-values of the 
components that have truth-values.   
Kripke’s procedure is unavailable because L′ would contain exclusion negation, which is 
a non-monotonic sentential operator.  Gupta and Martin proved that a language with a weak 
                                                 
8 Tarski (1933). 
9 Kripke (1975).  The only differences between the languages is the extension and anti-extension of ‘true’; thus, it 
makes sense to think of p as belonging to all the languages in the sequence. 
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 Kleene scheme can contain a non-monotonic sentential operator and still reach a fixed point, but 
their procedure will not work for a language with exclusion negation.10  I know of no procedure 
for adding a truth predicate to a language with truth-value gaps that contains exclusion negation.   
There is a good reason for this problem.  I have argued in Chapter Three that weak truth 
is inconsistent.  If that is right, then any language that has the capacity to represent its own 
syntax, that validates the truth rules, and that has exclusion negation (which is used to formulate 
revenge paradoxes) is inconsistent.  One could use the account I offer of how to interpret such 
languages, but that would beg the question because it presupposes the claim that strong truth and 
dual truth can be defined in terms of weak truth.  Instead of providing a formal language and a 
formal definition, I offer an informal account of weak truth, strong truth, and dual truth.   
I begin by noting that the three notions of truth agree on the sentences that do not contain 
truth predicates.  I assume that one has an adequate definition of weak truth in the sense that one 
knows its application set (WT), its disapplication set (WF), and its range of inapplicability 
(WG).  One then defines the application set of strong truth (ST) so that it is identical to WT.  
The disapplication set of strong truth (SF) is the union of WF and the set of truth attributions 
that belong to WG.  One defines dual truth by stipulating that its application set (DT) is the 
union of WT and the set of truth attributions that belong to WG.  The disapplication set of dual 
truth (DF) is identical to WF.   
One can define the sentential operators in terms of weak truth and then explain the way 
strong truth and dual truth interact with sentential operators by appeal to the above relations 
between them.  For example, the following are the principles that describe the relations between 
weak truth and three types of negation (choice negation (~), exclusion negation (¬), and 
inclusion negation (−)):   
                                                 
10 Gupta and Martin (1984). 
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 If p ∈ WT, then ⎡~ p⎤ ∈ WT. 
If p ∈ WF, then ⎡~ p⎤ ∈ WF. 
If p ∈ WG, then ⎡~ p⎤ ∈ WG. 
If p ∈ WT, then ⎡¬ p⎤ ∈ WT. 
If p ∈ WF, then ⎡¬ p⎤ ∈ WF. 
If p ∈ WG, then ⎡¬ p⎤ ∈ WT. 
If p ∈ WT, then ⎡− p⎤ ∈ WT. 
If p ∈ WF, then ⎡− p⎤ ∈ WF. 
If p ∈ WG, then ⎡− p⎤ ∈ WF. 
 
One issue is how the negation operators interact with strong truth and dual truth.  Given that 
strong truth and dual truth are identical to weak truth for sentences that do not contain truth 
predicates, for sentences that do not contain truth predicates, strong truth and dual truth behave 
just like weak truth.  For truth attributions, one defines strong truth and dual truth by appeal to 
weak truth.  For example, let r be a member of WG, SG, and DG.  Thus, r contains no truth 
predicate.  ‘r is weak true’ and ‘r is weak false’ are both members of SF.  To determine whether 
‘~ (r is weak true)’ is a member of ST or SF, one first determines whether ‘~ (r is weak true)’ is 
a member of WT, WF, or WG.  By the above definition, ‘~ (r is weak true)’ is a member of WG.  
Given the relation between truth sentences of WG and SF, ‘~ (r is weak true)’ is a member of 
SF.  The other sentential operators are defined on strong truth and dual truth in the same way.  
The result is that the sentential operators are weak truth functional, but not strong truth functional 
or dual truth functional. 
This explanation of strong truth in terms of weak truth is a striking departure from the 
assumption that the application set of strong truth is a proper subset of the application set of 
weak truth.  On the contrary, the only difference between weak truth and strong truth is their 
disapplication sets.  The disapplication set of strong truth contains all the truth-attributions that 
are in either the disapplication set of weak truth or the range of inapplicability of weak truth.  
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 The diagrams below illustrate the difference between weak truth, strong truth, and dual truth.  
Circles represent the set of truth-attributions of a given language: 
 
 
WT WF 
WG 
ST SF DT DF
 
Figure 7.1 (Weak Truth) Figure 7.2 (Strong Truth) Figure 7.3 (Dual Truth) 
 
 
 
One final issue deserves comment: the status(es) of truth tellers.  A truth teller is a 
sentence like: 
(τ) (τ) is true. 
Truth tellers are less perplexing than liars, because they do not engender paradoxes.  However, 
they are still troubling because one can consistently assign either truth or falsity to them.  Just as 
one can show that a contradiction follows from the claim that a liar is true or false, one can show 
that a tautology follows from the claim that a truth teller is either true or false.  Furthermore, if 
one assigns (τ) to WG, one can construct a new “revenge” truth teller that can consistently be 
assigned either truth, falsity, or gaphood.  It seems to me that just as the liars and revenge liars 
show that weak truth is inconsistent, the truth tellers and revenge truth tellers show that weak 
truth is partial on the truth-sentences.  I assume that any truth teller should be treated as a weak 
gap.  Notice that all the truth tellers will be members of SF and DT as well.11   
                                                 
11 This result vindicates Yablo’s intuitions regarding truth tellers; see Yablo (1985, 2003). 
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 The point of this section is to sort out the issues surrounding weak truth, strong truth, and 
dual truth in an effort to get clear on the different notions of truth one requires when one treats 
truth as a partial concept.  It seems obvious to me that there is no good reason to think that weak 
truth, strong truth, or dual truth is our everyday notion of truth.  Rather, I claim that we should 
think of our everyday concept of truth as a confused concept whose components are weak truth, 
strong truth, and dual truth.  However, that claim alone does not constitute a solution to the 
problems associated with the liar paradox.  The problem is that we can still generate liar-type 
paradoxes with weak truth (I discussed them at length in Chapters Two and Three), and, since 
strong truth and dual truth are defined in terms of weak truth, they give rise to paradoxes as well.  
Thus, nothing in this section should be taken as a solution to the liar paradox.  Rather, I take it to 
have justified the claim that the choice of components for truth should respect the distinction 
between weak truth, strong truth, and dual truth. 
 
7.4 INCONSISTENT TRUTH 
 
 
In this section, I offer a theory of truth on which truth is an inconsistent concept, and I propose a 
logic, a pragmatic theory, and a semantic theory for truth that are based on this theory of truth.  
There should not be any surprises in the general outlines of my account—it is just the theory of 
inconsistent concepts developed in Chapters Four, Five, and Six applied to truth.  The logic, the 
pragmatic theory, and the semantic theory for truth are versions of those presented in Chapters 
Five and Six.  Given my claims that: (i) truth is an inconsistent concept, (ii) inconsistent concepts 
should be explained in terms of confused concepts, and (iii) confused concepts should be 
 230
 explained by appeal to their components, the most pressing issue is the choice of components for 
truth.  That is the topic of the first subsection. 
 
 
7.4.1  COMPONENTS OF TRUTH 
 
 
On one interpretation, Tarski held an inconsistency view of truth.  He actually claimed that 
natural languages are inconsistent, but he thought that they are inconsistent, in part, because of 
the truth predicates they contain.12  Other notable inconsistency theorists include Chihara, Priest, 
Yablo, McGee, and Eklund, all of whom I discuss at other points in this dissertation.13  Chihara 
and Yablo provide ways of thinking about concepts with inconsistent definitions (the account I 
presented in Chapter Four owes much to their views) and McGee simply states that the concept 
of truth (or our understanding of it) is inconsistent and needs to be replaced.  McGee 
concentrates on his favored replacement instead of on how best to understand an inconsistent 
concept of truth.  Eklund presents a modified version of supervaluation semantics for 
inconsistent concepts and applies it to truth.  Priest advocates dialetheism, which is the doctrine 
that some contradictions are true; the aletheic paradoxes supply one justification for his view.  
My account differs considerably from each of these.  (See Appendix E for discussion of each of 
these approaches and a comparison to the theory I advocate.) 
On the account I offer, the claim that truth is an inconsistent concept is cashed out as the 
claim that truth is a confused concept.  On the theory of confused concepts I endorse, a confused 
concept is a fusion of two or more concepts, which are called the components of the confused 
concept.  These components play two roles in the theory: (i) they are used in the logic, the 
                                                 
12 Tarski (1944). 
13 Chihara (1973, 1979, 1984), Priest (1979, 1987), Yablo (1985, 1993a, 1993b), McGee (1991), and Eklund (2002).  
A number of other philosophers have made remarks that suggest they are sympathetic to the inconsistency view, 
including Mates (1981), Parsons (1984), Barwise and Etchemendy (1987), Tappenden (1994), and Orlilia (2000).    
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 pragmatic theory, and the semantic theory for the confused concept, and (ii) they serve as 
replacements for the confused concept.  Thus, the logic, the pragmatic theory, and the semantic 
theory for the confused concept are used to interpret discourse in which the confused concept is 
expressed; however, the linguistic practice to which the discourse in question belongs should be 
changed so that the confused concept is no longer employed and replacement concepts are used 
in its place.  Thus, the hope is that the linguistic practice changes so that the logic, the pragmatic 
theory, and the semantic theory for the confused concept are no longer needed (except to 
interpret portions of discourse from the old linguistic practice).   
As I have suggested, the everyday notion of truth is inconsistent, and it is inconsistent in 
more than one way.  That is, given that our everyday concept of truth is an amalgam of weak 
truth, strong truth, and partial truth, it is range-inconsistent.  Furthermore, given that weak truth 
is itself inconsistent, our everyday concept of truth is application-inconsistent as well.  The 
components I suggest reflect this complexity.  I can give no assurances that I have chosen the 
optimum components.  Indeed, there are certainly other ways of breaking up truth into 
components, and some of these might work better than the one I propose. 
I suggested in the previous section that one could define weak truth, strong truth, and 
dual truth in several different ways depending on how one draws the line between their ranges of 
applicability and their ranges of inapplicability.  Instead of worrying about all these options, I 
concentrate on those I defined in the previous section.  I assume that weak truth and strong truth 
have the same application set, that weak truth and dual truth have the same disapplication set, 
and that strong truth and dual truth have the same range of applicability.  Finally, I assume that 
their range of applicability is some proper subset of the set of declarative sentences (as I have 
emphasized, this assumption can be dropped if one is committed to a version of bivalence).   
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 Truth is range-inconsistent because some sentences are within the range of applicability 
for strong truth and dual truth, but belong to the range of inapplicability for weak truth.  Truth is 
application-inconsistent because the intersection of the application set and disapplication set for 
weak truth is not empty (it contains the paradoxical sentences).  Hence, treating truth as a partial 
concept (and distinguishing weak, strong, and dual truth predicates) does not solve the aletheic 
paradoxes.  That was one of the lessons of Chapter Three.  When a concept is both application-
inconsistent and range-inconsistent, I find it helpful to deal with the range-inconsistency first.  I 
have distinguished between the three mentioned truth predicates to do so.  Each of these truth 
predicates is application-inconsistent because weak truth is application-inconsistent and strong 
truth and dual truth are defined in terms of weak truth.  Addressing the application-inconsistency 
of weak truth will solve the problem with strong truth and dual truth as well.   
Before presenting my suggestion for the components of truth, I want to consider and 
reject several alternative suggestions.  One suggestion involves the Tarskian truth predicates.  
That is, one can treat truth as if it is an amalgam of all the Tarskian concepts of truth.  There are 
several difficulties with this proposal.  First, it is exceedingly difficult to characterize all the 
Tarskian truth predicates because the task requires a transfinite hierarchy, which poses its own 
problems (see Appendix A for a discussion of some of these).  Another problem is that the 
Tarskian truth predicates do not serve as adequate replacements for the concept of truth (again, 
Appendix A has the details).  Finally, this suggestion does nothing to remedy the range-
inconsistency present in our concept of truth because all the Tarskian truth predicates are 
completely defined.     
A second suggestion appeals to the claim, common in deflationist theories of truth, that 
the set of T-sentences of a language implicitly define its truth predicate or serve as its theory of 
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 truth.  Of course, the problem with such a view is that the set of T-sentences for any natural 
language is inconsistent.  It might seem natural to treat the T-sentences as meaning-constitutive 
sentences for truth and explain its inconsistency in terms of the inconsistency of the set of T-
sentences.  I argue in Appendix E that such theories are inadequate to explain inconsistent 
concepts because they do not respect the distinction between concept possession and concept 
employment.   
However, one might still want to take a cue from the T-sentences when determining the 
components for weak truth.  For example, it might seem plausible to say that weak truth is an 
amalgam of two concepts, each of which is governed by a subset of the T-sentences such that the 
two sets are disjoint and mutually exhaustive of the set of T-sentences.  Unfortunately, no such 
strategy can work.  No matter how one divides the set of T-sentences into two subsets, at least 
one will still be inconsistent.  Consider the T-sentence for the standard liar (i.e., ‘(λ) is false’): 
‘(λ) is false’ is true iff (λ) is false.  If (λ) is in the language in question, then this T-sentence will 
be a member of the set of T-sentences for that language, and this T-sentence is a contradiction in 
classical logic.  No matter how one splits up the set of T-sentences, whichever subset contains 
this T-sentence will be inconsistent.  Thus, to use the T-sentences to define the components of 
weak truth, one must eliminate some of them.  Of course, the problem is which ones to 
eliminate?  McGee has shown that there are indefinitely many distinct maximally consistent sets 
of T-sentences, that none of them are axiomatizable, and that the only sentences that belong to 
the intersection of all of them are T-sentences for truth tellers.14  I do not see the set of T-
sentences as a good place to look for components of weak truth.15
                                                 
14 McGee (1991). 
15 Another serious problem with this approach is that whether a sentence is paradoxical can depend on factors 
beyond its semantic features; one can construct a sentence whose paradoxicality depends on most anything.  If one’s 
approach to the liar paradox involves eliminating the T-sentences for paradoxical sentences of the language, then the 
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 I propose to look to the truth rules, in particular, the ascending and descending weak truth 
rules.  The ascending and descending weak truth rules are: 〈p〉 follows from 〈〈p〉 is weak true〉 
and 〈〈p〉 is weak true〉 follows from 〈p〉.  Recall that these were the basis for the behavior of the 
weak truth predicate.  That is, 〈〈p〉 is weak true〉 has the same truth status as 〈p〉.  I believe that 
these rules are also the reason for the inconsistency of weak truth.  I propose to split weak truth 
into two concepts, one based on one of the weak truth rules, the other based on the other rule.  I 
call them ascending weak truth and descending weak truth.  Ascending weak truth, ‘AWT’, is 
governed by an ascending weak truth rule: 〈〈p〉 is AWT〉 follows from 〈p〉.  Descending weak 
truth, ‘DWT’, is governed by a descending weak truth rule: 〈p〉 follows from 〈〈p〉 is DWT〉.   
It seems to me that one should stipulate restricted versions of the other rule for both types 
of weak truth.  Ascending weak truth obeys a restricted version of the descending weak truth 
rule, and descending weak truth obeys a restricted version of the ascending weak truth rule.  The 
restricted versions should hold for non-pathological sentences and fail for pathological ones.  
One defines the pathological sentences by appeal to the paradoxical sentences for weak truth.  If 
p is a paradoxical sentence for weak truth in the sense that one can derive that p is both weak true 
and notE weak true using the weak truth rules16, then the result of substituting ‘AWT’ for all the 
occurrences of ‘weak true’ and ‘AWF’ for all the occurrences of ‘weak false’ is a pathological 
sentence, and the result of substituting ‘DWT’ for all the occurrences of ‘weak true’ and ‘DWF’ 
for all the occurrences of ‘weak false’ is a pathological sentence.  For example, the following are 
pathological sentences: 
(α)  (α) is AWF. 
                                                                                                                                                             
concepts of truth that result will depend on unrelated empirical facts.  See Appendix B for a full discussion of this 
problem. 
16 On my view, there is no non-circular way of defining paradoxicality.  Certainly, there is no syntactic or semantic 
definition of paradoxicality (I argue for this claim in Appendix B).  The best we can hope for is that a sentence is 
paradoxical iff one can derive that it is both true and not true from principles governing weak truth.   
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 (δ)  (δ) is DWF. 
They result from substituting ‘AWF’ and ‘DWF’ for ‘weak false’ in the weak liar.  Notice that 
pathological sentences are not paradoxical—they do not give rise to paradoxes.  
The two types of weak are truth very similar.  Of course, they are different concepts with 
different application sets and disapplication sets.  Most important, both are consistent concepts.  
The following are principles governing ascending weak truth (AWT) and descending weak truth 
(DWT):  
If p ∈ DWT, then ‘p is AWT’ ∈ DWT. 
If p ∈ DWT, then ‘p is DWT’ ∈ DWT. 
If p ∈ DWT, then ‘p is AWF’ ∈ AWF. 
If p ∈ DWT, then ‘p is DWF’ ∈ AWF. 
 
If p ∈ AWF, then ‘p is AWT’ ∈ AWF. 
If p ∈ AWF, then ‘p is DWT’ ∈ AWF. 
If p ∈ AWF, then ‘p is AWF’ ∈ DWT. 
If p ∈ AWF, then ‘p is DWF’ ∈ DWT. 
 
If p ∈ DWF, then ‘p is AWT’ ∈ AWF. 
If p ∈ DWF, then ‘p is DWF’ ∈ DWT. 
 
If p ∈ AWT, then ‘p is AWT’ ∈ DWT. 
If p ∈ AWT, then ‘p is DWF’ ∈ AWF. 
 
The intersection of AWT and DWF is not empty.  In fact, (α) and (δ) are members of this set.  In 
other words, (α) and (δ) are both ascending weak true and descending weak false.  DWT and 
AWF contain non-pathological sentences (which include all the truth-apt sentences without truth 
predicates).  AWF is a proper subset of DWF, and DWT is a proper subset of AWT.  Aside from 
being partial, ‘AWT’ and ‘DWT’ behave just like any other predicates.  In the previous section, I 
used a weak Kleene scheme for sentential operators (other than exclusion negation and inclusion 
negation), but I prefer to accommodate a range of views on how best to handle partial concepts. 
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 Once ascending weak truth and descending weak truth are available, one can define strong and 
dual versions of each according to the account given in the previous section.  The result is a team 
of six truth concepts that are all consistent and can be used in the logic, the pragmatic theory, and 
the semantic theory for the inconsistent concept of truth. 
To recapitulate, here is my proposal for how to divide up the concept of truth.  Truth is 
range-inconsistent.  To address this inconsistency, I distinguish between weak truth, strong truth, 
and dual truth.  Weak truth, strong truth, and dual truth are application-inconsistent.  To address 
this inconsistency, I distinguish between ascending weak truth and descending weak truth.  I 
define ascending strong truth and ascending dual truth in terms of ascending weak truth, and I 
define descending strong truth and descending dual truth in terms of descending weak truth.  
That makes for six component concepts for truth. 
 
7.4.2  ALETHEIC LOGIC 
 
I find it helpful to present an example of a community of language users that employ an 
inconsistent concept of truth.  The Aletheians (ăl′-ĭ-thē′-ənz) are my model community.  It is also 
helpful to be able to describe the activities of an interpreter who attempts to understand and 
describe the linguistic practice of the Aletheians.  I call the interpreter in my story, Mojo.  In this 
subsection, I describe the way the Aletheians use ‘true’.  Just to avoid confusion, I use the term 
‘trueA’ for their truth predicate.   
It should be obvious that I want Mojo’s interpretation of the Aletheians’ concept of truth 
to apply to our own concept of truth.  Hence, their linguistic practice should be as much like ours 
as possible.  Accordingly, they speak English, or at least a language that is very much like the 
American English of 2004 (my idiolect, noon GMT on Jan. 1).  I do not want to be burdened 
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 with language identity problems so I stipulate that all the Aletheians speak exactly the same 
language.  There is no difference between the idiolects and the communal language.  The 
Aletheians’ language (I call it Aletheian) is a bit different from English because their linguistic 
practice does not display a division of linguistic labor or a speaker’s reference/term reference 
distinction.  They do use indexicals, demonstratives, pronouns, and other context dependent 
expressions.  They also use the usual modal, normative, moral, epistemic, logical, temporal, 
mental, and semantic vocabulary.  They experience reference failure, presupposition failure, 
category mistakes, confusion, identity ignorance17, and the other common types of defective 
discourse.   
As far as their use of ‘trueA’ is concerned, I want it to express an inconsistent concept for 
them.  However, I am not going to specify the way they use it in advance.  To do so would be to 
lay out a theory before I have my example set up.  They use ‘trueA’ just like we use ‘true’; they 
use ‘falseA’ just like we use ‘false’, except that there is no issue about the legitimacy of their 
aletheic paradoxes.  The application conditions for ‘trueA’ determine that it both applies and 
disapplies to some sentences—the paradoxical ones.  They are unaware that their concept of 
truthA is inconsistent, but they are aware of the paradoxes.  They believe that paradoxicality is 
the result of their god’s anger.  That is, they believe that their god has caused them to make 
mistakes in their use of ‘trueA’, which result in calling some sentences both trueA and not trueA.  
They believe that their god does this to punish them for their transgressions.  Although they 
cannot figure out where the supposed mistakes took place, they think that looking into the matter 
too much will further anger the god and bring more conceptual wrath.  Hence, they rarely reflect 
on their uses of ‘trueA’.   
                                                 
17 Identity ignorance is the phenomenon that drives Frege’s puzzle and Kripke’s puzzle.  One can think of it as 
inverse confusion and use an inverse confusion logic, pragmatics, and semantics to sort out the issues Frege and 
Kripke raise; but this is a story for another occasion. 
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 Although they are perplexed about the phenomenon of paradoxicality, they effectively 
employ the containment strategy as far as possible.  That is, once it is discovered that a sentence 
is paradoxical, the Aletheians think of it as tainted and so they stop using it and stop talking 
about it.  They are not proactive about the containment strategy.  They do not check each 
sentence they intend to use before using it for paradoxicality.  Instead, they only worry about 
paradoxicality once someone shows that a given sentence is paradoxical.  Not surprisingly, this 
approach rarely leads to problems in everyday communication.  The Aletheians are not much for 
semantic theorizing so the paradoxes do not bother them the way they bother us. 
Mojo has the thankless task of constructing a logic, a pragmatic theory, and a semantic 
theory for Aletheian.  It should not come as a surprise that Mojo agrees with me on the relevant 
issues.  In particular, he accepts the theory of inconsistent concepts presented in Chapters Four, 
Five, and Six, and he intends to use it to arrive at the theories he needs.   
Let me emphasize the fact that Mojo is not a radical interpreter.  For one, he understands 
Aletheian.  Nor is he restricted to the materials of the radical interpreter.  Mojo has access to any 
non-linguistic fact he needs.  He can also determine the mental states of the Aletheians with 
incredible accuracy—not that it will help him much.  He needs to come up with a way of 
interpreting the Aletheians’ statements involving ‘trueA’.  First, he will have to sort out several 
issues surrounding the truth predicate itself.  His main goal is to determine the component 
concepts he will use in constructing his logic, pragmatics, and semantics.  If truth is inconsistent, 
and inconsistent concepts are confused, then truth is confused.  If truth is confused, then there are 
component concepts that have been fused together into truth.  To use the theory of inconsistent 
concepts, Mojo must decide on a set of component concepts.  This is no small task.  I have 
already indicated that I have no algorithm for how to decide on component concepts.  Instead of 
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 worrying about how Mojo goes about it, I assume that he has already made the choice and 
decided on using the six component concepts I suggest. 
In this subsection, I concentrate on the logic that is appropriate for the Aletheians’ truth-
sentences.  Mojo first needs to assemble a crack team of experts on the various component 
concepts of truth.  He will have to rely on them when determining the aletheic logic to use for 
evaluating the Aletheians’ arguments involving truth.  He then determines which Aletheian 
sentences contain ‘trueA’ as a predicate.  He then compiles a list of all of them and a list of all the 
all the possible Aletheian arguments.     
Which logic should Mojo use?  Given that there are six components of truth, he will need 
a 6-component logic; given that the components of truth are partially defined and have different 
ranges of applicability, he will need a partial 6-component logic.  The query values are: Y, N, ?, 
and G.  A partial 6-component logic has more response values than I care to list, but they are 
analogous to the response values for the other partial n-component logics.  For a partial 6-
component logic, the response values are grouped into semantic values in the usual way; it turns 
out that a partial 6-component logic has 63 semantic values.  Mojo assigns each of the sentences 
on his list one of these semantic values by asking his experts for query values for each, tabulating 
the response value for each, and deriving the semantic value for each.  For example, if the 
response values for a sentence p are Y, N, Y, ?, N, and G, then the semantic value for p is YNG.  
For each of the logically compound sentences on his list, he uses the rules for the sentential 
operators given in Chapter Six.  Given that he is using a partial 6-component logic, negation, 
disjunction, and conjunction are straightforward; however, the conditional is not.  He cannot rely 
on a link between his logic and a standard relevance logic (like R).  Instead, he can introduce a 
non-embeddable conditional based on the validity criterion. 
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 Using the rules for validity in partial n-component logics from Chapter Six, Mojo 
determines whether each of the arguments on his list is valid or invalid.  Given that he has to use 
a partial n-component logic, there is no general principle associating the valid arguments from 
his logic with valid arguments in a standard relevance logic (like R).  Despite these difficulties 
and the complexity involved, he has a workable logic with which he can evaluate the relevant 
arguments of the Aletheians. 
 
7.4.3  ALETHEIC PRAGMATICS 
 
After using the aletheic logic to evaluate the Aletheians’ arguments, Mojo can use the confusion 
pragmatics to keep score on them and determine which of their assertions are warranted.  There 
are no surprises here.  The only difference between what Mojo does for the Aletheians and what 
Ginger did to Fred in Chapter Five is that Mojo can use the ‘G’ value to rule out warrant right 
away.  If one of the Aletheians utters a sentence and that sentence is assigned a ‘G’ under the 63-
valued aletheic logic, then that utterance does not count as warranted.  Otherwise, Mojo can use 
the logic to assign entitlements to the Aletheians. 
 
7.4.4  ALETHEIC SEMANTICS 
 
Again, no surprises.  Mojo uses the confusion semantics to determine freestanding assertional 
contents and freestanding ingredient contents for the Aletheians’ sentences that contain ‘trueA’.  
His procedure is no different than Ginger’s in Chapter Five. 
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 7.5  FROM INCONSISTENT TRUTH TO CONSISTENT TRUTH 
 
Mojo has a procedure by which to interpret the Aletheians’ use of ‘trueA’.  I do not want to 
suggest that he is obligated to try to replace their inconsistent concept of truth with the six 
component concepts.  However, I want to consider what would happen if the Aletheians 
discovered that their concept of truth is inconsistent and decided to implement the six 
components as a team of replacements. 
I do not want to get into the procedure by which they determine that their truth predicate 
is inconsistent or their transformation to consistency.  One problem that surfaces after their 
transformation is complete is that the theory of truth I have constructed is no longer correct—the 
Aletheians no longer employ an inconsistent concept of truth.  No matter.  If they accept the 
suggested replacements, then the semantics appropriate for them will work for the Aletheians as 
well.  I did not give a semantics for the six component predicates, but I do not anticipate any 
problems with them.  Of course, they are partial concepts so the semantic theory for them will 
have to treat them accordingly. 
One point about the sentences that express the inconsistent concept of truth is that they 
are all gaps.  That is, they are all in the ranges of inapplicability for ascending weak truth and 
descending weak truth.  That fact reflects the conclusion from Chapter Five that sentences that 
express defective concepts do not have truth values.   
How do the replacements fare in actual conversation?  Among the component predicates, 
the ascending weak truth predicate and the descending weak truth predicate are primary (since 
the other four can be defined in terms of them).  Can the Aletheians tell when to use one over the 
other in conversation?  Certainly, the choice of one of the weak truth predicates versus one of the 
strong ones or one of the dual ones is easy enough to make.  But can they effectively choose 
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 between the two weak ones?  Only on the pathological sentences will the two weak truth 
predicates differ.  A pathological sentence is descending weak false and ascending weak true.  
Consider the standard liar reasoning.  The argument from 〈p〉 to 〈〈p〉 is ascending weak true〉 is 
valid but the argument from 〈〈p〉 is ascending weak true〉 to 〈p〉 is invalid for pathological 
sentences.  On the other hand, the argument from 〈p〉 to 〈〈p〉 is descending weak true〉 is invalid 
for pathological sentences, but the argument from 〈〈p〉 is descending weak true〉 to 〈p〉 is valid.     
Still, it might seem that if an Aletheian is presented with a sentence and decides to 
evaluate it with respect to one of the types of weak truth, she needs to know whether it is 
pathological before she can choose between ascending weak truth and descending weak truth.  
Thus, it seems that the Aletheians will have trouble using these truth predicates—they seem to 
impose unreasonable epistemic demands on their users.   
The Aletheian does not need to know whether the target of his attribution is pathological 
to decide which weak truth predicate to use.  The extension of descending weak truth is a proper 
subset of the extension of ascending weak truth.  The extension of descending weak truth 
contains no pathological sentences, while the extension of ascending weak truth contains all the 
pathological sentences.  Thus, descending weak truth is stronger than ascending weak truth.  A 
sentence can be both ascending weak true and descending weak false, but no sentence is both 
descending weak true and either descending or ascending weak false.  Thus, a descending weak 
truth attribution is, in some sense, more careful than an ascending weak truth attribution.  If the 
Aletheian in question (let us call him Alex) wants to make sure that the sentence he utters is not 
both ascending weak true and descending weak false, then he should use descending weak truth.  
If he does not care, then he should use ascending weak truth.  Using ascending weak truth gives 
one a better chance of uttering a sentence that is ascending weak true.  However, it also opens 
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 one up to uttering a sentence that is both ascending weak true and descending weak false.  If the 
idea of uttering a sentence that is both ascending weak true and descending weak false is 
unsavory to Alex, then he should use descending weak truth.  If he uses descending weak truth, 
then his sentence is guaranteed to be either descending weak true or ascending weak false (or a 
weak gap).  Therefore, the Aletheians can decide which weak truth predicate to use on a given 
occasion despite the fact that they are often not in a position to determine whether a given 
sentence is pathological.  
 
7.6  OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 
 
Objection 1:  On the view presented in this chapter, all sentences with truth predicates are gaps.  
That is radically counterintuitive.   
Reply 1: First, a clarification—all the sentences that express the inconsistent concept of 
truth are gaps (they are ascending and descending weak gaps, ascending and descending strong 
gaps, and ascending and descending dual gaps).  However, many of the sentences that express 
one of the replacement concepts of truth are not gaps.  Moreover, the vast majority of the 
sentences that express the inconsistent concept of truth can be reformulated with one of the 
replacement concepts such that they have ascending and descending weak truth-values.  I agree 
that the account I offer of the sentences that express the inconsistent concept of truth might seem 
counterintuitive at first, but it makes sense once one admits that truth is a defective concept.  For 
example, it does not seem counterintuitive to say that all the sentences that express the 
Newtonian concept of mass are gaps.  Given the very minor changes required to retire the 
inconsistent concept of truth and begin using the team of consistent concepts, one can begin 
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 uttering truth-valued sentences containing truth predicates in no time.  Compared to the 
revolution that had to occur before we could start using an appropriate concept of mass, this one 
is painless. 
The objector might respond by saying: given that on the theory of truth (our everyday 
concept) I accept, sentences that express this concept are truth-valueless (for any concept of 
truth), this theory does a poor job of explaining our intuitions about our everyday concept of 
truth (e.g., that many sentences that express this concept have truth-values); thus, the theory I 
advocate does not explain our concept of truth as well as many of its competitors.  In the face of 
the objection, I plead guilty that the theory I have developed does not respect all of our intuitions 
about truth.  However, because our intuitions about truth are inconsistent, only an inconsistent 
theory could respect them all.  Everyone who works on truth should admit that much.  As for the 
explanatory adequacy of the theory I propose, it satisfies the strong internalizability requirement 
and it is one of the only consistent theories to do so.  Many of the other theories of truth (all the 
various gap theories, revision theories, contextualist theories, etc.) fail to meet the 
internalizability requirement because they face either revenge paradoxes or self-refutation 
problems.  I argued at length in Chapters One and Two that, from an explanatory standpoint, the 
internalizability requirements are not negotiable.  Thus, when understood properly, none of these 
theories even purports to explain the concept of truth—never mind how good a job they do.  
Thus, when it comes to the game of explaining our concept of truth (not some restricted version 
of it), the theory I offer is at least a player—that is more than can be said for these other theories.  
Of course, there are several theories that purport to meet the internalizability requirement; I 
claim that only one other meets it (Eklund’s theory) and that the theory I offer is superior to it 
(see Appendix D and Appendix E for discussion of this issue). 
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 Here is a related worry: even if some philosophers accept this account (and that is a big 
‘if’), no one else is going accept the change to our linguistic practice I recommend.  I agree, but 
that does not pose a problem for me because the division of linguistic labor will effectively force 
the change on everyone provided that most people will defer to experts concerning difficult 
matters of usage.  For example, even if I do not know that there are two concepts of mass, I will 
still defer to experts on the topic of mass.  So long as I am willing to do this, it makes sense to 
interpret my word ‘mass’ as a generic term for mass, which is synonymous with ‘relativistic 
mass or proper mass’.  The same goes for the replacement concepts of truth. 
Consider a further worry: no philosophers are going to accept the changes I propose 
because, given the centrality of truth, they force more changes in other areas of philosophy (e.g., 
assertibility, meaning, reference, predication, knowledge, justification, validity, proof, 
soundness, completeness, etc.)  My response is that accepting the replacement concepts of truth 
will have some effects on mathematical and philosophical logic; however, they are minor and the 
costs of change are more than outweighed by the benefits that come from a consistent conceptual 
scheme.  Given that, on a deflationist account of truth, one can explain most of these other 
concepts without a substantive appeal to truth, they should survive unscathed.  I suppose that 
some changes will have to take place to accommodate the presence of defective concepts (e.g., 
truth-conditional theories of meaning will have to be amended or abandoned), but given that 
these changes need to be made anyway, there is no added burden for the theory of truth. 
Objection 2: Inconsistent concepts are unusable because every object in the domain in 
question is in the overdetermination set for an inconsistent concept. 
Reply 2:  Recall that I responded to a general form of this objection in section 6.6.3 of 
Chapter Six.  I showed that the argument on which this objection depends is invalid in the logic 
 246
 for inconsistent concepts.  However, there is a more insidious version of this objection I must 
address.  Instead of the disjunctive syllogism argument I considered before, Gupta and Belnap 
use a variant of Curry’s paradox to argue that if truth in particular is an inconsistent concept, then 
it is unusable.  Hence, according to Gupta and Belnap, if truth is inconsistent, then the rules for 
using truth dictate that every sentence is paradoxical.18  Curry’s paradox concerns the following 
sentence: 
(γ)  If (γ) is true, then 0 = 1. 
The following argument is used to derive the paradox (obviously, any sentence could be used in 
place of ‘0 = 1’): 
(a)  (γ) is true. 
(b)  ‘if (γ) is true, then 0 = 1’ is true.  (Substitution) 
(c)  if (γ) is true, then 0 = 1.  (Descending) 
(e)  0 = 1.  (Modus Ponens) 
(f)  if (γ) is true, then 0 = 1.  (Conditional Proof) 
(g)  ‘if (γ) is true, then 0 = 1’ is true.  (Ascending) 
(h)  (γ) is true.  (Substitution) 
(h)  0 = 1.  (Modus Ponens) 
Given that the aletheic logic I presented to interpret the Aletheians’ truth predicate does not 
include an embeddable conditional, it is difficult to give a particular evaluation of this argument.  
However, because the argument relies on using both the ascending and descending truth rules for 
                                                 
18 Gupta and Belnap (1993: 13-15). 
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 a paradoxical sentence, it will turn out to be invalid no matter what conditional is added to the 
logic.19   
Objection 3: I have said several times that truth is an inconsistent concept and that once 
one recognizes that a concept one possesses is inconsistent, one should refrain from employing 
it.  Yet, I have employed it throughout this dissertation.   
Reply 3: I have three explanations for my actions.  First, if the only way to inform 
someone that a certain concept is inconsistent is to employ it, then it seems to me that one ought 
to go ahead and employ it.  For example, to show that ‘rable’ is inconsistent I might find a red 
table, point at it, and say ‘this is rable’ and ‘this is not rable’.  That is a very special use of the 
concept, and it seems to me that it should be legitimate.20  Some of my uses of truth in this 
dissertation are of this sort.  Second, an assertion of ‘truth is an inconsistent concept’ is not an 
employment of the concept of truth.  It is an employment of the concept of the concept of truth, 
which need not be inconsistent even though truth is.  Most of my uses of ‘truth’ in this 
dissertation are of this sort.  Third, most of the dissertation is independent of my views on truth.  
I want my claims about internalizability, inconsistent concepts, confused concepts, and partial 
truth to be acceptable even to those who do not share my view that truth is an inconsistent 
concept.  My use of the word ‘true’ can be filled out in many different ways.  One who agrees 
with my view that truth is an inconsistent concept can think of those uses of ‘true’ as expressing 
ascending weak truth and can think of my uses of ‘false’ as expressing descending weak falsity. 
  Here is a deeper worry: I have to employ the inconsistent concept of truth to construct 
the theory of inconsistent concepts, the semantic theory for truth, or to introduce the replacement 
concepts; hence, the account is circular.  I disagree.  None of these theories depend for their 
                                                 
19 Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that (γ) should be a weak gap, because it is a variant of the truth-teller 
(τ). 
20 See Tappenden (1994) for discussion. 
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 construction on the inconsistent concept of truth.  For example, the semantic theory for truth uses 
epistemically interpreted semantic values instead of truth values.  Even the notion of validity to 
which the logic appeals is explained in terms of profitability, not truth, and, as deflationists have 
argued for the past several decades, there is no good reason to think that profitability must be 
explained in terms of truth.21   
Objection 4: Why should we think that this view does not give rise to revenge paradoxes 
or self-refutation problems? 
Reply 4: It is difficult to show that the replacement concepts do not give rise to revenge 
paradoxes.  Of course, I could give a model-theoretic semantics for a formal language with 
predicates that behave somewhat like the replacement concepts and present a relative consistency 
proof, but that would not show much.  First, it would show only that language-specific versions 
of the replacement concepts are consistent so long as set theory is consistent.  However, 
language-specific versions of the replacement concepts are inadequate as replacements (see 
Appendix A for more on this issue).  Second, even if I were to present such a proof, that would 
not show that the replacement concepts (even the language-specific versions of them) do not give 
rise to revenge paradoxes.  For example, Field presents just such a proof for his theory of truth, 
but it does give rise to revenge paradoxes.  Field avoids the revenge paradoxes by excluding the 
relevant linguistic resources from the formal language he considers.   
I can say that if the account of the revenge paradoxes I gave in Chapter Three is accurate, 
then we have very good reason to believe that the replacement concepts do not engender revenge 
paradoxes.  On that explanation, revenge paradoxes occur for accounts of truth that respect the 
truth rules and try to contain the paradoxical sentences by assigning them a defectiveness status.  
                                                 
21 See Putnam (1967), Horwich (1978, 1990), Leeds (1978, 1995), Soames (1984), Williams (1986), Field (1986, 
1994), Resnik (1990), Devitt (1991), Wright (1992), Gupta (1993), and Clark (1997) for discussion.   
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 The revenge paradox occurs if the set of defective sentences is too small.  On my account of 
inconsistent truth, all the sentences that express the concept of truth are defective.  Thus, it does 
not give rise to a revenge paradox.  On the theory of the replacement concepts, no concept of 
truth obeys the truth rules for the relevant sentences.  Thus, they do not give rise to revenge 
paradoxes.   
As for self-refutation problems, the theory of the inconsistent concept of truth implies 
that the inconsistent concept of truth has an empty extension and an empty antiextension because 
all inconsistent concepts do.  However, this theory is not self-refuting because it does not purport 
to exemplify this concept of truth.  Thus, it is not in the same position as a gap theory that 
implies that its consequences are gaps.  On the theory of the inconsistent concept of truth, this 
concept should not be employed at all.  The theory of the replacement concepts does purport to 
be true—descending weak true.  And it is.  The theory does not imply that any of its 
consequences are gappy.  Thus, it does not suffer from a self-refutation problem. 
Objection 5: In reply 1, I mentioned a generic truth predicate, and I claimed that someone 
who is unaware that there are several different kinds of truth could be interpreted as using this 
generic predicate, provided that he is willing to defer to the experts of his linguistic community 
on matters related to truth.  Doesn’t the generic concept give rise to a revenge paradox? 
Reply 5: No.  There are several ways to think of the generic predicate, and none of them 
give rise to a revenge paradox.  It seems to me that the best way to treat someone in this situation 
is to interpret his use of ‘true’ as a weak ascending truth predicate and his use of ‘false’ as a 
weak descending falsity predicate (if a sentence is weak descending true, then it is weak 
ascending true, and if a sentence is weak ascending false, then it is weak descending false).  That 
interpretation maximizes the chances that his truth and falsity attributions will be ascending 
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 weak true.  Of course, he will be using ‘true’ and ‘false’ under the false assumption that there is 
nothing to which both of these predicates apply, but I do not see that as a problem.  Someone 
who believes that there is nothing to which both ‘egg-layer’ and ‘mammal’ apply can still use 
them effectively.   
Objection 6: Assume that Mojo is interpreting an Aletheian, Alex, and Alex is employing 
the inconsistent concept of truth.  On the aletheic logic used by Mojo, Alex’s argument for the 
contradiction associated with the liar paradox is valid.  Of course, the aletheic logic keeps the 
contradiction from spreading, but the argument to the contradiction is valid nevertheless.  If 
Mojo is using the aletheic logic together with the pragmatic theory to determine which of Alex’s 
sentences is assertible, then the same sentence (i.e., the liar) is both assertible and not assertible.  
Therefore, this approach to the liar paradox just exports the problem to accounts of assertibility. 
Reply 6: It is not the case that Alex’s argument for the contradiction is valid on the 
Aletheic logic.  On the contrary, the logic implies that the truth rules are valid for non-
paradoxical sentences, but they are not both valid for paradoxical sentences.  Thus, Alex’s 
argument is invalid.  Nevertheless, when dealing with defective concepts, one is forced to admit 
two notions of assertibility and keep score appropriately.  For the most familiar notion of 
assertibility, a sentence is assertible iff the asserter is entitled to assert it.  Of course, from the 
point of view of someone who recognizes that a certain concept is defective, sentences that 
express this defective concept are not assertible because defective concepts should not be 
employed.  However, there is a derivative notion of assertibility that one can employ even in 
cases where a defective concept is being employed.  On this notion of assertibility, a sentence is 
assertible iff, given the information at the asserter’s disposal, he has good reason to believe that 
he is entitled to assert it.  On the account of inconsistent concepts I offer, paradoxical sentences 
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 might be assertible in this derivative sense.  There is no sense in which this result poses a 
problem for the notion of assertibility, and there is no sense in which the account I offer trades in 
problems with truth for problems with assertibility. 
Objection 7: Gupta and Belnap dispute the coherence of my position because they argue 
that inconsistency theorists are disguised context dependence theorists: 
The more thoroughly inconsistent a set of conventions is, the less guidance it 
provides to behavior and the more context dependent are its applications.  Hence, 
if the Inconsistency View is correct, we should expect our use of ‘true’ in a given 
context to depend on how we choose, in that context, to interpret and apply the 
inconsistent conventions governing it.  As a result, we should expect our use of 
‘true’, even in reference to context-independent sentences, to be highly dependent 
on context.  This expectation, however, is not borne out in our ordinary uses of 
‘true’, (Gupta and Belnap 1993: 16). 
 
Thus, if truth were an inconsistent concept, it would display context-dependence, but it does not. 
 Reply 7: I agree that our use of ‘true’ in reference to context-independent sentences is not 
dependent on context.  However, according to inconsistency theorists, our concept of truth is fine 
for most sentences, only paradoxical sentences pose a problem and they are few and far between.  
We do not see contextual variation because there are very few sentences to which our concept of 
truth directs us to both apply it and disapply it.  Furthermore, even for the paradoxical sentences, 
we do not see contextual variation.  We do not affirm them in some contexts and reject them in 
others.  Thus, it is ascending weak false that inconsistent concepts necessarily display context 
dependence.   
Proponents of context dependent approaches say that we do see contextual variation for 
paradoxical sentences.  In one context, we say that sentence (1) is paradoxical, where sentence 
(1) is ‘Sentence (1) is not true’, and in another we say that it is not paradoxical, indeed, it is true, 
because it accurately describes the semantic features of sentence (1); i.e., it says that sentence (1) 
is not true and it is not, because it is paradoxical.  Hence, we do see context dependence for the 
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 paradoxical sentences; the extension of ‘true’ differs from context to context.  In the first context 
the extension of ‘true’ includes sentence (1), while in the second context, it does not.  That is 
why sentence (1) is paradoxical in the first context and it is not paradoxical in the second.  I have 
two replies.  First, if truth displays this sort of context dependence, then it is not an inconsistent 
concept.  Thus, these considerations do not support Gupta and Belnap’s claim that inconsistent 
concepts inevitably display context dependence.  Second, there is no good reason to think that 
truth displays this sort of context dependence and there are plenty of good reasons to think that it 
does not; I enumerate them in Appendix B. 
Objection 8: One can construct sentences that are paradoxical for weak truth by virtue of 
empirical facts that are independent of their syntactic and semantic features (I call this the 
riskiness thesis in Appendix B).  Likewise, one can construct a sentence that is paradoxical in 
one context and non-paradoxical in another even though it has the same syntactic and semantic 
features in each context.  Because ascending weak truth and descending weak truth are defined in 
terms of paradoxicality, and paradoxicality varies from context to context, their extensions vary 
from context to context.  Thus, the replacement concepts do display context dependence.  
Therefore, this is a contextualist theory of truth. 
Reply 8: I endorse the riskiness thesis and the claim that whether a sentence token is 
paradoxical can vary from context to context.  However, it does not follow that the replacement 
concepts are context dependent.  For a given sentence token, p, whether p is ascending or 
descending weak true does depend on contextual features, but this sort of context dependence we 
find in our everyday notion of truth anyway.  If I write a sentence token on a card and whip it out 
from time to time throughout the day, on some occasions it will be considered true and on others 
it will be considered false.  All this reasoning shows is that sentence tokens are not appropriate 
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 truth bearers.  When presenting theories of truth, it is often helpful to assume that sentences or 
sentence tokens are truth bearers, but, strictly speaking, they are not.  I do not advocate 
propositions as truth bearers for reasons presented in Appendix B.  Rather, it seems to me that 
the best choice of truth bearers is pairs of sentence tokens and contexts appropriate to determine 
paradoxicality status.  Given that this is the right choice of truth bearers, the replacement 
concepts are not context dependent—they have the same extensions and anti-extensions (of truth 
bearers, not sentence tokens) in all contexts. 
Objection 9:  Truth is indispensable.  Hence, it cannot be replaced.  The following 
passage from Leeds expresses this intuition well:  
A theory of truth should not allow us to say, for example, ‘A, but ‘A’ is false;’ or 
‘A, but in one sense ‘A’ is false, in another true,’ etc.  Speaking for myself, I 
would take this as an obvious desideratum for any account of truth: indeed, I think 
that if we were somehow to become persuaded to use the word ‘true’ in ways that 
conflicted with the T-sentences, we would immediately – so important are the 
disquotational uses of truth in our own language – invent an additional notion of 
truth – say truth* – that conformed to them; under such circumstances, I think one 
might as well say that we had never abandoned the T-sentences after all: we had 
merely decided to rename truth ‘truth*’ and use the word ‘true’ to mean 
something else, (Leeds 1995: 8). 
 
Given that truth is indispensable, there is no chance of replacing it with the replacement concepts 
of truth. 
Reply 9:  This view depends on the assumption that truth is consistent.  Once it is 
recognized to be an inconsistent concept, this view is no longer so appealing.  Of course, we 
could introduce an inconsistent concept of truth that obeys all the T-sentences (as Leeds 
suggests), but it is not going to be as useful as Leeds thinks.  Indeed, once it is recognized as an 
inconsistent concept, it is also recognized as a concept that should not be employed at all.  Of 
course, Leeds’ intuition is that without a truth predicate that behaves as the disquotationalists 
claim, our language would be expressively impoverished.  I agree.  However, one need not 
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 introduce an inconsistent concept of truth to receive the benefits of a deflationist truth predicate.  
Indeed, I argued in section 7.1 that deflationist truth predicates do not pose any risk of paradox at 
all.  Thus, one could introduce a deflationist truth predicate into the language without much 
concern—so long as one recognizes that it is distinct from the inconsistent concept of truth that 
gives rise to the liar paradox. 
Here is a deeper worry: why shouldn’t we just continue using our inconsistent concept of 
truth in the way prescribed by the theory of truth presented above (i.e., as governed by a partial 
6-component relevance logic) instead of introducing the replacement concepts?  My answer: one 
cannot just use a concept one knows to be inconsistent in accord with the rules for it.  The theory 
of inconsistent truth outlined above is a theory for how to interpret someone who is using this 
concept, it is not a theory for how one should use this concept.  The theory for how one should 
use this concept is very simple: it has no extension and no anti-extension, so one should not 
apply or disapply it to anything.  Once one accepts this, one should see the pointlessness of 
introducing such a concept or retaining the one we already have.     
Objection 10: In Chapter Three, I argued against approaches to the liar paradox that posit 
some hidden semantic feature of truth (e.g., ambiguity, context dependence, circularity, 
intensionality) to dismiss the paradox.  In particular, these theories are implausible in their 
account of truth and they do nothing to solve the liar paradox because one could reintroduce the 
paradox by constructing a new concept that does not have this hidden semantic feature.  
However, the theory presented above has just this flavor—it posits a hidden semantic feature 
(i.e., inconsistency) in an effort to dismiss the paradox.  Thus, it is just as bad as the other 
theories that do this.   
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 Reply 10: I agree that on the theory I offer, our concept of truth has a hidden semantic 
feature—conceptual inconsistency.  However, this theory is quite different from the others listed 
above that I criticized in Chapter Three.  First, there is no reason to think that we should have 
been able to detect the inconsistency in our concept before we acquired the logical sophistication 
we have today.  For inconsistent concepts, it makes sense to think that they can be used for 
centuries without recognizing that they are inconsistent.  That is not the case for context 
dependent concepts or ambiguous words—we should be able to detect those right away.  I do not 
know if a concept can display hidden circularity, but it seems to me that it can.   
Second, the other approaches that posit a hidden semantic feature fail because they try to 
vindicate truth—they try to show that the liar paradox is not genuine.  Not mine.  I argue that the 
liar paradox is genuine—it has its source in our concept of truth.  Thus, the theory I offer does 
constitute a real solution to the paradox.  It is a multi-part solution.  We need to begin by 
understanding why the paradox arises—because truth is an inconsistent concept.  Once we do 
that, we need a theory that explains such concepts and allows us to make sense of those who 
employ them.  Finally, we need to know how to change our linguistic practice so that the 
paradox no longer shows up.  The objection that I presented in Chapter Three—that the theories 
in question do not really solve the paradox because one could just introduce a concept that does 
not have the hidden semantic feature—does not apply to the theory I present.  Of course, one 
could introduce a concept that does not have this hidden semantic feature (i.e., inconsistency), 
but that will not reintroduce the paradox, and if one decided to introduce a new inconsistent 
concept, then the account I give explains what we should do about it. 
Objection 11: My view is that ‘true’ has a certain content and that sentences containing 
truth predicates have contents that are determined, in part, by the content of the truth predicate.  
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 On my view, the content of sentences in which truth predicates occur is different from the 
content most people think they have, and the content of a truth predicate is different from the 
content most people think it has.  However, on the only respectable view of content, truth 
predicates and the sentences in which they occur have their contents because of the ways they are 
used.  How can the truth predicate have a content that is different from the content people think it 
has if it is the actions of those people that are responsible for it having its content?  Furthermore, 
if my view is correct, then no one uses truth predicates according to the real rules that govern 
them.  How can that be?  Does it even make sense to say that everyone uses it improperly?   
Reply 11: I agree that a condition on any theory of linguistic phenomena is that linguistic 
items (e.g., sentences, words) have the contents they have because of the ways they are used.  
The theory I offer respects this condition, but one must alter one’s account of use somewhat to 
accommodate uses of predicates that express inconsistent concepts.  For an inconsistent concept, 
there are three sets of rules.  First, there are the inconsistent rules that those who employ the 
concept without knowing that it is inconsistent try to follow.  Second, there are the rules for how 
it is to be used that are prescribed by the logic, the pragmatic theory, and the semantic theory for 
the inconsistent concept.  These rules are pertinent for those who know that the concept is 
inconsistent, but are faced with the problem of interpreting those who use it without knowing it 
is inconsistent.  Third, there are the rules for how it is to be used by those who know that it is 
inconsistent.  On these rules, it should not be used at all (except maybe in demonstrations of its 
inconsistency).  The first set of rules describe how it should be used by everyone from the point 
of view of someone who does not know it is inconsistent; the second set describe how it should 
be used by those who do not know it is inconsistent from the point of view of those who know 
that it is inconsistent; and the third set describe how it should be used by those who know it is 
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 inconsistent from the point of view of those who know it is inconsistent.  Almost everyone uses it 
according to the first set of rules, and a few enlightened ones use it according to the third set of 
rules; however, no one uses it according to the second set of rules.  It is the second set of rules 
that are used to determine its content for those who do not know it is inconsistent from the point 
of view of those who do know it is inconsistent.   
Without this distinction between the three sets of rules, there would be no distinction 
between concept possession and concept employment.  The pragmatic theory allows one to keep 
track of these distinctions.  That should not be surprising.  When I am talking with someone who 
I know endorses different inference rules, I can keep track of whether they are following their 
own rules and whether they are following my rules.  In the case of someone who employs the 
inconsistent concept of truth, they are committed to following the rules for the use of the 
concept, but they think that it has different rules than it actually does.  Moreover, it has the rules 
it actually has (i.e., it should not be used) because of the rules everyone thinks it has (i.e., it 
should be used according to principles that turn out to be inconsistent).  The commitments 
undertaken by those who employ the concept outrun the commitments they acknowledge.   
This case is no different from any other.  I can acknowledge what I want, but once I do, what I 
have undertaken is not up to me.   
Objection 12: I have done nothing to justify the theory of inconsistent concepts I present 
over any of its competitors.  Why isn’t some other theory of inconsistent concepts preferable?   
Reply 12: See Appendix E, where I compare and contrast it with several other theories. 
Objection 13: Consider a language that has a truth predicate that expresses our 
inconsistent concept of truth.  Presumably, classical logic is appropriate for the fragment of the 
language that does not include this truth predicate.  Thus, there are multiple logics for the 
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 language as a whole—classical logic and the partial 6-component aletheic logic.  It seems that, 
given a bunch of sentences and arguments from this language, the choice of which logic to use is 
determined by whether they contain the truth predicate.  That is, the aletheic logic overrules 
classical logic.  If an argument does not contain any sentences with truth predicates, then the 
argument should be evaluated by classical logic, but if it contains even a single sentence with a 
truth predicate, then one should use the aletheic logic to evaluate it.  The problem is that one can 
find an argument that has no truth predicates and is deductively valid by classical logic (e.g., it is 
a disjunctive syllogism), but by adding a new premise containing a truth predicate, it becomes an 
argument that should be evaluated by the aletheic logic and is invalid on this logic.  Thus, one 
looses the monotonicity of deductively valid arguments—one can always turn a valid argument 
into an invalid one by adding another premise.  Moreover, the same considerations hold for the 
pragmatic theory and the semantic theory.  One can find two contexts, one in which a truth 
predicate is present and the other in which it is not, such that a sentence without a truth predicate 
is assertible in one but not in the other, and that sentence has one meaning in the first context and 
a different meaning in the other.   
Reply 13: I agree.  There are plenty of issues raised by this objection and I cannot address 
all of them here.  If we admit the possibility of defective concepts and we have different logics 
for them (as we should), then we are going to run into this issue.  Whether one counts an 
argument as valid depends on the inference rules one accepts.  If one accepts different inference 
rules for different topics or contexts, then one will have to face the fact that monotonicity is not a 
good indicator of deductive validity.  On an inferential role account of meaning, the meaning of 
any given sentence is going to depend on the auxiliary premises available.  Thus, people with 
different beliefs will associate different meanings with a single sentence.  The objection merely 
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 points out that people that accept different inference rules will associate different meanings to a 
single sentence, even if they have all the same beliefs.  The result does not seem so 
counterintuitive once it is understood in this way. 
 
7.7  CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I have applied the theory of inconsistent concepts developed in Chapters Four, 
Five, and Six to truth to derive a theory of truth, a logic for truth, a pragmatic theory for truth, 
and a semantic theory for truth.  The theory of truth does not give rise to revenge paradoxes or 
self-refutation problems and the semantic theory for truth satisfies the strong internalizability 
requirement laid down in Chapters One and Two.    
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
FRAGMENTARY THEORIES OF TRUTH 
 
 
 
 
A.1  INTRODUCTION  
 
Some theories of truth explain natural language truth predicates in terms of a group of restricted 
truth predicates; these restricted truth predicates have extensions that are proper subsets of the 
extension of ‘true’.  I call these fragmentary theories of truth.  Several types of deflationism and 
the vast majority of approaches to the liar paradox are committed to fragmentary theories of 
truth.  The fragmentary theories of truth I consider are descriptive in the sense that they purport 
to describe the way we actually use truth predicates of natural languages.1  As such, these 
theories should be consistent with our intuitions about which uses of truth predicates are proper.  
In particular, they should be consistent with our intuitions about which assertions of sentences 
that contain truth predicates are warranted.  I argue that many descriptive fragmentary theories of 
truth imply that some clearly warranted assertions are unwarranted.  It follows that these theories 
are unacceptable. 
One way of classifying fragmentary theories of truth is based on the type of restricted 
truth predicates to which the theory appeals.  On this classification scheme, I discuss two types 
                                                 
1 I use the term ‘theory of truth’ in a loose way such that a theory of truth describes some aspect of a truth predicate. 
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 of fragmentary theories of truth: (i) those that appeal to language-specific truth predicates (e.g., 
‘true-in-English’), and (ii) those that appeal to hierarchies of restricted truth predicates.  A 
second way of classifying fragmentary theories of truth is based on the relation between a natural 
language truth predicate and the restricted truth predicates to which the theory appeals.  I focus 
primarily on fragmentary theories of truth that treat truth predicates of natural languages as 
ambiguous; these theories imply that natural language truth predicates take on the meaning of 
one of the relevant restricted truth predicates on each occasion of use.  I also address fragmentary 
theories of truth that appeal to translation to explain the relation between a natural language truth 
predicate and the restricted truth predicates in question. 
I argue that each of the fragmentary theories of truth I consider is inconsistent with our 
intuitions about which assertions of truth attributions are warranted (a truth attribution is a 
sentence of the form: p is true).  In each case, the theory in question implies that a clearly 
warranted assertion is unwarranted.  The arguments I use for each criticism are instances of a 
single argument scheme, which I call the warranted assertibility argument.  Although the 
warranted assertibility argument casts doubt on a wide range of fragmentary theories of truth, it 
does not show that all such theories are unacceptable.  My objective is to argue for a condition 
on fragmentary theories of truth: such theories should respect our intuitions about which 
assertions of sentences that contain truth predicates are warranted.  I show that this condition is 
difficult to meet without betraying the underlying motivations for accepting fragmentary theories 
of truth. 
The appendix is divided into six sections.  In the first section, I discuss and motivate 
fragmentary theories of truth.  To guide my presentation, I offer several claims about assertion, 
warranted assertibility, and ambiguity in section two.  The next three sections contain criticisms 
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 of fragmentary theories of truth.  In section three, I illustrate the warranted assertibility argument 
by applying it to Alfred Tarski’s theory of truth.  In section four, I use the argument to criticize 
those fragmentary theories of truth that explain natural language truth predicates in terms of 
language-specific truth predicates.  In section five, I apply the argument to fragmentary theories 
of truth that appeal to hierarchies of restricted truth predicates; Hartry Field’s recent theory of 
truth and indeterminacy (which appeals to a transfinite hierarchy of determinate truth predicates) 
serves as my example.  Finally, in section six, I address several objections. 
 
A.2  FRAGMENTARY THEORIES OF TRUTH 
 
My discussion of the motivations for fragmentary theories of truth is organized by the type of 
restricted truth predicates to which the theories appeal.  Some fragmentary theories of truth 
explain natural language truth predicates in terms of language-specific truth predicates.  I call 
this explanatory strategy the language-specific approach (the LS approach).2  A language-
specific truth predicate (an LS truth predicate) is satisfied only by true sentences of a particular 
language.  For example, ‘true-in-English’ is a language-specific truth predicate: ‘p is true-in-
English’ is true if p is a true sentence of English, and it is false if p is either a false sentence of 
English, or a sentence of some other language.3   
 The motivation for the LS approach originates from at least two sources: deflationism 
and investigations into the logic of truth.  Deflationists reject explanations of truth in terms of a 
substantive property or relation (e.g., correspondence with reality, coherence with a body of 
                                                 
2 I use the term ‘approach’ as a synonym of ‘doctrine’ or ‘theory’. 
3 I follow most of the theorists I discuss in assuming that sentences (or sentence tokens) are the primary bearers of 
truth.  One can define an LS truth predicate so that attributions containing it are truth-value gaps when the target of 
the attribution is a sentence of another language.  Although I ignore this possibility in the text, my argument could 
be altered to accommodate it. 
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 belief, utility, etc.).  One group of deflationists, disquotationalists, favor theories of truth based 
on the T-sentences, which have the form: 〈p〉 is true if and only if p.4  On disquotational theories 
of truth, the meaning of a truth predicate is entirely determined by a set of T-sentences (or a T-
sentence schema).  These truth predicates are defined only for the sentences of a single language; 
hence, they are LS truth predicates.5   
The second motivation for the LS approach comes from investigations into the logic of 
truth.  Dating back to Tarski, there is a convention in logic of considering only LS truth 
predicates.  Almost everyone who works on the logic of languages that contain truth predicates 
follows suit.6  One explanation for this unanimity is that it is more difficult to provide a logic for 
an unrestricted truth predicate than for an LS truth predicate; to construct a logic for an 
unrestricted truth predicate, one must consider its behavior when applied to sentences of every 
language.   
Another reason for focusing exclusively on the logic of LS truth predicates is that it is 
easier to avoid the liar paradox and its relatives for an LS truth predicate.  The liar paradox 
pertains to liar sentences, like the following: 
                                                 
4 ‘〈’ and ‘〉’ are angle quotes; ‘p’ serves as a sentential variable that can be replaced by a sentence, and ‘〈p〉’ is the 
quote-name of such a sentence.  See McGee (1991, 2000) for this usage (McGee uses different symbols).  I also use 
‘p’ as a logical constant (e.g.: p is true).  Note that these uses are distinct: an occurrence of ‘p’ cannot be both a 
sentential variable and a constant.  Corner quotes, ‘⎡’ and ‘⎤’, are used in conjunction with constants.  For example, 
if ‘p’ and ‘q’ are names of sentences, then ‘⎡p ∧ q⎤’ is the name of the sentence that results from placing sentence p 
and sentence q on opposite sides of ‘∧’.     
5 For deflationist theories of this sort, see Leeds (1978, 1995, 1997), Williams (1986, 1999, 2002), Field (1986) (in 
which they are discussed but not endorsed), Resnik (1990), Quine (1992), McGee (1993), Field (1994a, 1994b), 
Weir (1996), Halbach (1999, 2000, 2002), and Burgess (2002). 
6 A logic is a theory that specifies which arguments in a certain collection are valid.  For more examples of logics for 
truth that address only LS truth predicates, see van Fraassen (1968), Parsons (1974), Kripke (1975), Burge (1979a), 
Herzberger (1982), Skyrms (1982), Feferman (1982), Yablo (1985), Reinhardt (1986), Priest (1987), McGee (1991), 
Gaifman (1992), Simmons (1993), Gupta and Belnap (1993), McDonald (2000), Field (2003a, 2003b), and Maudlin 
(2004).  The sentence in the text on which this footnote is a comment contains ‘almost’ because I am not familiar 
with every logic for truth, not because I am aware of one that deals with an unrestricted truth predicate for sentences.  
Barwise and Etchemendy (1987) and Glanzberg (2004) formulate their theories in terms of propositions instead of 
sentences.  Gupta and Belnap (1993: 265-6) speculate on how to define ‘true-in-L’ where ‘L’ is a variable that 
ranges over first-order languages, but that is still not an unrestricted truth predicate for sentences.   
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 (Λ) Λ is false. 
The paradox is that an intuitively plausible argument shows that Λ is both true and false.7  By 
considering only LS truth predicates, one can ignore liar-like paradoxes that result from inter-
linguistic truth attributions (e.g., if p is the German sentence ‘q ist wahr’—which means that q is 
true—and q is the English sentence ‘p is false’, then both p and q are paradoxical).   
Tarski’s theorem on the indefinability of truth provides further motivation for the LS 
approach.  Tarski uses a variant of the liar paradox to prove that for any consistent language L, if 
L is (i) bivalent (i.e., every sentence of L is either true or false), (ii) mono-aletheic (i.e., no 
sentence of L is both true and false), (iii) capable of self-reference (i.e., it can quantify over the 
natural numbers, has a name for zero, and can express addition, multiplication, successor, and 
identity), and (iv) classical (i.e., it obeys the laws of classical logic), then L cannot contain a truth 
predicate that is both satisfied by all the true sentences of L and fails to be satisfied by all the 
false sentences of L.8  It follows that languages that contain unrestricted truth predicates are 
either inconsistent or do not satisfy the conditions of Tarski’s theorem.  This result suggests that 
the LS approach offers a promising strategy for solving the liar paradox.   
In addition, most approaches to the liar paradox require a distinction between 
metalanguage and object language.9  That is, the language in which one of these theories is 
                                                 
7 The argument is based on the truth rules (according to which 〈〈p〉 is true〉 follows from 〈p〉 and vice versa), the 
substitution rule (according to which two names that refer to 〈p〉 are intersubstitutable in 〈〈p〉 is true〉 without 
changing the truth-value of the sentence), and the inference rules of classical logic.  On the one hand, if Λ is true, 
then ‘Λ is false’ is true (by substitution).  If ‘Λ is false’ is true, then Λ is false (by truth rule).  Thus, if Λ is true, then 
Λ is false.  On the other hand, if Λ is false, then ‘Λ is false’ is true (by truth rule).  If ‘Λ is false’ is true, then Λ is 
true (by substitution).  Thus, if Λ is false, then Λ is true.  Therefore, Λ is true if and only if Λ is false.  It follows that 
Λ is both true and false.   
8 Tarski (1933: 247-251).  See McGee (1991: ch. 1) and Gupta and Belnap (1993: 49-63) for details on Tarski’s 
theorem. 
9 Of all the theories cited in footnote 6, only Reinhardt (1986), Priest (1987), McGee (1991), Simmons (1993), Field 
(2003a, 2003b), and Maudlin (2004) even attempt to dispense with a substantive distinction between object language 
and metalanguage.  In Chapters One and Two, I argue that no semantic theory that requires this distinction is 
acceptable. 
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 formulated (i.e., the metalanguage) is expressively richer than the languages to which it applies 
(i.e., the object languages).  These approaches are forced to consider only LS truth predicates 
because permitting an unrestricted truth predicate effectively forfeits the distinction between 
metalanguage and object language.   
To summarize my discussion of the first type of fragmentary theory: both 
disquotationalism and accounts of the logic of truth predicates provide motivation for the LS 
approach.  The former implies that a truth predicate is defined only for the sentences of a 
particular language, while the latter benefits from the convenience offered by LS truth predicates 
and the role LS truth predicates play in approaches to the liar paradox.  If disquotationalism or 
these logics for truth predicates are to be applicable to natural languages, one must be able to 
explain natural language truth predicates in terms of LS truth predicates. 
The second type of fragmentary theory I address explains natural language truth 
predicates by appeal to a hierarchy of restricted truth predicates.  I call this explanatory strategy 
the hierarchy approach.  The motivation for the hierarchy approach comes from attempts to 
solve the liar paradox for languages that are rich in expressive resources.  Again, Tarski’s 
theorem is a motivating factor.  A consistent language that satisfies the conditions of Tarski’s 
theorem cannot contain even an LS truth predicate that is satisfied by all and only the true 
sentences of the language.  This result suggests that explaining a natural language truth predicate 
in terms of truth predicates that are restricted to certain sentences of the language in question 
offers a promising approach to the liar paradox.  For example, Tarski shows how to solve the liar 
paradox for languages rich in expressive resources by treating an LS truth predicate of a 
language as a hierarchy of truth predicates that are restricted to certain sentences of that 
language.  Saul Kripke shows how to solve the liar paradox without appeal to such a hierarchy; 
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 however, if one applies his theory to languages that have certain expressive resources, new 
paradoxes that are similar to the liar (called revenge paradoxes) emerge.  Field shows that one 
can apply a theory like Kripke’s to expressively rich languages if one appeals to a hierarchy of 
determinate truth predicates to solve the revenge paradoxes.10  If hierarchy approaches are to be 
successful, then one must be able to explain a natural language truth predicate in terms of the 
restricted truth predicates of the hierarchy. 
A proponent of a fragmentary theory of truth must answer the question: what is the 
relation between the restricted truth predicates posited by the theory and a natural language truth 
predicate?  Surprisingly, most proponents of fragmentary theories of truth ignore this crucial 
issue.  One answer is that natural language truth predicates are ambiguous and can have the 
meaning of any of the restricted truth predicates in question.11  Another is that a natural language 
truth predicate is context-dependent—its content changes from context to context, and in any 
given context, its content is identical to the content of one of the restricted truth predicates.12  I 
do not consider context-dependence interpretations of fragmentary theories in this appendix.  
Instead, I take issue with fragmentary theories of truth that imply that natural language truth 
predicates are ambiguous (I also consider an LS approach that appeals to translation instead of 
ambiguity).  Before presenting these arguments, I discuss some aspects of assertion, warranted 
assertibility, and ambiguity. 
                                                 
10 Tarski (1933), Kripke (1975), and Field (2003a, 2003b).  For other proponents of the hierarchy approach, see 
Fitch (1964), Myhill (1975), Parsons (1974), Burge (1979a), Barwise and Etchemendy (1987), Gupta (1990), 
Gaifman (1992, 2000), Koons (1992, 2000), Gupta and Belnap (1993), Simmons (1993), Cantini (1995), Williamson 
(2000b), and Glanzberg (2004, forthcoming).  Davidson (forthcoming) tentatively endorses a hierarchy approach to 
the liar paradox.  For criticisms of the hierarchy approach, see Reinhardt (1986), Priest (1987), McGee (1991, 1997), 
and Simmons (1993).  For a defense of the use of hierarchies in approaches to the liar paradox, see Glanzberg 
(2005).   
11 Parsons (1974) interprets Tarski (1933) in this way; see also Williamson (2000b). 
12 See Parsons (1974), Burge (1979a), Barwise and Etchemendy (1987), Gaifman (1992, 2000), Koons (1992, 2000), 
Simmons (1993), and Glanzberg (2004).  In Appendix B, I argue that approaches to the liar paradox that imply that 
truth predicates display context-dependence are unacceptable.  Although that argument is unrelated to the warranted 
assertibility argument, it seems to me that a version of the warranted assertibility argument could be used to criticize 
context-dependence versions of fragmentary theories as well. 
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A.3  ASSERTION, WARRANTED ASSERTIBILITY, AND AMBIGUITY 
 
In this section, I present several claims about assertion, warranted assertibility, and ambiguity on 
which I rely in later sections.  First, I need an account of the relation between asserting a 
sentence 〈p〉 and asserting that p.  I assume that if S asserts 〈p〉 in context C and 〈p〉 means that q 
in context C, then S asserts that q in context C.  That is a rough characterization, but it will 
suffice for my purposes.13   
 Second, I require a rudimentary account of warranted assertibility.  Philosophers apply 
‘warrant’ to both beliefs and assertions, but the sense in which an assertion is warranted is 
different from the sense in which a belief is warranted.  Beliefs are typically assumed to be 
attitudes toward propositions, while assertions are actions.  The difference between the two is 
reflected in the areas of philosophy in which they are studied: warranted beliefs are a topic of 
epistemology, while warranted assertions are usually studied in the philosophy of language or 
action theory.  Roughly, S’s belief that p is warranted if S has a good reason for believing that p.  
I treat ‘good reason’ in a loose way so that the fact that S has a good reason for believing that p 
can be founded on causal connections, reliability, or other factors of which S might be unaware.  
Likewise, S’s assertion that p is warranted if S has a good reason for asserting that p.  Again, 
‘good reason’ should be read in a loose way.  I assume that a good reason for asserting that p 
always involves believing that p.  That is, I assume that if S asserts that p and S’s assertion is 
                                                 
13 Soames’ account of sentences, propositions, and assertions is more precise; see Soames (2002: 105-106). 
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 warranted, then S believes that p.14  Most theories of warranted assertibility share this 
assumption.15   
The warranted assertibility argument appeals only to the belief component of warranted 
assertibility.  In each version of the argument, I present an example of an assertion that is clearly 
warranted, and I argue that the fragmentary theory of truth in question implies that the asserter 
does not believe the proposition asserted.  Consequently, I could have argued that certain 
fragmentary theories of truth imply that some sincere assertions are insincere (where an assertion 
that p is sincere if only if the asserter believes that p).  I chose to make my point in terms of 
warranted assertibility because we have firm intuitions about which assertions of truth 
attributions are warranted, and it is clearly unacceptable if a descriptive theory of truth is 
inconsistent with these intuitions.   
Turning now to ambiguity: a linguistic expression is ambiguous if and only if it has two 
or more determinate, independent meanings.  The standard example in English is ‘bank’, which 
can mean effluvial embankment or financial institution (of course, it has other meanings as 
well).16  It is important to distinguish ambiguity from confusion, vagueness, and context-
dependence.  An expression is confused if and only if, in employing it, one is committed to 
applying it to two or more distinct entities without properly distinguishing between them; in 
other words, the employer of a confused expression thinks that two or more distinct entities are 
identical.  An example is ‘mass’ as it was used in Newtonian mechanics.  Today we know that 
physical objects have relativistic mass and proper mass (which are different physical properties), 
                                                 
14 I assume that the relevant notion is de dicto belief; I discuss alternatives in section six.  I ignore issues associated 
with expressivism. 
15 For proponents of the knowledge theory of assertion, see Unger (1975: ch. 6), Williamson (1996, 2000a: ch. 11), 
DeRose (2002), and Hawthorne (2004: 21-24, 85-91).  See Wright (1992) and Price (1998) for alternatives.  Kripke 
is a supporter of the link between assertion and belief; he endorses what he calls the disquotation principle: if a 
normal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely asserts 〈p〉, then he believes that p; see Kripke (1979).   
16 I am assuming a standard distinction between expression types and tokens.  Strictly speaking, expression types are 
ambiguous. 
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 but before the advent of relativistic physics, people who employed ‘mass’ used it in an attempt to 
designate what they mistakenly took to be a single property.  An expression is vague if and only 
if it has borderline cases (i.e., it neither definitely applies nor definitely fails to apply to some 
entities).  An expression is context-dependent if and only if its content depends on the context in 
which it is used.  It is common to distinguish the meaning of a context-dependent expression, 
which is constant, from its content, which varies.  According to my usage, a linguistic expression 
can be ambiguous without being confused, vague, or context-dependent.17
 
A.4  THE TARSKIAN APPROACH 
 
A Tarskian theory of truth for a natural language is fragmentary in two senses: it is both an LS 
approach and a hierarchy approach.  That is, the truth predicate of the natural language is 
explained in terms of a set of language-specific truth predicates, and each of these is explained in 
terms of a hierarchy of more restricted truth predicates.  In this section, I concentrate on the 
hierarchy aspect of Tarski’s theory. 
Tarski proposes a theory of truth for certain formal languages that do not contain their 
own truth predicates.  Of course, natural languages seem to contain their own truth predicates 
(e.g., English speakers apply ‘true’ to sentences of English).  To apply Tarski’s theory of truth to 
a language like English, one constructs a hierarchy of truth predicates that are restricted to 
certain sentences of the language.  For example, a Tarskian theory of truth for English appeals to 
a hierarchy of truth predicates (true0, true1, etc.), which are restricted to certain sentences of 
English depending on the sentences’ levels.  A sentence of English is level 0 if and only if it 
                                                 
17 See Atlas (1989) on ambiguity, Field (1973) and Camp (2002) on confusion, Williamson (1994) on vagueness, 
and Kaplan (1989) on context-dependence. 
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 contains no truth predicate.  Roughly, a sentence of English is level n only if it attributes truth to 
sentences whose levels are less than n, and one of the sentences to which it attributes truth is 
level n – 1.  The predicate ⎡truen⎤ is satisfied by a sentence only if the sentence’s level is less 
than or equal to n.  For example, if p is a true English sentence of level 0, then ‘p is true0’ is true; 
if q is a true English sentence of level 3, then ‘q is true2’ is false.18  I call true0, true1, etc., 
Tarskian truth predicates. 
One might object to Tarski’s theory of truth on the grounds that English contains a single 
truth predicate, ‘true’, not an infinite number of Tarskian truth predicates.  A proponent of the 
Tarskian approach might reply by stipulating that ‘true’ of English is ambiguous—it takes on the 
meaning of one of the Tarskian truth predicates on each occasion of use.  I call this the ambiguity 
Tarskian approach (the AT approach).19   
The variant of the warranted assertibility argument that undermines the AT approach is 
inspired by one of Kripke’s criticisms of Tarski.  The following is a portion of Kripke’s remarks 
on the AT approach: 
If someone makes such an utterance as (1) [i.e., ‘Most (i.e., a majority) of Nixon’s 
assertions about Watergate are false’]20, he does not attach a subscript, explicit or 
implicit, to his utterance of ‘false’, which determines the “level of language” on 
which he speaks.  An implicit subscript would cause no trouble if we were sure of 
the “level” of Nixon’s utterances; we could then cover them all, in the utterance of 
(1) or even of the stronger 
(4) All of Nixon’s utterances about Watergate are false. 
simply by choosing a subscript higher than the levels of any involved in Nixon’s 
Wategate-related utterances.  Ordinarily, however, a speaker has no way of 
knowing the “levels” of Nixon’s relevant utterances.  …  If the speaker is forced 
to assign a “level” to (4) in advance [or to the word ‘false’ in (4)]21, he may be 
                                                 
18 Tarski (1933).  This approach avoids the liar paradox because Λ is a sentence of level n that attributes truthn to a 
sentence of level n (itself); hence, it is false.  See Church (1976), Halbach (1997), and Soames (1999) for more 
details on the Tarskian approach. 
19 See Kripke (1975: 695) for discussion of this interpretation of Tarski’s theory; Kripke attributes this interpretation 
to Parsons (1974).  Other interpretations of the Tarskian hierarchy are possible as well.  See Burge (1979a, 1982a, 
1982b) for a reading on which a truth predicate of a natural language is an indexical.   
20 I have added the bracketed text to indicate Kripke’s sentence (1).   
21 This bracketed text is in the original. 
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 unsure how high a level to choose; if, in ignorance of the “level” of Nixon’s 
utterances, he chooses too low, his utterance of (4) will fail of its purpose, (Kripke 
1975: 695-696).   
 
 Although Kripke does not phrase his criticism in terms of warranted assertibility or provide an 
argument for his conclusion, he does mention that in ordinary situations English speakers would 
have trouble using an ambiguous truth predicate of this sort.  In addition to explicitly arguing 
against the AT approach, I propose the account of fragmentary theories of truth, and I use the 
warranted assertibility argument to criticize a wide range of fragmentary theories of truth 
(including the LS approach, which Kripke endorses).  I certainly do not want to attribute these 
proposals to Kripke.  However, it is unclear to me whether the rendition of the warranted 
assertibility argument I use against the AT approach is what Kripke had in mind as a criticism of 
Tarski.  If I may parody Kripke: probably many of my formulations and recastings of the 
argument are done in a way Kripke would not himself approve.  So the present section should be 
thought of as expounding neither ‘Kripke’s’ argument nor ‘Scharp’s’: rather Kripke’s argument 
as it struck Scharp, as it presented a problem for him.22
The following situation sets up the first instance of the warranted assertibility argument.  
Ned and Maude are at a bar, on Tuesday, having a conversation in English.  Maude is a 
distinguished expert on ring-tailed lemurs, and Ned is aware of this fact.  Maude tells Ned that 
on Monday she was at a talk given in English by Helen, another expert on ring-tailed lemurs.  
Maude informs Ned that Helen argued for a certain thesis, but Maude does not tell Ned what the 
thesis is.  Maude simply refers to it as Helen’s thesis.  Maude remarks that Helen’s thesis implies 
that a theory Maude recently published is false, and she tells Ned that she now agrees with 
                                                 
22 The last two sentences are, of course, a parody of a famous passage in Kripke’s monograph on Wittgenstein’s 
private language argument: “Probably many of my formulations and recastings of the argument are done in a way 
Wittgenstein would not himself approve.  So the present paper should be thought of as expounding neither 
‘Wittgenstein’s’ argument nor ‘Kripke’s’: rather Wittgenstein’s argument as it struck Kripke, as it presented a 
problem for him,” (Kripke 1982: 5). 
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 Helen.23  Later that morning, Ned bumps into Tim at the library.  Tim is writing a paper on ring-
tailed lemurs, and he informs Ned that he is planning to rely on Maude’s recently published 
theory.  Ned tells Tim that Maude’s theory is false.  Tim knows that Ned is usually sincere and 
trustworthy, but that Ned does not know much about the literature on ring-tailed lemurs; 
accordingly, Tim challenges Ned on his assertion.  Ned responds by asserting ‘if Helen’s thesis 
is true, then Maude’s theory is false’ and ‘Helen’s thesis is true’.  Ned, of course, explains to Tim 
that Maude told him of these facts.  After hearing this, Tim scurries off to the bar to find Maude 
so that he can find out what Helen’s thesis is.  (I refer to the conversation between Tim and Ned 
as context C.)   
Ned believes that Helen’s thesis is true, and Ned’s assertion of ‘Helen’s thesis is true’ is 
warranted.  However, Ned does not have beliefs about which sentence Helen’s thesis is, the level 
to which it belongs, or which Tarskian truth predicate it satisfies.24  This example shows that, 
given the established usage of ‘true’ among English users, it is possible that (i) S asserts that a 
sentence p is true, (ii) S’s assertion is warranted, and (iii) it is not the case that there is some 
positive integer i such that S believes that p is truei.25
The AT approach implies that Ned’s assertion is unwarranted, as the following argument 
shows: 
                                                 
23 I assume that Maude is right about the truth of Helen’s thesis and its consequence. 
24 One might object that Ned should believe that Helen’s thesis is level 0.  In response, I point out that Helen’s thesis 
could contain a truth predicate (e.g., it could be ‘if Maude’s theory is true, then ring-tailed lemurs are not primates’). 
25 One might object to my formulation on Quinean grounds that it is illegitimate to quantify into belief contexts 
because of their opacity; see Quine (1956).  My reply: the quantification into belief contexts in my example is 
optional.  I formulate it in this way for its convenience and precision.  Quine distinguishes between notional belief 
and relational belief (some philosophers call these belief de dicto and belief de re), and rejects quantification into 
belief contexts as a way of explaining relational belief.  This distinction is based on quantification into the object 
position (e.g., for all x, if x is x monkey, Ned believes that x is cute).  In my formulation, there is quantification into 
the subscript of the predicate position (e.g., for some x, if x is a positive integer, then it is not the case that Ned 
believes that q is truex).  Moreover, several philosophers have defended the legitimacy of quantifying into belief 
contexts; see Hintikka (1962), Kaplan (1969, 1986), Forbes (1996), and Santambrogio (2002).  For criticism of 
quantifying into belief contexts, see Tienson (1987).  For more on the issue of de re and de dicto belief, see Burge 
(1977), McDowell (1984), and Brandom (1994: 495-573).   
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 (AT1) Ned asserts ‘Helen’s thesis is true’ (in context C). 
 
(AT2) On the AT approach, for some positive integer i, ‘Helen’s thesis is true’ means 
that Helen’s thesis is truei (in context C). 
 
(AT3) On the AT approach, for some positive integer i, Ned asserts that Helen’s thesis is 
truei (in context C).   
 
(AT4) For every positive integer i, if Ned asserts that Helen’s thesis is truei and Ned’s 
assertion is warranted, then Ned believes that Helen’s thesis is truei. 
 
(AT5) It is not the case that for some positive integer i, Ned believes that Helen’s thesis 
is truei.   
 
  ∴ (AT6) On the AT approach, Ned’s assertion is unwarranted. 
 
I call this the warranted assertibility argument.26   
(AT1) is true by stipulation.  (AT2) follows from the definition of the AT approach.  
(AT3) follows from (AT2) and the assumption about assertion I proposed in section two.  (AT4) 
follows from the assumption about warranted assertibility I proposed in section two.  That leaves 
(AT5) open for the AT theorist to reject. 
If the AT theorist rejects (AT5), then she suggests that for some positive integer i, Ned 
believes that Helen’s thesis is truei.  Thus, for some positive integer i, Ned asserts that Helen’s 
thesis is truei, and he believes that Helen’s thesis is truei ;  hence, his assertion is warranted.  My 
reply to this suggestion is that it attributes to Ned a belief he does not have; in the example, Ned 
believes that Helen’s thesis is true, not that Helen’s thesis is truei (for some positive integer i).  
Ned does not know what Helen’s thesis is, much less what level it has or which Tarskian truth 
                                                 
26 The warranted assertibility argument highlights one of the problems with treating univocal expressions as 
ambiguous.  As such, it complements the following famous remark of Kripke’s: “it is very much the lazy man’s 
approach in philosophy to posit ambiguities when in trouble.  If we face a putative counterexample to our favorite 
philosophical thesis, it is always open to us to protest that some key term is being used in a special sense, different 
from its use in the thesis.  We may be right, but the ease of the move should counsel a policy of caution: Do not 
posit an ambiguity unless you are really forced to, unless there are really compelling theoretical or intuitive grounds 
to suppose that an ambiguity is really present,” (Kripke 1977: 19); Anscombe expresses a similar sentiment in the 
following passage: “where we are tempted to speak of ‘different senses’ of a word which is clearly not equivocal, 
we may infer that we are pretty much in the dark about the concept it represents,” (Anscombe 1957: 1). 
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 predicate is appropriate for it.  Thus, this version of the AT approach implies that Ned has a 
belief he does not have.   
A proponent of the AT approach can, of course, stipulate that for some positive integer i, 
Ned’s belief that Helen’s thesis is true is identical to the belief that Helen’s thesis is truei.  
However, this account attributes the wrong content to Ned’s belief.  In particular, this theory 
implies that if Ned believes that Helen’s thesis satisfies some Tarskian truth predicate or other, 
then he believes that Helen’s thesis satisfies a particular Tarskian truth predicate.  This result is 
intolerable.  Hence, rejecting (AT5) is unacceptable.  (The AT theorist could insist that, despite 
the evidence to the contrary, for some positive integer i, Ned does believe Helen’s thesis is truei; 
I consider this option in section six.) 
Instead of rejecting (AT5), a proponent of Tarski’s theory might revise the AT approach 
by permitting ‘true’ to have meanings other than those of the Tarskian truth predicates.  One 
choice is to stipulate that on an occasion of use, ‘true’ can have either the meaning of any of the 
Tarskian truth predicates or the meaning of a generic Tarskian truth predicate (whose extension 
is the union of the extensions of the Tarskian truth predicates, and whose anti-extension is the 
intersection of their anti-extensions); one could achieve the same results by permitting 
quantification into the subscripts of the Tarskian truth predicates.  A proponent of the revised AT 
approach can then claim that Ned asserts that Helen’s thesis is generically true, and Ned believes 
that Helen’s thesis is generically true; hence, his assertion is warranted. 
In response, I argue that the AT approach cannot admit a generic Tarskian truth predicate 
(or quantification in to the subscripts of the Tarskian truth predicates) because this addition 
would introduce a relative of the liar paradox.  With a generic truth predicate available, one can 
construct the following sentence: 
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 (Γ) Γ is not generically true. 
Γ means that it is not the case that for some positive integer i, Γ is truei.  According to the 
assumptions of Tarski’s theory, Γ is both generically true and not generically true.  Assume that 
Γ is generically true.  If so, then for some i, Γ is truei.  If for some i, Γ is truei, then for some i, ‘Γ 
is not generically true’ is truei.  If for some i, ‘Γ is not generically true’ is truei, then Γ is not 
generically true.  Hence, if Γ is generically true, then Γ is not generically true.  Assume that Γ is 
not generically true.  If so, then for some i, ‘Γ is not generically true’ is truei.  If for some i, ‘Γ is 
not generically true’ is truei, then for some i, Γ is truei.  If for some i, Γ is truei, then Γ is 
generically true.  Hence, if Γ is not generically true, then Γ is generically true.  Therefore, Γ is 
generically true if and only if Γ is not generically true.  It follows that Γ is both generically true 
and not generically true.  Therefore, introducing a generic Tarskian truth predicate would 
undermine the primary motivation for the AT approach.  
 
A.5  LANGUAGE-SPECIFIC APPROACHES 
 
In the previous section, I presented the warranted assertibility argument, and I used it to criticize 
the AT approach.  In this section, I apply the warranted assertibility argument to certain 
fragmentary theories of truth that exemplify the language-specific approach (the LS approach).  
On the LS approach, one can explain natural language truth predicates in terms of language-
specific truth predicates (LS truth predicates).  In the next section, I address the hierarchy 
approach. 
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 An objection to the LS approach is that natural language truth predicates are not 
language-specific.  For example, one can attribute truth to a German sentence by using the truth 
predicate of English (e.g., ‘ ‘ Schnee ist weiss’ is true’ is a true sentence of English).  A 
proponent of the LS approach can respond by claiming that ‘true’ in English is ambiguous and 
can have the meaning of any of the LS truth predicates.  I call such a truth predicate an 
ambiguous language-specific truth predicate (an ALS truth predicate), and I call the species of 
the LS approach on which natural language truth predicates are ALS truth predicates, the 
ambiguity language-specific approach (the ALS approach).  I now turn to a version of the 
warranted assertibility argument that undermines the ALS approach.   
Recall the example with Ned, Maude, Tim, and Helen.  In this version, Maude, the expert 
on ring-tailed lemurs, is fluent in many languages; Ned is aware of this fact, but he does not 
know which particular languages Maude comprehends (other than English).  Maude tells Ned 
about Helen’s thesis without telling him what the thesis is or the language Helen was speaking 
when she asserted it.  Ned has the same interaction with Tim that he had in the first version.  In 
particular, Ned asserts ‘Helen’s thesis is true’, and this assertion is warranted.  It is not the case 
that Ned has a belief about either the languages in which Helen’s talk was given or the LS truth 
predicate Helen’s thesis satisfies.  This example shows that, given the established usage of ‘true’ 
among English users, it is possible that (i) S asserts that a sentence p is true, (ii) S’s assertion is 
warranted, and (iii) it is not the case that there is some language l such that S believes that p is 
true-in-l.   
The ALS approach implies that Ned’s assertion is unwarranted, as the following version 
of the warranted assertibility argument shows: 
(ALS1) Ned asserts ‘Helen’s thesis is true’ (in context C). 
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 (ALS2) On the ALS approach, for some language l, ‘Helen’s thesis is true’ means that 
Helen’s thesis is true-in-l (in context C). 
 
(ALS3) On the ALS approach, for some language l, Ned asserts that Helen’s thesis is 
true-in-l (in context C). 
 
(ALS4) For every language l, if Ned asserts that Helen’s thesis is true-in-l and Ned’s 
assertion is warranted, then Ned believes that Helen’s thesis is true-in-l. 
 
(ALS5) It is not the case that for some language l, Ned believes that Helen’s thesis is 
true-in-l.   
 
  ∴ (ALS6) On the ALS approach, Ned’s assertion is unwarranted. 
 
The justifications for the premises of this argument are analogous to those given in section three.   
In an attempt to avoid (ALS5), an advocate of the LS approach might revise the ALS approach 
by introducing a generic language-specific truth predicate (whose extension is the union of the 
extensions of the LS truth predicates, and whose anti-extension is the intersection of their anti-
extensions); one could achieve the same results by allowing quantification into the language 
position of ‘true-in-L’.  I see no reason in principle why this cannot be done.  However, I am not 
aware of an advocate of the LS approach who endorses this strategy, and there are good reasons 
for avoiding it.  First, one would have to either give an account of quantification over languages 
or define an LS truth predicate for every language; either project would require a substantial 
theory of language.  That is not impossible, but a sufficiently precise and plausible account of 
language would be difficult to produce.  Moreover, it is unclear whether a deflationist who 
advocates the LS approach could appeal to a notion of truth conditions that would be sufficient to 
individuate languages in the right way.27  In addition, appeal to a generic LS truth predicate 
would undermine another motivation for the LS approach: namely, if one added a generic LS 
truth predicate or allowed quantification into the language position of ‘true-in-L’, then the LS 
approach would be susceptible to the liar paradox (see section one).   
                                                 
27 David (1994: 158-166) makes a similar point. 
 278
 Some deflationists who advocate the LS approach suggest that natural language truth 
predicates should be understood as translational language-specific truth predicates.28  A 
translational language-specific truth predicate (a TLS truth predicate) for a language L is a 
predicate that is synonymous with ‘translatable into a sentence of L that is true-in-L’.  For 
example, a proponent of treating natural language truth predicates as TLS truth predicates claims 
that the English sentence ‘ ‘ Schnee ist weiss’ is true’ means that ‘Schnee ist weiss’ is translatable 
into an English sentence that is true-in-English.  I call this species of the LS approach the 
translational language-specific approach (the TLS approach).29
There are at least two options for the way the TLS approach interprets an English 
sentence like ‘ ‘ Schnee ist weiss’ is true’: the quantificational version, which treats this sentence 
as ‘(∃x)(x is a sentence of English and x is a translation of ‘Schnee ist weiss’ and x is true-in-
English)’, and the constant version, which treats it as ‘p is a sentence of English and p is a 
translation of ‘Schnee ist weiss’ and p is true-in-English’, where ‘p’ is a constant.  When 
interpreting multiple-target truth attributions (e.g., ‘all the sentences Carl asserted yesterday are 
true’), the quantificational version of the TLS approach is the only acceptable option.30  Thus, 
one might as well endorse it in general.   
                                                 
28 The move is familiar in the face of other criticisms leveled against LS approaches; for such criticisms, see David 
(1989, 1994), Richard (1996), Soames (1997), Brendel (2000), Horwich (2001), Azzouni (2001), Künne (2002), and 
Shapiro (2003).  These philosophers all address deflationists who advocate the LS approach.  Some philosophers 
who work on the logic of truth have criticized Tarski’s commitment to the LS approach; see Field (1972), Dummett 
(1978: introduction), and Putnam (1985).  See also Davidson (1990, forthcoming) for discussion of this issue. 
29 On the TLS approach, see Field (1986) (in which it is discussed but not endorsed), McGee (1993), Field (1994a) 
(in which it is endorsed as an option), Leeds (1995, 1997), and Williams (1999, 2002).  For deflationist alternatives 
to LS truth predicates, see Field (1994a), Lance (1996), Azzouni (2001), Horwich (2001), and Brandom (2002). 
30 The quantificational version can render this claim as: ‘for all x, if x is a sentence Carl asserted yesterday, then for 
some y, y is a sentence of English and y is a translation of x and y is true-in-English’.  How should the constant 
version treat this sentence?  Perhaps ‘for all x, if x is a sentence Carl asserted yesterday, then p is a sentence of 
English and p is a translation of x and p is true-in-English’?  This cannot be right because it implies that p is a 
translation of all the sentences Carl asserted.  Another option might be: ‘for all x, if x is a sentence Carl asserted 
yesterday, then p and q are sentences of English, and either p or q is a translation of x, and p and q are true-in-
English’.  This suggestion works only if Carl asserted at most two sentences on the day in question.  A supporter of 
the constant version might suggest that the logical form of the truth attribution depends on the number of its targets, 
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 The TLS approach is plausible only for accounts of language and accounts of translation 
on which all languages are intertranslatable.  Otherwise, it faces an obvious criticism.  Pick a true 
sentence p of a language L that is not translatable into English.  The sentence ‘p is true’ is a true 
sentence of English, but the TLS approach implies that it is false (on the TLS approach, ‘p is 
true’ means that for some x, x is a sentence of English and x is a translation of p and x is true-in-
English—but, by stipulation, there is no such sentence of English).  Thus, I assume that, given 
the notions of language and translation employed by the TLS theorist, all languages are 
intertranslatable.   
This concession does not save the TLS approach from the warranted assertibility 
argument.  Again, the example is a story with Ned, Maude, Helen, and Tim.  In this version, 
Maude tells Ned about Helen’s thesis, but she does not tell him which language Helen was 
speaking when Helen asserted it.  Maude tells Ned that Helen’s thesis cannot be translated into 
English because it involves technical jargon that currently belongs only to the language Helen 
was speaking when she asserted it.  When Ned meets up with Tim, Ned asserts ‘Helen’s thesis is 
true’, and his assertion is warranted.  Furthermore, Ned believes that Helen’s thesis is not 
translatable into English; consequently, Ned believes that there is no sentence of English that is 
both a translation of Helen’s thesis and true-in-English. 
The following version of the warranted assertibility argument shows that, on the TLS 
approach, Ned’s assertion is unwarranted: 
(TLS1) Ned asserts ‘Helen’s thesis is true’. 
 
(TLS2) On the TLS approach, ‘Helen’s thesis is true’ means that for some x, x is a 
sentence of English and x is a translation of Helen’s thesis and x is true-in-
English. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
but this hardly seems plausible.  Moreover, it abandons the view that ‘true’ means ‘translatable into a sentence of 
English that is true-in-English’.   
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 (TLS3) On the TLS approach, Ned asserts that for some x, x is a sentence of English 
and x is a translation of Helen’s thesis and x is true-in-English.   
 
(TLS4) If Ned asserts that for some x, x is a sentence of English and x is a translation of 
Helen’s thesis and x is true-in-English, and Ned’s assertion is warranted, then 
Ned believes that for some x, x is a sentence of English and x is a translation of 
Helen’s thesis and x is true-in-English. 
 
(TLS5) It is not the case that Ned believes that for some x, x is a sentence of English 
and x is a translation of Helen’s thesis and x is true-in-English.   
 
  ∴ (TLS6) On the TLS approach, Ned’s assertion is unwarranted. 
 
Again, the justifications for the premises are analogous to the ones given in section three.  Unlike 
both the AT and ALS approaches, there is no generic truth predicate to consider for the TLS 
approach. 
 
A.6  HIERARCHY APPROACHES 
 
In the previous section, I applied the warranted assertibility argument to certain LS approaches.  
In this section, I apply it to another type of fragmentary theory: the hierarchy approach.  A 
hierarchy approach explains a truth predicate of a natural language in terms of a hierarchy of 
restricted truth predicates.  Because the principal motivation for the hierarchy approach arises 
from attempts to solve the liar paradox, the truth predicates to which the theory appeals are 
almost always used to classify paradoxical sentences.  My example of the hierarchy approach is 
Field’s theory of truth and indeterminacy. 
In a series of recent papers, Field introduces an impressive account of partially defined 
expressions.  From this account he derives a theory of truth and indeterminacy, a theory of 
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 vagueness, and a theory of properties.31  He uses his account of partially defined expressions to 
provide a novel, powerful, and unified solution to the liar paradox, Curry’s paradox, the sorites 
paradox, and the property version of Russell’s paradox.32  To accompany his account, he 
presents a new formulation of deflationism, a new non-classical logic with an intuitive 
conditional, and a non-standard probability calculus that allows him to explain degrees of belief 
in propositions that display indeterminacy.33  There is no question that Field’s account of 
partially defined expressions deserves to be one of the most discussed topics in the philosophy of 
language for years to come.  It should be clear that a discussion of this entire account is beyond 
the scope of this appendix.  Instead, I focus on his theory of truth and indeterminacy, but I 
provide only the details that are relevant to my criticism.   
Field begins with a version of Kripke’s theory of truth.  Kripke was one of the first to 
present a formal theory of truth that applies to languages that contain their own truth predicates; 
he accomplishes this feat by allowing truth-value gaps in the languages he considers.  A 
language displays truth-value gaps if it contains sentences that are in neither the extension nor 
the anti-extension of ‘true’.34  A problem with Kripke’s approach is that the languages he 
considers lack an intuitive conditional.  One of Field’s innovations is showing how to add a 
                                                 
31 See Field (2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, forthcoming a, forthcoming b) for the theory of truth and indeterminacy, 
Field (2003b, 2003c) for the theory of vagueness, and Field (2003c, 2004) for the theory of properties.   
32 I discussed the liar paradox in section one.  Curry’s paradox is that, from intuitive assumptions, one can use the 
sentence ‘if this sentence is true, then God exists’ to derive that God exists (or any other absurdity).  The sorites 
paradox is that, from intuitive assumptions, one can derive that a person with a full head of hair is bald (the 
reasoning works for most vague expressions, not just ‘bald’).  The property version of Russell’s paradox is that, 
from intuitive assumptions, one can derive that the property of non-self-instantiation both instantiates itself and does 
not instantiate itself.  It seems that Field’s account could be adapted to provide solutions for the paradoxes of 
denotation (Richard’s paradox, Berry’s paradox, and König’s paradox) and Grelling’s paradox of predication as 
well, but he does not emphasize this aspect of his work.  Field is pessimistic about using it as a solution to the set-
theoretic paradoxes; however, he also does not think that a new solution is in order.  See Field (2004). 
33 See the previously cited works on his theory of truth for the first two topics and Field (2000, 2001b, 2003b, 
forthcoming c) for the non-standard probability calculus.  One should be aware that Field presents two nonstandard 
probability calculi, one that is classical and the other nonclassical.  He now endorses only the nonclassical version; 
see Field (2003c: 462). 
34 See Kripke (1975).  Kripke considers only LS truth predicates, but I am ignoring this complication in this section. 
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 conditional to these languages that obeys most of the principles we associate with conditionals 
(e.g., it obeys modus ponens, ‘A → A’ is a logical truth, etc.).   
Field’s method for adding a truth predicate and a conditional to a first-order language 
results in a language that has truth-value gaps and for which the principle of excluded middle 
(i.e., ⎡p ∨ ~ p⎤) fails in general.35  The conditional behaves just like a material conditional if one 
assumes the relevant instances of the principle of excluded middle.  According to Field, truth 
displays indeterminacy in the sense that some sentences (e.g., the liar sentence) are in neither the 
extension nor the anti-extension of ‘true’; however, neither ‘the liar sentence is not true’, nor ‘the 
liar sentence is not false’ is a member of the extension of ‘true’ because the sentence ‘the liar 
sentence is either true or false’ is indeterminate.  Instead, one can describe the status of the liar 
sentence by asserting that it is not determinately true and not determinately false (i.e., the liar 
sentence is indeterminate).  One of the most satisfying aspects of Field’s theory is that he 
provides the means for asserting that the liar sentence is indeterminate in the languages he 
considers.  He defines a sentential determinacy operator, ‘D’, in terms of his conditional: 
DA =df A ∧ (┬ → A). 
Here, ‘┬’ is any tautology (e.g., ‘A → A’ or ‘0 = 0’).     
That Field provides a characterization of the liar in the languages he considers is a huge 
advance over Kripke’s theory, which implies that the liar is a truth-value gap, but cannot be 
applied to languages that contain truth-value gap predicates.  The problem with applying 
Kripke’s theory to such languages is that one can use a truth-value gap predicate to construct a 
                                                 
35 Field denies that the languages he considers have truth-value gaps; see Field (2003b: 270).  However, Field means 
something different by ‘true-value gap’ than most of those who work on truth and the liar paradox.  The common 
usage is that a sentence p of a language L is a truth-value gap if p is a member of neither the extension nor the anti-
extension of ‘true-in-L’.  On Field’s usage, a sentence p of L is a truth-value gap if the sentence ‘p is not true-in-L 
and p is not false-in-L’ is in the extension of ‘true-in-L’.  The languages Field considers allow truth-value gaps in 
the common sense of the term, but do not allow truth-value gaps in the Fieldian sense of the term.   
 283
 revenge paradox for his theory.36  Given that Field’s theory implies that the liar sentence is 
indeterminate (not determinately true and not determinately false), the revenge paradox for 
Field’s theory of truth involves the sentence: 
(Δ)  Δ is either indeterminate or false. 
I call Δ the determinate liar.  Field is ready for it.  Although the sentence ‘Δ is determinately true 
or determinately false’ is indeterminate, Field’s determinacy operator iterates non-trivially so 
that one can say that Δ is not determinately determinately true and not determinately false 
(determinate determinate falsity is equivalent to determinate falsity, but determinate determinate 
truth is stronger than determinate truth).37  Of course, one can formulate a determinate 
determinate liar, but Field’s determinacy operator iterates again so that he can characterize it in 
the language as well.  In fact, Field shows how to define a transfinite hierarchy of determinacy 
operators (Dσ) in terms of which he defines a transfinite hierarchy of determinate truth predicates 
(Dσtrue(x)) and a transfinite hierarchy of indeterminacy predicates (~Dσtrue(x) ∧ ~Dfalse(x)).   
When I say that Field constructs a transfinite hierarchy of determinacy operators, I mean that, 
given a system of ordinal notations (roughly, a certain mapping from a set of integers onto a 
segment of the ordinals), Field shows how to construct an operator ⎡Dσ⎤ for any ordinal σ in a 
proper initial segment of the recursive ordinals.  There is no maximal recursively related system 
of ordinal notations; hence, given a system of ordinal notations for a proper initial segment of the 
                                                 
36 A revenge paradox for a theory of truth is a paradox that is similar to the liar, but employs a key expression of the 
theory in question.  Kripke’s theory characterizes the liar sentence as gappy; the revenge liar for Kripke’s theory 
involves sentence g: g is either gappy or false.  If g is either gappy or false, then ‘g is either gappy or false’ is true.  
If ‘g is either gappy or false’ is true, then g is true.  Hence, if g is either gappy or false, then g is true.  Likewise, if g 
is true, then ‘g is either gappy or false’ is true.  If ‘g is either gappy or false’ is true, then g is either gappy or false.  
Hence, if g is true, then g is either gappy or false.  Consequently, g is true if and only if g is either gappy or false.  
Therefore, g is both true and either gappy or false (a contradiction—if we assume that a sentence that is either gappy 
or false is not true). 
37 It might be helpful to see that ‘determinately determinately A’ is synonymous with ‘(A ∧ (0 = 0 → A)) ∧ (0 = 0 
→ (A ∧ (0 = 0 → A)))’. 
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 recursive ordinals, one can construct a new system of ordinal notations for a larger proper initial 
segment of the recursive ordinals.  One can construct a new set of determinacy operators based 
on the new system of ordinal notations such that there exists an operator ⎡Dσ⎤ in the new set that 
is not a member of the old set.  In less precise language: there are many different ways of 
constructing the hierarchy of determinacy operators, and there is no “highest” hierarchy of 
them—given one hierarchy of determinacy operators, one can construct a “higher” one.38    
In the remainder of this section, I am concerned with showing that a version of the 
warranted assertibility argument casts doubt on Field’s theory.  (Because Field advocates a 
language-specific approach to natural language truth predicates, the criticism presented in the 
previous section applies to his theory as well.)  When applying his theory to a natural language 
Field faces an objection that is analogous to the one we saw leveled against both the Tarskian 
approach and the language-specific approach: namely, English contains a single expression 
‘indeterminate’, not a transfinite hierarchy of indeterminacy predicates.39  A proponent of Field’s 
theory might respond to this criticism with the claim that our word ‘indeterminate’ in English is 
ambiguous and can take on the meaning of any of the Fieldian indeterminacy predicates in the 
hierarchy.  However, unlike any of the previously considered approaches, Field’s theory permits 
quantification into the subscripts of the restricted truth predicates to which his theory appeals.  
                                                 
38 See Field (2003a, 2003b, forthcoming b: fn. 14, fn. 21).  I want to thank Hartry Field for conversations on this 
aspect of his theory in which he pointed out several mistakes in my exposition.  See Rogers (1967: 205-213), and 
Setzer (1999), and Rathjen (1999) on ordinal notations.  Those who are familiar with approaches to the liar paradox 
will no doubt be able to predict the next problem for Field.  One can generate a new revenge paradox by quantifying 
into the subscripts of the indeterminacy predicates (assuming a fixed system of ordinal notations).  Consider: ‘either 
this sentence is false or for all ordinals σ, this sentence is indeterminateσ’.  Field responds to this problem by 
claiming that there is no way to introduce a “maximal” determinacy operator into the language.  He also appeals to 
Tarski’s indefinability theorem in an effort to persuade us that we should not expect such an operator to be definable 
in the language.  See Field (2003a, 2003b).  Evaluating this response is beyond the scope of this appendix, but my 
arguments do not depend on whether it is adequate.  See Yablo (2003) for criticism of this aspect of Field’s theory. 
39 I present the warranted assertibility argument against Field’s theory by focusing on his interpretation of 
‘indeterminate’; I could have considered the implications of his theory for ‘true’ instead.  Because he explains his 
indeterminacy predicates in terms of truth, this choice makes no real difference. 
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 Thus, a defender of Field’s theory can claim that ‘indeterminate’ is ambiguous and can have 
either the meaning of one of the Fieldian indeterminacy predicates or the meaning of 
‘indeterminateσ for some ordinal σ’.40  I call this the ambiguity Fieldian approach (the AF 
approach). 
Consider once more the example with Ned, Maude, Tim, and Helen.  In this version, 
Maude tells Ned that Helen’s thesis is indeterminate; Ned believes her, and he has good reason 
to believe her.  Ned asserts ‘Helen’s thesis is indeterminate’ to Tim.  Ned has no beliefs about 
what Helen’s thesis is, what its level of indeterminacy is, or which Fieldian indeterminacy 
predicate it satisfies.     
The following version of the warranted assertibility argument shows that the AF 
approach implies that Ned’s assertion is unwarranted (assume a fixed system of ordinal 
notations): 
(AF1) Ned asserts ‘Helen’s thesis is indeterminate’ (in context C). 
 
(AF2) On the AF approach, either for some ordinal σ, ‘Helen’s thesis is indeterminate’ 
means that Helen’s thesis is indeterminateσ (in context C), or ‘Helen’s thesis is 
indeterminate’ means that for some ordinal σ, Helen’s thesis is indeterminateσ (in 
context C). 
 
(AF3) On the AF approach, either for some ordinal σ, Ned asserts that Helen’s thesis is 
indeterminateσ (in context C), or Ned asserts that for some ordinal σ, Helen’s 
thesis is indeterminateσ (in context C). 
 
(AF4) For every ordinal σ, if Ned asserts that Helen’s thesis is indeterminateσ and Ned’s 
assertion is warranted, then Ned believes that Helen’s thesis is indeterminateσ; if 
Ned asserts that for some ordinal σ, Helen’s thesis is indeterminateσ, and Ned’s 
assertion is warranted, then Ned believes that for some ordinal σ, Helen’s thesis is 
indeterminateσ. 
 
                                                 
40 As far as I know, Field does not endorse this interpretation.  He is careful to say that he is “non-committal” on the 
issue of whether his determinacy operator “is a fully accurate reflection of ‘the’ intuitive notion of determinacy,” 
(Field 2003c: 479). 
 286
 (AF5) It is not the case that for some ordinal σ, Ned believes that Helen’s thesis is 
indeterminateσ, and it is not the case that Ned believes that for some ordinal σ, 
Helen’s thesis is indeterminateσ.   
 
  ∴ (AF6) On the AF approach, Ned’s assertion is unwarranted. 
 
The justifications for (AF1) through (AF4) are analogous to those given in section three.   
A proponent of Field’s theory will almost certainly reject the second conjunct of (AF5).  
Hence, the AF theorist claims that Ned asserts that for some ordinal σ, Helen’s thesis is 
indeterminateσ, and Ned believes that for some ordinal σ, Helen’s thesis is indeterminateσ.  Thus, 
on this objection, Ned’s assertion is warranted.  In response, I point out that this suggestion 
attributes to Ned a belief he does not have.  Ned believes that Helen’s thesis is indeterminate.  It 
is not the case that Ned believes that for some ordinal σ, Helen’s thesis is indeterminateσ.   
A proponent of the AF approach can, of course, stipulate that Ned’s belief that Helen’s 
thesis is true is identical to the belief that for some σ, Helen’s thesis is indeterminateσ.  However, 
Field’s theory implies that given a system of ordinal notations, Ned believes that for some 
ordinal σ, Helen’s thesis is indeterminateσ.  One problem with this claim is that it implies that the 
content of Ned’s belief is relative to a system of ordinal notations.  Another problem is that if 
Helen’s thesis has a “high enough” level of indeterminacy (i.e., the ordinal it is assigned is not a 
member of the proper initial segment of the recursive ordinals on which the system of ordinal 
notations in question is defined), then the sentence Ned asserts is true, but on the AF approach, it 
is false.  Of course, a defender of the AF approach could define a new system of ordinal 
notations and introduce a new hierarchy of indeterminacy predicates for a larger initial segment 
of the recursive ordinals with which to interpret Ned’s assertion and belief, but the same 
problems will occur again because there is no maximal system of ordinal notations and, hence, 
no “maximal” hierarchy of indeterminacy predicates.  Hence, this version of the AF approach 
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 does not allow Ned to believe that Helen’s thesis satisfies some indeterminacy predicate or other 
unless he believes that Helen’s thesis satisfies some indeterminacy predicate or other among 
members of S (where S is a set of indeterminacy predicates defined in terms of a fixed system of 
ordinal notations).  Therefore, rejecting (AF5) is unacceptable. 
I have addressed my criticism of hierarchy approaches to Field’s theory because it is a 
prominent, sophisticated, and well-developed version of the hierarchy approach.  Analogous 
criticisms can be constructed for the ambiguity versions of other hierarchy approaches.     
 
A.7  OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 
 
Objection 1:  One can accept a fragmentary theory of truth and accept that Ned’s assertions are 
warranted so long as one assumes that Ned can apply the expression in question to the target 
while intending that the expression has the meaning of whichever restricted expression is 
appropriate for the target.  Take the case of the ambiguity Tarskian (AT) approach as an 
example.  Ned can assert ‘Helen’s thesis is true’ and intend that ‘true’ has the meaning of the 
Tarskian truth predicate that is appropriate for Helen’s thesis.  Thus, even if he does not have a 
belief about the level of Helen’s thesis, he can still assert that Helen’s thesis is truen and believe 
that Helen’s thesis is truen (for some particular n).  Hence, his assertion can count as warranted 
despite the fact that he has no belief about the level of Helen’s thesis.  Similar reasoning holds 
for the other examples. 
Reply 1:  I have two replies to this objection.  First, even if all the claims in the objection 
are true, it does not undermine the warranted assertibility argument or save the fragmentary 
theories of truth in question.  In my example, Ned does not intend that ‘true’ has the meaning of 
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 whichever Tarskian truth predicate is appropriate for Helen’s thesis.  No such intention is 
required for Ned’s assertion to be warranted.  Thus, this version of the AT approach still implies 
that Ned’s assertion is unwarranted.  Second, the following is a brief example that illustrates a 
problem with this objection.  Assume that Adil and Uter are having a conversation in English.  
Adil asserts ‘at two o’clock, either I will be at the edge of the Mississippi river doing some 
fishing or I will be at First National depositing my paycheck’.  Assume that Uter knows that Adil 
is a man of his word, but Uter has no belief about which action Adil will choose.  After his 
assertion, Adil leaves, and at two o’clock, Uter encounters Lewis.  Lewis utters ‘where is Adil?’.  
In response, Uter asserts ‘He is at the bank’.  Assume that Uter intends the expression ‘bank’ in 
his sentence to have whichever meaning is appropriate for Adil’s location.  Lewis, of course, 
asks ‘do you mean river bank or financial bank?’.  In response, Uter asserts ‘I do not know; I 
mean whichever one is appropriate’.  Befuddled by Uter’s shenanigans, Lewis resigns from the 
conversation. 
Does it seem plausible to say that Uter successfully gives ‘bank’ in his sentence a definite 
meaning?  Of course not.  Is Uter’s utterance a warranted assertion?  No; in fact, I would say that 
it is not even an assertion.41  We cannot expect to disambiguate our words by intending that they 
have whichever meaning will make the sentences we utter true.  The same mistake is present in 
the objection.  Ned cannot successfully attach a meaning to ‘true’ in ‘Helen’s thesis is true’ by 
intending that it has whichever meaning is appropriate for Helen’s thesis.  In order for Ned to 
attach the appropriate meaning to ‘true’, he must have a belief about either the level of Helen’s 
                                                 
41 One reason for thinking that his utterance is not an assertion is that ‘bank’ fails to have a determinate meaning in 
the sentence he utters.  Even if his utterance counts as an assertion, it is not warranted because it is not the case that 
either Uter believes that Adil is at the riverbank or Uter believes that Adil is at the financial bank. 
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 thesis or which Tarskian truth predicate Helen’s thesis satisfies.  Similar reasoning holds for Ned 
in the other examples.42
Objection 2:  An advocate of one of the fragmentary theories of truth criticized above can 
claim that, in each example, Ned has access to a definite description that picks out the relevant 
fact about the target of his attribution.  For example, in the case of the ambiguity language-
specific (ALS) approach, Ned believes that Helen’s thesis is true in whichever language Helen 
was speaking when she asserted it.  Although Ned does not know the name of that language, he 
possesses a definite description that picks it out.  A proponent of the ALS approach can claim 
that Ned’s sentence means that Helen’s thesis is true-in-the-language-Helen-was-speaking.  
Thus, Ned asserts that Helen’s thesis is true-in-the-language-Helen-was-speaking, and Ned 
believes that Helen’s thesis is true-in-the-language-Helen-was-speaking; thus, his assertion is 
warranted.  Similar reasoning holds for the other examples. 
Reply 2: According to the ALS approach, ‘Helen’s thesis is true’ is synonymous with 
‘Helen’s thesis is true-in-L’, where ‘L’ is a constant.  If definite descriptions receive a Russellian 
explanation, then the sentence ‘Helen’s thesis is true-in-the-language-Helen-was-speaking’ has 
the logical form: (∃x)(x is the language Helen was speaking, and Helen’s thesis is true-in-x).  On 
this account, the predicate ‘true-in-the-language-Helen-was-speaking’ has a hidden variable.  
However, LS approaches cannot appeal to a predicate ‘true-in-L’ where ‘L’ functions as a 
variable (see the discussion in section four).  Therefore, this interpretation of Ned’s sentence is 
not available to the ALS approach.  If definite descriptions receive a more “referential” 
explanation, then the predicate ‘true-in-the-language-Helen-was-speaking’ behaves more like 
                                                 
42 An example similar to the one with Adil, Uter, and Lewis figures prominently the debate between Goldberg and 
Brueckner.  They disagree about its relevance for semantic externalism, but they agree with my conclusion; see 
Goldberg (1997, 1999, 2000) and Brueckner (1999, 2000). 
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 ‘true-in-L’ where ‘L’ is a name.  In the reply to the next objection, I address this version of the 
ALS approach.  
Objection 3: One can accept a fragmentary theory of truth and accept that the assertions 
made by Ned are warranted so long as one assumes that Ned has access to a name for the portion 
of discourse that determines the relevant facts about the target of the attribution in question.  For 
example, Ned can assert ‘Helen’s thesis is true’ and intend that ‘true’ is synonymous with ‘true-
in-Helen-language’ where ‘Helen-language’ is a name for the language Helen was speaking 
when she asserted Helen’s thesis.  Ned asserts that Helen’s thesis is true-in-Helen-language, and 
Ned believes that Helen’s thesis is true-in-Helen-language; hence, his assertion is warranted.  If 
‘Helen-language’ is unavailable to Ned, he can simply create it as a name whose referent is 
determined by the definite description ‘the language Helen was speaking when she asserted 
Helen’s thesis’.  Similar remarks hold for the other cases. 
Reply 3:  I have two replies to this objection.  First, even if all the claims in the objection 
are true, it does not undermine the warranted assertibility argument or save the fragmentary 
theories of truth in question.  In my example, Ned does not create a name ‘Helen-language’, nor 
does he intend his use of ‘true’ to be synonymous with a particular LS truth predicate.  
Nevertheless, Ned’s assertion is warranted, and the ALS approach implies that it is unwarranted.  
Second, I doubt that Ned succeeds in determining the appropriate meaning for ‘true’ in the 
scenario described in the objection.  Consider the example with Adil, Uter, and Lewis again, but 
assume that they have in their language two terms ‘bank-river’ and ‘bank-downtown’ that are not 
ambiguous (assume for simplicity that there is only one financial bank, and it is downtown).  At 
two o’clock, Uter creates the name ‘Adil-location’ by stipulating that it refers to the location of 
Adil.  Uter then asserts ‘Adil is at the bank’ and intends ‘bank’ to be synonymous with ‘bank-
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 Adil-location’.  Is his assertion warranted?  No.  He still has failed to give ‘bank’ a determinate 
meaning.  The lesson carries over to the situation in the objection.43
Objection 4: The assumption that a user of an ambiguous word has to intend it to have a 
particular meaning is false.  Speakers can use the term without implicitly attaching a meaning to 
it.  The context in which it is used determines the meaning.  This goes on “behind the speaker’s 
back,” so to speak.  One can hold an analogous view for the content of the speaker’s 
propositional attitudes.  In the example for the ambiguity Tarskian approach, Ned asserts 
‘Helen’s thesis is true’ and believes that Helen’s thesis is true.  Ned’s term ‘true’ takes on the 
appropriate meaning (e.g., if Helen’s thesis is level 3, then ‘true’ in the sentence Ned asserts is 
synonymous with ‘true3’), and Ned’s belief has the appropriate content as well (e.g., Ned 
believes that Helen’s thesis is true3).  The disambiguation occurs without Ned having to do 
anything other than asserting ‘Helen’s thesis is true’.  Ned’s assertion is warranted even though 
he does not have a belief about the particular level of Helen’s thesis.  Similar reasoning holds for 
the other examples.44
Reply 4: One might reply to this objection by claiming that if this account of 
disambiguation is correct, then Ned does not know what the sentence he asserted means and does 
not know the content of his associated belief.  Analogous criticisms are commonly made of 
semantic externalism (i.e., the doctrine that the contents of mental states and expressions are 
determined, in part, by their physical or social environment).  Defenders of semantic externalism 
have replied to these criticisms by proposing accounts of how we know the contents of our 
                                                 
43 I am indebted to conversations with Graham Hubbs and Brad Cokelet on this issue.  See Kripke (1980) and 
Soames (2003: ch. 16) for more on these aspects of name creation and reference fixing. 
44 John Morrison suggested this objection in conversation. 
 292
 mental states and expressions that are compatible with semantic externalism.45  It seems to me 
that the objector could make a similar move in response to my suggested reply.     
Instead of pushing that sort of reply to the objection, I want to point out what is a more 
pedestrian problem with it.  The real issue is that the account of disambiguation endorsed in the 
objection is implausible.  Consider once more the example with Adil, Uter, and Lewis.  In this 
version, instead of intending anything, Uter simply asserts ‘Adil is at the bank’ while allowing 
the “context” to disambiguate ‘bank’ for him.  This story is even less plausible than the other 
versions of this example.  Clearly, Uter does not succeed in giving a meaning to ‘bank’, it is not 
the case that he believes that Adil is at the riverbank, and it is not the case that he believes that 
Adil is at the financial bank.  If a person asserts a sentence that contains an ambiguous 
expression, he is asked the meaning of that expression on that occasion of use, and he responds 
to the query by saying, “I don’t know,” then this is a guilty admission, and a clear case where the 
assertion is unwarranted.  Thus, the account of disambiguation in question (according to which 
‘true’ in a speaker’s assertion is disambiguated “behind his back”) has the opposite problem—it 
treats what are clearly unwarranted assertions as warranted.46
There are cases that bear a certain similarity to the ones where someone asserts a 
sentence without knowing the meaning of an ambiguous word in the sentence.  Consider Cletus, 
who asserts ‘the bird is red’.  Assume that Cletus’s wife, Brandine, challenges him by asking, 
“By ‘red’ do you mean brick, crimson, maroon, etc.?”  If Cletus says, “I don’t know,” in 
response to Brandine’s query, but refuses to retract his assertion, then the most natural way of 
                                                 
45 The literature on semantic externalism is vast.  See Putnam (1975), Burge (1979b), and Davidson (1988) for 
arguments in favor of semantic externalism.  For criticism see Boghossian (1989) and Segal (2000).  For attempts to 
reconcile semantic externalism with knowledge of the contents of one’s expressions and mental states, see Davidson 
(1987), Burge (1988), Kobes (1996), Gibbons (1996), and Heal (2001). 
46 One should not assume that this reply casts doubt on semantic externalism.  There is an important difference 
between using ‘water’ while being secretly switched from Earth to Twin Earth and using a word one knows to be 
ambiguous without intending any particular meaning.  It is akin to the difference between confusion and ambiguity; 
see Camp (2002: ch. 5). 
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 understanding Cletus’s original assertion is not that ‘red’ is ambiguous and that the “context” 
disambiguates it “behind Cletus’s back.”  The obvious interpretation is that ‘red’ is being used as 
a generic predicate.  Cletus’s claim means something like: there is some kind of red such that the 
bird is that kind of red.  There is a moral for proponents of fragmentary theories of truth: if a 
language contains a set of expressions for concepts that fall under an intuitive kind, then that 
language should either have a generic term for them or allow for introduction of a generic term 
for them.47     
Objection 5: There are theories of warranted assertibility on which someone who asserts 
that p need not have the de dicto belief that p for her assertion to count as warranted.  One might 
take de re belief to be enough, or one might claim that truth is the only norm of assertion.48  On 
such theories of warranted assertibility, the fragmentary theories of truth considered above do not 
imply that Ned’s assertions are unwarranted. 
Reply 5:  Even if it turns out that the best theory of warranted assertibility does not 
require the asserter to believe (de dicto) what he or she asserted, it will still have to respect Keith 
DeRose’s distinction between primary and secondary propriety.49  If S believes that he is acting 
in accordance with the norms that govern warranted assertibility, then, although S’s assertion 
might be unwarranted, S is still acting properly in the sense that he should not be sanctioned for 
his action by the members of his community.  Call such an assertion responsible.  Even if the 
                                                 
47 One might be tempted to offer a similar objection based on disambiguation via the division of linguistic labor (see 
Putnam 1975).  The objection would be something like: because the asserter lives in a community in which there are 
people who know the relevant facts about the target of Ned’s attribution, he can assert a sentence with the 
ambiguous word and allow the opinions of the experts to disambiguate it for him.  My reply is similar in spirit.  
First, there is no guarantee that a member of Ned’s community will have the relevant knowledge; if no such person 
is available, then his assertion is still unwarranted.  Second, if Ned does not know that the word is ambiguous, then 
he is confused (he thinks that two or more distinct entities are identical); confusion cannot be explained in terms of 
ambiguity; see Camp (2002: ch. 5).  If Ned does know that the word is ambiguous, and he does not intend that it has 
one meaning rather than another, then either he uses it as a generic word (which is not ambiguous) or he does not 
know what the word means in his utterance.  It makes no difference whether he lives in a community of people who 
know what he should mean in that circumstance in order to make the sentence he asserts true.   
48 See Williamson (2000a: ch. 11) for discussion. 
49 DeRose (2002: 180). 
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 primary propriety for assertibility is bound up with de re belief or the truth of the sentence 
asserted, the secondary propriety for assertibility depends on the asserter’s de dicto belief that p 
when asserting that p.  If S asserts a proposition, S’s assertion is responsible (S made a sufficient 
effort to follow the relevant norms of assertion), and the relevant norms involve either the truth 
of the sentence asserted or de re belief in the proposition it expresses, then S has the de dicto 
belief in that proposition.  The warranted assertibility argument goes through with ‘responsible 
assertion’ in place of ‘warranted assertion’.  The resulting argument shows that the fragmentary 
theories of truth I discuss do not respect our intuitions about responsible assertibility; a theory 
that implies that some responsible assertions are irresponsible is just as bad as one that implies 
that some warranted assertions are unwarranted.   
Objection 6:  There are other ways for a proponent of a fragmentary theory of truth to 
explain the relation between the restricted expressions posited by the theory and the expressions 
of natural language.  For example, one can identify the natural language expression with one of 
the restricted expressions and introduce the other restricted expressions into the language.  
Another option is to assume that the expression of natural language is context-dependent. 
Reply 6: I stated in section one that I would not consider context-dependence versions of 
fragmentary theories of truth.  As I have presented it here, the warranted assertibility argument 
might seem to lend support to context-dependence versions because it casts doubt on the 
alternatives; I want to caution against this assessment.  I argue elsewhere that context-
dependence approaches to the liar paradox are untenable, but I do not have the space to recreate 
that argument here.50  As for the other suggestion in the objection, no account of that sort will be 
a plausible descriptive theory of truth.  Consider the example of the ambiguity Tarskian 
approach.  If one were to stipulate that ‘true’ of English is synonymous with ‘true0’, then that 
                                                 
50 See Appendix B. 
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 theory would imply that ‘p is true’ is false whenever p contains a truth predicate.  That account is 
obviously false.  Similar results hold for the other fragmentary theories of truth when interpreted 
in this way.  Of course, there are other ways to interpret fragmentary theories of truth, but the 
warranted assertibility argument shows that if they are to be acceptable, they must be consistent 
with our intuitions about which assertions of truth attributions are warranted. 
Objection 7: Perhaps most language users would say that the assertions performed by 
Ned are warranted.  However, they should not count as warranted.  Those sorts of assertions 
happen infrequently, and changing our linguistic practice so that they do not count as warranted 
would have a minor impact.  That is a small price to pay for being able to use the fragmentary 
theories of truth considered here. 
Reply 7:  The objection suggests that we treat fragmentary theories of truth as revisionary 
theories of truth—ones that specify how we should think and talk about truth instead of ones that 
purport to describe our actual linguistic practice.  There are two problems with this suggestion.  
First, if we want to understand our current linguistic practice, then the fragmentary theories of 
truth I consider are not going to be of help.  That is the conclusion of the warranted assertibility 
argument.  Reinterpreting fragmentary theories of truth as revisionary theories does nothing to 
change that fact.   
Second, the ability to blindly assert truth attributions that count as warranted is essential 
to the functioning of a truth predicate (a blind assertion of a truth attribution occurs when the 
asserter is not in a position to assert the targets of the attribution).  Deflationists and non-
deflationists alike can agree on this issue.  If truth is a substantive property (as a non-deflationist 
holds) and a person has good reason to believe that some particular sentences are true, then she 
should be able to attribute truth to them in a warranted assertion without having to believe other 
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 things about them (e.g., which levels they have, which languages they belong to, or whether they 
are translatable into the language she is using).  Likewise, deflationists have good reason to 
permit blind assertions of truth attributions; otherwise they lose the deflationist account of the 
value of truth predicates, which is that truth predicates allow us to make generalizations we could 
not otherwise make.51  Without the ability to assert truth attributions that are both blind and 
warranted, that would be impossible.  Thus, a concept of truth offered by a revisionary theory of 
truth that abandons this aspect of our use of ‘true’ would be of little use to us.52
 
A.8  CONCLUSION 
 
I have argued that certain fragmentary theories of truth are unacceptable.  These include the 
ambiguity version of Tarski’s theory of truth, the ambiguity language-specific approach, the 
translational language-specific approach, and the ambiguity version of Field’s theory of truth and 
indeterminacy (I also suggested that the criticism of Field’s theory applies to the ambiguity 
versions of other hierarchy approaches).  In each case, I used the warranted assertibility 
argument to show that the theory in question is inconsistent with our intuitions about which 
assertions are warranted.   
                                                 
51 See Field (1994a), Horwich (1998), and Halbach (1999). 
52 Despite Field’s claims to the contrary (See Field 2003c: 300), it is not plausible to interpret his theory as a 
descriptive theory of truth and a revisionary theory of indeterminacy.  For Field, if p is a sentence of a language L, 
and p is a member of neither the extension nor the anti-extension of ‘true-in-L’, then neither ‘p is not true-in-L’ nor 
‘p is not false-in-L’ are in the extension of ‘true-in-L’.  Instead, Field delegates this traditional role of ‘true’ to his 
indeterminacy predicates, each of which is built up from conjunction, (choice) negation, truth predicates, and 
determinacy operators.  When one applies Field’s theory to English, one can either (i) stipulate that ‘true’ can be 
correctly applied to gappy sentences, but ‘true’ is ambiguous and can have the meaning of any of the determinate 
truth predicates, or (ii) stipulate that ‘true’ cannot be correctly applied to gappy sentences.  In the first case, a version 
of the warranted assertibility argument shows that Field’s theory implies that some warranted assertions are 
unwarranted; in the second, the theory is a revisionary theory of truth.  Again, we have the option of a false 
descriptive theory or a revisionary theory. 
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 Deflationism and approaches to the liar paradox provide the motivation for fragmentary 
theories of truth.  I have not argued that deflationism or these approaches to the liar paradox are 
false; nor have I demonstrated that they have nothing to do with natural language truth 
predicates.  Rather, I have shown that if they are relevant to natural language truth predicates, 
then the proponents of these theories must provide some account of the relation between the 
restricted truth predicates to which they appeal and natural language truth predicates that does 
not run afoul of the warranted assertibility argument. 
The motivations for fragmentary theories of truth are powerful, and I have not shown that 
all fragmentary theories of truth are unacceptable.  Indeed, I advocate a fragmentary theory of 
truth.  However, it is neither a language-specific approach nor a hierarchy approach.  Rather, it 
appeals to a group of six restricted truth predicates.  Instead of treating natural language truth 
predicates as ambiguous or context-dependent, I claim that they are confused.  The approach I 
offer permits a generic truth predicate, and it respects our intuitions about which assertions of 
truth attributions are warranted.  It also solves the liar paradox without relying on a hierarchy of 
semantic predicates, a substantive distinction between object language and metalanguage, or a 
restriction to expressively weak languages.   
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
RISKY BUSINESS: TRUTH AND PARADOXICALITY 
 
 
 
 
B.1  INTRODUCTION  
 
Some sentences of natural languages that contain truth predicates are paradoxical.  By 
‘paradoxical’, I mean that one can prove that these sentences are both true and not true from 
some intuitively plausible assumptions via intuitively plausible inference rules.  I do not mean 
that these sentences are both true and not true.  The most well-known example of a paradoxical 
sentence is the liar sentence:  
(Λ) λ is false. 
A sentence token of type Λ whose name is ‘λ’ attributes falsity to itself; such a sentence is 
paradoxical.1  It is common knowledge among those who work on the liar paradox that one can 
construct paradoxical sentences with the use of empirical predicates.  These sentences are 
paradoxical because of some empirical facts; if the facts had been different, they would not have 
been paradoxical.  We can say that such sentences are empirically paradoxical.  The existence of 
                                                 
1 The argument is based on the truth rules (i.e., 〈〈p〉 is true〉 follows from 〈p〉 and vice versa, and two names that 
refer to 〈p〉 are intersubstitutable in 〈〈p〉 is true〉 without changing the truth-value of the sentence).  On the one hand, 
if λ is true, then ‘λ is false’ is true.  If ‘λ is false’ is true, then λ is false.  Thus, if λ is true, then λ is false.  On the 
other hand, if λ is false, then ‘λ is false’ is true.  If ‘λ is false’ is true, then λ is true.  Thus, if λ is false, then λ is true.  
Therefore, λ is true if and only if λ is false.  It follows that λ is both true and false. 
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 these sentences suggests that a sentence’s syntactic and semantic features do not determine 
whether it is paradoxical.  In section two, I discuss this intuition, and in section three, I provide 
an argument for it.  
Although many contemporary philosophers who work on truth pay lip service to 
empirical paradoxicality, few realize that it has sweeping consequences for a wide range of 
views related to truth.  In particular, the thesis that for some sentences, their syntactic and 
semantic features do not determine whether they are paradoxical is incompatible with (i) the 
claim that utterances of paradoxical sentences do not count as assertions, (ii) theories that make 
propositions the primary bearers of truth and falsity, (iii) minimalist accounts of truth-aptness, 
which hold that the syntactic features of a sentence determine whether it has a truth-value, (iv) 
the version of deflationism that defines truth predicates in terms of sets of T-sentences (e.g., 
‘‘spandex jumpsuits are hot’ is true if and only if spandex jumpsuits are hot’), and (v) 
contextualist theories of truth, which seek to avoid the liar paradox by stipulating that the 
extensions and anti-extensions of truth predicates vary from context to context.  I develop these 
criticisms in sections four through nine. 
  
B.2  RISKINESS: INTUITION 
 
Philosophers have known of empirical versions of the liar paradox since it first became an object 
of study over two millennia ago.  For example, the predicate ‘is a complete sentence in section 
two of Scharp’s “Risky Business,” whose first letter is an ‘E’’, can be used to construct a version 
of the liar paradox; consider the following sentence. 
Every complete sentence in section two of Scharp’s “Risky Business,” whose first letter 
is an ‘E’ is false.   
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The fact that the previous sentence is the only complete sentence in section two of this appendix 
to begin with an ‘E’ is an empirical fact about that sentence.  If I had chosen to place it in a 
different section, it would not have satisfied that empirical predicate and, thus, it would not have 
predicated falsity of itself.2  Nevertheless, it seems obvious that this change would not have 
altered the sentence’s syntactic features or its meaning.   
Although empirical versions of the liar paradox are as old as the paradox itself, they have 
not received much attention in contemporary discussions.3  Certainly the most influential 
examination of empirically paradoxical sentences is found in Kripke’s paper on truth.4  Kripke 
draws a striking conclusion from the fact that there are empirical versions of the liar paradox: 
The versions of the Liar paradox which used empirical predicates already point up 
one major aspect of the problem: many, probably most, of our ordinary assertions 
about truth and falsity are liable, if the empirical facts are extremely unfavorable, 
to exhibit paradoxical features, (Kripke 1975: 691; italics in original). 
 
He provides his own example of this phenomenon in which Nixon and Jones assert sentences 
that, due to their satisfaction of empirical predicates, are paradoxical.  Kripke claims that his 
example “points up an important lesson: it would be fruitless to look for an intrinsic criterion that 
will enable us to sieve out—as meaningless, or ill-formed—those sentences which lead to 
paradox,” (Kripke 1975: 692).  He continues, “The moral: an adequate theory must allow our 
statements involving the notion of truth to be risky: they risk being paradoxical if the empirical 
facts are extremely (and unexpectedly) unfavorable.  There can be no syntactic or semantic 
‘sieve’ that will winnow out the ‘bad’ cases while preserving the ‘good’ ones,” (Kripke 1975: 
                                                 
2 I assume that sentence tokens are truth bearers for reasons I discuss in section five. 
3 See Church (1946), Cohen (1957, 1960), Prior (1958, 1961), van Fraassen (1968), Burge (1979), Gupta (1982), 
Yablo (1982), Martinich (1983), Parsons (1984), Barwise and Etchemendy (1987), Kremer (1988), Stebbins (1992), 
Gaifman (1992), Simmons (1993: ch. 8), Goldstein (2001), and Visser (2004) for remarks on empirical 
paradoxicality. 
4 Kripke (1975). 
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 692).  In these passages, Kripke claims that: (i) the existence of empirically paradoxical 
sentences shows that approaches to the liar paradox on which paradoxical sentences are either 
ungrammatical or meaningless are unacceptable, (ii) a theory of truth should imply (or at least 
permit) that truth attributions are risky, and (iii) it is not the case that for every sentence token σ, 
the syntactic and semantic features of σ determine whether σ is paradoxical.  (i) follows from 
(iii), and the most natural reading of (ii) is that a theory of truth should imply (iii).  Thus, (iii) 
seems to be the most important of these claims.  I refer to it as the riskiness thesis.  However, 
given the significance of this claim (which I draw out in sections five through nine), I would 
prefer a more convincing justification of it.   
What is needed is an example with two situations, one in which a person asserts a token 
of a sentence type that is not paradoxical and the other in which a person asserts a token of the 
same sentence type that is paradoxical.  In both situations, the people are molecule for molecule 
identical, they have the same mental states, the sentences have the same meanings, their 
subsentential parts have the same meanings, and the singular terms that occur in the sentences 
refer to the same things.  I provide such an example in the next section.  Before doing so, I want 
to emphasize that I am not arguing that the semantic and syntactic features of a sentence token 
never determine whether it is paradoxical.  Indeed, the syntactic and semantic features of some 
sentence tokens do determine whether they are paradoxical.5  I am arguing that for some 
sentence tokens, their syntactic and semantic features do not determine whether they are 
paradoxical. 
 
                                                 
5 Tarski (1944) argued for this claim.  See also Quine (1961) in which the example ‘‘yields a falsehood when 
appended to its own quotation’ yields a falsehood when appended to its own quotation’ features prominently. 
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 B.3  RISKINESS: EXAMPLE 
 
Let w1 and w2 be two possible worlds that are very much like our own (e.g., they have the same 
natural laws6, they have very similar histories, humans exist in both, some humans speak English 
in both, etc.).  I am appealing to possible worlds at this point because they provide a relatively 
easy way to make my point.  The conclusions I draw from this example hold across a range of 
views on the role of ‘possible worlds’ talk.   
In w1 there is a person, Stu, who is in a room that is empty except for a single blackboard 
and another person, Gil.7  Stu is a competent English speaker and all the sentences in the 
example are sentences of English (my idiolect at noon GMT on January 1, 2004, to be precise).  
Stu asserts a token of the following sentence type: 
(Α)  The sentence written on the blackboard is true. 
Let ‘α’ be the name of the sentence token Stu utters.  Thus, α is a sentence token of sentence 
type Α.  Assume that Stu indicates by gesture that the sole blackboard in the room is the one to 
which he is referring.  Assume as well that there is a single sentence written on that blackboard.  
The sentence token written on the blackboard is a token of the following sentence type:  
(Β) The sentence written on the blackboard in the room next door is true. 
Let ‘β’ be the name of the sentence token that is written on the blackboard in the room in which 
Stu and Gil are present.  For simplicity, I call the room in which Stu and Gil are present, room 1.  
Assume also that there is only one room next door to room 1.  I call it room 2.  Assume that 
                                                 
6 Advocates of Humean supervenience (i.e., the natural laws of a world supervene on its non-nomic facts) should 
feel free to assume that w1 and w2 have very similar natural laws, but because their non-nomic facts differ slightly, 
their natural laws will as well.  This complication makes no difference for my argument. 
7 At this point, Gil is present merely to insure that Stu has an audience so that his utterances count as assertions; in 
section eight, Gil plays a more substantial role. 
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 room 2 is empty except for a single blackboard and that on that blackboard is a single sentence.   
The lone sentence on the lone blackboard in room 2 is a token of the following type: 
(Γ1)  β is false. 
Let ‘γ1’ be the name of the sentence token written on the blackboard in room 2 in world w1.  
Thus, γ1 is a sentence token of the sentence type Γ1.   
In w1, α, β, and γ1 are paradoxical.  An argument similar to the one used to show that λ is 
paradoxical is sufficient to demonstrate this fact.8   
For my purposes, I do not need to provide a rigorous definition of ‘paradoxical’.  Or, 
better, any of the rigorous definitions of paradoxicality in the literature would serve my 
purposes.9  Roughly, a sentence token is paradoxical if and only if from the assumptions that 〈〈p〉 
is true〉 and 〈p〉 are intersubstitutable in extensional contexts, that ‘___ is true’ is an extensional 
context, and that the sentence token is either true or false, we can derive that the sentence token 
is both true and false using the inference rules of classical logic.   
World w2 is exactly like w1 in every detail except that in w2, a different sentence token is 
inscribed on the blackboard in room 2.10  In world w2 on that blackboard in room 2 is a token of 
the following sentence type:  
(Γ2) Monkeys like bananas. 
                                                 
8 See footnote 1. 
9 See Chihara (1973) for an account of paradoxicality in terms of the vicious circle principle.  For an account of 
paradoxicality in terms of diagonalization, see Thomson (1962), Richards (1967), Goddard and Johnston (1983), 
Goddard (1984), and Simmons (1990, 1993); see Mackie (1973), Chihara (1973), and Martin (1976) for criticism.  
See Tennant (1982, 1995) for a proof-theoretic characterization of paradoxicality.  See Priest (1994) for an account 
in terms of the qualified Russell schema; see Grattan-Guinness (1998), Priest (1998), N. Smith (2000) for 
discussion.  Most of the approaches to the liar paradox include accounts of paradoxicality as well.  See Kripke 
(1975) for a fixed-point characterization, Yablo (1985) for a stage-theoretic characterization, Gupta and Belnap 
(1993) for a revision-theoretic characterization, and McDonald (2000) for a variational characterization.  See also 
McGee (1991), Simmons (1993), and Field (2003b). 
10 Of course, that cannot be the only difference, but I am ignoring backtracking issues; see Lewis (1979b: 32-35). 
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 Let ‘γ2’ be the name of the sentence token on the blackboard in room 2 in world w2.  In world w2, 
α, β and γ2 are not paradoxical.  If we assume that monkeys do indeed like bananas and that γ2 is 
truth-apt, then α, β, and γ2 are all true in w2.   
The example shows that paradoxicality does not supervene on the syntactic and semantic 
features of a sentence token.  In w1 and w2, Stu and Gil are molecule for molecule identical, they 
have the same histories, and they have the same mental states.  Thus, the syntactic and semantic 
features of α that depend on who produced α are the same in w1 and w2.  Indeed, in w1 and w2, α 
has all the same syntactic and semantic features.  In each world, it belongs to the same language, 
it is a closed, well-formed, declarative sentence, it has the same grammatical structure, and it has 
the same subsentential parts.  In w1 and w2, α has the same sentential meaning, its subsentential 
parts have the same subsentential meanings, its predicates have the same extensions, and its 
singular terms have the same referents.  Yet in w1, α is paradoxical, and in w2, α is not 
paradoxical. 
Before leaving this example, I want to address several potential objections.  First, there 
are views according to which α has different sentential meanings in w1 and w2.  For example, 
according to one version of the Tarskian approach to the liar paradox, the truth predicate in α in 
w1 is different from the truth predicate in α in w2.  The Tarskian approach to the liar paradox 
appeals to a hierarchy of truth predicates, ‘true0’, ‘true1’, etc.  The “lowest” truth predicate, 
‘true0’, applies only to sentences that do not contain truth predicates.  ‘True1’ applies only to 
sentences that contain ‘true0’ but no other truth predicates, ‘true2’ applies only to sentences that 
contain ‘true1’ or ‘true0’, but no other truth predicates, etc.  There are several ways of using the 
Tarskian hierarchy to explain a natural language truth predicate.  One can stipulate that a natural 
language truth predicate is ambiguous and that it can take on the meaning of any one of the truth 
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 predicates in the hierarchy.11  An advocate of this view might say that the meaning of the natural 
language truth predicate is determined not by the intentions of the speaker, but by the target of 
the attribution.  If no predicate of the Tarskian hierarchy is appropriate for the target of the 
attribution, then ‘true’ in the sentence in question is meaningless.  On this theory of truth, ‘true’ 
in α in w1 is synonymous with ‘true1’, while ‘true’ in α in w2 is meaningless.  Thus, according to 
this view, α has different semantic features in the two worlds.   
Contextual theories of truth have this consequence as well.12  These views hold that 
natural language truth predicates are context dependent.  The contextual approaches stipulate that 
the extension of a natural language truth predicate changes from context to context in such a way 
that sentences that would be paradoxical are excluded from the extension.  Theories of context 
dependent expressions commonly distinguish between an expression’s meaning, which is 
constant, and its content, which varies.  On the contextual theory, although the occurrence of 
‘true’ has the same meaning in w1 and w2, it has different content and a different extension in the 
two worlds.  Depending on the particular theory, sentences that seem paradoxical are either false 
in the context or gappy in the context.   
In my view, there are serious problems with both the claim that natural language truth 
predicates are ambiguous and the claim that they are context dependent.  I discuss the former 
                                                 
11 Toms (1956), Wormell (1958), Huggett (1958), Whiteley (1958), Herzberger (1966), and Williamson (2000a) for 
advocates of this view.  Kripke attributes it to Parsons (1974) as well in Kripke (1975: 695 n. 10).  Kripke criticizes 
this approach to natural language truth predicates in Kripke (1975) and I develop that criticism in Appendix A.   
12 Parsons (1974, 1983, 1984), Thomason (1976), Burge (1979a, 1982a, 1982b), Gaifman (1982, 1992, 2000), 
Hodges (1986), Barwise and Etchemendy (1987), Koons (1992, 2000b), Simmons (1993, 2000, 2003), Cantini 
(1995), and Glanzberg (2001, 2004).  For criticism of Burge, see Gupta (1982) and Simmons (1993); for criticism of 
Gaifman see Simmons (1993) and Yi (1999); for criticism of Barwise and Etchemendy, see Gupta (1989), Grim 
(1991), McGee (1991), Gaifman (1992), and Priest (1993); for criticism of Simmons, see Antonelli (1996), Hardy 
(1997), and Beall (2003).  For discussion of revenge liars for contextual theories see Hazen (1987), Hinckfuss 
(1991), Juhl (1997), Clark (1999), Weir (2000, 2001), and Weir (2002). 
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 elsewhere13 and the latter below.  For now, I assume that truth predicates are univocal and 
invariant.     
Another potential objection is that α in w1 and α in w2 are tokens of different types.14  I 
do not want to enter in the debate about what makes a given object a token of a certain type.  I 
assume that in ordinary situations a competent human who comprehends a language L can 
determine whether a given object is a sentence token of L and can determine whether any two 
sentence tokens of L are tokens of the same sentence type.  That rules out views that treat α in w1 
and α in w2 as tokens of different types. 
 
B.4  PARADOXICALITY 
 
Although a survey of all the approaches to the liar paradox that have been suggested in the last 
century is beyond the scope of this paper, I can briefly describe the major views on the status of 
paradoxical sentences.  One view is that paradoxical sentences are not syntactically well-
formed.15  No one has defended this account in print in decades.  The most likely reason for this 
dearth of proponents is that paradoxical sentences seem to be well-formed and the commonly 
accepted rules of grammar imply that they are well-formed.  If that is not enough, the example in 
section two shows that if paradoxical sentences are not well-formed, then whether a sentence is 
well-formed can depend on unrelated empirical facts (in the example, whether α is well-formed 
would depend on which sentence token is written on the blackboard in room 2).  I assume that if 
a competent person comprehends a language, then that person can determine whether a given 
                                                 
13 See Appendix A. 
14 On the distinction between types and tokens, see Kaplan (1973), Szabó (1999), and Truncellito (1999).  See 
Kaplan (1990) for criticism.   
15 Jørgensen (1953).  See Kattsoff (1955) for criticism. 
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 syntactic string is a well-formed sentence of that language solely on the basis of local inspection 
(i.e., by looking at it, listening to it, touching it, tasting it, etc.) and linguistic investigation (i.e., 
consulting a dictionary, a thesaurus, a grammar book, etc.).  Thus, whether a sentence is well-
formed cannot depend on arbitrary empirical facts. 
A similar view is that paradoxical sentences are meaningless.16  This approach was 
popular in the first half of the twentieth century; it has since fallen out of favor and has been 
recently endorsed only by a handful of deflationists who claim that all ungrounded sentences are 
meaningless because of the way truth predicates function.17  There are several ways to define 
‘grounded’, but the most intuitive is the following.  One begins with sentences that do not 
contain ‘true’; these are level 0 sentences.  One then constructs all the possible sentences that 
attribute truth to level 0 sentences; these are level 1 sentences.  One then constructs all the 
possible sentences that attribute truth to level 1 sentences; these are level 2.  And so on.  If a 
sentence is assigned a level in this way, then it is grounded.  Otherwise, it is ungrounded.  Note 
that all paradoxical sentences are ungrounded, but some ungrounded sentences are not 
paradoxical (e.g., ‘no sentence is both true and false’).18
One problem with the claim that all paradoxical sentences are meaningless is that 
paradoxical sentences seem to be meaningful (i.e., one can have the impression that one 
understands them) and they seem to have the properties that meaningful sentences have (e.g., 
they seem to participate in inferences, it seems that one can use them to express beliefs, etc.).  
Moreover, the example in section two shows that if paradoxical sentences are meaningless, then 
whether a sentence is meaningful can depend on unrelated empirical facts (in the example in 
section two, whether α is meaningful would depend on which sentence token is written on the 
                                                 
16 Skinner (1959), Ross (1969); for criticism see Popper (1954), Rozeboom (1957), and Skyrms (1970). 
17 See Grover (1976, 1977), Brandom (1994: ch. 5); see also Beall (2001), and Armour-Garb (2001) for discussion. 
18 See Herzberger (1970), Kripke (1975), Yablo (1982), and McCarthy (1988) for more on grounding. 
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 blackboard in room 2).  I assume that if a person comprehends a language, then that person can 
determine whether a given well-formed sentence of that language is meaningful on the basis of 
local inspection and linguistic investigation alone.  Thus, whether a sentence is meaningful does 
not depend on arbitrary empirical facts.19   
Some hold that paradoxical sentences are false.  For example, one version of the Tarskian 
approach holds that paradoxical sentence tokens attribute truth or falsity using a truth predicate 
of level n to a sentence of level n.  Any sentence that has that feature is false.20  Another view is 
that every proposition entails the conjunction of it and the proposition that it is true.  According 
to this view, the propositions expressed by paradoxical sentences are simply contradictions.21  
Thus, paradoxical sentences are false. 
The most popular and influential view is that paradoxical sentences are truth-value 
gaps.22  That is, paradoxical sentences are in neither the extension nor the anti-extension of 
‘true’.  There are many different theories that have this consequence and equally many 
philosophical justifications for treating paradoxical sentences as truth-value gaps.  There are also 
several different views on what truth-value gaps are.  Some take them to be simply the lack of a 
truth-value.  Others take them to be a different kind of truth-value.  I take no position on these 
issues.23, 24
                                                 
19 Therefore, the deflationist theories of truth that imply that ungrounded sentences are meaningless are 
unacceptable. 
20 Tarski (1933); see Church (1976), Halbach (1995), Soames (1999), and Glanzberg (2005) for discussion.  For 
criticism see Kripke (1975), Simmons (1993), and Appendix A.   
21 Ushenko (1937), Michael (1975), and Mills (1998).  I am not aware of any commentary on these approaches. 
22 See Ryle (1951), Fitch (1964), Martin (1967), van Fraassen (1968), Skyrms (1970), Kripke (1975), Feferman 
(1982), Reinhardt (1986), McGee (1991), Soames (1999), McDonald (2000), Blamey (2002), Field (2003a, 2003b), 
and Maudlin (2004).  For criticism see Simmons (1993), Gupta and Belnap (1993), and Glanzberg (2003). 
23 See Kijania-Placek (2002) and Blamey (2002). 
24 In the following passage, Kripke argues that the riskiness thesis implies that the gap approach to the liar paradox 
is the only acceptable one: “The orthodox assignment of intrinsic levels guarantees freedom from “riskiness” in the 
sense explained in sec. I above.  For (4) and (5) below, the very assignment of intrinsic levels which would eliminate 
their riskiness would also prevent them from “seeking their own levels” (see pp. 695-697).  If we wish to allow 
sentences to seek their own levels apparently we must also allow risky sentences.  Then we must regard sentences as 
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 A radical view is that paradoxical sentences are both true and false.  The approach with 
this consequence is called dialetheism.25  Because most philosophers agree that it is constitutive 
of the concepts of truth and falsity that a sentence token cannot be simultaneously both true and 
false, most philosophers reject dialetheism.  However, when rejecting dialetheism, one must be 
careful to avoid saying that dialetheism is false.  It turns out that the most natural version of 
dialetheism implies that the sentences that constitute dialetheism are both true and false.  Thus, 
informing a dialethist that his theory is false is not a way of rejecting his theory (according to the 
dialetheist).  Not only can one be a dialetheist and accept that dialetheism is false, a dialetheist 
must accept that it is false.  Indeed, the fact that dialetheism is false is the one thing that 
everyone (dialetheists and non-dialetheists alike) can agree on.  I follow the vast majority of 
philosophers in rejecting dialetheism.26   
One final take on the status of paradoxical sentences I mention comes from the revision 
theory of truth, according to which truth is a circular concept.  The details of this subtle and 
ingenious theory are not relevant to my argument here.  It is sufficient to say that, according to 
                                                                                                                                                             
attempting to express propositions, and allow truth-value gaps,”  (Kripke 1975: 695 n. 10).  I find this argument 
intriguing, and I am unaware of any attempt to formulate it rigorously, but I do not attempt to do so here. 
25 See Priest (1979, 1987, 1998), and Armour-Garb and Beall (2001).  For criticism see Parsons (1990), Everet 
(1996), Bromond (2002), Shapiro (2002), and Field (forthcoming a).  Dialetheism is sometimes characterized by its 
adherents as the view that some contradictions are true.  This characterization seems unfortunate to me.  One should 
distinguish the doctrine that implies some instances of the negation of the principle of non-contradiction from the 
doctrine that some sentences are both true and false.  One can accept one of these doctrines and reject the other.  The 
distinction is similar to the distinction between the rejection of the principle of excluded middle and the rejection of 
bivalence.  Strictly speaking, dialethists do not claim that some truth  bearers are both true and false.  Rather, they 
advocate three-valued logics whose third value is designated (and so interpreted as both truth and falsity).   
26 My views on justifying the rejection of dialetheism are similar to David Lewis’s, which he summarizes in the 
following passage: 
The reason we should reject [dialetheism] is simple.  No truth does have, and no truth could have, a true 
negation.  Nothing is, and nothing could be, literally both true and false.  This we know for certain, and 
apriori, and without any exception for especially perplexing subject matters. …  That may seem dogmatic.  
And it is: I am affirming the very thesis that Routley and Priest have called into question and – contrary to 
the rules of debate – I decline to defend it.  Further, I concede that it is indefensible against their challenge.  
They have called so much into question that I have no foothold on undisputed ground.  So much the worse 
for the demand that philosophers always must be ready to defend their theses under the rules of debate, 
(Lewis 1982: 101).   
That is, a non-dialetheist is entitled to ignore dialetheism. 
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 the revision theory of truth, it is inappropriate to assert that paradoxical sentences are true and 
inappropriate to assert that they are false, but that does not imply that paradoxical sentences are 
truth-value gaps.  According to the revision theorist, truth and falsity are not up to the task of 
characterizing paradoxical sentences.  Instead, one can say that paradoxical sentences are not 
categorically true and not categorically false.  Most important for my purposes is that it is not the 
case that the revision theory implies that paradoxical sentences are true.27
That covers the major views on the status of paradoxical sentences.  No approach to the 
liar paradox implies that paradoxical sentences are true.  That claim is important enough that you 
should read it again, this time in italics: no approach to the liar paradox implies that paradoxical 
sentences are true.  As I have said, some contextualist theories imply that paradoxical sentences 
are true in some contexts and false or gappy in others, but that is quite different than claiming 
that paradoxical sentences are true.  I am setting these approaches aside for the moment.  
Dialetheism implies that paradoxical sentences are both true and false, but, again, that is different 
from claiming that they are true (and not false).  I am not considering dialetheism in this paper.   
 
B.5  ASSERTION 
 
In this section, I use the riskiness thesis to criticize the view that utterances of paradoxical 
sentences do not count as assertions.  This view is espoused explicitly by some who use it as an 
approach to the liar paradox.28  It also follows from several prominent views on assertion and the 
liar paradox.  For example, Glanzberg argues that utterances of sentences that are truth-value 
                                                 
27 See Gupta (1982, 1997, 2002), Herzberger (1982a, 1982b), Gupta and Belnap (1993), Yaqūb (1993), and Chapuis 
(1996).  For criticism see Hart (1989), Simmons (1993), Koons (1994), McGee (1997), Martin (1997), and Cook 
(2002). 
28 See Prior (1958, 1961), Richards (1967), Martinich (1983), and Goldstein (1991, 1992, 1999, 2001) for examples 
of this approach.   
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 gaps do not count as assertions.29  When coupled with the most prominent approach to the liar 
paradox (the truth-value gap approach), it follows that utterances of paradoxical sentences are 
not assertions.  In addition, some philosophers explain assertion as a propositional attitude.30  
When this view is combined with the claim that paradoxical sentences do not express 
propositions, it follows that utterances of paradoxical sentences are not assertions.31  Thus, the 
claim that paradoxical sentences cannot be asserted follows from some pretty common views.  I 
argue that it is incompatible with the riskiness thesis.  
I have two objections.  First, we do not treat utterances of paradoxical sentences as if they 
are not assertions.  Evidence for this claim comes from our practice of warrantedly asserting 
assertion attributions to blindly uttered truth attributions.  That is, we assert that a particular 
utterance of a truth attribution (i.e., a sentence of the form: 〈p〉 is true) is an assertion even if we 
do not know what the target of that truth attribution is and we know that the person who uttered 
it does not know what the target is either.  For example, on Tuesday at noon, Bob blindly utters a 
truth attribution, ‘the sentence Merle uttered yesterday at noon is true’.  Bob does not know 
which sentence Merle uttered yesterday at noon, but Bob has been informed by someone he 
trusts that the sentence is true.  If the sentence in question is ‘the sentence Bob will utter 
tomorrow at noon is false’, then both sentences are paradoxical.  On the view in question, if that 
is indeed the sentence Merle uttered on Monday at noon, then neither Merle’s utterance nor 
Bob’s utterance counts as an assertion.  Assume that Cecil is in Bob’s presence at noon on 
Tuesday and hears his utterance.  Cecil utters ‘Bob’s utterance is an assertion’.  Cecil does not 
know the identity of Merle’s utterance either, but he is justified in attributing assertionhood to 
Bob’s utterance.  This is an established practice.  We simply do not treat paradoxical utterances 
                                                 
29 Glanzberg (2003); see also Stalnaker (1978). 
30 Stalnaker (1970, 1974, 1978, 1998) and Soames (2002). 
31 See Kripke (1975) for the claim that paradoxical sentences do not express propositions. 
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 as if they fail to be assertions.  Thus, the claim that utterances of paradoxical sentences are not 
assertions is best interpreted as a revisionary suggestion, not as a descriptive claim.  That is, it is 
a claim about how we should conduct our linguistic practice, not a claim about how we actually 
behave. 
Given that the claim in question fails as a descriptive theory, we should ask: should we 
use ‘assertion’ in the way it suggests?  I argue that we should not.  The problem, in essence, is 
that if utterances of paradoxical sentences failed to be assertions, then whether an utterance of a 
sentence that contains ‘true’ counts as an assertion could depend on any arbitrary fact.  This is at 
best a counterintuitive result, and at worst an unacceptable one.  I claim that it is unacceptable 
because it implies that humans in everyday discourse situations cannot in general determine 
whether an utterance of a sentence containing a truth predicate is an assertion.  The view that 
humans cannot in general determine the pragmatic force of utterances of sentences in which a 
certain linguistic expression occurs is unacceptable.  I cannot adequately defend such a big claim 
in such a small space, but I do want to provide the sketch of an argument for it.  
Here is the argument (which I call the availability argument): 
(1A)  Paradoxicality (i.e., whether a sentence token on an occasion of use is paradoxical) 
need not be available to the participants in a conversation. 
 
(2A)  Assertionhood (i.e., whether an utterance of a sentence token is an assertion) is 
available to participants in a conversation. 
 
  ∴ (3A) Assertionhood does not depend on paradoxicality (i.e., whether an utterance of a 
sentence token is an assertion does not depend on whether that sentence token is 
paradoxical). 
 
Defending the first two premises requires an account of what is available to participants in a 
conversation.  I use Stalnaker’s theory of conversational context for this purpose (I have no 
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 attachment to Stalnaker’s theory other than that it should be familiar to many readers; I assume 
that other accounts would work just as well).   
On Stalnaker’s view, at each stage in a conversation, the participants have certain 
presuppositions, which are treated as propositional attitudes, not as semantic relations.  Both the 
participant’s presuppositions and the propositions presupposed are modeled on sets of possible 
worlds.  A proposition is modeled on the set of possible worlds in which it is true.  
Presuppositions are modeled on a set of possible worlds in which the proposition presupposed is 
true.  The intersection of the sets of possible worlds associated with a participant’s 
presuppositions is called the context set.  In nondefective conversations, the context sets of the 
participants are identical.  Thus, in such conversations, the context of the conversation is just the 
context set of each participant.  In defective conversations, the context is not well-defined.  An 
assertion reduces the context set by eliminating the possible worlds in which the proposition 
asserted is false.  The context is available to the participants of the conversation in the sense that 
they know what their presuppositions are and so they know what their context sets are.  So long 
as the conversation is nondefective, they know what the context is.32   
Premise (1A) is that paradoxicality need not be available to the participants of a 
conversation.  This claim should be obvious from the example in section two.  In the 
conversation between Stu and Gil, the context is the same in world w1 and world w2.  However, 
α is paradoxical in w1 and not paradoxical in w2.  Thus, paradoxicality need not be determined 
by the conversational context.   
Defending premise (2A) is more complicated.  To begin, I want to consider how the force 
of an utterance affects a conversation.  The main effect is that it allows us to keep track of each 
                                                 
32 See Stalnaker (1970, 1974, 1978, 1998, 1999: introduction).  Note that one can accept Stalnaker’s account of 
conversational context without accepting his views on the rules governing the way contexts change. 
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 others’ beliefs and exchange information smoothly.  It registers the type of move that is being 
made in the conversation.  When a participant utters a sentence, the force of her utterance 
informs the other members of the conversation what to expect and how to behave.  In David 
Lewis’s terms, force allows us to keep score properly in a conversation.33   
On Lewis’s account of conversational scorekeeping, each stage of a conversation is 
associated with a score.  The score is a set of abstract entities (he cites presupposed propositions 
and boundaries between permissible and impermissible courses of action as examples).  The 
score determines both which utterances are acceptable and the contextually determined features 
of the sentences uttered (e.g., disambiguation, the antecedents of pronouns, the contents of 
context dependent expressions, the scopes of quantifiers, etc.).  The way the score changes from 
one stage to the next is rule-governed.  Lewis’s example of a rule that specifies the kinematics of 
score is: if at time t the conversational score is s, and if between time t and time t′, the course of 
conversation is c, then at time t′ the score is s′, where s′ is determined in a certain way by s and 
c.34  That is, the conversational actions of the participants and the events that occur in their local 
environment affect the conversational score.   
There are several ways to treat the relation between the participants and the rules that 
specify the kinematics of score.  First, the rules might be constitutive in the sense that they define 
what counts as an acceptable move in the conversation in terms of the behavior of the participant 
and the score.  Second, the score might be operationally defined in the sense that the score is 
whatever a given scoreboard says it is.  Here, the assumption is that the scoreboard is some batch 
of mental representations.  Third, one might define the scoreboard as whatever best fills the role 
specified by the rules governing the kinematics of score and define the score as whatever the 
                                                 
33 Lewis (1979a).  See Brandom (1994), Lance (1998, 2001), DeRose (2004), and Feldman (2004) for discussion. 
34 Lewis (1979a: 238). 
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 scoreboard says it is (Lewis tentatively accepts this third option).35  It will not matter for my 
purposes which way the score is defined. 
When a participant in a conversation utters a sentence, that utterance affects the 
conversational score.  The utterance is an attempt at a move in the conversation.  Thus, the 
utterance (qua physical behavior) affects the score in two ways.  First, it is an event that occurs in 
the vicinity of the conversation and is noticed by the participants in the conversation and 
assumed by the participants in the conversation to be noticed by all the others.  Second, it is an 
attempt at a move in the conversation.  That is, it is recorded as an attempt to affect the score 
with the content of the sentence uttered.  Of course, it is intended to have more than these two 
effects on the conversational score—it is intended to be a legitimate move in the conversation.  If 
the utterance counts as a legitimate move in the conversation, then the effect it has on the score is 
a product of the force of the utterance and the content of the sentence uttered.  Obviously, the 
force of the utterance is not determined by the syntactic or semantic features of the sentence 
uttered (e.g., one can use a declarative sentence to ask a question).36   
If the participants in the conversation cannot determine the force of a particular utterance, 
then they cannot decide how that utterance alters the conversational score.  If they cannot decide 
how that utterance alters the conversational score, then they cannot alter their own beliefs and 
expectations about which moves are acceptable.  Thus, they cannot determine which future 
moves are legitimate.  In short, if the members of a conversation cannot determine the forces of 
the utterances made, then they cannot continue with the conversation.   
Consider some examples.  Assume that Clancy and Sara are having a conversation.  
Clancy utters ‘everything Ralph uttered in lecture yesterday is true’.  Assume that Clancy does 
                                                 
35 Lewis (1979a: 239-240). 
36 See Davidson (1982) where he argues that if we introduced syntactic or semantic markers for force, then they 
would be used in most films, plays, and novels as well. 
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 not know which sentences Ralph uttered yesterday in the lecture, but he has good reason to 
believe that they are true.  Thus, Clancy does not know whether the sentence he uttered is 
paradoxical.  Assume that Sara does not know which force Clancy’s utterance has.  She asks: 
was that an assertion?  Clancy is expected to treat this question as relevant and provide an 
answer to it.  If paradoxical sentences cannot be asserted, then Clancy should respond by saying, 
“I don’t know.”  The fact that this sort of thing does not happen and would be unacceptable 
should cast doubt on the doctrine in question.   
Nevertheless, let us press on.  How should Sara respond to Clancy’s admission?  Should 
she attribute a belief to Clancy?  Should she expect him to assent to this claim if queried?  
Should she expect him to act in a way that is consistent with a belief that everything Ralph 
uttered at yesterday’s lecture is true?  Is it acceptable for Clancy to appeal to this claim in order 
to justify another claim later in the conversation?  Can Sara challenge Clancy’s claim?  What 
sorts of justifications are required to challenge such an utterance?  Should Sara adopt the belief 
that everything Ralph uttered in yesterday’s lecture is true?  Is it acceptable for her to defer to 
Clancy if she asserts this claim in another conversation and is challenged to justify it?  Is Clancy 
at fault if it turns out that his utterance is not an assertion?  It is unclear how to answer these 
questions because we do not have a force that is appropriate for utterances that are intended to be 
assertions but fail.     
This example illustrates a further point about conversational score.  It is unacceptable in a 
conversation to perform an utterance without believing that it has a certain force.  If asked about 
the force of one’s utterance, one must always be able to specify a force.  Does that mean one can 
never be mistaken about the force of one’s utterance?  I do not know; but that is not the point 
here.  When attempting to make a move in a conversation, one must intend it to have a certain 
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 force and have good reasons for believing that it has that force; otherwise the move is 
unacceptable.  It is always appropriate for one participant to ask another about the force of an 
utterance and to expect a definitive answer.   
Of course, introducing a force for attempted assertions of sentences that turn out to be 
paradoxical would not help matters at all.  The participants of a conversation would not know 
whether a given utterance is an assertion or whether it has the other type of force.  Thus, they 
would not know how to adjust the score of the conversation appropriately.   
Advocates of the claim that utterances of paradoxical sentences are not assertions are 
fond of citing semantic externalism to support their claims.37  In particular, the view that there 
are singular propositions (i.e., propositions some of whose constituents are physical objects) and 
that some propositional attitudes are relations between people and such propositions implies that 
if a person mistakenly believes that an object exists, then that person might believe that he has a 
belief about that object when in fact there is no proposition for him to believe.  Thus, what seems 
to him to be a belief is not a belief at all.38  The analogy to the view of assertion I have been 
discussing is that if one mistakenly believes that a sentence is non-paradoxical, then that person 
might believe that he has asserted it, when in fact his utterance does not count as an assertion.  
This analogy is especially tight for those who treat speech acts on the model of propositional 
attitudes (i.e., John’s assertion that p is a relation between John and the proposition that p).  If 
paradoxical sentences do not express propositions, then there is no proposition for John to assert. 
There are several problems with an appeal to this version of semantic externalism to 
justify the claim that utterances of paradoxical sentences are not assertions.  First, appealing to 
this version of semantic externalism is not a good way to garner support for one’s view given 
                                                 
37 See Goldstein (2001).  Glanzberg draws a similar analogy to support his claim that utterances of sentences that are 
truth-value gaps are not assertions; see Glanzberg (2003). 
38 See McDowell (1977, 1984) and Evans (1982). 
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 that this version of semantic externalism is rather controversial.  Second, there are good reasons 
(or at least plausible reasons) for thinking that there are singular propositions and that if the 
object in question does not exist, then the purported belief is not a genuine belief.  There is no 
analogous argument for the claim that utterances of paradoxical sentences do not count as 
assertions.  Thus, there is no good reason to think that an utterance of a paradoxical sentence is 
not an assertion other than that it seems to some to help deal with the liar paradox.   
A defender of the claim that paradoxical sentences cannot be asserted might object that 
the same reasoning that leads one to claim that one cannot have certain beliefs about an object if 
that object does not exist supports the claim that utterances of truth attributions that turn out to be 
paradoxical are not assertions.  All paradoxical sentences attribute some semantic property (e.g., 
truth, falsity, gaphood, etc.) to some object or objects.  That is not quite right; rather, paradoxical 
sentences purport to attribute some semantic property.  In particular, they purport to attribute 
some semantic property to a proposition or propositions.  Usually, the purported target of the 
attribution is what is taken to be the proposition expressed by the very sentence itself.  Consider 
λ (the liar sentence token).  λ purports to attribute falsity to itself or rather, to the proposition it 
supposedly expresses.  However, paradoxical sentences do not express propositions.  Thus, the 
target of the attribution does not exist.  Thus, an utterance of λ would not count as an assertion 
for the same reason that a purported belief about an object that does not exist does not count as a 
belief—in both cases, the target does not exist.   
This reply to my objection depends on the claim that paradoxical sentences do not 
express propositions.  In the next section, I show that this view is unacceptable as well, and for 
essentially the same reasons.   
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B.6  PROPOSITIONS   
 
One of the perennial issues in the literature on truth is the choice of truth bearers.  Sentence 
tokens, sentence types, propositions, statements, beliefs, utterances, assertions, and 
computational roles have all been suggested as truth bearers.  No one disputes the fact that it is 
common to attribute truth to all these things, and no one thinks that these are unrelated properties 
that coincidentally have the same name.  They are intimately connected.  The most common way 
of explaining their connection is to provide an account of truth for primary truth bearers and 
extend the account to other types of truth bearers.  There seem to be two ways to go on this issue.  
One is to say that there is only one type of truth bearer, and any time someone attributes truth to 
a different type of entity, that is just shorthand for a truth attribution to a real truth bearer.  For 
example, if one accepts that propositions are the primary truth bearers, then one treats an 
attribution of truth to a sentence token as an attribution of truth to the proposition expressed by 
that sentence token.  The other strategy is to designate one type of entity as primary truth bearer, 
give an account of truth for them, and then extend it to other types of entities by their relations to 
the primary truth bearers.  For example, if propositions are the primary truth bearers and one has 
an account of truth for propositions, then one can provide an account of truth for sentence tokens 
by saying that a sentence token is true if and only if it expresses a true proposition.  
Combinations are also possible; e.g., propositions are primary truth bearers and a sentence token 
is true if it expresses a true proposition, but attributing truth to a sentence type is just shorthand 
for saying that a token of that type is true (because sentences types are not truth bearers).     
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 Propositions are one of the most popular candidates for truth bearers.39  There are several 
contemporary theories of propositions, but they fall into two broad categories.  The first is that 
propositions should be explained in terms of possible worlds.  The standard account of this sort 
is that a proposition is a function from a set of possible worlds to a set of truth-values.  The 
second is that propositions are structured entities.  That is, a proposition has constituents that are 
usually taken to be the semantic values of the linguistic expressions occurring in a sentence that 
expresses that proposition.40  It does not matter for my purposes which account of propositions 
one takes to be the correct one.  I do want to point out that propositions are intended to serve 
several purposes in philosophical theories.  First, they are intended to be the primary bearers of 
truth and falsity.  That role is my focus in this section.  Second, they are supposed to serve as the 
objects of propositional attitudes (e.g., belief, desire, intention).  That is, when someone has the 
belief that p, there is a relation between that person and the proposition that p.  Third, it is 
assumed by defenders of propositions that they are the contents of sentence tokens on occasions 
of use.  That is, when a person utters the sentence token q in a conversational context, q 
expresses a particular proposition (or multiple propositions).  The proposition expressed by a 
sentence token in the context in which it is uttered encapsulates the truth conditions conveyed by 
the sentence token in that context.  Finally, propositions are sometimes used as the bearers of 
epistemological and modal properties (i.e., knowledge, justification, necessity, possibility, etc.). 
I argue that the riskiness thesis implies that propositions are a poor choice for primary 
truth bearers.  Here is the problem.  Either paradoxical sentences express propositions or they do 
not.  If paradoxical sentences do not express propositions, then whether a sentence token uttered 
in a conversation expresses a proposition is not available to the participants of that conversation 
                                                 
39 See Barwise and Etchemendy (1987), Horwich (1998), Soames (1999), Glanzberg (2001, 2003, 2004), and Künne 
(2003) for examples. 
40 See Stalnaker (1987) for an example of the former and King (1995) and Soames (2002) for examples of the latter. 
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 (because of the riskiness thesis).  I use a version of the availability argument to show that this 
result is unacceptable.  If paradoxical sentences do express propositions, then one can prove that 
certain sentence tokens both express and fail to express propositions.  That is, one can generate a 
new paradox. 
To see that the claim that paradoxical sentences do not express propositions is 
unacceptable, consider another version of the availability argument: 
(1P)  Paradoxicality need not be available to the participants in a conversation. 
 
(2P)  Propositional expression (i.e., whether a sentence token uttered expresses a 
proposition) is available to participants in a conversation. 
 
  ∴ (3P)  Propositional expression does not depend on paradoxicality (i.e., whether a sentence 
token uttered expresses a proposition does not depend on whether the sentence 
token is paradoxical in context of utterance). 
 
I argued for (1P) in the previous section (under the name ‘(1A)’).  The argument for (2P) is 
similar to the argument for (2A).  If the participants of a conversation could not determine 
whether a given sentence uttered expresses a proposition, then they would not be able to keep 
score in a way that would allow the conversation to continue.  Both the force of an utterance and 
the proposition expressed by the sentence token uttered must be available to the participants in a 
conversation for their interactions to constitute a conversation. 
There is good reason to claim that paradoxical sentences do express propositions.  
However, the claim that paradoxical sentences express propositions encounters troubles of its 
own.  The following is an argument that is well known to those who work on the liar paradox, 
but the particular formulation of it I present is due to Glanzberg.41 If we symbolize propositional 
expression by E(x, y) (i.e., sentence token x expresses proposition y), and propositional truth in a 
                                                 
41 Glanzberg (2004: 33-34). 
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 possible world by T(x) (i.e., proposition x is true), then we can formulate a propositional liar 
sentence: 
(Π) ~ (∃x) E (π, x) ∧ T(x) 
If ‘π’ is the name of the sentence token of Π, then we can prove a contradiction from the claim 
that π expresses a proposition and several auxiliary claims about propositional expression.  The 
additional claims are: 
(E1) E(〈s〉, p) ⊃ (T(p) ≡ s) (i.e., if a given sentence expresses a proposition then the 
sentence that attributes truth to that proposition is materially equivalent to the 
sentence that expresses that proposition). 
 
(E2) (E(p, q) ∧ E(p, r)) ⊃ q = r (i.e., a sentence token expresses a unique proposition). 
 
(E3) p = q ⊃ (T(p) ≡ T(q)) (i.e., truth is an extensional property of propositions). 
 
From the claim that λ expresses a proposition (i.e., (∃x)(E(λ, x)) and principles (E1) – (E3), we 
can derive a contradiction.42  That is, we can prove that if (E1) – (E3) are true, then λ does not 
express a proposition. 
One might object that although I have shown that some paradoxical sentences cannot 
express propositions, I have not shown that some empirically paradoxical sentences cannot 
express propositions.  I agree.  Fortunately, it is not difficult to construct an empirically 
paradoxical sentence that cannot express a proposition.  Consider a variant of the example in 
section two in which α and β are the propositional variants of the sentences in the old example.  
That is, α is a token of ‘(∃x)(E(β, x) ∧ T(x))’, β is a token of ‘(∃x)(E(γ3, x) ∧ T(x))’ and γ3 is a 
token of the following type: 
                                                 
42 Assume (∃x)E(λ, x).  Let ‘a’ be the name of the proposition λ expresses.  Assume T(a).  Thus, ~ (∃x)(E(λ, x) ∧ 
T(x)) (by (E1)).  Therefore, ~T(a).  Assume ~T(a).  Thus, (∃x)(E(λ, x) ∧ T(x)) (by (E1)).  Therefore, T(a) (by (E2) 
and (E3)).  Consequently, ~ T(a) ≡ T(a).   
 323
 Γ3: Either the proposition expressed by β is false or there are more objects heavier than 
one gram above the ecliptic of the Earth’s solar system than there are objects heavier 
than one gram below the ecliptic at 1200 GMT on January 1, 2004. 
 
(The ecliptic is the plane that contains the closed curve marked out by the Earth’s orbit; ‘above’ 
is defined in the obvious way via the positive orientation of the orbit curve.)  In both worlds (i.e., 
w1 and w2), Stu utters α, β is inscribed on the blackboard in room 1, and γ3 is inscribed on the 
blackboard in room 2.  The only difference between w1 and w2 is the distribution of matter in our 
solar system such that that the second disjunct of γ3 is false in w1 and true in w2.  We can show 
that in w1, α, β, and γ3 are paradoxical, while in w2, α, β, and γ3 are true.  Let ‘δ’ be the name of 
the sentence token that occurs as the second disjunct of γ3.  Assume that is w1, δ is false and in 
w2, δ is true.43  In w1, α is paradoxical, while in w2, α is true.  Here is the argument.  Consider 
w1.  Assume β is true.  If β is true, then γ3 is true.  If γ3 is true, then either δ is true or β is false.  δ 
is false.  Thus, β is false.  Hence, if β is true, then β is false.  Assume β is false.  If β is false, then 
γ3 is false.  If γ3 is false, then δ is false and β is true.  Thus, β is true.  Hence, if β is false, then β 
is true.  Therefore, β is true if and only if β is false.  Consequently, β is paradoxical.  It follows 
that in w1, α, β and γ3 are paradoxical.  However, in w2, γ3 is true (because δ is true), which 
implies that β and α true as well.   
I have shown that both the claim that paradoxical sentence tokens express propositions 
and the claim that paradoxical sentences do not express propositions are unacceptable.  Thus, 
propositions are a poor choice for primary truth bearers.   
 
                                                 
43 Of course, the truth-value of δ will depend on how we define ‘object’, ‘gram’, ‘ecliptic’ and ‘solar system’.  As 
the example is formulated, I am assuming that these terms would be given definitions that do not display 
indeterminacy.  The example can, of course, be modified to accommodate indeterminacy. 
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 B.7  MINIMALIST THEORIES OF TRUTH-APTNESS 
 
Although it might be tempting to think of truth-aptness issues and truth bearer issues as one and 
the same, it seems to me that there is an important distinction here.  The issue of truth-aptness 
arises once one has already made choices about truth bearers.  A truth bearer is truth-apt if it is 
capable of having the property of truth.44  How is this any different from just being a truth 
bearer?  The difference is that one’s choice of truth bearers is a choice between types of objects 
without regard to their semantic or pragmatic features.  The options for truth bearers are not 
distinguished in semantic terms (e.g., fact-stating sentence tokens).  If one chooses sentence 
tokens as truth bearers, then there is still the issue of deciding which sentence tokens are capable 
of possessing truth.  We do not think that sentence tokens used to produce questions or 
commands are true or false.  Some philosophers argue that sentence tokens whose semantic 
presuppositions fail are neither true nor false.45  Others claim that sentence tokens that contain 
occurrences of normative vocabulary are neither true nor false.46  These are truth-aptness issues.  
A single truth bearer can be truth-apt in one context and not truth-apt in another.  For example, 
‘the room is cool’.  If a token of this sentence is used to describe the temperature of the room in 
question then it is truth-apt (on most accounts), but if it is used to express one’s positive 
evaluation of the room, then, on some views, it is not truth-apt.   
Of course, one could combine truth-aptness issues and truth bearer issues into one topic, 
but I think that this would do a disservice to those engaged in debates about them.  Expressivists 
                                                 
44 I have heard some people use the term ‘truth-aptitude’ instead of ‘truth-aptness’.  As I understand the terms, 
‘aptness’ and ‘aptitude’ have very similar meanings, but the latter tends to have the connotation of ability—
something that an animate entity can do—whereas the former seems to apply more readily to inanimate objects.  I 
prefer ‘aptness’ since it seems odd to me to say that truth-apt truth bearers have the ability to be true (i.e., they can 
accomplish truth if they try hard enough). 
45 See Strawson (1952). 
46 See Gibbard (1990) for an example. 
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 who discuss which things are capable of truth are not (usually) worried about choosing between 
propositions and sentence tokens; they are concerned with truth-aptness.  Another way to bring 
out the difference is to say that truth bearer issues are explanatory (i.e., how should we go about 
explaining the truth and falsity of one type of entity in terms of the truth and falsity of another?), 
whereas truth-aptness issues are demarcational (i.e., which entities are in the class of those that 
can be true or false?).  Clearly, these are different issues and deserve to be kept distinct. 
For clarity, I distinguish truth-valuedness from truth-aptness and truth bearerhood.  
Truth-valuedness is the property of being true or false.  On some accounts, a truth-apt truth 
bearer can fail to be truth-valued.  The distinction between truth-aptness and truth-valuedness is 
intended to allow for the view that some truth bearers are truth-apt but, because they are 
paradoxical, they are not truth-valued (i.e., they are gappy).  There are important differences 
between a failure to be truth-apt and a failure to be truth-valued.  One is that if a person attributes 
truth to a sentence token (acceptable truth bearer) that is used to produce a question (not truth-
apt), then that person does not have a full grasp of the concept of truth.  In some sense, he has a 
made a category mistake.  However, if a person attributes truth to a sentence token (acceptable 
truth bearer) that is truth-apt, but paradoxical (not truth-valued on some accounts), then that 
person is probably not at fault for attempting to apply truth to an object that is not true or false.  
Language users are often not at fault for attributing truth or falsity to paradoxical sentences 
because the fact that they are paradoxical is beyond what any responsible language user could be 
expected to know.  Such a person has not made a category mistake and might well have a perfect 
grasp of the concept of truth.  Truth bearerhood and truth-aptness are properties that should be 
available to language users, while truth-valuedness might not be.  We treat the failure to be a 
truth bearer, failure to be truth-apt, and the failure to be truth-valued rather differently.  
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 Distinguishing between attributions of truth to objects that are not truth bearers, attributions of 
truth to truth bearers that are not truth-apt, and attributions of truth to truth-apt truth bearers that 
are not truth-valued is essential to understanding the issues that arise in connection with the liar 
paradox.   
The notion of truth-aptness is a recent addition to discussions of the nature of truth and it 
comes up almost exclusively in connection with the compatibility of deflationism and 
nonfactualism.  Nonfactualism about X is the view that X talk is not representational, that it does 
not purport to describe the world, or that there are no facts about Xs.  Often, nonfactualism about 
X is thought of as the claim that sentences involving X are not truth-apt.  There is an important 
debate about whether deflationism implies that all declarative sentences are truth-apt, which has 
led to a distinction between minimalist and substantive accounts of truth-aptness.47  The two 
minimalist accounts of truth-aptness are syntacticism and disciplined syntacticism. 
Syntacticism is the view that truth-aptness depends only on the syntactic features of a 
truth bearer.  Obviously, syntacticism is compatible only with theories that take truth bearers to 
have syntactic properties.  The most common syntactic property cited by syntacticists is that of 
being a declarative sentence.  The most common criticisms of syntacticism are that there are 
declarative sentences that are not truth-apt and that it takes more than syntactic properties to 
insure that a truth bearer is truth-apt.48
Disciplined syntacticism is the theory that a truth bearer is truth-apt if and only if it has 
the right syntactic features and interacts properly with other common linguistic expressions (i.e., 
it can be embedded in truth functional contexts, ‘S believes that’ can be appended to it, etc.).  
                                                 
47 See Boghossian (1990), Kraut (1993), Dreier (1994), Smith (1994), Divers and Miller (1994), Horwich (1994), 
Smith (1994), Kalderon (1997), Wedgwood (1997), Blackburn (1998), Wright (1998), Holton (2000), Swan (2000), 
Jackson et al. (1994), Smith (1994), Holton (2000), Dodd (2002), and Engel (2002). 
48 Wright (1992); see Jackson et al. (1994) for discussion. 
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 Criticisms similar to those that apply to syntacticism can be wielded against disciplined 
syntacticism as well.  Usually theories that require more for truth-aptness than disciplined 
syntacticism does are called substantive.49
Several deflationists have endorsed substantive accounts of truth-aptness.  There is very 
little common ground here so making generalizations is difficult, but some substantive theories 
of truth-aptness require truth-apt sentences to be capable of expressing beliefs; others demand 
that the presuppositions of the sentences in question are met.50  However, many philosophers 
who discuss deflationism assume that it is incompatible with accounts of truth-aptness that are 
more substantive than disciplined syntacticism.51   
Enough history.  If one accepts either syntacticism or disciplined syntacticism, then α in 
w1 and α in w2 have to have the same truth-status (where a sentence token’s truth status is either 
its truth-value or its lack of truth-value).  However, α in w1 is paradoxical and, hence, not true, 
but α in w2 is true.  Thus, α in w1 and α in w2 have different truth statuses.  Therefore, 
syntacticism and disciplined syntacticism are false.   
If deflationists have to accept either syntacticism or disciplined syntacticism then 
deflationism is sunk by this argument as well.  However, I see no reason to think that 
deflationists are required to accept a minimalist theory of truth-aptness.   
If one wanted to use syntacticism or disciplined syntacticism as a theory of truth-
valuedness instead of as theory of truth-aptness, then we encounter what is essentially the same 
problem again.  Truth-valued sentence tokens are not paradoxical.  However, paradoxicality does 
                                                 
49 Wright (1992). 
50 See Kraut (1993) for an example. 
51 See the debate outlined in fn. 47. 
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 not depend on the syntactic features of a sentence token.  Thus, neither syntacticism nor 
disciplined syntacticism is capable of serving as a theory of truth-valuedness. 
 
B.8  T-SCHEMA DEFLATIONISM 
 
One of the most popular versions of deflationism is T-schema deflationism: a theory of truth-in-L 
for a language L consists of all and only the T-sentences for the sentences of L.52  A T-sentence 
is a sentence of the form: 〈p〉 is true if and only if p.  If the language in question is classical, then 
the connective in the T-sentences is the material biconditional.53  If the language in question is 
non-classical, then there is a range of options.  One can use a weak Kleene or a strong Kleene 
biconditional (both of which are monotonic and value-theoretic), a Łukasiewicz or a Holton 
biconditional (both of which are non-monotonic but value-theoretic), or any one of the many 
non-monotonic intensional biconditionals on the market.54   
One obvious problem for T-schema deflationism is that the set of T-sentences for most 
any language that has minimal expressive capacities is inconsistent (in classical logic) because of 
the liar paradox and its brethren.  The three main responses to this problem are: (i) restrict the set 
of T-sentences that constitute the theory to those for non-paradoxical sentences of the language, 
(ii) weaken the logic and keep all the T-sentences, and (iii) use a different biconditional and keep 
                                                 
52 Truth-in-L is a language-specific concept of truth (an LS concept).  The extension of ‘true-in-L’ is the set of true 
sentences of L (one can either treat it as a partial predicate and claim that its anti-extension is the set of false 
sentences of L, or one can treat it as a completely-defined predicate and claim that its extension and anti-extension 
are jointly exhaustive).  T-schema deflationism is a theory of truth-in-L for a particular language L.  An advocate of 
this theory might claim that natural language truth predicates can be explained in terms of LS truth predicates.  See 
Appendix A for a criticism of explaining natural language truth predicates in terms of LS truth predicates. 
53 Of course, many deflationists consider the T-sentences to be necessary; hence, they treat the connective as strict 
co-implication. 
54 The most promising of these is Field’s biconditional; see Field (2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2004, forthcoming a, 
forthcoming b, forthcoming c).  See also Gupta and Belnap (1993), Beall (2000), and Yablo (2003). 
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 all the T-sentences (combinations of (ii) and (iii) are also promising).  Accordingly, there are two 
types of T-schema deflationism: those that exclude T-sentences for paradoxical sentences from 
the theory (option (i)) and those that include all the T-sentences (options (ii) or (iii)).  I call the 
former exclusive and the latter inclusive.55  The target of my criticism is exclusive T-schema 
deflationism.  For my purposes, it makes no difference which biconditional is used for non-
classical languages by the theories in question, so long as T-sentences for paradoxical sentence 
tokens are excluded from the theory of truth-in-L. 
McGee dealt a blow to exclusive T-schema deflationism (from here on I suppress the 
‘exclusive’) by proving that for any set S of sentences of a language L that is consistent with 
basic facts about the syntax of L, there is a maximally consistent set of T-sentences that is 
consistent with the basic facts about the syntax of L and that entails S.  Thus, a deflationist 
cannot simply say that she wants a maximally consistent set of T-sentences for her theory 
because there are lots of them and they are incompatible with one another.  Moreover, the 
overlap between them contains only truth-tellers (sentences like ‘this sentence is true’ that affirm 
their own truth).  Finally, none of the maximally consistent sets of T-sentences is recursively 
axiomatizable.  Thus, there is no effective way of constructing a maximally consistent set of T-
sentences.56   
McGee’s results on maximally consistent sets of T-sentences certainly close off one 
avenue for a deflationist reply to the semantic paradoxes.  Namely, a deflationist cannot simply 
stipulate that a maximally consistent set of T-sentences provides an implicit definition of ‘true’.  
There are too many of them, they are incompatible, they are not recursively axiomatizable, and 
                                                 
55 See Horwich (1998) for a version of the exclusive type (Horwich formulates his theory in terms of propositions 
but claims that it is just as plausible when formulated for sentence tokens).  See Gupta and Belnap (1993) and the 
Field references in the previous footnote for examples of inclusive theories. 
56 McGee (1992).  See also Weir (1996) and Gauker (2001). 
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 they overlap only on pathological sentences.  Thus, if a deflationist wants to use the T-sentences 
as implicit definitions of ‘true’ and wants a consistent definition, then she should provide some 
way of choosing between them.  The received view is that an approach to the paradoxes that 
characterizes paradoxicality can be use to determine which T-sentences should be included in the 
theory of truth for the language in question (e.g., McGee suggests the revision theory).57
Given the riskiness thesis (i.e., the syntactic and semantic features of a sentence token 
need not determine whether it is paradoxical), T-schema deflationism is a non-starter.  Consider 
the T-schema theory of truth for the idiolect of English (call it L) in the example from section 
two.  Let T1 be the set of T-sentences for sentences of L that are non-paradoxical in w1 and T2 be 
the set of T-sentences for sentences of L that are non-paradoxical in w2.  The T-sentence for α, 
‘‘the sentence written on the blackboard is true-in-L’ is true-in-L if and only if the sentence 
written on the blackboard is true-in-L’, is a member of T2, but it is not a member of T1.  Because 
T-schema deflationists take the set of T-sentences in question to be definitional of the concept of 
truth, the concept of truth-in-L in w1 is different from the concept of truth-in-L in w2.  Call the 
former truth1-in-L and the latter truth2-in-L.  The T-sentence for α is constitutive for truth2-in-L 
but not for truth1-in-L. 
Is this result plausible?  Consider the variant of the example in which γ3 is the sentence 
inscribed on the blackboard in room 2.  In w2, the concept of truth-in-L is truth2-in-L and not 
truth1-in-L because of the particular distribution of matter in our solar system at noon GMT on 
January 1, 2004.  If that distribution had been different, then the concept of truth for L would 
have been different.  That is highly counterintuitive.  That is, the concept of truth-in-L does not 
depend on the distribution of matter in our solar system.   
                                                 
57 McGee (1992). 
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 One possible reply to this objection is that truth predicates are context dependent—their 
extensions change from context to context.  Thus, contrary to the conventional wisdom, 
deflationism is not only compatible with a contextual approach to the paradoxes, one version of 
deflationism implies that truth is context-dependent.58  In the next section, I pose a criticism for 
contextual approaches to the paradoxes.  After that, the consequence of context dependence 
should seem much less palatable.   
 
B.9  CONTEXTUAL APPROACHES TO THE LIAR PARADOX 
 
In section five, I argued that the riskiness thesis implies that it is unacceptable to claim that 
utterances of paradoxical sentence tokens are not assertions.  One objection to my argument 
depends on the claim that paradoxical sentence tokens do not express propositions.  In section 
six, I argued that it is unacceptable to claim that paradoxical sentence tokens do not express 
propositions.  I also argued that the riskiness thesis implies that propositions are a poor choice 
for primary truth bearers.  An objection to my argument depends on the claim that truth displays 
an element of context dependence.  Furthermore, in section eight, I argued that exclusive T-
schema deflationism is unacceptable.  One objection to my claim is that truth displays an element 
of context dependence.  Thus, several of my arguments depend on a rejection of contextual 
theories of truth.  In this section, I present several objections to such theories. 
There are at least a dozen contextual theories of truth, so instead of either describing each 
one in detail or picking one as a representative, I address two main types of them.  Theories of 
the first type imply that ‘true’ is a context dependent expression similar to demonstratives (e.g., 
                                                 
58 See Simmons (1999) for an argument that contextualist theories of truth and deflationist theories of truth are 
incompatible. 
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 ‘that’), indexicals (e.g., ‘here’), and graded adjectives (e.g., ‘tall’).  On a theory of the first type, 
‘true’ has a fixed meaning, but its content on an occurrence of its use depends on the context in 
which it is used.  That is, the contribution an occurrence of ‘true’ makes to the truth conditions of 
a sentence token in which it occurs depends on the context in which that sentence token is 
uttered.  Once the meanings of the subsentential components, the referents of the singular terms, 
and the logical form of the sentence token have been determined, any ambiguities have been 
resolved, and the context-determined contents of any non-semantic terms have been determined, 
there is the additional variability in the semantic content of the sentence token due to the 
presence of the truth predicate.  In particular, the extension of the truth predicate changes from 
context to context.  What would count as a paradoxical sentence token in a given context is 
eliminated from the extension of ‘true’ in that sentence token.  Paradoxical sentence tokens are 
treated as either false or gappy in the contexts in question.59   
The theories of the first type solve the liar paradox by finding a context shift in the 
associated argument.  Consider a token λ of ‘λ is not true’ in a context C.  In context C, neither 
the extension nor the antiextension of ‘true’ contains λ.  Thus, in context C, λ is a gap.  
However, if we assert ‘λ is not true’, then we have changed the context to C′.  In C′, λ is in the 
antiextension of ‘true’; hence, ‘λ is not true’ is true in C′, but the token of the same type (i.e., λ) 
in context C is a gap.       
The second type of contextual theory of truth implies that, while ‘true’ is not a directly 
context dependent expression, sentence tokens in which ‘true’ occurs do display context 
                                                 
59 Thomason (1976), Burge (1979a, 1982a, 1982b), Gaifman (1982, 1992, 2000), Hodges (1986), Barwise and 
Etchemendy (1987), Koons (1992, 2000b), Simmons (1993, 2000, 2003), and Cantini (1995).  For criticism of 
Burge, see Gupta (1982) and Simmons (1993); for criticism of Gaifman see Simmons (1993) and Yi (1999); for 
criticism of Barwise and Etchemendy, see Gupta (1989), Grim (1991), McGee (1991), Gaifman (1992), and Priest 
(1993); for criticism of Simmons, see Antonelli (1996), Hardy (1997), and Beall (2003).  For discussion of revenge 
liars for contextual theories see Hazen (1987), Hinckfuss (1991), Juhl (1997), Clark (1999), Weir (2000, 2001), and 
Weir (2002). 
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 dependence.  One way to think of this context dependence is to treat truth as a predicate of 
propositions and claim that an attribution of truth to a sentence is actually an attribution of truth 
to the proposition expressed by that sentence.  On this view, attributions of truth to sentences 
have a hidden quantifier.  For example, let ‘p’ be the name of a sentence token.  The truth 
attribution ‘p is true’ becomes ‘the proposition expressed by p is true’; on a Russellian 
interpretation of definite descriptions, the latter becomes ‘there is a proposition such that it is 
expressed by p and it is true’.  Quantifiers are known to display context dependence in their 
scope.  That is, the set of objects over which a quantifier ranges is determined, in part, by the 
context in which it is used.  It is this quantificational context dependence that is claimed to be 
present in sentences that contain truth predicates.  The appeal to propositions can be replaced 
with talk of schemes for interpreting sentences, which contain domains and are determined by 
the context.60
Theories of this type solve the liar paradox by claiming that one sentence token does not 
express a proposition at all, but another token of the same type does express a proposition.  For 
example, if λ is a token of ‘λ is not true’, then λ actually says that it is not the case that there 
exists a proposition such that it is expressed by λ and it is true.  Assume that λ is in context C.  In 
context C, the scope of the hidden quantifier in λ is a certain set of propositions.  In C, there is no 
proposition in this set for λ to express.  However, if one asserts ‘λ is not true’ then this action 
changes the context.  In the new context C′, the quantifier ranges over a more inclusive set of 
propositions, one of which is the proposition that it is not the case that there exists a proposition 
such that it is expressed by λ and it is true.   
                                                 
60 Parsons (1974, 1983, 1984) and Glanzberg (2001, 2004).   
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 Most contextual theories of truth (of either type) incorporate some sort of hierarchy in 
order to accommodate changes in context.  For example, Burge’s theory employs a Tarskian 
hierarchy of truth predicates as a supply of contents for ‘true’.  In a given context, ‘true’ has one 
of the contents of a Tarskian truth predicate.  Other examples include Parsons, who employs a 
hierarchy of interpretation schemes, and Glanzberg, who employs a hierarchy of contexts.  
Although Simmons’ theory does not employ a hierarchy of contexts, it does appeal to a hierarchy 
of invariant truth predicates to handle revenge paradoxes. 
I make three points in the remainder of this section: (i) given the riskiness thesis, the 
standard arguments used to support contextualist theories of truth are circular, (ii) the riskiness 
thesis casts doubt on whether contextual theories of truth can respect a Gricean condition on 
theories of context, (iii) the riskiness thesis implies that if we adopted a context dependent truth 
predicate that behaves in the way contextualists claim, then it would be an impediment to 
communication. 
One of the driving forces behind the contextual approach is that it handles cases like: 
λ1: λ1 is not true. 
λ2: λ1 is not true. 
‘λ1’ and ‘λ2’ are to be thought of as names of the particular physical sentence tokens on this page 
of this particular physical document.61  λ1 and λ2 are tokens of the same type.  However, on one 
interpretation, while λ1 is a liar sentence and thus, paradoxical, λ2 is a comment on λ1 to the 
effect that, because it is paradoxical, it is not true.  Thus, on this interpretation, although they are 
                                                 
61 That stipulation makes the tokens ‘λ1’ and ‘λ2’ ambiguous because there are multiple copies of this document.  
This complication does not affect my discussion. 
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 two tokens of the same type, one is true and the other is paradoxical.  This phenomenon is known 
as the two-line puzzle.62   
 A related phenomenon concerns the reasoning that accompanies λ1.  An intuitive 
argument supports the claim that sentence λ1 is true if and only if it is not true.  Thus, sentence λ1 
seems to be paradoxical.  It is natural to think that paradoxical sentences are not true because 
assuming that they are true leads to contradiction.  Thus, one might conclude that because 
sentence λ1 is paradoxical, it is not true (indeed, I have argued this point above).  At this point, 
one might reread sentence λ1 and realize that it says of itself that it is not true.  We have just 
argued that it is not true; thus, sentence λ1 accurately describes its own status—it says that it is 
not true and, indeed, it is not true.  Hence, sentence λ1 must be true (for that is what we say about 
sentences that say that such and such is the case when such and such actually is the case).  I will 
refer to this as the strong liar reasoning.63   
The first point is that because paradoxicality affects the truth status of a sentence token 
and paradoxicality is not determined by the syntactic and semantic features of a sentence token, 
it is inappropriate to argue from the claim that two sentence tokens of the same type differ in 
truth-status to the claim that they must contain a context-dependent expression.  The assumption 
at work in the argument for contextual theories is that if two sentence tokens of the same type 
have different truth-statuses (as is the case with λ1 and λ2), then they must contain a context-
dependent expression.  I call this the context-dependence principle.  The argument in the case at 
hand begins with the assumption that λ1 is paradoxical and λ2 is true.  Thus, they have different 
                                                 
62 See Hazen (1987), Gaifman (1992), Juhl (1997), Clark (1999), Goldstein (1999, 2001), Weir (2000, 2002), and 
Gupta (2001).   
63 See Kearns (1970), Parsons (1974), Burge (1979), Hazen (1987), Gaifman (1992, 2000), Gupta (2001), and 
Glanzberg (2001, 2003, 2004). 
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 truth statuses but are tokens of the same sentence type.  Hence, they contain a context-dependent 
element.   
The problem with this argument is that if paradoxicality is not determined by the 
syntactic and semantic features of a sentence token and paradoxical sentences are not true, then 
the principle used above is false.  As a variant of the example in section two shows, one 
construct two sentence tokens of the same type, one of which is paradoxical and the other of 
which is true, yet both have the same syntactic and semantic features.  In order to appeal to the 
context-dependence principle, the contextualist must reject either the riskiness thesis or the 
assumption that paradoxical sentences are not true.  However, only contextual theories of truth 
reject either of these claims.64  Thus, in appealing to the context-dependence principle to justify a 
contextual theory of truth, a contextualist is appealing to a principle that only a contextualist 
would endorse.  Analogous criticism applies to contextualists who appeal to the strengthened liar 
reasoning to justify the claim that truth predicates are context-dependent.   
My second point is that there is a tension between contextual theories of truth and the 
Gricean intuition that a central goal of linguistic activity is communication.  Stalnaker expresses 
one consequence of this intuition in the following passage: 
It is a substantive claim that the information relevant to determining the content of 
context-dependent speech acts is presumed to be available to the participants of a 
conversation—that it is included in the presuppositions of the context—but it is a 
claim that is motivated by natural assumptions about the kind of action one 
performs in speaking.  It is not unreasonable to suppose that speakers, in 
speaking, are normally aiming to communicate—at least to have the addressees 
understand what is being said.  Succeeding in this aim requires that the 
information relevant to determining content be available to the addressee.  The 
representation of context as a body of presupposed information is also appropriate 
to the other side of the interaction between context and content, since it is 
reasonable to suppose that a body of information is also what speech acts act on.  
If the goal of speech, or at least one central goal, is to exchange information, then 
                                                 
64 As I have said, others reject the riskiness thesis as well but these views are implausible on their own and 
incompatible with contextualism; e.g., dialetheism accepts that paradoxical sentences are both true and false.   
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 it is natural to explain the force of speech acts as the attempt to add to or alter a 
body of information that is presumed to be shared by the participants in the 
conversation, (Stalnaker 1999: 6). 
 
Stalnaker argues that the aspects of the conversational context that determine the content of the 
sentence tokens uttered in that context should be available to the participants in that 
conversation.  If not, then the audience members cannot use the relevant aspects of the context to 
determine the content of the sentence token uttered and the speaker cannot use the relevant 
aspects of the context to determine the potential contents of sentence tokens he intends to utter.  
Stalnaker’s theory of conversational contexts respects this condition.   
The example in section three shows that if contextualist theories of truth are correct that 
the content of a sentence token containing an occurrence of a truth predicate depends on which 
sentence tokens are paradoxical, then the theory of conversational context required by the 
contextualist theory of truth will not satisfy the Gricean condition voiced by Stalnaker in the 
above passage.  In other words, if contextualist theories of truth are correct, then they cannot rely 
on Stalnaker’s theory of conversational context or any other theory that implies that the aspects 
of the conversational context are available to the participants in the conversation.   
This objection directly affects Simmons who advocates both a contextualist theory of 
truth and Stalnaker’s theory of conversational context.65  However, the objection has wider 
implications.  A proponent who endorses a contextualist theory of truth must adopt or construct a 
theory of conversational context on which the relevant aspects of the context need not be 
available to the participants in the conversation.  Furthermore, a philosopher in this position 
should explain how utterances of sentence tokens containing occurrences of truth predicates 
could be used in a process of successful communication.  If the participants in a conversation do 
not have the resources to determine the content of sentence tokens uttered in the conversation, 
                                                 
65 See Simmons (1993, 2000) for the theory of truth and Simmons (2003) for the endorsement of Stalnaker’s theory. 
 338
 how can they communicate successfully?  If speakers are unable to determine what the content 
of a sentence token in which a context dependent truth predicate occurs would be if uttered and 
audience members are unable to determine the content of such sentence tokens when uttered, 
then why would anyone employ a context dependent truth predicate or participate in a 
conversation in which one is used?  Without answers to these questions, contextualist theories of 
truth are unable to explain the most obvious fact about our practice of using truth predicates—the 
fact that we continue to use truth predicates at all. 
My third and final point is that if a content-determining feature of a conversational 
context is not available to the participants of a conversation, then it must be relatively constant in 
the sense that it is either present in the vast majority of the conversations or absent in the vast 
majority of the conversations in which the expression in question is employed.  Otherwise, the 
participants in the conversation would have no way of successfully communicating.  If the 
feature in question is relatively constant, then the participants in the conversation can be justified 
in assuming that the feature in question is present (absent) for almost all the utterances made in a 
conversation.  That is, they can still successfully communicate by “factoring out” the feature in 
question.   
For example, assume that those who live in the town of Varyville employ an expression 
whose content depends on the number of rocks on the mantle of the mayor’s fireplace.  These 
people use the term ‘in-town’, which is a context dependent term.  If there are no rocks on the 
mayor’s mantle, then the extension of ‘in-town’ is the area within ten meters of the fountain in 
the town square.  If there is one rock on the mayor’s mantle, then the extension of ‘in-town’ is 
the area within one hundred meters of the fountain in the town square.  If there are two or more 
rocks on the mayor’s mantle, then the extension of ‘in-town’ is the area within one kilometer of 
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 the fountain in the town square.  Thus, ‘in-town’ is a context dependent expression.  Its content 
depends on the context of the conversation in which it is employed.  It just so happens that 
Varyville has had one mayor for the past 50 years and he has had a single rock on his mantel for 
the entire time.  Thus, although ‘in-town’ is a context dependent expression, every time it has 
been uttered in the past 50 years, it has had the same content.  Thus, although the number of 
rocks on the mayor’s mantle is not available in most conversations in which the citizens of 
Varyville participate, they can use ‘in-town’ and assume that they mean the same thing when 
they use it.  Because the content-determining features of ‘in-town’ do not change during the 
course of a conversation or from conversation to conversation, the members of Varyville know 
that their uses of ‘in-town’ have the same content.   
Despite the fact that the content-determining features of the conversational context for 
‘in-town’ are often unavailable to the participants of conversations, the citizens of Varyville can 
employ it without running into trouble because the content-determining feature is relatively 
constant.  Contrast the story about Varyville with the account of truth given by the advocate of a 
contextualist theory of truth. On the contextualist’s theory, the content of a sentence token 
containing a truth predicate is determined by the context in which it is used.  However, the 
context in which the sentence token is used might have to be very broad.  In the example given in 
section six, the context includes the distribution of matter in our solar system.  Of course, one 
could construct a sentence token whose paradoxicality depends on most any fact.  Thus, there is 
no limit to what might count as a content-determining feature of a given conversational context.  
Furthermore, the content-determining features are not relatively constant.  Indeed, they change 
continuously.  Given any empirical fact, one can construct a sentence token whose paradoxicality 
depends on that empirical fact.  Because empirical facts change continuously, the set of sentence 
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 tokens that count as paradoxical changes continuously.  Hence, the content-determining features 
for contextual truth predicates change continuously. Therefore, users of context dependent truth 
predicates have no reason to think that they mean the same thing in a conversation. 
Similar criticisms have been leveled against semantic externalism as well.  Semantic 
externalism is, roughly, the doctrine that the content of some linguistic expressions (and some 
mental states) depends on the physical or social environment of the users of those expressions 
(and the possessors of those states).66  I assume that the reader has a superficial familiarity with 
semantic externalism.  An objection to my criticism of contextual theories of truth is that 
defenders of semantic externalism have argued in the face of similar criticisms that there are 
plausible accounts of semantic knowledge (a person’s knowledge of the contents of the linguistic 
expressions he uses and the mental states he possesses) that are compatible with both semantic 
externalism and the claim that competent language users have semantic knowledge (and even 
that this knowledge is privileged in certain ways).67  An advocate of a contextual theory of truth 
might suggest that the same accounts of semantic knowledge would be compatible with a 
contextual theory of truth. 
The problem I posed for contextual theories of truth is different from the problem 
semantic externalists face.  I point out two differences.  First, in the case of semantic externalism, 
there are good reasons (or at least there are some arguments that some philosophers find 
convincing) for the claim that semantic features of some linguistic expressions and mental states 
depend on the physical or social environment.  The arguments have to do with the properties of 
                                                 
66 The literature on semantic externalism is vast.  See Putnam (1975), Burge (1979b), and Davidson (1988) for 
arguments in favor of semantic externalism.   
67 For criticism of semantic externalism, see Boghossian (1989) and Segal (2000).  For attempts to reconcile 
semantic externalism with knowledge of the contents of one’s expressions and mental states, see Davidson (1987), 
Burge (1988), Kobes (1996), Gibbons (1996), Sawyer (1999), Heal (2001), Stueber (2002), and Hahwy (2002). 
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 natural kind terms, our practices of attributing propositional attitudes, the individuation of 
concepts, and the way our expressions acquire meanings from the ways they are used.  The 
contextual truth theorist has none of those justifications for her theory.  The best she can do is 
say that it is one way of avoiding the liar’s paradox, or even that it is better than its competitors.  
That does not count as a justification for the claim that the contents of some of our ordinary 
sentences that contain truth predicates are determined by empirical facts that seem to have 
nothing to do with the contents of our expressions.   
That brings me to my second point.  At least in the case of semantic externalism, the 
content-determining empirical facts are localized.  Here are some examples.  The contents of 
sentences of a language L that contain occurrences of ‘water’ depend on the chemical 
composition of the samples to which people who speak L have applied ‘water’.  The contents of 
sentences of a language M that contain occurrences of ‘arthritis’ depend on the norms present in 
the community of those who speak M that specify how ‘arthritis’ should be used.  The contents 
of sentences of a language N that contain occurrences of ‘tree’ depend on the causal connections 
between trees and the speakers of N that use ‘tree’.  In the example from section three, all these 
factors are the same in w1 and w2.  Thus, the contextualist cannot appeal to any of the factors that 
we commonly take to be relevant to the determination of content.  Indeed, for any sentence at all, 
one can construct a sentence token that contains an occurrence of ‘true’ whose content  depends 
on whether that sentence is true (according to the contextualist).  Let ε be the sentence in 
question.  Simply construct an example like the one in section two where the sentence token on 
inscribed on the blackboard in room 2 is ‘either β is false or ε is true’.  According to the 
contextualist, the content of α in a world where ε is true is different than the content of α in a 
world where ε is false.  In the cases where semantic externalism applies, we need to know the 
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 chemical composition of ‘water’ or the norms of our linguistic community or our own causal 
history to be in a position to have semantic knowledge.  In the case of contextualist theories of 
truth, there is no limit to what one might have to know in order to have semantic knowledge.  
The content of a sentence that contains a truth predicate might depend on anything.   
The implications for our semantic knowledge from contextualist theories of truth are far 
more radical than those from semantic externalism.  The aletheic contextualist has no 
justification for these radical consequences other than that they are the cost of solving the liar 
paradox.  Finally, the arguments that are supposed to justify contextual theories of truth (e.g., the 
two-line puzzle and the strengthened liar reasoning) should be convincing only to contextualists.  
Therefore, there is no good reason to think that truth predicates are context-dependent and there 
are plenty of good reasons to think that they are not. 
 
B.10  CONCLUSION 
 
I have argued that the syntactic and semantic features of some sentence tokens do not determine 
whether they are paradoxical.  I take it as a condition on theories of truth that they should be 
consistent with this empirical fact.  Many are not.  In particular I discussed five popular and 
influential doctrines that are incompatible with the riskiness of truth.  I argued that the riskiness 
thesis is incompatible with: the view that the utterances of paradoxical sentences are not 
assertions, the claim that propositions are primary truth bearers, minimalist theories of truth-
aptness, and exclusive T-schema deflationism.  I also argued that the arguments for contextual 
theories of truth are circular, that these theories do not respect the Gricean condition on theories 
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 of context, and that they imply that we do not know the contents of many of the sentences that 
contain truth predicates. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
 
REVISION AND REVENGE 
 
 
 
 
C.1  INTRODUCTION  
 
The revision theory of truth is currently one of the three most prominent approaches to the liar 
paradox (the others being fixed-point theories and contextual theories).1  Although the revision 
theory must be formulated in a language that is expressively richer than those to which it applies, 
its proponents claim that it does not fall prey to revenge paradoxes.  I argue that it does face a 
revenge paradox, and this revenge paradox casts doubt on both its claim to be an acceptable 
approach to the liar paradox and its prospects for applying to natural languages. 
 
C.2  THE REVISION THEORY 
 
On the revision theory, truth is a circular concept in the sense that the definition of truth is 
circular (i.e., the definiendum appears in the definiens).  The revision theory of truth is grounded 
                                                 
1 Herzberger and Gupta independently developed ancestors of the revision theory I describe; see Gupta (1982) and 
Herzberger (1982a, 1982b).  The theory I describe is expounded in Gupta and Belnap (1993).  In particular, I focus 
on their theory T#; see Gupta and Belnap (1993: 182-190, 210-229).  See Kripke (1975) for an example of a fixed-
point theory, and see Simmons (1993) for a contextual theory. 
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 on a theory of circular concepts, which implies that the meaning of a word that expresses a 
circular concept is captured by a rule of revision.  Given a hypothesis about such a word’s 
semantic features, a rule of revision specifies a more accurate hypothesis about its semantic 
features.  For example, the rule of revision for a circular predicate F implies that if we assume F 
has a certain extension, then we can determine a different extension for F.  That is, the rule of 
revision specifies the extension of F under different assumptions about the extension of F.  
Although circular concepts do not have fixed semantic features, one can use the revision rule for 
a given circular concept to acquire information about its semantic features by considering its 
behavior during repeated applications.  For example, if we begin with an arbitrary extension for 
F and apply the revision rule for F over and over, we generate a sequence of extensions for F.  
Roughly, if a certain object b always ends up in the extension of F and stays there through 
repeated applications of the revision rule to different starting extensions, then b satisfies F.  
Likewise, if a certain object c always ends up outside the extension of F and stays there through 
repeated applications of the revision rule to different starting extensions, then c does not satisfy 
F.  We can say that b is categorically F and that c is categorically not F.   
When used as a semantic theory for truth, the theory of circular concepts yields the 
revision theory for truth.  On the revision theory, the T-sentences of a certain language L (i.e., 
sentences of the form: 〈p〉 is true-in-L iff p) are partial definitions of ‘true-in-L’.2  Given the set 
of partial definitions for ‘true-in-L’, the revision theory for truth determines a revision rule for 
‘true-in-L’, which is used to specify the set of categorical sentences of L (those that are 
categorically true or categorically false) and the set of non-categorical sentences of L. 
                                                 
2 Gupta and Belnap insist on distinguishing between T-sentences as definitional equivalences (where ‘iff' is read as 
‘=df’) and T-sentences as material equivalences (where ‘iff' is read as ‘≡’).  They accept all the T-sentences as 
definitional equivalences, but not all the T-sentences as material equivalences; see Gupta and Belnap (1993: 138-
139). 
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 Like the vast majority of approaches to the liar paradox, the language in which the 
revision theory for truth is formulated is expressively richer than the languages to which it 
applies.3  In particular, it does not apply to certain languages that contain categoricalness 
predicates.  One way to interpret this limitation is that the revision theory is restricted from 
applying to those languages that contain categoricalness predicates because it would imply that 
some of their sentences are both categorical and not categorical.  When confronted with this 
objection, Gupta and Belnap write: 
It is a perennial problem with theories of truth that while they apparently resolve 
one paradox, they allow the generation of another, more vicious one.  It may be 
objected that our account is not exempt from this.  For example, a sentence such 
as (1) presents us with difficulty. 
(1)  Either this sentence is not categorical or it is not true. 
If (1) is not categorical then it must be true (because its first disjunct is true) and 
hence categorical.  On the other hand, if it is categorical then it is like the Liar 
(because its first disjunct is false) and hence noncategorical.  In either case, we 
can deduce a contradiction.  Our proposal, it may be said, can perhaps account for 
the ordinary versions of the Liar, but it cannot deal with the strengthened versions 
such as (1) above.  The central problem raised by the paradoxes, it may appear, is 
left unresolved in our approach, (Gupta and Belnap 1993: 253).   
 
I call this objection the revenge objection (what Gupta and Belnap call strengthened versions of 
the liar paradox are often called revenge paradoxes because with them the liar paradox takes its 
revenge on the theory in question by using a key concept of the theory to construct a new 
paradox).   
Gupta and Belnap have two replies to the revenge objection.  First, they argue that the 
argument given in the passage above (which I call argument A) is unsound because it relies on 
                                                 
3 Gupta and Belnap admit that this is the case: “We have been concerned, for the most part, with languages whose 
only problematic element is the truth predicate.  Even if these languages can be enriched, the strengthened versions 
of the paradoxes show that an adequate description of any of them requires, within our general framework, a richer 
metalanguage,” (Gupta and Belnap 1993: 256). 
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 the principle that all truths are categorical, which is not a consequence of the revision theory.4  
Their second reply is contained in the following passage:  
Another problem with the argument is that it assumes that the notion “categorical 
in L” is in L itself.  This assumption can be accepted, but it cannot be assumed 
that “categorical in L” has an ordinary logic and semantics.  On the contrary, we 
should observe that this notion is just as circular as truth: We can determine the 
categorical sentences of L only on the basis of a prior hypothesis concerning the 
extension of “categorical in L.”  …  Because of this, the argument for the first 
horn does not establish that (1) is categorical.  It shows only that if (1) falls 
outside the extension of “categorical” at one stage of the revision process, then it 
falls in the extension at the next stage.  A similar claim holds for the second horn, 
(Gupta and Belnap 1993: 255-6). 
 
They argue that the revenge objection assumes that the language in question (call it L) has a 
categoricalness-in-L predicate; if so, then categoricalness-in-L is a circular concept as well, and 
it does not obey the classical reasoning used in the objection. 
They go on to argue that for a given language L, there is a hierarchy of categoricalness-
in-L concepts, each of which is a circular concept: 
Just as the sentences ‘the Liar is true’ and ‘the Liar is not true’ are pathological in 
the one case, the sentences ‘the Strengthened Liar is categorical’ and ‘the 
Strengthened Liar is not categorical’ are pathological in the other.  Hence, the 
concept of categoricalness that is appropriate for describing the behavior of the 
Ordinary Liar is not appropriate for the Strengthened Liar.  To correctly describe 
the behavior of the latter we need to appeal to a higher-level notion of 
categoricalness.  This higher-level notion would itself manifest paradoxical 
behavior in the presence of vicious reference.  And we would account for it in the 
same way.  The higher-level paradoxes would demand a still higher-level notion 
for their description, (Gupta and Belnap 1993: 256). 
 
To sum up: Gupta and Belnap reply to the revenge objection by arguing that argument A is 
unsound both because it appeals to the claim that all truths are categorical and because it does 
not respect the fact that categoricalness is a circular concept.  Moreover, they construct a 
                                                 
4 Gupta and Belnap (1993: 255). 
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 hierarchy of circular concepts of categoricalness with which one can classify the revenge 
paradoxes.5   
 
C.3  CRITICISM 
I argue that the Strengthened Liar (i.e., sentence (1) from the first quotation) does pose a problem 
for the revision theory and that Gupta and Belnap’s two replies to it are inadequate.  Fortunately, 
Gupta and Belnap have already done most of my work for me by proving the indefinability (in a 
language L) of categoricalness-in-L.  In particular, they prove that an extension (L+) of the 
classical language of arithmetic that contains its own truth-in-L+ predicate (which is governed by 
the revision theory for truth) cannot contain a predicate that is true of all and only the categorical 
sentences of L+.6  This theorem is analogous to Tarski’s indefinability theorem for truth, which 
he proves with a reductio by deriving that a variant of the liar sentence is both true and not true.7  
Not surprisingly, Gupta and Belnap prove the indefinability of categoricalness-in-L+ by deriving 
that a variant of the Strengthened Liar is both categorical-in-L+ and not categorical-in-L+.  They 
even comment: “The above proof is exactly parallel to the proof of Tarski’s Indefinability 
Theorem.  The principal difference between the two is that where the latter uses the Ordinary 
Liar, the former uses the Strengthened Liar,” (Gupta and Belnap 1993: 230).  To be clear: Gupta 
and Belnap prove that if a language L contains a categoricalness-in-L predicate, then the revision 
theory of truth implies that a certain sentence of L (e.g., a variant of the Strengthened Liar) is 
both categorical-in-L and not categorical-in-L (L must have other properties as well, but those 
                                                 
5 See Gupta and Belnap (1993: 229-235) for the semantics of categoricalness. 
6 Gupta and Belnap (1993: 229-230). 
7 See Tarski (1933). 
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 are irrelevant for my purposes).  I call this subproof of their proof of the indefinability theorem 
argument B.8
Argument B shows that Gupta and Belnap’s first reply to the revenge objection is 
inadequate.  Argument A and argument B have the same conclusion: if the revision theory for 
truth is applied to a language L that contains its own categoricalness-in-L predicate, then it 
implies that a certain sentence of that language (e.g., a variant of the Strengthened Liar) is both 
categorical-in-L and not categorical-in-L.  However, the arguments are quite different.  In 
particular, argument A depends on the problematic principle that all truths are categorical, while 
argument B does not.  Gupta and Belnap attribute argument A to the proponent of the revenge 
objection, and they claim that it is unsound.9  I agree that it is unsound.  However, there is a 
sound argument for the same conclusion; namely, their own argument B.  I will not speculate on 
why they attribute an unsound argument to the objector when their own proof of the 
indefinability theorem contains a sound argument for the objector’s claim. 
What about their second response to the revenge objection?  Gupta and Belnap assume 
that if a language L contains a categoricalness-in-L predicate, then this predicate expresses a 
circular concept.  Given that Gupta and Belnap prove that categoricalness-in-L is not definable in 
L, it should seem odd that they claim that L can contain a categoricalness-in-L predicate.  
Moreover, they claim that if ‘categorical-in-L’ is in L, then it expresses a circular concept, but in 
                                                 
8 Here is their proof of the indefinability theorem: “Suppose for reductio that A(x) defines X in L+ [X is the set of 
Gödel numbers of sentences categorical in L+, which is the classical language of arithmetic extended with a truth 
predicate ‘T’, such that ‘T’ is governed by revision semantics].  Construct by the Gödelian techniques a ‘fixed point’ 
for the formula ‘~ A(x) ∨ T(x)’; i.e., the sentence B such that (1) B ↔ (~ A(⎡B⎤) ∨ ~ T(⎡B⎤)) is true in M + g, for all 
possible classical interpretation g of T.  Since A(x) defines X, we know that (2) B is categorical in L+ if and only if 
A(⎡B⎤ is valid in L+ and that (3) B is not categorical in L+ if and only if ~ A (⎡B⎤) is valid in L+.  Now, either B is 
valid or ~ B is valid or B is not categorical.  Each of these assumptions can be shown to imply a contradiction.  
Suppose, for instance, that B is valid.  Then T(⎡B⎤) must also be valid.  Since (1) is valid, and validity is closed 
under logical consequence, it follows that ~ A(⎡B⎤) is valid.  This contradicts (2).  The arguments for the other two 
cases are similar,” (Gupta and Belnap 1993: 230; I have altered the use/mention conventions in this passage for 
economy). 
9 Gupta and Belnap attribute argument A to Cargile (1986) and Priest (1987); see Gupta and Belnap (1993: 253 n. 1) 
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 their proof of the indefinability theorem (i.e., in argument B), they treat ‘categorical-in-L’ as if it 
obeys classical logic (i.e., as if it does not express a circular concept).   
On reflection, we see that there is no tension between their claims about the definability 
and circularity of categoricalness and their proof of the indefinability theorem.  The concept of 
categoricalness-in-L employed by a revision theory for a language L is different from the 
concept of categoricalness-in-L that can be defined in L by a revision theory.  The concept of 
categoricalness-in-L employed by a revision theory is not definable in L, is not circular, and 
gives rise to revenge paradoxes, while the concept of categoricalness-in-L that can be defined in 
L by a revision theory for L is (obviously) definable in L, is circular, and does not give rise to 
revenge paradoxes.  A sequence of examples should illustrate these facts.   
Let L0 be a first order language with a truth predicate ‘true-in-L0’ and the usual capacity 
for self-reference (via arithmetization or names for its linguistic expressions).  L0 does not 
contain any categoricalness predicates.  Let M0 be a language in which a revision theory for 
truth-in-L0 is formulated; call this theory T0.  Because T0 employs ‘categorical-in-L0’, T0 is not 
expressible in L0.  Consider a different language, L1, which is just like L0, except that instead of 
containing ‘true-in-L0’, it contains both ‘true-in-L1’ and ‘categorical-in-L1’.  Let M1 be the 
language in which a revision theory for truth-in-L1 and categoricalness-in-L1 is formulated; call 
this theory T1.10  T1 employs a categoricalness-in-L1 predicate; that is, it specifies which 
sentences of L1 are categorical-in-L1 and which ones are not categorical-in-L1.  It might seem 
that T1 is expressible in L1 or that the notion of categoricalness employed by T1 is the same as 
the one expressible in L1, but these impressions are inaccurate.   
                                                 
10 One of the exciting features of Gupta and Belnap’s theory of circular concepts is that it can handle systems of 
interdependent concepts; T1 is a revision theory for both truth-in-L1 and categoricalness-in-L1.   
 351
 The concept of categoricalness-in-L1 employed by T1 is not circular, and it is a “genuine” 
categoricalness concept in the sense that it applies to all the categorical sentences of L1 and fails 
to apply to all the non-categorical sentences of L1.  I use ‘categoricalnessË-in-L1’ as a term for 
this concept of categoricalness.  CategoricalnessË-in-L1 is not definable in L1, as the 
indefinability theorem shows.  If L1 contained a categoricalnessË-in-L1 predicate, then L1 would 
contain a genuinely paradoxical variant of the Strengthened Liar (e.g., ‘either this sentence is 
false-in-L1 or it is not categoricalË-in-L1’), as argument B shows (i.e., T1 would imply that this 
sentence is both categoricalË-in-L1 and not categoricalË-in-L1).   
On the other hand, the concept of categoricalness-in-L1 that is expressible in L1 is 
circular.  I use ‘categoricalness1-in-L1’ as a term for this concept of categoricalness.  
Categoricalness1-in-L1 is not a “genuine” categoricalness concept because it is not the case that it 
both applies to all the categorical sentences of L1 and fails to apply to all the non-categorical 
sentences of L1 (e.g., it neither categorically applies nor fails to categorically apply to ‘either this 
sentence is false-in-L1 or it is not categorical1-in-L1’).11  Categoricalness1-in-L1 is, of course, 
definable in L1.  Consequently, L1 contains a variant of the Strengthened Liar that expresses 
categoricalness1-in-L1 (i.e., ‘either this sentence is false-in-L1 or it is not categorical1-in-L1’).  
However, this variant of the Strengthened Liar is not paradoxical (i.e., it is not the case that T1 
implies that it is both categoricalË-in-L1 and not categoricalË-in-L1).  Instead, this sentence is not 
categoricalË-in-L1, but L1 does not have the resources to express this fact.   
Recall that Gupta and Belnap define a hierarchy of circular categoricalness concepts.  To 
illustrate the relation between them and the notion of categoricalness employed by the revision 
theory, consider a language L2, which is like L1 and L0 except that instead of the semantic 
predicates that belong to L0 and L1, L2 contains a truth-in-L2 predicate and two categoricalness 
                                                 
11 That is, ‘either this sentence is false-in-L1 or it is not categorical1-in-L1’ is not categoricalË-in-L1. 
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 predicates: ‘categorical1-in-L2’ and ‘categorical2-in-L2’.  Let T2 be the revision theory for truth-
in-L2, categoricalness1-in-L2, and categoricalness2-in-L2.  T2 employs a concept of 
categoricalness-in-L2 as well; call it categoricalnessË-in-L2.  CategoricalnessË-in-L2 applies to 
all and only the categorical sentences of L2 (i.e., it is a “genuine” categoricalness predicate); 
furthermore, it is indefinable in L2 (as the indefinability theorem shows).  Both categoricalness1-
in-L2 and categoricalness2-in-L2 are circular concepts.  They are obviously expressible in L2, and 
the variants of the Strengthened Liar that express them (i.e., ‘either this sentence is false-in-L2 or 
it is not categorical1-in-L2’ and ‘either this sentence is false-in-L2 or it is not categorical2-in-L2’) 
are not paradoxical.  The difference between categoricalness1-in-L2 and categoricalness2-in-L2 is 
that one can use categoricalness1-in-L2 to assert that the Liar is not categorical (by asserting that 
it is not categorical1-in-L2), and one can use categoricalness2-in-L2 to assert that ‘either this 
sentence is false-in-L2 or it is not categorical1-in-L2’ is not categorical (by asserting that it is not 
categorical2-in-L2).  That is a nice feature of L2.  However, L2 does not have the resources to 
classify ‘either this sentence is false-in-L2 or it is not categorical2-in-L2’.   
With these facts about the categoricalness concepts in view, we can see that Gupta and 
Belnap’s second reply to the revenge objection is inadequate.  They claim that categoricalness is 
a circular concept, that it can be described by a revision theory, and that it does not give rise to 
revenge paradoxes.  Although they show how to construct circular concepts of categoricalness 
(e.g., categoricalness1-in-L1, categoricalness1-in-L2, and categoricalness2-in-L2), none of these 
concepts are genuine categoricalness concepts, none of them are employed by a revision theory, 
and none of them are expressed by the Strengthened Liar in the revenge objection.  The revenge 
objection pertains to a language L that contains a categoricalnessË-in-L predicate.  Any such 
language contains a variant of the Strengthened Liar that expresses categoricalnessË-in-L.  If the 
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 revision theory applies to such a language, then it implies that the sentence ‘either this sentence 
is false-in-L or it is not categoricalË-in-L’ is both categoricalË-in-L and not categoricalË-in-L.  
Thus, the worries Gupta and Belnap express in their formulation of the revenge objection hold 
true: (i) the revision theory does resolve one paradox while allowing for “the generation of 
another, more vicious one,” (ii) the revision theory “can perhaps account for the ordinary 
versions of the Liar, but it cannot deal with the strengthened versions,” and (iii) “the central 
problem raised by the paradoxes … is left untouched.”12  The revenge objection stands. 
 
C.4  OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 
 
Objection 1: The only notions of categoricalness are the circular ones that can be handled by the 
revision theory.  CategoricalnessË-in-L is incoherent. 
Reply 1: The revision theory for language L employs categoricalnessË-in-L.  If this 
concept is incoherent, then the revision theory is incoherent as well.  Recall the example of 
language L1.  T1 is the revision theory for truth-in-L1 and categoricalness1-in-L1.  T1 employs 
categoricalnessË-in-L1, which means that T1 specifies which sentences of L1 are categoricalË-in-
L1 and which ones are not categoricalË-in-L1.  T1 does not employ categoricalness1-in-L1 (i.e., 
the circular concept of categoricalness that can be defined in L1 by the revision theory) as Gupta 
and Belnap’s indefinability theorem shows. 
Objection 2:  Revision theories do employ circular concepts of categoricalness; the 
concept of categoricalness employed by a given revision theory T for a language L is one level 
                                                 
12 All these quotes are from the first passage; Gupta and Belnap (1993: 253). 
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 above the highest notion of categoricalness expressible in L.  For example, L1 contains a 
categroicalness1-in-L1 predicate; hence, T1 employs categoricalness2-in-L1. 
Reply 2: I have two replies to this objection.  First, categoricalnessË-in-L1 (the concept 
employed by T1) is not circular, while categoricalness2-in-L1 is circular.  Thus, they are distinct 
concepts.  That categoricalness2-in-L1 is circular follows from its definition.  The concept of 
categoricalnessË-in-L1 is not circular because it is defined in terms of non-circular set-theoretic 
concepts.13   
Second, argument B with ‘categoricalË-in-L1’ in place of ‘categorical’ is sound and 
shows that categoricalnessË-in-L1 is not definable in L1 (so long as the assumptions of the 
indefinability theorem hold).  However, argument B with ‘categorical2-in-L1’ in place of 
‘categorical’ is invalid; hence, it does not show that categoricalness2-in-L1 is indefinable in L1.  
Therefore, categoricalnessË-in-L1 is not identical to categoricalness2-in-L1.  Similar reasoning 
shows that categoricalnessË-in-L1 is not identical to any of the circular categorical concepts.  
Again, similar reasoning shows that none of the revision theories employs a circular concept of 
categoricalness.   
 Objection 3: Either the notion of categoricalness for a language L is expressible in L or it 
is not.  If it is expressible in L, then it is circular and the version of the Strengthened Liar that 
expresses it is not paradoxical.  If the notion of categoricalness for L is not expressible in L, then 
it is not circular and the version of the Strengthened Liar that expresses it does not belong to L; 
hence, it is false (i.e., it attributes either falsity-in-L or non-categoricalness-in-L to itself, but it 
satisfies neither because it does not belong to L).  The indefinability theorem shows that it is 
                                                 
13 CategoricalnessË-in-L1 is defined in terms of validity on a set of definitions in a model for a theory of circular 
concepts, which is defined in terms of set theoretic constructions and truth-in-a-model (which is not circular); see 
Gupta and Belnap (1993: 145-147, 166-174, 182-189) 
 355
 impossible for a language to contain a categoricalness predicate with which one can construct a 
version of the Strengthened Liar that is genuinely paradoxical.   
Reply 3: On this objection, it is impossible for a language to contain its own 
categoricalnessË predicate.  This is obviously false.  One can construct a language that contains 
its own categoricalnessË predicate; however, the revision theory cannot apply to such a language 
while remaining consistent.14  The indefinability theorem assumes the consistency of the revision 
theory.  That is, given that the revision theory is consistent and that it applies to a language L, L 
cannot contain a categoricalnessË-in-L predicate.  Thus, given that the revision theory is 
consistent, and that it applies to L, L cannot contain a genuinely paradoxical version of the 
Strengthened Liar.  The proponent of the revenge objection does not dispute these claims; 
however, she claims that either the revision theory is inconsistent or it applies only to languages 
that are expressively impoverished (e.g., those that do not contain their own categoricalnessË 
predicates).  Citing the indefinability theorem is not an adequate response to this objection.  
Indeed, the proponent of the revenge objection accepts the indefinability theorem and claims that 
its central argument (argument B) shows that the revision theory is either inconsistent or 
expressively restricted.  In either case, the revision theory does not constitute an acceptable 
approach to the liar paradox. 
 
C.5  CONCLUSION 
 
The revision theory for truth faces a revenge paradox.  Although Gupta and Belnap address this 
objection, their replies are inadequate.  Their first reply is that the argument used in the objection 
                                                 
14 For example, English (or my idiolect of English at noon GMT on January 1, 2004) contains its own 
categoricalnessË predicate. 
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 is unsound.  They attribute an unsound argument (argument A) to the objector and point out that 
it is unsound; I agree with them.  However, their own indefinability theorem is proved with the 
help of a sound argument for the objector’s claim (argument B).  Thus, their first reply is 
inadequate.  Their second reply is that the revenge objection does not respect the fact that 
categoricalness is a circular concept; when one treats categoricalness as a circular concept, there 
is no revenge paradox.  However, the concept of categoricalness employed by a revision theory 
(e.g., categoricalnessË-in-L1) is not circular, it gives rise to revenge paradoxes, and it is 
indefinable in the language in question.  Although Gupta and Belnap show how to introduce 
categoricalness predicates (e.g., categoricalness1-in-L1) that do not give rise to revenge 
paradoxes, these are not “genuine” categoricalness predicates, and revision theories do not 
employ them. 
The consequences of the revenge objection for the revision theory are severe.  Gupta and 
Belnap “solve” the liar paradox only by using the familiar trick of restricting the expressive 
resources of the languages they consider.  In particular, their theory is not applicable to a 
language (like English) that can express their theory.15  At this point in our battles with the liar 
paradox, we know that solutions that incorporate this maneuver are unacceptable.   
 
                                                 
15 I am not claiming that English is semantically self-sufficient (i.e., English can express the complete semantic 
theory for English) or that a theory of truth should be applicable to languages that are semantically self-sufficient.  
Given what I have said, Gupta and Belnap’s attacks on semantic self-sufficiency criticisms are misplaced; see Gupta 
and Belnap (1993: 256-259).  I claim that they cannot apply a revision theory to a language that contains its own 
categoricalnessË predicate.  English contains its own categoricalnessË predicate.  Hence, their theory does not apply 
to English.   
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
 
PURPORTEDLY INTERNALIZABLE SEMANTIC THEORIES FOR TRUTH 
 
 
 
 
D.1  INTRODUCTION  
 
In Chapters One and Two, I introduced the concept of internalizability in an effort to categorize 
the relations between semantic theories, the languages to which they apply, and the languages in 
which they are formulated.  In particular, I wanted to show that semantic theories for truth that 
do not apply to the languages in which they are formulated are unacceptable.  In Chapter Two, I 
presented five internalizability requirements, and I argued that any acceptable semantic theory is 
internalizable for every language and that any acceptable semantic theory for truth is 
internalizable for every natural language to which it applies.  A semantic theory that is 
internalizable for a single language does not require a substantive distinction between target 
language (i.e., the language to which it applies) and employed language (i.e., the language in 
which it is formulated).  However, a semantic theory can be internalizable for one language 
without being internalizable for every language and without being internalizable for a single 
natural language.  Thus, a semantic theory that does not require a substantive distinction between 
target language and employed language might not be internalizable for a natural language. 
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 A number of semantic theories for truth have appeared whose proponents claim they do 
not require a substantive distinction between target language and employed language.  These 
theorists claim that this feature qualifies these theories to apply to natural languages.  In this 
paper, I compare and contrast these theories, and I evaluate them with respect to the various 
internalizability requirements.  In section two, I define ‘internalizability’ and present three 
internalizability requirements.  The semantic theories are divided into two groups.  The first 
group of semantic theories for truth are based on consistency theories of truth—theories that 
imply that truth is a consistent concept.  These include: Reinhardt’s theory (which employs a 
formalist strategy), McGee’s theory (which implies that truth is a vague concept), Simmons’ 
theory (which implies that truth is context dependent), Field’s theory (which implies that truth 
displays indeterminacy), and Maudlin’s theory (which implies that truth is partially defined, and 
only grounded sentences have truth-values).  I discuss each of these in section three.  The second 
group of semantic theories for truth are based on inconsistency theories of truth—theories that 
imply that truth is an inconsistent concept.  These include: dialetheism (which implies that some 
sentences are both true and false), Yablo’s theory (which implies that truth is a particular type of 
circular concept), Elkund’s theory (which implies that the constitutive principles for truth are 
inconsistent and that an acceptable assignment of semantic values should satisfy a weighted 
majority of these principles), and the semantic theory for truth I presented in Chapters Four, 
Five, Six, and Seven (which implies that truth is a confused concept with six components).  I 
discuss each of these in section four. 
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 D.2  INTERNALIZABILITY 
 
For a full discussion of internalizability, the motivations for introducing this terminology, and 
my arguments for internalizability requirements on semantic theories, the reader should consult 
Chapters One and Two.  In this section, I reproduce the definitions, and I formulate the 
requirements.   
A semantic theory is internalizable for a given language if and only there exists an 
extension of the language such that the theory is expressible in the extension and the semantic 
theory applies to everything in the extension to which it is supposed to apply.  The following is a 
more elaborate definition of internalizability: 
A semantic theory T that purports to specify the meanings of sentences that express a 
concept X is internalizable for a language L if and only if there exists an extension of L 
such that all the sentences that compose T can be translated into sentences that belong to 
the extension of L and T specifies the meanings of all the sentences of the extension of L 
that express X. 
 
Below I provide definitions of ‘semantic theory’, ‘language’, ‘expressible’, ‘applies’, and related 
terms: 
A theory is a set of declarative sentences all of which belong to a single language.  A 
semantic theory is a theory that specifies the meanings of certain sentences that belong to 
some particular language or languages.  A specification of meaning by a semantic theory 
is an assignment.1   
 
A language is a function from sets of sentences (syntactic strings) to a set of sentential 
meanings.  A language L0 is a sublanguage of a language L1 if and only if the set of 
sentences of L0 is a subset of the set of sentences of L1 and the set of sentential meanings 
of L0 is a subset of the set of sentential meanings of L1.  A language L1 is an extension of 
a language L0 if and only if L0 is a sublanguage of L1.   
                                                 
1 I use the locution ‘semantic theory for X’, where X is a placeholder for the name of a concept (e.g., a semantic 
theory for moral obligation, a semantic theory for truth).  A semantic theory for X specifies the meanings of the 
sentences of certain languages that express the concept X (e.g., a semantic theory for truth specifies the meanings of 
sentences that express the concept of truth).  In particular, a semantic theory for X that applies to a language L that 
can express X (an X-language) assigns meanings to the sentences of L that express X (the X-sentences of L).  A 
theory of X is a theory that specifies the nature of X.  A semantic theory for X is based on both a theory of meaning 
and a theory of X (see Chapter Three for discussion). 
 360
  
A theory T that belongs to one language L0 is expressible in another language L1 if and 
only if for every sentence q that composes T, there exists a sentence p of L1 such that p is 
a translation of q.  A sentence of one language is a translation of a sentence that belongs 
to another if they have the same or relevantly similar meanings (or contents). 
 
A semantic theory T for X applies to a language L if and only if L is an X-language and 
T does not contain a restriction specifying that it does not provide the meanings for 
sentences of L.  A semantic theory T for X applies to a sentence S of L if and only if S is 
an X-sentence and T does not contain a restriction specifying that it does not provide a 
meaning for S.  A restriction for a semantic theory T is a claim that T does not provide 
meanings for the sentences of certain languages or that T does not provide the meanings 
of certain sentences of certain languages. 
 
With these definitions in mind, we can define some concepts that are helpful in discussions of 
internalizability, and we can provide a more economical definition of internalizability (assume 
that T is a semantic theory for X and L is a language): 
T is descriptively complete for L if and only if T provides an assignment for every X-
sentence of L. 
 
T is descriptively complete if and only if for every X-language L, T is descriptively 
complete for L. 
 
T is descriptively correct for L if and only if T is consistent and T provides a correct 
assignment for every member of L in its scope. 
 
T is descriptively correct if and only if for every X-language, T is descriptively correct 
for L. 
 
T is internal for L if and only if T is expressible in L and T is descriptively complete for 
L. 
 
T is internalizable for L if and only if there exists an extension L′ of L such that T is 
internal for L′.   
 
T is essentially external for L if and only if it is not the case that T is internalizable for L. 
 
It turns out that a semantic theory for X can be internalizable for one language and essentially 
external for another.  Furthermore, a semantic theory can be internalizable for a formal language 
(or a sublanguage of a natural language) without being internalizable for a natural language.  
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 Thus, the definition of internalizability (which is a relation between a semantic theory and a 
language) permits the formulation of several different properties of semantic theories.  I focus on 
three particular properties: 
(WEAK)  A semantic theory T for X is weakly internalizable if and only if there exists an 
X-language L such that T is internalizable for L.   
 
(NATURAL)  A semantic theory T for X is naturally internalizable if and only for every 
natural language L, T is internalizable for L.2
 
(STRONG)  A semantic theory T for X is strongly internalizable if and only if for every 
X-language L, T is internalizable for L.   
 
With these definitions in mind, we can classify the various semantic theories for truth listed in 
the introduction.   
Before discussing the individual theories, I want to discuss four topics: (i) the relation 
between internalizability, revenge paradoxes, and self-refutation problems, (ii) the relation 
between internalizability and language-specific truth predicates, (iii) using a natural language to 
describe that natural language, and (iv) semantic theories that imply that some linguistic 
expressions are unintelligible.   
As I explain in Chapters One, Two, and Three, semantic theories for truth that are not 
internalizable for certain languages have been restricted from applying to certain languages or 
certain sentences.  A semantic theory for truth that is not internalizable for some language has 
been restricted from applying to some sentences of that language in order to prevent either a 
revenge paradox or a self-refutation problem from rendering the theory false or unacceptable.  
                                                 
2 I admit that the concept of natural internalizability is vague because the concept of a natural language is vague.  
However, I take English (or, my idiolect of English at noon GMT on January 1, 2005) as my paradigm of a natural 
language.  An alternative definition of natural internalizability is ‘a semantic theory T for X is naturally 
internalizable if and only if there exists a natural language L such that T is internalizable for L’; however, if a 
natural language is just a language that is used by some community of people, then this notion of internalizability 
would not differ substantially from weak internalizability, because most any language can be used by some 
community of people.   
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 (See Chapters One, Two, and Three for discussion of revenge paradoxes and self-refutation 
problems.) 
The second topic I want to discuss is language-specific concepts of truth.  Most semantic 
theories for truth are actually semantic theories for language-specific concepts of truth.  A 
language-specific concept of truth is like the concept of truth except that it is satisfied only by 
sentences of a single language.  For example, ‘true-in-English’ is a language-specific truth 
predicate.  Any sentence that is true-in-English is true, but true sentences of other languages are 
not true-in-English.  One reason for focusing exclusively on language-specific (LS) truth 
predicates is that it is easier to avoid the liar paradox and its relatives for an LS truth predicate.  
By considering only LS truth predicates, one can ignore liar-like paradoxes that result from inter-
linguistic truth attributions (e.g., if p is the German sentence ‘q ist wahr’—which means that q is 
true—and q is the English sentence ‘p is false’, then both p and q are paradoxical).  In addition, it 
is easier for an account of an LS concept of truth to avoid revenge paradoxes.  If T is a theory of 
truth and T implies that paradoxical sentences are truth-value gaps, then a revenge paradox for T 
concerns the sentence (λ′), which is ‘(λ′) is either false or a gap’; T implies that (λ′) is both true 
and either false or a gap.  However, if T′ is a theory of truth-in-L (where ‘L’ is the name of a 
language), and T′ implies that paradoxical sentences of L are truth-in-L-value gaps, then T′ does 
not face a revenge paradox so long as L does not contain a gap predicate.  That is, if L does not 
contain a gap predicate, then (λ′′), which is ‘(λ′′) is either false-in-L or a gap-in-L’ is not a 
member of L.  Hence, (λ′′) is not true-in-L.  Thus, (λ′) does not constitute a revenge paradox for 
T.  Therefore, a theorist can avoid revenge paradoxes by constructing a theory of an LS truth 
predicate and insuring that the language in question is expressively impoverished. 
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 In Appendix A, I argue that there is no good way to explain natural language truth 
predicates in terms of LS truth predicates.  This result affects internalizability in the following 
way.  Assume that T is a semantic theory for an LS concept of truth (truth-in-L).  Assume that T 
is descriptively correct for L, that T is descriptively complete for L, and that T is expressible in 
L.  Hence, T is internalizable for L.  A theorist who accepts T might claim that T is naturally 
internalizable as well.  Of course, T is a semantic theory for an LS concept of truth, and the most 
common concept of truth expressible in a natural language is not an LS concept of truth.  
However, the theorist who accepts T could claim that natural language concepts of truth can be 
explained in terms of LS concepts of truth.  If that is correct, then T might turn out to be 
naturally internalizable (e.g., if it is both descriptively complete for the natural language and 
expressible in the natural language).  However, my claim that natural language truth concepts 
cannot be explained in terms of LS concepts of truth blocks this move.  Because T is a semantic 
theory for LS truth concepts, either T does not apply to natural languages or it is not 
descriptively correct for natural languages.  Either way, T is not both naturally internalizable and 
descriptively correct. 
The third topic I want to discuss is natural languages.  The conventional wisdom is that a 
necessary condition on a semantic theory for truth that does a good job of describing a natural 
language is that the theory does not require a substantive distinction between employed language 
and target language.  The idea is that if we are using our natural language to describe our natural 
language, then a theory that requires a substantive distinction of this sort is unacceptable.  This 
view has led several philosophers to construct a semantic theory for truth and a formal language 
such that the semantic theory for truth is internal for that formal language.  The common 
assumption is that because these theories apply to a language in which they are formulated, these 
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 theories will do a good job of describing a natural language.  Although I agree that a semantic 
theory for truth that requires a substantive distinction between employed language and target 
language is unacceptable for use on a natural language, the problem with the above reasoning is 
that although these theorists propose semantic theories for truth that are internalizable for the 
formal language in which they are formulated (i.e., they are weakly internalizable), such theories 
are often not internalizable for a natural language (i.e., they are not naturally internalizable).  If 
we are to use our natural language to describe our natural language, then we need a naturally 
internalizable semantic theory, not one that is merely weakly internalizable.  I argue that this is a 
problem for many of the theories that purport to be internalizable: although they might be weakly 
internalizable, they are not naturally internalizable, and weak internalizability is not enough.3    
I rely on two claims in my evaluation of semantic theories for truth.  First, any acceptable 
semantic theory for truth is naturally internalizable.4  Second, any acceptable semantic theory for 
truth is descriptively correct for every language to which it applies.  Several theorists attempt to 
insure that their semantic theories of truth are internalizable for natural languages by claiming 
that certain linguistic expressions (e.g., non-monotonic sentential operators) are unintelligible; 
they then argue that their theories need not apply to languages with such expressions or to 
sentences that contain such expressions.  I call this move an unintelligibility maneuver.  
Although it is unclear what these theorists mean by ‘unintelligible’, I take it that they mean either 
that these linguistic expressions are meaningless or that they express inconsistent concepts.   
                                                 
3 It seems to me that a semantic theory might be naturally internalizable without being strongly internalizable; 
however, it also seems to me that it would be difficult to argue that a semantic theory has this status because any 
such argument would have to specify the relevant linguistic resources that are present in some languages (but not 
natural languages).  Any such specification would take place in a natural language, which would render the claim 
false.   
4 See Chapter Two for an argument for this condition. 
 365
 I take it for granted that if there is an established practice of using a linguistic expression, 
then that linguistic expression is meaningful.5  For each of the linguistic expressions that are 
labeled unintelligible by these theorists, there is an established practice of using them.  
Moreover, these linguistic expressions belong to some natural languages.  Thus, any semantic 
theory for truth that incorporates an unintelligibility maneuver is unacceptable.  To see why, 
assume that L is a natural language with a non-monotonic sentential operator and that T is a 
semantic theory for truth that applies to L and implies that non-monotonic sentential operators 
are unintelligible.  If the theory implies that such expressions are meaningless, then it is not 
descriptively correct for L, because its assignments to the truth-sentences of L that contain this 
expression are incorrect— the sentences of L that contain this expression are meaningful, but the 
theory implies that they are meaningless.  If the theory implies that such expressions express 
inconsistent concepts, then it is not descriptively complete for L, because the truth-sentences of L 
that contain these expressions are outside its scope.  Because any extension of L will contain 
these expressions as well, for every extension L′ of L, the theory is not descriptively complete for 
L′.  Hence, the theory is not internalizable for L, because if a theory is internalizable for a 
language, then it is descriptively complete for some extension of that language.  Therefore, if a 
semantic theory for truth incorporates an unintelligibility maneuver, then it is not both 
descriptively correct and naturally internalizable.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Even linguistic expressions like ‘tonk’ are meaningful; they just express inconsistent concepts; see Prior (1960) for 
a discussion of ‘tonk’. 
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 D.3  CONSISTENCY THEORIES 
 
 
All the semantic theories in this section are based on theories of truth that imply that truth is a 
consistent concept.  I discuss the distinction between consistent and inconsistent concepts in 
Chapter Four.  In Chapter Three, I argued that any acceptable theory of truth that respects the 
truth rules and implies that truth is a consistent concept is restricted in such a way that any 
semantic theory for truth that is based on this theory of truth is not naturally internalizable.  
Dividing the purportedly internalizable semantic theories for truth into consistency theories and 
inconsistency theories should help the reader verify this conclusion. 
 
D.3.1  FORMALISM (REINHARDT) 
 
The first theory I consider is Reinhardt’s, which he published in 1986.6  Reinhardt is committed 
to providing a theory of truth that applies to the language in which it is formulated. 
Let us suppose, as I believe is intuitively correct, that one of the primary features 
of [truth] is that it is one notion: in particular it does not split into some hierarchy 
of notions.  …  Let us explain that the truth predicate of our formal language (call 
the language L) is intended to be taken in the sense of our preexisting informal 
notion of truth.  …  Unless we are prepared to entertain splitting the notion of 
truth, we are forced to admit that the metalanguage is included in the object 
language.  If the formal language is to provide an adequate explication of the 
informal language that we use, it must contain its own metalanguage.  I take it 
that this is in fact a desideratum for success in formulating a theory of truth, 
(Reinhardt 1986: 227-228). 
 
Recall that I used this quote in Chapter One to motivate my account of internalizability. 
The theory Reinhardt proposes is an extension and a reinterpretation of Kripke’s theory of truth 
(for discussion of Kripke’s theory, see Chapter One).  In particular, Reinhardt proposes a 
different way of interpreting partial truth predicates.  He argues that, although Kripke intends to 
                                                 
6 Reinhardt (1986). 
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 interpret truth as a partial predicate, the fixed-point model treats it as a completely defined 
predicate.  Reinhardt links this problem to the fact that Kripke’s theory of truth must be 
formulated in a language that is expressively richer than the ones to which it applies if it is to be 
consistent.   
Reinhardt’s approach uses a significance predicate, which he takes to be synonymous 
with ‘is true or false’.  He does not assume that insignificant sentences are meaningless, but he 
does propose a particular reading of them according to which they are to be treated as merely 
formal (in Hilbert’s sense).  They are to be treated as strings of symbols that can be manipulated, 
but that have no meaning outside this practice.  Reinhardt requires that the fundamental 
principles of his theory turn out to be significant.  Moreover he argues that this condition is 
equivalent to the condition that the theory of truth should apply to the language in which it is 
formulated.     
Reinhardt uses the axiomatic theory of truth, KF, which is Feferman’s axiomatization of 
Kripke's model theoretic semantic theory.7  From KF, one can prove the schema 〈S(〈p〉) → 
(T(〈p〉) ↔ p)〉, where 〈S(〈p〉)〉 says that sentence 〈p〉 is significant and 〈T(〈p〉)〉 says that 〈p〉 is 
true.  Reinhardt uses KF to state two sufficient conditions on his theory of truth.  Specifically, if 
KF├ T(〈p)〉8, then 〈p〉 is true, and if KF├ S(〈p〉), then 〈p〉 is significant.  Thus, Reinhardt uses 
KF’s pronouncements on truth and significance as a basis for his accounts of truth and 
significance.  Note that he denies that if KF├ 〈p〉, then 〈p〉 is true; he takes as true the sentences 
for which KF proves truth ascriptions, not those that KF proves.  Reinhardt completes his theory 
by adding the claim that if KF ├ T(〈p〉) then 〈p〉 is true, to KF itself.  That is, KF+ is KF with the 
additional axiom 〈T(〈∀x(Θ(x) → T(x))〉)〉, where ‘Θ(x)’ is an arithmetical predicate.   
                                                 
7 Feferman (1982). 
8 The turnstile is a symbol for the proof theoretic consequence relation. 
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 The result is that, although Reinhardt’s theory is consistent and proves a number of 
important facts about truth, it also proves results that, according to it, are not significant.  Indeed, 
the axioms of KF are not significant.  In particular, any claim that some significance attribution 
is insignificant turns out to be insignificant.  Reinhardt’s solution to this problem is to claim that 
these are uninterpreted symbols that have a use in deriving the results of the theory, but have no 
significance in themselves.  Moreover, Reinhardt takes great care in the exposition of his theory 
to avoid asserting any insignificant sentences.  The result is a clever presentation of an 
interesting thesis.   
Is Reinhardt’s theory internalizable in any of the three senses?  Assume that Reinhardt’s 
theory is the set of axioms of KF+ and L is the formal language in which Reinhardt formulates it.  
KF+ is expressible in L and, given that KF+ is formulated in an artificial language whose 
sentences are stipulated to have the semantic properties they have and that the theory implies that 
they turn out to have these semantic properties, KF+ is descriptively correct for L; hence, KF+ is 
weakly internalizable.   
Reinhardt achieves weak internalizability for his theory by claiming that many seemingly 
significant sentences are insignificant.  One should not assume that this is an unintelligibility 
maneuver since ‘significant’ for Reinhardt is synonymous with ‘neither true nor false’.  His 
theory does face both a revenge paradox and a self-refutation problem though.  These insure that 
it is not both descriptively correct for a natural language and naturally internalizable.  The self-
refutation problem comes from the fact that the theory has consequences that the theory implies 
are insignificant.  Reinhardt readily admits this fact, but he does not discuss the self-refutation 
problem.9  The revenge paradox concerns the fact that any attempt to add the resources that 
                                                 
9 Reinhardt (1986: 236-7). 
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 allow one to make a significant comment on the insignificance of a sentence renders the theory 
inconsistent.  Consider the following sentence:  
(1)  (1) is either false or insignificant. 
Reinhardt’s theory implies that (1) is both true and either false or insignificant.  To avoid this 
result, he restricts his theory so that it does not apply to languages with insignificance predicates.  
Reinhardt comments, “[t]he most awkward point in carrying this out is translating our use of 
‘non-significant’.  This does not usually mean ‘is not significant’....  It generally means ‘is not in 
X’, where X is some reasonably comprehensive collection of significant sentences.  I may 
perhaps be justly accused of replacing a hierarchy of truth predicates with a hierarchy of non- 
significance predicates,” (Reinhardt 1986: 228).  Given that natural languages contain 
insignificance predicates, Reinhardt’s theory is not both descriptively correct and naturally 
internalizable.  Moreover, given that the theory is self-refuting (i.e., it implies that some of its 
consequences are insignificant), if one has access to a language with more expressive resources, 
one can argue that this fact renders it false (see Chapter Three for a discussion of self-refutation 
problems).  Nevertheless, Reinhardt’s theory is, as far as I know, the first theory of truth to 
permit a descriptively correct, weakly internalizable semantic theory for truth.  That alone is a 
significant accomplishment. 
 
 
D.3.2 VAGUENESS (MCGEE) 
 
 
The second theory I consider was published by McGee in 1991 (although an abstract of the 
theory was published in 1989).10  McGee, like Reinhardt, assumes that a theory of truth that 
                                                 
10 McGee (1989, 1991). 
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 requires a substantive distinction between employed language and target language is 
unacceptable.   
It must be possible to give the semantics of our language within the language 
itself.  …  [This requirement] is intended to hold open the possibility that the 
methods we develop can be applied to natural languages.  If in developing the 
theory of truth for a language, we required the services of an essentially richer 
metalanguage, that possibility would be closed off.  …  [It] makes it reasonable to 
hope that our methods can be used to get a semantics of a natural language, 
(McGee 1991: 159). 
 
Recall that I used this quotation in Chapter One to motivate my account of internalizability.   
McGee claims that our naïve conception of truth is inconsistent, where the naïve conception of 
truth is governed by the truth rules.  Although McGee offers no account of inconsistent concepts, 
he assumes that they should be replaced and he sets out to provide a replacement. 
McGee’s theory of truth is subtle and ingenious, and I do not have the space to describe it 
in detail.  Because my only concern in this paper is internalizability, I give a rough sketch of the 
theory below that is sufficient for my purposes.  McGee’s replacement concept of truth is 
vague—the sentences that are overdetermined on the naïve conception of truth are 
underdetermined on McGee’s conception.  In order to arrive at his theory of truth, McGee uses a 
supervaluation–based theory of vague concepts and applies it to truth.  Like many accounts of 
vagueness, McGee introduces a ‘definite’ operator to distinguish unproblematic from 
problematic cases of application.  For example, one might say that someone is definitely bald, in 
which case, the person does not fall within the borderline between baldness and nonbaldness.  
Likewise, McGee distinguishes between truth and definite truth.  On McGee’s theory, the 
ascending and descending truth rules preserve definite truth.  That is, the following principles 
hold:  
If 〈p〉 is definitely true, then 〈〈p〉 is true〉 is definitely true. 
 371
 If 〈p〉 is definitely not true, then 〈〈p〉 is true〉 is definitely not true. 
If 〈p〉 is unsettled, then 〈〈p〉 is true〉 is unsettled. 
For his theory of definite truth, McGee uses Kripke’s fixed-point theory.  By appealing to the 
notion of a partially interpreted language, McGee proves that both his supervaluation semantic 
theory for truth and his fixed point semantic theory for definite truth apply to the language in 
which they are formulated.  One of the keys to this result is that the formal language in which his 
theories are formulated does not contain sentences that pose revenge paradoxes.  That is, the 
sentence:  
(2) (2) is false or unsettled, 
is unsettled, and so not definitely true, but it is not definitely unsettled, thus, no paradox results 
from it.11  Furthermore, because (2) is not a consequence of either theory, it does not pose a self-
refutation problem. 
Is McGee’s theory internalizable in any of the three senses?  One must be careful in 
answering this question to distinguish between his theory of truth and his theory of definite truth.  
One thing is for sure, McGee proves that both theories are internalizable for the formal language 
in which they are formulated and that they are descriptively correct for this language.  Thus, a 
version of each theory is weakly internalizable and descriptively correct.  He achieves this result 
by setting up his theories so that ‘if p is definitely true, then p is true’ is not definitely true.  This 
is a counterintuitive result, but he needs it to ensure that (2) does not pose a revenge paradox.  He 
also has to deny that the vague concept of truth he presents can be made more precise.  Attempts 
at precisification result in revenge paradoxes.12  In addition, he restricts the ascending and 
                                                 
11 McGee (1991, ch. 9). 
12 See Yablo (1989), Priest (1992), Simmons (1993), Priest (1994), Tappenden (1994), and Mills (1995) for 
discussion of this aspect of McGee’s theory. 
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 descending truth rules to categorical contexts—they are invalid in hypothetical contexts like 
conditional proofs.  Thus, McGee’s theory does not respect the truth rules. 
Is McGee’s theory of truth or his theory of definite truth naturally internalizable?  It 
seems to me that neither one is for the following reasons.  The theory of definite truth employs a 
fixed-point semantic theory that is similar to the one Kripke proposes.  Fixed-point semantic 
theories are restricted to languages with monotonic sentential operators.13  Thus, his theory of 
definite truth is restricted so that it does not apply to languages, like English, that contain non-
monotonic sentential operators (e.g., exclusion negation).  For such languages, the construction 
never reaches a fixed point, and so it does not have any assignments at all.  Thus, McGee’s 
theory of definite truth is not naturally internalizable.  His theory of truth is not naturally 
internalizable either.  The notion of definite truth employed by the theory of truth is vague (so 
that it avoids revenge paradoxes).  However, in a language with a completely defined, non-
partial definite truth predicate (which one can define with the help of a non-monotonic sentential 
operator) one can formulate a revenge paradox for McGee’s theory.  Thus, his theory must be 
restricted so that it does not apply to such languages.  Nevertheless, McGee’s theory of truth is 
the first to be weakly internalizable, descriptively correct, and not self-refuting.14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Gupta and Martin (1984) prove that a fixed point semantics can handle certain non-monotonic linguistic devices 
(e.g., gap predicates), but they do not show that one can handle exclusion negation or other non-monotonic 
sentential operators. 
14 McGee’s theory is a theory of LS truth concepts.  He does not discuss the relation between these concepts and 
natural language truth concepts explicitly with respect to his theory of truth, but he does claim in other work that 
natural language truth predicates can be explained in terms of LS truth predicates; see McGee (1993).  If we add this 
claim to his theory of truth it is not both descriptively correct and naturally internalizable. 
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 D.3.3 CONTEXT-DEPENDENCE (SIMMONS) 
 
Simmons published a theory of truth in 1993, called the singularity theory, that is quite different 
from those of Reinhardt and McGee.15  Simmons’s theory is in the tradition of contextual 
theories of truth—it implies that ‘true’ is a context dependent expression in the sense that its 
extension and anti-extension differ from context to context.  Like Reinhardt and McGee, he 
claims that it does not require a substantive distinction between employed language and target 
language.   
I argue that the singularity proposal satisfies the criteria of adequacy developed 
earlier.  In particular, I argue that my proposal does justice to Tarski’s intuition 
that natural languages are semantically universal, in a way that is not undermined 
by diagonal arguments.  I show that the singularity theory can accommodate not 
only our ordinary uses of ‘true’, but also the very semantic notions in which the 
theory is couched: the notions of groundedness, truth in a context, and 
singularity.  Moreover, on the singularity account, the language of the theory does 
not stand to the object language as a Tarskian metalanguage to object language.  
Indeed, an ordinary use of ‘true’ in the object language includes in its extension 
the sentences of the theory, since these theoretical sentences are not identified as 
singularities.  I conclude that the singularity theory respects the intuition that a 
natural language like English is semantically universal, (Simmons 1993: xi). 
 
For Simmons, a language is semantically universal if and only if every semantic concept is 
expressible in the language.  He claims that many natural languages are semantically universal 
and that an adequate theory of truth should apply to such languages.  He also criticizes most 
other theories of truth for failing to meet this condition.  (I drew the distinction between weak 
internalizability and natural internalizability in section one; one can find a similar distinction at 
work in Simmons’ criticisms.16) 
                                                 
15 Simmons (1993, 1994, 2000, 2003). 
16 See Simmons (1993: chs. 3 and 4). 
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 Simmons’s theory is different from most contextual theories in that he does not use a 
hierarchy of contexts.17  Each contextual use of ‘true’ is at the same level as every other one.  
However, each contextual use of ‘true’ has some gaps—sentences that are neither true nor false 
in that context; he calls these singularities.  He provides a set of rules for determining which 
singularities are appropriate for which contexts and he is explicit about the fact that each 
contextual use of ‘true’ should be thought of as applying to all truth apt truth bearers except the 
singularities.18   
Simmons provides a way to introduce ‘groundedness’, ‘singularity’, and ‘context’ 
predicates into the object language (i.e., the language containing the context dependent concept 
of truth).  This is quite a feat given the difficulty that other approaches have had with these 
issues.  Of course, they give rise to revenge paradoxes (e.g., a sentence that says of itself that it is 
not true in any context).  Simmons then moves to a hierarchy of metalanguages to handle these 
cases.  Each metalanguage contains a context-independent truth predicate that applies to the 
object language and all the metalanguages “below” it.  An interesting aspect of his account is 
that all the sentences of the metalanguages are within the scope of the context dependent truth 
predicate, which is in the object language.  Thus, in any given context, the sentences of the 
metalanguages are in either the extension, the anti-extension, or the gap-set of the context 
dependent truth predicate, which belongs to the object language.  Furthermore, Simmons claims 
that the sentences that compose the singularity theory itself are within the scope of the context 
dependent truth predicate.  Moreover, these sentences are not singularities in any context.  Thus, 
in one sense, the theory describes a truth predicate that can apply to the sentences of the theory.  
                                                 
17 See Parsons (1974), Burge (1979a), Barwise and Etchemendy (1987), Koons (1992), Gaifman (1992, 2000), and 
Glanzberg (2003) for other examples of contextual theories of truth.  I discuss such theories in Appendix B.  
18 Simmons claims that his theory is not restricted to LS truth predicates. 
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 Presumably, this fact is what leads Simmons to claim (in the passage quoted above), that the 
singularity theory can accommodate the notions it employs. 
Is Simmons’ theory of truth internalizable in any of the three senses?  It seems to me that 
he answer is “no.”  Simmons’ theory depends on a contextual account of the truth predicate to 
solve the liar.  His solution depends on a hierarchy of metalanguages to solve the revenge liars 
that result from allowing the language to express the concepts of groundedness, singularity, and 
context dependence (concepts involved in the contextual account of truth).  Of course, the theory 
also employs each of the context independent truth predicates that occur in the hierarchy of 
metalanguages.  The question arises: in which language can the singularity theory be formulated?  
It seems that it cannot be formulated in any of the metalanguages because these lack the 
resources for constructing the hierarchy itself.  Thus, if it can be expressed at all, then it must be 
expressible in the object language (the one with the contextual truth predicate).  Can it be 
expressed here?  I have my doubts.  The object language would have to have enough resources to 
construct the hierarchy of metalanguages; in particular, it would have all the context-independent 
truth predicates that occur in the metalanguages.  It seems to me that if it has these resources, 
then there is no sense in which they constitute a hierarchy of metalanguages.  It seems instead 
that there is a hierarchy of context invariant truth predicates that belong to the object language.  
Then the question (or at least one question) would be: does this construction still avoid the 
revenge liars?  It does not.  Indeed, Simmons’ combination of contextual truth predicate in the 
object language with context-invariant truth predicates in the hierarchy of metalanguages is 
designed to avoid revenge paradoxes because there is no “highest metalanguage” out of which 
one can diagonalize.  However, the singularity theory itself cannot be expressed in any of these 
languages.  If, instead, Simmons uses an object language with a single contextual truth predicate 
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 and an infinite hierarchy of context-invariant truth predicates, then there will be revenge liars in 
the offing.  Thus, either his theory is inexpressible in the languages it posits or it is open to 
revenge paradoxes, which require it to be restricted to keep it consistent.  Thus, it is not even 
weakly internalizable. 
 
D.3.4  INDETERMINACY (FIELD) 
 
In a series of recent papers, Field introduces an impressive account of partially defined 
expressions.  From this account he derives a theory of truth and indeterminacy, a theory of 
vagueness, and a theory of properties.19  He uses his account of partially defined expressions to 
provide a novel, powerful, and unified solution to the liar paradox, Curry’s paradox, the sorites 
paradox, and the property version of Russell’s paradox.20  To accompany his account, he 
presents a new formulation of deflationism, a new non-classical logic with an intuitive 
conditional, and a non-standard probability calculus that allows him to explain degrees of belief 
in propositions that display indeterminacy.21  It should be clear that a discussion of this entire 
account is beyond the scope of this paper.  Instead, I focus on his theory of truth and 
                                                 
19 See Field (2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, forthcoming a, forthcoming b) for the theory of truth and indeterminacy, 
Field (2003b, 2003c) for the theory of vagueness, and Field (2003c, 2004) for the theory of properties.   
20 Curry’s paradox is that, from intuitive assumptions, one can use the sentence ‘if this sentence is true, then 0 = 1’ 
to derive that 0 = 1 (or any other absurdity).  The sorites paradox is that, from intuitive assumptions, one can derive 
that a person with a full head of hair is bald (the reasoning works for most vague expressions, not just ‘bald’).  The 
property version of Russell’s paradox is that, from intuitive assumptions, one can derive that the property of non-
self-instantiation both instantiates itself and does not instantiate itself.  It seems that Field’s account could be 
adapted to provide solutions for the paradoxes of denotation (Richard’s paradox, Berry’s paradox, and König’s 
paradox) and Grelling’s paradox of predication as well, but he does not emphasize this aspect of his work.  Field is 
pessimistic about using it as a solution to the set-theoretic paradoxes; however, he also does not think that a new 
solution is in order.  See Field (2004). 
21 See the previously cited works on his theory of truth for the first two topics and Field (2000, 2001b, 2003b, 
forthcoming c) for the non-standard probability calculus.  One should be aware that Field presents two nonstandard 
probability calculi, one that is classical and the other nonclassical.  He now endorses only the nonclassical version; 
see Field (2003c: 462). 
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 indeterminacy, but I provide only the details that are relevant to deciding whether it is 
internalizable.   
Field advertises his theory of truth as a “revenge-immune solution to the semantic 
paradoxes,” and he claims that his semantic theory applies to the very language in which it is 
formulated.22  Thus, he certainly claims at least weak internalizability for his theory.  Before 
evaluating this claim, I want to describe his theory. 
Field begins with a version of Kripke’s theory of truth.  A problem with Kripke’s 
approach is that the languages he considers lack an intuitive conditional.  One of Field’s 
innovations is showing how to add a conditional to these languages that obeys most of the 
principles we associate with conditionals (e.g., it obeys modus ponens, and ‘A → A’ is a logical 
truth).  Field’s method for adding a truth predicate and a conditional to a first-order language 
results in a language that has truth-value gaps and for which the principle of excluded middle 
(i.e., ⎡p ∨ ~ p⎤) fails in general.23  The conditional behaves just like a material conditional if one 
assumes the relevant instances of the principle of excluded middle.  According to Field, truth 
displays indeterminacy in the sense that some sentences (e.g., the liar sentence) are in neither the 
extension nor the anti-extension of ‘true’; however, neither ‘the liar sentence is not true’, nor ‘the 
liar sentence is not false’ is a member of the extension of ‘true’ because the sentence ‘the liar 
sentence is either true or false’ is indeterminate.  Instead, one can describe the status of the liar 
sentence by asserting that it is not determinately true and not determinately false (i.e., the liar 
sentence is indeterminate).  One of the most satisfying aspects of Field’s theory is that he 
                                                 
22 Field (2003a, 2003b). 
23 Field denies that the languages he considers have truth-value gaps; see Field (2003b: 270).  However, Field means 
something different by ‘true-value gap’ than most of those who work on truth and the liar paradox.  The common 
usage is that a sentence p of a language L is a truth-value gap if p is a member of neither the extension nor the anti-
extension of ‘true-in-L’.  On Field’s usage, a sentence p of L is a truth-value gap if the sentence ‘p is not true-in-L 
and p is not false-in-L’ is in the extension of ‘true-in-L’.  The languages Field considers allow truth-value gaps in 
the common sense of the term, but do not allow truth-value gaps in the Fieldian sense of the term.   
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 provides the means for asserting that the liar sentence is indeterminate in the languages he 
considers.  He defines a sentential determinacy operator, ‘D’, in terms of his conditional: 
DA =df A ∧ (┬ → A). 
Here, ‘┬’ is any tautology (e.g., ‘A → A’ or ‘0 = 0’).     
That Field provides a characterization of the liar in the languages he considers is a huge 
advance over Kripke’s theory, which implies that the liar is a truth-value gap, but cannot be 
applied to languages that contain truth-value gap predicates.  The problem with applying 
Kripke’s theory to such languages is that one can use a truth-value gap predicate to construct a 
revenge paradox for his theory.  Given that Field’s theory implies that the liar sentence is 
indeterminate (i.e., not determinately true and not determinately false), the revenge paradox for 
Field’s theory of truth involves the sentence: 
(3)  (3) is either false or indeterminate. 
Field is ready for it.  Although the sentence ‘(3) is determinately true or determinately false’ is 
indeterminate, Field’s determinacy operator iterates non-trivially so that one can say that (3) is 
not determinately determinately true and not determinately false (determinate determinate falsity 
is equivalent to determinate falsity, but determinate determinate truth is stronger than 
determinate truth).24  Of course, one can formulate a determinate determinate liar, but Field’s 
determinacy operator iterates again so that he can characterize it in the language as well.  In fact, 
Field shows how to define a transfinite hierarchy of determinacy operators (Dσ) in terms of 
which he defines a transfinite hierarchy of determinate truth predicates (Dσtrue(x)) and a 
transfinite hierarchy of indeterminacy predicates (~Dσtrue(x) ∧ ~Dfalse(x)).  (In other words, 
                                                 
24 It might be helpful to see that ‘determinately determinately A’ is synonymous with ‘(A ∧ (0 = 0 → A)) ∧ (0 = 0 
→ (A ∧ (0 = 0 → A)))’. 
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 Field’s theory incorporates what I called in Chapter Three the robust response to the revenge 
problem.)   
When I say that Field constructs a transfinite hierarchy of determinacy operators, I mean 
that, given a system of ordinal notations (roughly, a certain mapping from a set of integers onto a 
segment of the ordinals), Field shows how to construct an operator ⎡Dσ⎤ for any ordinal σ in a 
proper initial segment of the recursive ordinals.  There is no maximal recursively related system 
of ordinal notations; hence, given a system of ordinal notations for a proper initial segment of the 
recursive ordinals, one can construct a new system of ordinal notations for a larger proper initial 
segment of the recursive ordinals.  One can construct a new set of determinacy operators based 
on the new system of ordinal notations such that there exists an operator ⎡Dσ⎤ in the new set that 
is not a member of the old set.  In less precise language: there are many different ways of 
constructing the hierarchy of determinacy operators, and there is no “highest” hierarchy of 
them—given one hierarchy of determinacy operators, one can construct a “higher” one.25    
Is Field’s theory internalizable in any of the three senses?  I grant that Field’s theory can 
be formulated without employing notions outside his target language; thus, it is weakly 
internalizable.  He argues convincingly that he appeals only to a model-relative concept of 
semantic value to set up his theory and to prove that his theory is consistent in the non-classical 
logic he provides.26  Moreover, it seems to me that none of the consequences of his theory that 
are expressible in the target language are counted as untrue by the theory.  Thus, his theory does 
not face any self-refutation problems.  Is his theory naturally internalizable?  The answer is “no.”  
The most obvious reason is that Field’s theory depends on a fixed-point construction that is 
                                                 
25 See Field (2003a, 2003b, forthcoming b: fn. 14, fn. 21).  I want to thank Hartry Field for conversations on this 
aspect of his theory in which he pointed out several mistakes in my exposition.  See Rogers (1967: 205-213), and 
Setzer (1999), and Rathjen (1999) on ordinal notations. 
26 Field (2003a: 167-176; 2003b: 302-305). 
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 similar to Kripke’s theory.  If he begins with a target language that contains an exclusion 
negation operator, then the construction will never reach a fixed point.  Thus, his theory does not 
apply to languages, like English, that can express exclusion negation.  
Field’s response to this objection would almost certainly be to claim that a sentential 
operator like exclusion negation is unintelligible.27  If we grant him this claim (and extend it to 
any linguistic device that prevents the construction from reaching a fixed point), then his theory 
is naturally internalizable, and indeed, it is strongly internalizable.  However, I have argued that 
we should not accept his unintelligibility maneuver (see section two of this paper and Chapter 
Three). 
A related point is that one can construct a revenge paradox for Field’s theory in a 
language that has a fully determinate indeterminacy predicate.  Field’s theory avoids revenge 
paradoxes because it implies that the indeterminacy predicate in (3) displays indeterminacy.  Of 
course, if one allows him this move, then he can justify his claim that his target language has all 
the resources needed to classify every type of revenge paradox.  However, the sensible response 
to his claim is that the real revenge paradox concerns a sentence like (3) that contains an 
indeterminacy predicate that does not display any indeterminacy.  If his theory applied to a 
language with such a predicate, then it would imply that (3) is both true and either false or 
indeterminate.28  If one had access to exclusion negation, then one could easily define such an 
indeterminacy predicate.  Of course, Field’s response to this problem is to deny the intelligibility 
of a fully determinate indeterminacy predicate.29  Thus, he has to appeal to the unintelligibility 
                                                 
27 In Field (2003b: 302), he claims that an operator that could be used to define exclusion negation is “not fully 
intelligible.” 
28 See Yablo (2003) for a similar criticism. 
29 Field (2003b: 302). 
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 maneuver in two different ways to justify the claim that his theory is naturally internalizable.  I 
have argued that if a theory appeals to the unintelligibility maneuver, then it is unacceptable. 
Another reason to doubt that Field’s theory is naturally internalizable is that his semantic 
theory for truth pertains to LS truth concepts.  Of course, Field claims that natural language truth 
predicates can be explained in terms of LS truth predicates.30  However, given the considerations 
in Appendix A, if his theory applies to natural languages then it is not descriptively correct, and 
if it does not, then it is not naturally internalizable.   
In sum, Field’s theory of truth marks a real advance over Kripke’s because of the 
conditional that he defines.  Moreover, his semantic theory for truth is admirable because it is 
both descriptively correct and internalizable for its target languages.  Thus, his theory is weakly 
internalizable.  In addition, it does not fall prey to self-refutation problems.  However, it is not 
naturally internalizable. 
 
D.3.5  GROUNDEDNESS (MAUDLIN) 
 
The final consistency theory I consider was published in 2004 by Maudlin.31  Like those of 
Reinhardt, McGee, and Field, it is based on Kripke’s theory of truth.  Maudlin claims that his 
theory of truth does not require a substantive distinction between employed language and target 
language.   
If one has a formal language with the truth and falsity predicates, various 
grammatical predicates, the function F(x), and a variable over functions from 
sentences in the language into the ordinals, the language can serve as its own 
metalanguage.  Or at least, one can write down sentences in such a language 
which express the semantic theory which we have been considering, (Maudlin 
2004: 86). 
 
                                                 
30 Field (1994a, 1994b). 
31 Maudlin (2004).  See Blamey (2002) for a similar theory. 
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 Again, Maudlin’s theory is complex and subtle, and I describe only enough of it to decide 
whether it is internalizable. 
Maudlin’s book contains many interesting and insightful discussions of truth and the liar 
paradox.  Indeed, his emphasis on the inferential version of the paradox (i.e., the one that 
employs the truth rules instead of the one that employs the T-sentences) influenced my 
presentation of the paradox in Chapter One and my analysis of the revenge paradoxes and self-
refutation problems in Chapter Three.32  His theory of truth is very similar to Kripke’s theory.  
Indeed, the principal differences are in his views on the employed language for the theory.  
Kripke claims that his theory can be formulated in a bivalent language, while Maudlin claims 
that the employed language should be thought of as gappy as well.  In addition, Maudlin claims 
that all ungrounded sentences are gaps, which means that he endorses Kripke’s minimal fixed 
point as the language that best describes the truth predicate (Kripke is noncommittal on this 
issue).  One nice feature of Maudlin’s theory is that it respects the truth rules.  In order to do so, 
he has to offer a non-classical logic in which the inference rules of negation-introduction and 
conditional proof fail (though he does permit restricted versions of them).33  
Is Maudlin’s theory internalizable in any sense?  Given that Maudlin’s theory is a gap 
approach, a revenge paradox for it concerns:  
(4)  (4) is either false or a gap. 
One consequence of Maudlin’s theory is that the set of gappy sentences includes all the revenge 
liars and all the claims about the truth-statuses of the revenge liars (e.g., ‘(4) is true if and only if 
(4) is either false or a gap’), which were used in the derivation of the revenge paradoxes.  Thus, 
Maudlin’s theory does not face revenge paradoxes.  As I argued in Chapter Three, theories of 
                                                 
32 See Maudlin (2004: ch. 1). 
33 Maudlin (2004: ch. 6). 
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 truth that respect the truth rules and avoid revenge paradoxes face self-refutation problems, and 
Maudlin’s theory is no exception.  For Maudlin, it is not just the consequences of his theory that 
are classified as gaps by his theory; indeed, his theory implies that most of the sentences that 
constitute it are gaps.  He admits that on his theory of truth, his theory of truth is gappy.  “The 
good news that one can write down the theory in the language is, however, matched by a piece of 
bad news.  For the theory so expressed is, by its own lights, not true.  That is, if one applies the 
method of semantic evaluation to the very sentences which express the semantic theory, those 
sentences mostly turn out to be ungrounded,” (Maudlin 2004: 86).   
In Chapter Three, I argued that theories of truth that respect the truth rules and face self-
refutation problems are unacceptable because one can show that if a theory of truth respects the 
truth rules and implies that one of its consequences is a gap, then it is false (so long as one has 
access to a bivalent language with the requisite linguistic resources).  Maudlin claims that there 
are no languages in which one could formulate this objection because the truth predicate for any 
language with the capacity to represent its syntactic structure is partial and the linguistic devices 
that could be introduced into such a language to formulate the objection (e.g., exclusion 
negation) are unintelligible.34  Indeed, Maudlin claims that all non-monotonic sentential 
operators are unintelligible.35  Thus, his response to the self-refutation problem constitutes an 
unintelligibility maneuver.  (In Chapter Three, I called this the robust response to the self-
refutation problem.)   
He attempts to respond to the self-refutation problem by proposing an account of 
assertibility on which gappy sentences can be assertible.  However, once one introduces the 
vocabulary into the target language to express this claim, one can generate a paradox that is very 
                                                 
34 “No matter how much one wants there to be a Strong negation such that the Strong negation of an ungrounded 
sentence is true, such a connective is incoherent,” (Maudlin 2004: 54). 
35 Maudlin (2004: 51).  He also claims that strong truth is unintelligible; Maudlin (2004: 52). 
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 much like the liar, but involves assertibility.  Thus, it seems that Maudlin has traded in a 
paradoxical notion of truth for a paradoxical notion of assertibility.  In response to this worry, he 
claims that assertibility is always relative to a set of rules and there is no ideal set of rules for 
assertibility.  Given that the real problem with Maudlin’s response to the self-refutation problem 
is that he is forced into making an unintelligibility maneuver, it seems to me that, although his 
claims about assertibility are implausible, an opponent should focus on the original self-
refutation problem and the fact that his unintelligibility maneuver is unacceptable. 
It seems to me that Maudlin does an excellent job of insuring that his theory of truth 
employs only the linguistic devices that belong to the target language.  Thus, his semantic theory 
for truth is weakly internalizable and descriptively correct for its target language.  Of course, his 
theory is also self-refuting, and so it is unacceptable, even if it is restricted to this target 
language.  Because natural languages contain non-monotonic sentential operators, his semantic 
theory for truth is not naturally internalizable. 
 
D.4  INCONSISTENCY THEORIES 
 
All the theories of truth described in section three imply that truth is a consistent concept.  I call 
these consistency theories.  As I argued in Chapter Three, any consistency theory of truth that 
respects the truth rules faces either a revenge paradox or a self-refutation problem.  As we saw, 
one can construct a weakly internalizable semantic theory for truth on the basis of a consistency 
theory of truth if one is willing to respond to either the revenge paradoxes or the self-refutation 
problems with an unintelligibility maneuver.  Of course, such theories are radically implausible.   
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 In this section, I consider four theories of truth that imply that truth is an inconsistent concept.  I 
call these inconsistency theories.  The major project for a proponent of an inconsistency theory 
of truth is constructing a plausible theory of inconsistent concepts.  There has been little work 
done on this issue and there is little agreement on the nature of inconsistent concepts.  Each 
theory of truth in this section is based on a different theory of inconsistent concepts.   
In Chapter Three, I discussed a problem for any theory of inconsistent concepts; namely, 
most theories of X are naïve theories of X, which are collections of principles that purport to 
govern the concept X.  However, if X is an inconsistent concept, then the principles that govern 
it are inconsistent; hence, if X is an inconsistent concept, then a naïve theory of X is an 
inconsistent theory.  Thus, if inconsistent theories are unacceptable, then naïve theories of 
inconsistent concepts are unacceptable.  If X is an inconsistent concept, then what form should a 
theory of X take?  I have quite a bit to say in response to this question in Chapters Four, Five, 
Six, and Seven, and Appendix E.  One important point for my purposes in this paper is that if X 
is an inconsistent concept, then an inconsistency theory of X should not employ X.  Why?  If X 
is an inconsistent concept, then sentences that express X are truth-value gaps (for the argument 
see Chapter Five).36  Thus, if X is an inconsistent concept and a theory of X employs X, then 
some of the sentences that constitute that theory are gaps.  On some accounts of assertibility, no 
such theory is assertible.37  In addition, if X is an inconsistent concept, then X is a concept that 
should not be employed, not even in a theory of X.  Presumably, once people stop using X, one 
should still be able to use the theory of X (otherwise, the explanation of X, the logic for X, and 
the semantic theory for X would have to be abandoned along with X).  Thus, a theory of X 
                                                 
36 This result holds for any concept of truth for which the truth rules are constitutive.  It also holds for the 
replacement concepts of truth I offer in Chapter Seven.  Thus, sentences that express inconsistent concepts are 
neither ascending weak true, ascending weak false, descending weak true, or descending weak false.   
37 See Appendix B for discussion. 
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 should not employ X, if X is an inconsistent concept.  Another reason for this claim is that when 
one employs an inconsistent concept, one commits oneself to following incompatible rules.  
Other things being equal, one should avoid committing oneself to following incompatible rules.  
Thus, one should not employ an inconsistent concept.  That principle holds for theory 
construction as well.  If one accepts a theory that employs an inconsistent concept, then one 
commits oneself to following incompatible rules.  Thus, one should not accept any theory that 
employs an inconsistent concept.   
These issues affect internalizability in the following way.  If T is a semantic theory for 
truth and T is based on an inconsistency theory of truth that has the form of a naïve theory, then 
T is inconsistent unless it is restricted.  The restriction will render T essentially external for 
natural languages.  Likewise, if T is a semantic theory for truth, T is based on an inconsistency 
theory of truth, and T employs an inconsistent concept of truth, then T faces something similar to 
a revenge paradox unless T is restricted in a way that renders it essentially external.  Consider 
how a revenge paradox affects someone who accepts a theory of truth.  If S is a person who 
accepts a theory of truth that gives rise to a revenge paradox, then S is committed to the claim 
that the revenge liar is both true and notE true.  Now consider a person who accepts a theory that 
employs an inconsistent concept X.  If S accepts such a theory, then S is employing X; hence, S 
is committed to the claim that X both applies and disapplies to the objects in X’s 
overdetermination set.  Thus, both the person who accepts a theory of truth that gives rise to a 
revenge paradox and the person who accepts a theory that employs an inconsistent concept 
commit themselves to a contradiction.  A theory that employs an inconsistent concept can be 
restricted so that the items in the overdetermination set are outside its scope, but in the case of a 
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 semantic theory for truth that employs an inconsistent concept of truth, this restriction renders 
the theory essentially external for natural languages.   
To summarize, an inconsistency theory of truth should not take the form of a naïve 
theory, and an inconsistency theory of truth should not employ the inconsistent concept of truth 
(or any other inconsistent concepts).    
 
D.4.1  DIALETHEISM (PRIEST) 
 
The first inconsistency theory of truth I consider is dialetheism.  Actually, dialetheism is not, by 
itself, a theory of truth; rather, it is the view that some contradictions are true.  The supporters of 
dialetheism use it together with a paraconsistent logic to construct a theory of truth.  The logic 
used is called LP, and it is similar to the logic employed by Kripke’s theory of truth, except that 
the sentences assigned truth-value gaps (neither true nor false) by Kripke’s theory are assigned 
truth-value gluts (both true and false) by LP; on the logic at work in Kripke’s theory, these 
sentences are not designated, while on LP, they are designated.  LP is a paraconsistent logic, 
which means that it is not the case that everything follows from a contradiction in LP.  However, 
LP is not trivial—it is not the case that all sentences are theorems.  Thus, one can use it to draw a 
substantive distinction between theorems and non-theorems and between valid arguments and 
invalid arguments.  With the help of LP and dialetheism, one can simply take the truth rules to be 
a theory of truth; call it the dialetheic theory of truth.38   
                                                 
38 See Priest (1979, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1998, 2002).  An axiomatic version of the dialetheic theory of truth 
adds the truth rules to the truths of first-order arithmetic or some axiomatizable theory of a fragment of first-order 
arithmetic to allow for self-reference; I ignore this complication. 
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 It is important to understand something about dialetheism.  It is not the view that some 
contradictions are rationally acceptable.  Field endorses this interpretation and that is a mistake.39  
There is a cognitive/aletheic ambiguity that haunts areas around here.  The problem seems to be 
that ‘true’ can be used to convey agreement or acceptance.  However, this cannot be the meaning 
of ‘true’ because it fails in embedding tests.  Nevertheless, it is easy to confuse the illocutionary 
aspect of truth with its locutionary aspect.  That is, it is easy to mistake a claim that p is true for 
the claim that one believes that p.  Field makes this mistake when he revises the account of 
dialetheism in terms of belief or acceptance.  Dialetheism, as it as been formulated and defended, 
is an aletheic doctrine, not a cognitive one.  One can imagine a doctrine, dicognitivism, which 
implies that it is rational for us to believe contradictions, or diconativism, which implies that it is 
rational for us to desire contradictory circumstances, or diassertionism, which implies that it is 
rational to assert a contradiction.  However, these are distinct from dialetheism, which is a 
doctrine about the features of truth bearers.   
Notice that the dialetheic theory of truth is a naïve theory of truth.  It is also inconsistent.  
The proponents of dialetheism admit that this theory is inconsistent (indeed, they claim that it is 
both true and false), and they have spent a considerable amount of time and energy arguing that 
inconsistent theories can be rationally acceptable.40  It seems to me that the principle of mono-
aletheism (i.e., no truth-bearer is both true and false) is constitutive of our concept of truth.  
Thus, it seems to me that one can reject dialetheism and the dialetheic theory of truth without 
giving any further justification.41  However, in this paper, I am interested in whether the theories 
I consider are internalizable in any of the three senses. 
                                                 
39 Field (forthcoming a). 
40 See Chihara (1984), Priest (1984, 1987, 1998, 2000), Parsons (1990), and Field (2002). 
41 See Lewis (1982: 101) for a similar view. 
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 I am willing to assume that the dialetheic theory of truth appeals only to concepts 
definable in LP.  Thus, the semantic theory for truth that is based on this theory is weakly 
internalizable.  Of course, it is not descriptively correct (because it is inconsistent), but the 
dialetheist will deny that this is a problem and I am not going to argue the point here.  The 
semantic theory for truth that is based on the dialetheic theory is not naturally internalizable 
because of a familiar problem.  The dialetheic theory cannot be applied to languages with non-
monotonic sentential operators because LP is trivial for such languages; that is, every sentence of 
such a language is a theorem.  Even the dialetheist cannot accept a trivial logic.  Thus, in order to 
keep his theory dialetheically acceptable, the dialetheist must restrict it to languages with no non-
monotonic sentential operators.  Proponents of the dialetheic theory have responded to this 
criticism by denying that non-monotonic sentential operators are intelligible.42  Thus, the 
dialetheist too appeals to an unintelligibility maneuver to justify using his theory on natural 
languages.   
Before moving on, I want to note that the dialetheic theory of truth is the result of 
applying the dialetheic theory of inconsistent concepts to truth.  On the dialetheic theory of 
inconsistent concepts, an acceptable theory of an inconsistent concept X is a naïve theory of X.  
Of course, a naïve theory of X will be inconsistent (and both true and false according to the 
dialetheist), but provided one accepts LP and the claim that some inconsistent theories are 
rationally acceptable, one might not see this as a problem.  The fact that the dialetheic theory of 
truth is unacceptable because it is not naturally internalizable is significant because it shows that 
even if one is willing to give up the law of non-contradiction in an attempt to solve the liar 
paradox, one’s theory is still unacceptable.  The problem, as I see it, is that although the 
dialetheist is on the right track in accepting that truth is an inconsistent concept, he still 
                                                 
42 Priest (1990; 2002: 384-5). 
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 constructs a naïve theory of truth and his theory of truth employs the inconsistent concept of 
truth.  It is essential to recognize that one can hold that some concepts are inconsistent, but reject 
dialetheism.   
 
D.4.2  INCONSISTENT DEFINITIONS (YABLO) 
 
Yablo presents a different account of inconsistent concepts by way of a theory of inconsistent 
definitions.  He then uses this theory to arrive at a theory of strong truth.  A truth predicate is 
strong if and only if ‘p is true’ is false if p is a gap (see Chapter Seven for discussion).  Although 
Yablo does not discuss issues associated with internalizability, his theory has some interesting 
features.43   
Let the canonical form of a definition be: Px =def φ(x), where φ(x) is a formula with only 
‘x’ free.  He begins by distinguishing between noncircular, positive circular, and negative 
circular definitions.  A noncircular definition is one where P does not occur in φ, a positive 
circular definition is one where P occurs in ϕ in such a way that if P’s extension increases, φ’s 
does as well, and a negative circular definition is one where P occurs in φ in such a way that if 
P’s extension increases, φ’s decreases.  As for noncircular definitions, we can follow rule (D) to 
determine their extension on the basis of the definition: 
(D) x satisfies P in world w if and only if x belongs to φ’s extension in w. 
To use (D) one must first determine φ’s extension in w, which I will assume can be done without 
trouble for noncircular definitions.   
                                                 
43 Yablo (1985, 1993a, 1993b). 
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  Rule (D) will not work for circular definitions because they require one to first know the 
extension of P in order to determine the extension of φ.  One might instead follow rule (E) to 
determine the extension of P: 
(E) x satisfies P if and only if x is a member of Φ, where Φ is a set that solves the 
equation ⎡Φ = φw (Φ)⎤ and φw(Φ) is the extension of φ in w on the assumption that P 
has Φ as its extension. 
 
If Φ solves the above equation, then setting P’s extension to Φ will make the definition come out 
true.  One problem for using (E) as a rule for determining the extension of circularly defined 
expressions is that the equation associated with a positive circular definition will usually have 
multiple solutions and that associated with a negative circular definition need not have any 
solution at all.44   
To solve this problem, one can rely on rule (F) for positive circular definitions: 
(F) x satisfies P in w if and only if x is a member of Φ, where Φ is a set that constitutes 
the least solution to the equation ⎡Φ = φw (Φ)⎤ and φw(Φ) is the extension of φ in w 
on the assumption that P has Φ as its extension. 
 
The difference between (E) and (F) is that the latter forces the extension of F to be the least 
solution to the equation associated with F’s definition and one can prove that any such equation 
has a least solution.   
 For negative circular definitions, one can use: 
(G) x satisfies P in w if and only if x is Δ-grounded in w. 
Unfortunately, the definition of ‘Δ-grounded’ is a bit complicated because it incorporates 
Tarski’s definition of satisfaction.  The following are the rules that are based on Tarski’s 
definition: 
 (AT)  s(x)∈A → T(Ax, s). 
                                                 
44 Positive circular definitions are also called inductive definitions, negative circular definitions are also called anti-
inductive definitions.  See Yablo (1985; 1993a: appendix). 
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 (AF)  s(x)∈A → F(Ax, s). 
(~T)  F(ψ, s) → T(~ψ, s). 
(~F)  T(ψ, s) → F(~ψ, s). 
(∧T)  T(ψ, s) and T(χ, s) → T(ψ∧χ, s). 
(∧F)  F(ψ, s) and F(χ, s) → F(ψ∧χ, s). 
(∀T)  T(ψ, s′) for all s′ ≈ xs → T(∀xψ, s). 
(∀F)  F(ψ, s′) for all s′ ≈ xs → F(∀xψ, s). 
⎡T (ψ, s)⎤ is synonymous with ⎡formula ψ is true of the object assigned to its variable by  the 
function, s, which assigns objects from the domain to the variables of the language⎤, and ⎡F (ψ, 
s)⎤ is synonymous with ⎡formula ψ is false of the object assigned to its variable by  the function, 
s, which assigns objects from the domain to the variables of the language⎤.  Rest assured, these 
are just the standard clauses from Tarski’s definition of satisfaction.  I refer to these as the 
satisfaction rules.  The rest of the rules are: 
(ΔT)  T(φ, x) → T(P, x). 
(ΔF)  F(φ, x) → F(P, x). 
The first says that one should add x to P’s extension if the satisfaction rules prove that φ is true 
of it; the second says that one should not add x to F’s extension if the satisfaction rules prove that 
φ is false of it.  Now we can define Δ-groundedness: 
(Δ-groundedness)  an object is Δ-grounded if and only if the satisfaction rules, (ΔT), and 
(ΔF) prove T(φ, x). 
 
It turns out that one can rephrase (E) in terms of proof by the satisfaction rules and one can 
rephrase (F) in terms of the satisfaction rules and (ΔT).  Thus, (G) will work for non-circular, 
positive circular, and negative circular definitions.   
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  There is one more set of definitions that have yet to be dealt with.  These definitions are 
circular but are neither positive nor negative because the definiendum occurs both positively and 
negatively in the definiens.  For these, Yablo suggests a reflection rule that incorporates the 
reasoning from the groundlessness of the claim that φ is true of x to the claim that P is false of x:   
 (ΔR)  Θ → F(P, x), where Θ makes x ungroundable. 
Θ is a set of claims about which objects satisfy which formulas and Θ makes x ungroundable if 
and only if T(φ, x) is not provable using the satisfaction rules and (ΔT), from the set of F(P, s) 
such that T (P, s) ∉ Θ.  Rule (ΔR) allows us to infer that some object is not in P’s extension from 
the fact that T(φ, x) is not provable from the satisfaction rules and (ΔT) (i.e., it allows us to infer 
that x is not in P’s extension from the fact that T(φ, x) is groundless).   
Finally we get to inconsistent definitions.  For Yablo, a definition is consistent if and only 
if (E), (F), and (G) are jointly satisfiable.  A definition is inconsistent if and only if it is not 
consistent.  As a test of consistency, Yablo defines two sets: 
ΓΔ = {x: the reflective rules prove T(P, x)} 
ΓΔ = {x: the reflective rules do not prove F(P, x)} 
Here, the reflective rules are the satisfaction rules, (ΔT), and (ΔR).  A definition is consistent if 
and only if ΓΔ = ΓΔ.  Any attempt to follow the semantic rules when dealing with inconsistent 
definitions is impossible.  Yablo draws an analogy with incompatible moral obligations; the 
difference is that, with inconsistent definitions, an attempt to comply with one obligation creates 
another that one must defy.45   
Yablo’s theory of truth results from applying this account of inconsistent definitions to an 
inconsistent definition of truth.  Yablo endorses the following definition of truth: 
                                                 
45 Yablo (1993a, 1993b). 
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 φ is true =df either  φ = ⎡Ra⎤ and a’s referent belongs to R’s extension, or 
φ = ⎡~ψ⎤ and ψ is false, or  
φ = ⎡ψ & χ⎤ and both ψ and χ are true, or 
φ = ⎡∀xψ(x)⎤ and all its instances are true, or 
φ = ⎡ψ is true⎤ and ψ is true. 
 
φ is false =df either φ = ⎡Ra⎤ and a’s referent does not belong to R’s extension, or 
φ = ⎡~ψ⎤ and ψ is true, or  
φ = ⎡ψ & χ⎤ and either ψ or χ are false, or 
φ = ⎡∀xψ(x)⎤ and some of its instances are false, or 
φ = ⎡ψ is true⎤ and ψ is not true. 
 
This definition is circular, but it is neither positive nor negative; it is inconsistent.  The notion of 
truth defined here is known as strong truth (see Chapter Seven for discussion).  Yablo uses his 
account of inconsistent definitions to arrive at a theory of strong truth and a semantic theory for 
strong truth. 
Is Yablo’s theory internalizable in any sense?  It seems to me that his theory of 
inconsistent definitions does not require any concepts that are inexpressible in the target 
language of his theory.  Thus, the semantic theory for strong truth that is based on his theory of 
strong truth is weakly internalizable.  Notice that it is not a naïve theory.  However, Yablo’s 
theory of strong truth does employ the inconsistent concept of strong truth it purports to describe.  
Thus, it faces something like a revenge paradox.  Anyone who accepts Yablo’s theory of strong 
truth is committed to following incompatible rules for employing the concept of strong truth.  
Granted, according to Yablo, although the constitutive principles for strong truth are 
inconsistent, his theory of truth implies that these principles are not all in effect simultaneously.  
The rules for using it change from context to context.  In some contexts the rules stipulate that it 
should be employed in one way and in a different context, they stipulate that it should be 
employed in a different way.  Indeed, following its rules in a given context can change the 
context in a way that also changes its rules.  One can find oneself employing the concept of 
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 strong truth in a context where one follows its rules and applies it to a sentence, p.  This 
application changes the context and changes the rules so that one should now disapply it to the 
same object, sentence p.  This employment again changes the context, and in the new context, 
one should now apply it to p.  And so on, forever.  Anyone who accepts Yablo’s theory employs 
the strong concept of truth and so employs an inconsistent concept.  However, anyone who 
employs it accepts an inconsistent set of principles and is committed to flip-flop like this on 
certain sentences.   
Furthermore, Yablo’s theory faces something like a self-refutation problem as well.  
Some of the sentences on which one flip-flops are consequences of the theory.  Thus, acceptance 
of the theory requires employment of the strong concept of truth, which results in flip-flopping 
on some consequences of the theory and so on the theory itself.   
One version of Yablo’s theory applies to natural languages and is naturally internalizable; 
however, this version of the theory is unacceptable because of the flip-flop problems.  If Yablo’s 
theory is to be acceptable, then it must be restricted so that sentences that initiate flip-flop 
problems are outside its scope.  Obviously, this restriction renders the theory essentially external 
for natural languages.   
 
D.4.3  SUPERVALUATION (EKLUND) 
 
In this section, I present Eklund’s theory of inconsistent concepts and his inconsistency theory of 
truth.  Both appeal to a logic device called supervaluation (see Appendix E for discussion).  
Eklund does not discuss issues associated with internalizability, but as I argue, his theory fares 
relatively well when compared to the others I have discussed. 
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 Eklund provides a theory of truth and a theory of vague concepts on which truth and 
vague concepts are inconsistent concepts.46  He argues that by virtue of our semantic 
competence, we accept the premises and the inference rules that lead to the liar paradox and the 
sorites paradox.  Eklund phrases his analysis in terms of inconsistent languages, but I prefer to 
concentrate on concepts because of the flexibility this allows.  One can think of an inconsistent 
language as one that expresses an inconsistent concept.  For Eklund, a concept is inconsistent if 
and only if the set of constitutive principles for it is inconsistent, and one must accept all the 
constitutive principles for a concept in order to possess that concept.  He resists the temptation to 
think of constitutive principles as true or unrevisable.  To clarify this claim, he introduces the 
notions of competence dispositions and culprits.  One’s competence dispositions are belief-
forming dispositions that one has by virtue of one’s semantic competence.  A culprit is the false 
premise or invalid inference used in the derivation of the contradiction in a paradox.  One can 
say that one’s competence dispositions lead one to accept the culprit of the paradox because the 
set of cognitive meaning-constitutive sentences associated with the concept in question is 
inconsistent.  If a concept displays this phenomenon, then the paradox associated with it is said 
to exert pull.  One of Eklund’s central theses is that the liar paradox and the sorites paradox exert 
pull (I call this the pull exertion thesis).   
Eklund considers the compatibility of the pull exertion thesis with three popular theories 
of semantic competence: the truth conditional theory, conceptual role semantics, and the Fregean 
theory.  For the first, to know the meaning of a sentence is to know its truth conditions.  On 
conceptual role semantics, to know the meaning of a sentence is to have the right belief-forming 
dispositions.  Fregean theories imply that the semantic values of sentences satisfy their senses.  
He argues that all three preclude the pull exertion thesis.  The first would require an inconsistent 
                                                 
46 Eklund (2002). 
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 set of truths, the second would require an unsound set of valid inference rules, and the third 
would require semantic values to satisfy an unsatisfiable set of conditions.  If the liar paradox 
and the sorites paradox do exert pull then there must be something wrong with these three 
accounts of semantic competence (see Appendix E for discussion of a similar argument due to 
Gupta).   
To remedy this situation, Eklund suggests some changes for conceptual role theories and 
for Fregean theories.  The remedy for the former is to allow competence dispositions for the 
acceptance of inferences that are not truth preserving and that are defeasible.  Fregean theories 
need to allow the sense of an expression to be the constitutive principles associated with it.  The 
sense of an expression then determines that the semantic value of an expression is whatever 
comes closest to satisfying these principles. 
Eklund’s suggestion for a semantics for inconsistent concepts is to define an acceptable 
assignment of semantic values to expressions of an inconsistent language, L, as one that makes 
true a weighted majority of the constitutive principles for L.  Eklund says very little on how to 
determine whether an assignment is acceptable and on the weighting function that should be 
used.  In a footnote, Eklund compares his strategy with the traditional supervaluation semantics:   
Talk of “acceptable assignments” is familiar from supervaluationist analyses.  But 
note that the acceptable assignments considered here are quite different from the 
acceptable assignments—SV-assignments, let us call them—the supervaluationist 
talks about.  For the supervaluationist, the reason there are many SV-assignments 
for a natural language is that the meanings of some expressions are incomplete: 
they can be extended without being changed, as Kit Fine puts it (1975, p. 267).  
The SV-assignments correspond to all the possible completions of meanings of 
expressions of the language.  They are not, as the acceptable assignments 
discussed here, meant to be as faithful as possible to the meanings expressions 
actually are endowed with.  (As illustrated by, for example, the fact that although 
supervaluationists normally do not accept bivalence, all the particular SV-
assignments are bivalent), (Eklund 2002, 265n33). 
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 As I understand it, the big difference (according to Eklund) between his theory and 
supervaluation semantics is that, for supervaluation semantics, the semantic values of the 
expressions in question are determined by considering a collection of assignments and 
constructing one on the basis of their shared properties, whereas Eklund’s theory determines 
semantic values by considering a collection of assignments and picking one (or more) from 
among them on the basis of which ones satisfy the constitutive principles associated with the 
expressions of the language.  On the former, an expression has a certain semantic feature if all 
the various acceptable assignments imply that it does; on the latter, an expression has a certain 
semantic feature if the claim that it does is the most compatible with the constitutive principles.   
It seems to me that this way of putting the difference is misleading.  The real difference is 
just that most supervaluation semantics do not respect the constitutive principles associated with 
the expressions of a language.  That is, a supervaluation semantics treats all constitutive 
principles as aletheic—i.e., ones that must be true.  Eklund places a further constraint on what 
counts as an acceptable assignment.  An acceptable assignment must make a weighted majority 
of the constitutive principles associated with the expressions of a language come out true.  In 
(still) other words, Eklund’s version of supervaluation semantics allows sentences that express 
penumbral connections to turn out false.47  Another difference seems to be that Eklund does not 
take a stand on what to do in the face of multiple incompatible acceptable assignments.  He 
suggests that it might be all right to retain bivalence at the cost of accepting multiple 
incompatible assignments for some expressions.48   
                                                 
47 Tappenden (1993) makes similar recommendations and Fodor and Lepore (1996) point out the tension between 
constitutive principles and supervaluation semantics.  I certainly do not agree with Fodor and Lepore’s conclusion or 
their argument strategy, but the tension they point out is a real one; see also Morreau (1999). 
48 Eklund (2002: 263-6). 
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 Let us consider the theory of truth and the semantic theory for truth that are based on 
Eklund’s theory of inconsistent concepts.  I assume that the truth rules (i.e., ascending: from 〈p〉 
infer 〈〈p〉 is true〉; descending: from 〈〈p〉 is true〉 infer 〈p〉; and substitution: any name for 〈p〉 can 
be substituted in 〈〈p〉 is true〉 without changing its truth-status) and the rule of mono-aletheism 
(i.e., no truth bearer is both true and false) are constitutive principles for truth; these principles 
are inconsistent.  The liar paradox results from the fact that it follows from these principles that 
the liar sentence is both true and notE true.49  The liar paradox exerts pull because by virtue of 
our competence dispositions, we are led to accept the culprits in the derivation of the 
contradiction.   
Eklund’s semantic theory for truth implies that an acceptable assignment of semantic 
values to the sentences that contain truth predicates will be one that makes true a weighted 
majority of the constitutive principles for truth.  Which ones should be privileged?  It seems to 
me that substitution and mono-aletheism are not negotiable.50  That leaves ascending and 
descending.  Which one is more important?  It seems to me that descending is more important, 
but that intuition is probably idiosyncratic.  Either way, any acceptable assignment of semantic 
values to truth sentences makes true substitution, mono-aletheism, and either ascending or 
descending.  Presumably, the untrue truth rule is assigned either falsity or gaphood (depending 
on how one sets up the theory).  It seems to me that this theory has a host of problems (which I 
discuss in Appendix E), but here I am concerned with internalizability. 
Is Eklund’s theory internalizable?  Before answering this question, one should note that 
his theory is not a naïve theory of truth, but it does employ the inconsistent concept of truth.  
Thus, it satisfies one of the constraints presented at the beginning of section three, but not the 
                                                 
49 ‘notE’ expresses exclusion negation. 
50 See Eklund (2002: 267). 
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 other.  Given that the acceptable assignments of truth values must satisfy the law of mono-
aletheism, and the theory does not respect all the truth rules, Eklund’s theory does not give rise 
to revenge paradoxes.  Of course, he explains why they exert pull and such.  His theory says the 
same things about revenge paradoxes that it says about the liar paradox; if the liar is false 
(gappy) on Eklund’s theory then so is the revenge liar.  Thus, he might need a non-classical logic 
to accompany his theory, but I am willing to assume that he can do this without appealing to 
concepts outside his target language.  Thus, his theory is weakly internalizable, and it is 
descriptively correct for the target language (given that the target language is a formal language 
with stipulated semantic features). 
Does the theory face self-refutation problems?  Yes.  Assume that the theory implies that 
the liar is false.  Then, ‘the liar is false’ is a consequence of the theory.  Thus, the liar is a 
consequence of the theory.  Thus, the theory implies that one of its consequences is false.  If, 
instead, it assigns the liar gaphood, then it assigns the revenge liar for gap approaches a gap as 
well.  Thus, ‘the revenge liar is either false or gappy’ is a consequence of the theory.  Hence, the 
revenge liar is a consequence of the theory.  Therefore, the theory implies that one of its 
consequences is a gap.  Either way, the theory is self-refuting.  Because it does not validate the 
truth rules, he might be able to get out of this problem by proposing an account of assertibility 
and rational acceptability on which gappy sentences are assertible and acceptable.  If so, then he 
will face the assertibility paradox that Maudlin faces.   
Because his theory employs the inconsistent concept of truth it purports to describe, it 
does face an analog of the revenge paradox (the problem is similar to the one confronting 
Yablo’s theory).  In particular, if S accepts Eklund’s theory, then S employs the inconsistent 
concept of truth.  Thus, if one accepts Eklund’s theory, then one is disposed to accept the truth 
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 rules.  If one accepts the truth rules, then one is disposed to accept that paradoxical sentences are 
both true and notE true.  I showed in the previous paragraph that a paradoxical sentence is a 
consequence of Eklund’s theory.  Thus, anyone who accepts Eklund’s theory is disposed to 
accept that it has a contradiction as a consequence.  Although his theory can be formulated so 
that it does not imply that it is false, it does imply that anyone who accepts it will be disposed to 
accept that it is false.  This feature of his theory stems from the fact that his theory employs the 
inconsistent concept of truth.  It seems to me that any theory with this feature is unacceptable.  
Nevertheless, a version of his theory is naturally internalizable.  However, it is both self-refuting 
and unacceptable because it employs an inconsistent concept.  One could construct a restricted 
version of Eklund’s theory that avoids both the self-refutation problem and the analog of the 
revenge paradox, but the restricted version is not naturally internalizable. 
 
D.4.4  CONFUSION  
 
In this final section, I discuss the theory of inconsistent concepts I endorse.  On this theory, an 
inconsistent concept is one whose constitutive principles are inconsistent.  The central claim of 
this theory is that inconsistent concepts are confused concepts.  That is, for each inconsistent 
concept, there is a set of component concepts that play two roles.  First, they are used in the 
logic, the pragmatic theory, and the semantic theory for inconsistent concepts; second, they serve 
as replacements for the inconsistent concept. 
When considering an inconsistent concept, it is essential to distinguish between several 
sets of rules for using it.  First, there are the inconsistent rules that are constitutive of the concept.  
Those who employ the concept try to follow these rules.  Second, there are the rules stipulated by 
the logic, the pragmatic theory, and the semantic theory for inconsistent concepts.  An interpreter 
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 who knows the concept is inconsistent treats those who employ it as if they are bound by these 
rules.  Third, there are the rules stipulating that the concept should not be used at all.  Those who 
know that it is inconsistent are bound by these rules.   
It is essential to distinguish between an inconsistent concept’s application set, its 
extension, its disapplication set, its anti-extension, its range of inapplicability, and its non-
extension.  A concept’s application set includes all the items to which applies, its disapplication 
set contains all the items to which it disapplies, and its range of inapplicability consists of all the 
items to which it neither applies nor disapplies (all three are determined by its constitutive 
principles).  (The union of its application set and disapplication set is its range of applicability.)  
For acceptable concepts, the extension and the application set are identical, the anti-extension 
and the disapplication set are identical, and the non-extension and the range of inapplicability are 
identical.  An inconsistent concept has an empty extension and anti-extension, but its application 
set and a disapplication set need not be.  An inconsistent concept can be application-inconsistent 
or range-inconsistent (or both).  A concept is application-inconsistent if and only if its 
application set and disapplication set are not disjoint.  A concept is range-inconsistent if and only 
if its range of applicability and range of inapplicability are not disjoint.   
The theory of inconsistent concepts I offer has a logic, a pragmatic theory, and a semantic 
theory for inconsistent concepts.  The logic appropriate for an inconsistent concept depends on 
its components.  If it is completely defined and has n components, then an n-component logic is 
appropriate.  If it is partially defined and has n components, then a partial n-component logic is 
appropriate.  Both n-component logics and partial n-component logics are relevance logics.  The 
pragmatic theory is a scorekeeping theory—it specifies how those who know the concept is 
inconsistent should keep score on those who employ it.  The semantic theory for inconsistent 
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 concepts is an inferential role theory—it specifies the inferential roles of the sentences that 
express the inconsistent concept (the inferential role of a sentence includes its role in perception 
and action as well).  These three theories are used to interpret those who employ inconsistent 
concepts.  In addition, I endorse the replacement policy for handling cases of conceptual 
inconsistency; inconsistent concepts should be replaced with consistent ones.   
When one uses this theory of inconsistent concepts to arrive at an inconsistency theory of 
truth, one must decide on the components of truth.  My view is that truth is both range-
inconsistent and application-inconsistent.  One can deal with the range-inconsistency by 
distinguishing between weak truth, strong truth, and dual truth, but each of these concepts is still 
application-inconsistent (see Chapter Seven for discussion of these concepts).  One can deal with 
the application-inconsistency by distinguishing an ascending and a descending version of each of 
these concepts.  The theory of truth I offer implies that our inconsistent concept of truth has six 
components: weak ascending truth, weak descending truth, strong ascending truth, strong 
descending truth, dual ascending truth, and dual descending truth.  The strong and dual concepts 
are defined in terms of the weak concepts.   
The weak truth predicates are defined in the following way.  Both weak truth predicates 
are partially defined and have the same range of applicability; however their extensions and anti-
extensions are slightly different.  Ascending weak truth obeys the rule: from 〈p〉 infer 〈〈p〉 is 
ascending weak true〉.  Descending weak truth obeys the rule: from 〈〈p〉 is descending weak true〉 
infer 〈p〉.  Ascending weak truth obeys the analog of the descending weak truth rule for non-
pathological sentences, and descending weak truth obeys the analog of the ascending weak truth 
rule for non-pathological sentences.  A pathological sentence is a sentence that contains either 
‘ascending weak true’ or ‘descending weak true’ and would be weak paradoxical if they were 
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 replaced with the inconsistent weak truth predicate; a sentence is weak paradoxical if and only if 
the weak truth rules imply that it is both weak true and notE weak true.  Ascending weak truth 
and descending weak truth are weak truth predicates because if 〈p〉 is a weak gap, then 〈〈p〉 is 
ascending weak true〉 and 〈〈p〉 is descending weak true〉 are both weak gaps.  All the sentences 
that expresses defective concepts (including all the sentences that express our inconsistent 
concept of truth) are weak gaps.  It is important to recognize that although ascending and 
descending weak truth are partial, they are consistent concepts. 
Ascending weak truth and descending weak truth differ on the pathological sentences.  
Consider the following two sentences:  
(α) (α) is ascending weak false. 
(δ) (δ) is descending weak false. 
These sentences are pathological.  However, they are not paradoxical—it is not the case that the 
theory of the weak truth predicates has the following consequences: (i) (α) is both ascending 
weak true and ascending weak false, (ii) (α) is both descending weak true and descending weak 
false, (iii) (δ) is both ascending weak true and ascending weak false, and (iv) (δ) is both 
descending weak true and descending weak false.  Indeed, the theory of the weak truth predicates 
implies that (α) and (δ) are both ascending weak true and descending weak false.  Consider the 
analogs of the liar reasoning for (α) and (δ): 
 (α) is AWT (assumption) (δ) is DWT (assumption) 
 ‘(α) is AWF’ is AWT (substitution) ‘(δ) is DWF’ is DWT (substitution) 
 (α) is AWF (descending) (δ) is DWF (descending) 
 (α) is AWF (assumption) (δ) is DWF (assumption) 
 ‘(α) is AWF’ is AWT (ascending) ‘(δ) is DWF’ is DWT (ascending) 
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  (α) is AWT (substitution) (δ) is DWT (substitution) 
 ∴(α) is AWT iff (α) is AWF ∴(δ) is DWT iff (δ) is DWF 
Neither of these arguments is valid.  In the argument concerning (α), the third step is invalid, and 
in the argument concerning (δ), the fifth step is invalid.  Of course, one can prove that both (α) 
and (δ) are AWT and DWF, but that is not a contradictory conclusion.   
Figure D.1 is a diagram of weak truth (which is inconsistent) and Figure D.2 is a diagram 
of ascending weak truth and descending weak truth (which are consistent). 
 
 
 
WG
WT WF
Weak Paradoxical Sentences
  
AWG
AWT DWF
Weak Pathological Sentences
DWG
DWT AWF
 
 Figure D.1 (Weak Truth) Figure D.2 (Ascending Weak Truth and Descending 
Weak Truth) 
 
 
 
Notice that Figure D.1 is a diagram of the application set, disapplication set, and range of 
inapplicability for weak truth, while figure D.2 is a diagram of the extension, anti-extension, and 
non-extension of ascending weak truth and descending weak truth (weak truth has an empty 
extension and an empty anti-extension). 
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 The components of truth are used in the logic, the pragmatic theory, and the semantic 
theory for truth.  Because truth has six components and they are partially defined with different 
ranges of applicability, the logic for truth is a partial 6-component logic.  This logic has 63 
epistemically-interpreted semantic values (see Chapters Six and Seven for some details).  The 
partial 6-component logic is a relevance logic—it does not validate disjunctive syllogism, and it 
does not imply that every sentence is a consequence of a contradiction.   
The liar reasoning is invalid in the partial 6-component logic.  Consider the liar reasoning 
(let (λ) be ‘(λ) is false’): 
(a) (λ) is true. (assumption) 
(b) ‘(λ) is false’ is true. (from (a) by substitution)  
(c) (λ) is false. (from (b) by descending) 
(d) if (λ) is true, then (λ) is false. (from (a) through (c) by conditional proof) 
(e) (λ) is false. (assumption) 
(f) ‘(λ) is false’ is true. (from (e) by ascending) 
(g) (λ) is true. (from (f) by substitution) 
(h) if (λ) is false, then (λ) is true. (from (e) through (g) by conditional proof) 
(i)   (λ) is true and (λ) is false. (from (d) and (h) by classical logic) 
Steps (c) and (f) are invalid.  (Argument: the AW query value for (a) is Y, for (b) is Y, and for 
(c) is N; the DW query value for (a) is Y, for (b) is Y, and for (c) is Y.  Thus, step (c) is invalid.  
The AW query value for (e) is Y, for (f) is Y, and for (g) is Y; the DW query value for (e) is Y, 
for (f) is N, and for (g) is N.  Thus, step (f) is invalid.)  In general, any argument that depends on 
applying one of the truth rules to a paradoxical sentence is invalid in the logic for truth.   
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 Is the semantic theory for truth internalizable in any of the three ways?  To answer this 
question, we need to decide whether the inconsistency theory of truth faces any self-refutation 
problems or revenge paradoxes.  I cannot guarantee that it does not.  However, given that my 
analyses of self-refutation problems and revenge paradoxes are correct, I can argue that it does 
not.  First, notice that the inconsistency theory of truth is not a naïve theory.  It does not imply 
that the constitutive principles for truth are true or valid.  In addition, this theory of truth does not 
employ the inconsistent concept of truth.  The logic does not use truth-values and it does not 
explain validity in terms of truth preservation; instead, it uses epistemically interpreted semantic 
values and it explains validity in terms of profitability preservation.  The pragmatic theory does 
not explain assertibility in terms of truth; instead, it uses the same resources as the logic.  The 
semantic theory does not assign truth conditions to the sentences in its scope; instead, it assigns 
inferential roles.  Thus, one can accept this theory of truth without employing the inconsistent 
concept of truth it describes.   
My explanation of the revenge paradoxes is that they occur for theories of truth that 
respect the truth rules and classify some of the paradoxical sentences as defective, where the 
class of defective sentences does not include all the paradoxical ones.  However, the 
inconsistency theory of truth I endorse classifies all the sentences that express the inconsistent 
concept of truth as defective.  Thus, it does not face any revenge paradoxes.  The theory of the 
component concepts of truth does not respect the truth rules; hence it does not give rise to 
revenge paradoxes.   
Self-refutation problems occur for theories of truth that respect the truth rules and classify 
all the paradoxical sentences as defective, including some of their own consequences.  However, 
the inconsistency theory of truth has no paradoxical sentences as consequences because it does 
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 not employ the inconsistent concept of truth.  It does not classify the sentences in its scope as 
true or false.  Instead, it implies that all sentences are in the range of inapplicability for the 
inconsistent concept of truth.  The theory of the component concepts classifies all the sentences 
that express the inconsistent concept of truth as weak gaps.  Still, one might wonder whether the 
theory of ascending weak truth or the theory of descending weak truth faces a self-refutation 
problem.  Call the theory of ascending weak truth TAW and the theory of descending weak truth 
TDW.  It might seem that both theories are pathological (i.e., AWT and DWF).  Even if this were 
descending weak true, it would not constitute a self-refutation problem because pathological 
sentences are acceptable.  However, neither theory is pathological.  Consider TAW.  It implies 
that (α) is AWT and DWF.  One might be tempted to infer from the claim that TAW implies that 
(α) is AWT, that TAW implies (α).  However, the rule, from 〈〈p〉 is AWT〉 infer 〈p〉, is invalid for 
pathological sentences.  Now consider TDW and the following argument:  
TDW implies that (δ) is AWT and DWF. 
(δ) is ‘(δ) is DWF’. 
 Hence, (δ) is a consequence of TDW. 
Therefore, TDW is AWT and DWF.   
The problem with this argument is that pathologicality is not preserved by the consequence 
relation.  One can define validity in terms of AWT and DWT: an argument is valid if it preserves 
DWT and the absence of AWF (i.e., if the premises are DWT, then the conclusion is DWT, and 
if the conclusion is AWF, then one of the premises is AWF).  ‘(δ) is DWF’ is a consequence of 
TDW, and ‘(δ) is DWF’ is (δ); hence, (δ) is a consequence of TDW.  However, in order to show 
that TDW is pathological, one would have to show that ‘(δ) is DWT’ is a consequence of TDW.  
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 However, ‘(δ) is DWT’ is not a consequence of TDW because ‘(δ) is DWF’ is a consequence of 
TDW.  Therefore, neither TAW nor TDW is pathological. 
To summarize, the inconsistency theory of truth I offer does not give rise to revenge 
paradoxes, it is not self-refuting, and it does not employ the inconsistent concept of truth.  
Moreover, the theories of the component concepts of truth do not give rise to revenge paradoxes, 
they are not self-refuting, and they do not employ the inconsistent concept of truth.  In addition, 
the component concepts are consistent concepts.  Furthermore, I do not appeal to an 
unintelligibility maneuver to secure these results.  The inconsistency theory of truth is not 
restricted from applying to the language in which it is formulated; hence, the semantic theory for 
truth that is based on it is weakly internalizable.  The inconsistency theory of truth is not 
restricted from applying to natural languages; hence, the semantic theory for truth that is based 
on it is naturally internalizable.  Moreover, the semantic theory for truth is descriptively 
correct—it is consistent and it assigns the correct meanings to the sentences in its scope.  Finally, 
the inconsistency theory of truth, the logic for truth, the pragmatic theory for truth, the semantic 
theory for truth, and the theory of the component concepts are all descending weak true.  
Therefore, the inconsistency theory of truth I offer is the only one of the theories I have 
discussed that is acceptable for use on a natural language.   
 
D.5  CONCLUSION 
 
In section two, I presented an account of internalizable semantic theories and three 
internalizability requirements.  I then discussed nine purportedly internalizable semantic theories 
for truth: Reinhardt’s theory, McGee’s theory, Simmons’ theory, Field’s theory, Maudlin’s 
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 theory, the dialetheic theory, Yablo’s theory, Eklund’s theory, and the theory I propose.  I 
concluded that Simmons’ theory is not weakly internalizable.  Reinhardt’s theory, McGee’s 
theory, Field’s theory, Maudlin’s theory, and the dialetheic theory are weakly internalizable, but 
not naturally internalizable.  Field’s theory, Maudlin’s theory, and the dialetheic theory appeal to 
an unintelligibility maneuver, which is unacceptable as well.  Yablo’s theory, Eklund’s theory, 
and my theory are naturally internalizable.  However, both Yablo’s theory and Eklund’s theory 
are unacceptable because they employ the inconsistent concept of truth.  Furthermore, both 
theories are self-refuting as well.  One can construct versions of them that avoid these problems, 
but they are not naturally internalizable.  The confusion-based theory I endorse is naturally 
internalizable, it is descriptively correct, it does not employ an inconsistent concept, and it poses 
no self-refutation problems or revenge paradoxes; it is the only one of the theories I have 
considered to have these properties. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
 
THEORIES OF INCONSISTENT CONCEPTS 
 
 
 
 
E.1  INTRODUCTION  
 
In Chapters Four, Five, and Six, I presented a theory of inconsistent concepts, and in Chapter 
Seven, I used this theory to arrive at a theory of truth on which truth is an inconsistent concept.  
In this paper, I compare and contrast the theory of inconsistent concepts I develop with several 
others in an effort to justify the claim that the theory I offer is better than its competitors.  In 
section two, I discuss inconsistent concepts, I present an example of an inconsistent concept that 
is due to Anil Gupta, and I propose four conditions on acceptable theories of inconsistent 
concepts.  In section three, I discuss the prospects for treating inconsistent concepts as if they are 
context dependent.  In section four, I present an account of indirect context dependence and 
evaluate its efficacy as a theory of inconsistent concepts.  In section five, I address a theory that 
treats linguistic expressions for inconsistent concepts as if they are ambiguous.  In section six, I 
evaluate two theories that employ supervaluation semantics for inconsistent concepts.  The first 
theory is Hartry Field’s; it assigns semantic values to sentences that express the concept in 
question by treating it as indeterminate and considering all the various ways of making it 
determinate.  Matti Eklund’s theory is the second, and it assigns semantic values to sentences 
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 that express the concept in question by considering whether the assignment satisfies a weighted 
majority of the meaning-constitutive principles for the concept.  In section seven, I discuss 
Yablo’s theory of inconsistent concepts, which is based on a theory of circular definitions.  In 
section eight, I evaluate dialetheism (which is the view that some sentences are both true and 
false) as a theory of inconsistent concepts.  In section nine, I consider a suggestion of Gupta’s for 
how to interpret inconsistent concepts, which involves the notion of a frame of interpretation.  
Finally, in section ten, I present an outline of the theory I accept.  I argue that it is the only one to 
satisfy the four constraints on theories of inconsistent concepts (which can be found in section 
E.2.2). 
 
E.2  INCONSISTENT CONCEPTS 
 
I discuss the distinction between consistent and inconsistent concepts at length in Chapter Four; 
in this section, I present a brief overview.  On my view, concepts have constitutive principles.  
These principles are rules that specify how the concept is to be employed.  Simply by employing 
the concept, a person is obligated to follow these rules (of course, it is not the case that everyone 
actually obeys the constitutive principles for a given concept—some disobey out of ignorance, 
others do so on purpose).  Some concepts have constitutive rules that are compatible in the sense 
that one can follow all the rules in every situation in which the concept is employed.  Other 
concepts have constitutive rules that are incompatible in the sense that it is impossible to follow 
all the rules for employing the concept because, in some situations, the rules demand that the 
employer of the concept use it in incompatible ways simultaneously.   
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 In Chapter Four, I present several distinctions that are relevant to inconsistent concepts, 
and I provide a number of examples, including:  
 (1a)  ‘rable’ applies to x if x is a table. 
 (1b)  ‘rable’ disapplies to x if x is red. 
Rable is an inconsistent concept.  Someone who possesses rable might run into difficulty 
employing it because it both applies and disapplies to red tables.  When confronted with a red 
table, an employer of rable will be unable to satisfy the demands it places on her.  Of course, 
someone could employ rable without trouble as long as she avoids red tables.    However, even 
if an employer of rable never encounters a red table, the concept still poses a problem for her 
because inconsistent concepts pose a normative problem for their employers.  Someone who 
chooses to employ rable should apply it to tables and should disapply it to red things.  These are 
conceptual norms to which the employer has decided to bind herself.  Thus, an employer of 
rable has committed herself to obeying incompatible rules even if she never encounters a red 
table.   
In the first subsection, I present a more elaborate example of an inconsistent concept, 
which serves as my example throughout this paper.  In the second subsection, I propose four 
conditions on theories of inconsistent concepts. 
 
E.2.1  THE HIGHERIANS 
 
The following is an example of an inconsistent concept that is inspired by an example in Gupta’s 
provocative paper “Meaning and Misconceptions.”1   Consider a community of people who 
speak a language that is similar to English except that in their language, the rules for using the 
                                                 
1 Gupta (1999).  See Allen (forthcoming) for discussion. 
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 expression ‘x is up above y’ (where ‘x’ and ‘y’ are replaced by singular terms) are different.  I 
call the members of this community Higherians.  Two equally important features of the 
Higherians’ ‘up above’ talk are that they can perceptually distinguish situations in which one 
object is up above another (these situations are similar to the ones in which an English speaker 
would say that one object is up above another), and that they can determine when the ray 
connecting two objects is parallel to a particular ray that is designated as “Standard Up” (where 
Standard Up is orthogonal to a tangent plane for the surface of the planet on which the 
Higherians live).  An assertion of ‘A is up above B’ is warranted if and only if either A and B are 
constituents of one of the perceptually distinguishable situations, or the ray connecting A and B 
is parallel to Standard Up and A is farther from the surface than B.  An assertion of ‘A is not up 
above B’ is warranted if and only if either A and B are not in the proper perceptually 
distinguishable relation to one another, or it is not the case that both the ray connecting A and B 
is parallel to Standard Up and A is further from the surface than B.   
Assume that ‘up above’ is defined only for perceivable objects and only for objects 
within the national borders of the Higherians’ country.  When a Higherian can perceive two 
objects at the same time, then that person can perceive whether they are in the right perceptually 
distinguishable relation to one another.  In addition, every Higherian can determine the ray that 
connects any two perceivable objects and can determine whether any two rays are parallel.  
Thus, if a Higherian can perceive object A and he can perceive object B (not necessarily 
simultaneously), then he can determine whether the ray that connects them is parallel to Standard 
Up.  Assume that the Higherians do not know that their concept is inconsistent because when 
they can perceive two objects at the same time, they employ the perceptual criterion (i.e., they 
determine whether the objects are in the proper perceptually distinguishable relation) and when 
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 they cannot, they employ the conceptual criterion (i.e., they determine whether the ray 
connecting the two objects is parallel to Standard Up and they determine which object is closer 
to the surface of the planet on which they live).  Assume also that whether one object is up above 
another does not depend on any of the Higherians taking them to be in this relation and that the 
notion of warrant is not relative to anyone’s epistemic situation.  Finally, assume that there is no 
difference between the Higherians’ idiolects and their common language, that there is no 
conversational implicature associated with statements containing ‘up above’, and that the 
conventions governing ‘up above’ are common knowledge (i.e., there is no division of linguistic 
labor for this expression). 
  If the Higherians live on the surface of a spherical planet then ‘up above’ is inconsistent.  
If A and B are two objects that are located some distance from where Standard Up intersects the 
surface of their sphere and are in the right perceptually distinguishable relation then both ‘A is up 
above B’ and ‘A is not up above B’ will count as warranted because they are in the right 
perceptually distinguishable relation but the ray connecting them is not parallel to Standard Up.  
However, if the Higherians’ country is confined to one flat surface of a rectangular solid, then 
‘up above’ is consistent because it is defined only within their national borders.  I call concepts 
like rable that are inconsistent by definition intrinsically inconsistent, and I call concepts like up 
above (in the case where the Higherians live on the surface of a sphere) empirically inconsistent.  
From here on, I assume that the Higherians do indeed live on the surface of a sphere. 
Gupta argues that neither conceptual role theories of meaning (i.e., those that explain the 
meaning of a sentence in terms of rules governing its proper use) nor representational theories of 
meaning (i.e., those that explain meaning in terms of relations between linguistic and 
nonlinguistic entities) can give a proper account of the meaning of sentences containing ‘up 
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 above’ locutions.  According to Gupta, a proper account should provide both a way to 
distinguish between true (or warranted)2 and false (or unwarranted) sentences that contain ‘up 
above’ and a way to distinguish between valid and invalid arguments that contain such 
sentences.   
Gupta gives two examples of how people in the community use ‘up above’ to 
successfully guide their actions.  The first is the lamp example in which two roommates disagree 
about which lamp in their kitchen is broken.  Tim asserts ‘the lamp up above the stove is 
broken’.  Helen denies this claim.  It turns out that although the ray connecting the broken lamp 
and the stove is not parallel to Standard Up, the lamp and the stove are in the proper perceptually 
distinguishable relation to one another.  Gupta claims that in this case, it is legitimate to say that 
Tim’s assertion is true (or warranted).  He provides another example (the Vishnu example) in 
which a person’s assertion involving ‘up above’ is true (or warranted) by virtue of the conceptual 
criterion instead of the perceptual one.3   
The problem for conceptual role semantics (on Gupta’s account) is that it must treat 
assertions of sentences whose components are governed by incompatible rules as both warranted 
and unwarranted.  Obviously, any assertion that one object is up above another will be both 
warranted and unwarranted if the two objects satisfy one criterion for ‘up above’ but fail to 
satisfy the other.  For example, if the ray connecting two objects is not parallel to Standard Up, 
but they are in the right perceptually distinguishable relation to one another, then an assertion 
that one is up above the other will be both warranted and unwarranted.  Hence, conceptual role 
semantics cannot account for the fact that Tim’s assertion in the lamp example is true (or 
warranted).  It seems possible (and indeed likely) that some of our own expressions are 
                                                 
2 Gupta uses these two options and I will follow him.  The point is to accommodate assertibility condition theories of 
meaning. 
3 Gupta (1999: 21). 
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 analogous to ‘up above’; yet we seem to be able to use them without judging that any assertion 
involving them is both warranted and unwarranted.4   
According to Gupta, representational theories of meaning do not fare any better because 
they cannot specify which relation ‘up above’ represents.  Instead of arguing for this directly, 
Gupta considers several potential relations and finds problems with each one.  One proposal is 
that ‘up above’ represents the relation of being parallel to Standard Up.  Another is that it 
represents the relation that obtains between two objects when the ray connecting them passes 
through the center of the earth and the second object is closer to the center of the earth than the 
first.  Gupta finds three problems with these proposals.  First, they privilege one criterion over 
the other in all situations.  Consequently, they provide the wrong assessments of many assertions 
involving ‘up above’.  Moreover, there seems to be no good reason to prefer one of these 
interpretations to the other.  Finally, someone who endorses one of these interpretations will have 
a difficult time explaining why some assertions involving ‘up above’ are good guides to action 
while their negations are not.5   
 
E.2.2  CONDITIONS ON ACCEPTABLE THEORIES 
 
In this subsection, I present four conditions that any acceptable theory of inconsistent concepts 
should meet.  They are: (i) the theory should imply that the concepts in question are genuinely 
inconsistent (e.g., it should not reinterpret the concepts so that they have some other semantic 
features), (ii) the theory should be inferentially charitable (i.e., the theory should not imply that 
those who employ inconsistent concepts are poor reasoners), (iii) the theory should permit one to 
distinguish between concept possession and concept employment, and (iv) the theory should 
                                                 
4 Gupta (1999: 19-21). 
5 Gupta (1999: 22-26) 
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 apply to both intrinsically inconsistent concepts and empirically inconsistent concepts.  I discuss 
the conditions in order. 
The first condition is that a theory of inconsistent concepts should be a theory of 
inconsistent concepts—it should not imply that there are no such things or that what we take to 
be an inconsistent concept is really some type of consistent concept.  I argue in Chapters Four 
and Six that the strategy of reinterpreting a linguistic practice so that what seems to be the 
employment of an inconsistent concept might work in certain cases, but it fails as a general 
policy for handling inconsistent concepts.  I have no doubt that, given the brief description of the 
Higherians’ linguistic practice, one could plausibly interpret their concept up above as some sort 
of consistent concept (e.g., as context dependent, as vague, as circular, as intensional).  However, 
I also have no doubt that one could present a new example that is very much like the example 
given in the previous subsection except that up above cannot be plausibly interpreted as the sort 
of consistent concept in question.  Thus, given that one can construct genuinely inconsistent 
concepts, we need a theory of such things.   
A theory of inconsistent concepts should include at least: (i) an account of the distinction 
between consistent and inconsistent concepts, (ii) conditions on the logic that should be used to 
classify arguments that display inconsistent concepts as valid or invalid, (iii) conditions on a 
pragmatic theory that applies to speech acts involving inconsistent concepts, (iv) conditions on 
the semantic theory that applies to sentences that express inconsistent concepts, and (v) a policy 
for handling inconsistent concepts (i.e., a strategy to follow for those who discover that one of 
their concepts is inconsistent).  Some of the theories of inconsistent concepts I discuss below do 
not include all five parts, but I do not fault them on these grounds.  However, if it seems that a 
particular theory cannot be amended to include one of these parts, then that is a serious problem. 
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 The second condition is that a theory of inconsistent concepts should be charitable.  In 
particular, a theory of inconsistent concepts is unacceptable if it implies that those who employ 
inconsistent concepts are irrational.  There are plenty of types of rationality and I do not discuss 
them all here.  One type of rationality on which I want to focus is inferential rationality.  A 
theory of inconsistent concepts has implications for the inferential rationality of those who 
employ inconsistent concepts.  Given that an account of inconsistent concepts should include a 
logic for inconsistent concepts, when one adopts a certain theory of inconsistent concepts, one 
decides how to treat the reasoning practice of people who employ inconsistent concepts.  Thus, 
when one adopts a theory of inconsistent concepts, one undertakes a commitment to evaluate 
arguments in which such concepts are expressed according to a certain standard and to treat 
people who employ such concepts as if they should reason according to that standard.6   
Although I do not claim to have an exhaustive list, some of the aspects of inferential 
rationality include being able to determine when arguments are valid or invalid, being able to 
determine when inductive arguments are strong or weak, being able to weigh evidence for and 
against a claim, having the capacity and motivation to follow inference rules in one’s reasoning, 
and having the capacity and the motivation to alter one’s beliefs effectively in light of conflicting 
evidence.  One can employ an inconsistent concept and still be inferentially rational in all these 
ways.  A theory of inconsistent concepts should respect this fact.   
In particular, a theory of inconsistent concepts should imply that a person who employs 
an inconsistent concept is: (i) capable of following the formal inference rules he accepts, (ii) 
capable of following the formal inference rules of the logic used to evaluate his arguments, (iii) 
motivated to follow the formal inference rules of the logic used to evaluate his arguments, (iv) 
capable of following the material inference rules he accepts (i.e., capable of following his 
                                                 
6 See Camp (2002) and Chapter Five for discussion. 
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 accepted strategies for weighing evidence), (v) capable of following the material inference rules 
of the semantic theory used to interpret his utterances and beliefs, and (iv) motivated to follow 
the material inference of the semantic theory used to interpret his utterances and beliefs.7
Two features of inconsistent concepts make the inferential rationality condition on 
theories of inconsistent concepts especially urgent.  First, the potential for paradoxical reasoning 
accompanies the employment of an inconsistent concept.  For example, let R be the name of a 
red table.  R is a table; hence, R is a rable.  R is red; hence, it is not the case that R is a rable.  
Thus, R is a rable and it is not case that R is a rable.  We have arrived at a contradiction via 
intuitively plausible steps from intuitively plausible assumptions.  Consider another example.  
Assume for reductio that some red tables exist.  Let R be the name of a red table.  The reasoning 
above shows that R is a rable and R is not a rable.  Contradiction.  Therefore, no red tables exist.  
We have proven an obviously false sentence via intuitively plausible steps from intuitively 
plausible assumptions.  If one accepts classical logic and treats ‘rable’ as univocal and invariant, 
then one will have a hard time avoiding these unacceptable conclusions.  Hence, there is 
considerable pressure to endorse non-classical logics for evaluating arguments that involve 
inconsistent concepts.  Second, a person can possess and employ an inconsistent concept without 
knowing that it is inconsistent.  Indeed, anyone who discovers that one of his or her concepts is 
inconsistent should cease employing it.  Thus, a theory of inconsistent concepts will be used 
primarily to interpret people who are using an inconsistent concept without knowing that it is 
inconsistent.  Given that most employers of inconsistent concepts are ignorant of their 
inconsistency and that many theories of inconsistent concepts include non-standard logics for 
                                                 
7 In Chapter Five, I argue that the inferential rationality condition implies that a theory of confused concepts should 
imply that sentences that express confused concepts do not have truth values.  An analogous argument shows that 
sentences that express inconsistent concepts do not have truth values. 
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 inconsistent concepts, the potential for treating those who employ inconsistent concepts as 
inferentially irrational is high.   
It might seem impossible for a concept to be inconsistent without the employers of that 
concept knowing that it is inconsistent, but the fact that concepts can be empirically inconsistent 
should dispel this impression.  The rules for the employment of a concept often incorporate 
features of the environment in which it is used; if the employers of a concept are ignorant or 
mistaken about some features of their environment, then the concept in question can be 
inconsistent without their knowledge.  No amount of “reflection on their concepts” will inform 
them that their concept is inconsistent; they have to go out into the world and discover empirical 
facts to discover the conceptual inconsistency.  Consider the history of human inquiry—we 
(humans) discover false empirical beliefs alarmingly often.  Given the extent of our ignorance 
and error, there is a good chance that many, perhaps most, of our concepts are empirically 
inconsistent.  That sobering thought should lend urgency to the task of constructing an adequate 
theory of inconsistent concepts. 
The third condition is that a theory of inconsistent concepts should permit one to 
distinguish between concept possession and concept employment.  This distinction is not 
important for acceptable concepts—any acceptable concept I possess is a concept I employ.  
Here, employing a concept does not mean actively applying it or disapplying it.  Rather, 
employing a concept is being ready and willing to apply or disapply it should an occasion arise.  
However, not all concepts are acceptable; some are defective.  Indeed, an inconsistent concept is 
a particular type of defective concept.  When it comes to defective concepts, the distinction 
between employment and possession is essential.  Ceteris paribus, one should stop employing a 
concept one takes to be defective.  Of course, when one decides to stop employing a particular 
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 concept, one still possesses it.  Given that there is a valid distinction between defective and 
acceptable concepts and that one ought to stop employing a concept one believes to be defective 
(despite the fact that one still possesses it), there is an important distinction between concept 
possession and concept employment.  A theory of defective concepts in general, and a theory of 
inconsistent concepts in particular should respect this distinction.   
Some remarks of Dummett’s on concepts will illustrate this distinction.  Dummett’s 
account of concepts employs the distinction between the circumstances of application and the 
consequences of application.     
The distinction is thus meant as no more than a rough and ready one, whose 
application, in a given case, will depend in part on how we choose to slice things 
up.  It remains, nevertheless, a distinction of great importance, which is crucial to 
many forms of linguistic change, of the kind we should characterize as involving 
the rejection or revision of concepts.  Such change is motivated by a desire to 
attain or preserve a harmony between the two aspects of an expression’s meaning.  
A simple case would be that of a pejorative term, e.g., ‘Boche’.  The condition for 
applying the term to someone is that he is of German nationality; the 
consequences of its application are that he is barbarous and more prone to cruelty 
than other Europeans.  …  Someone who rejects the word does so because he does 
not want to permit a transition from the grounds for applying the term to the 
consequences of doing so, (Dummett 1973: 454). 
 
One important feature of Dummett’s model is that it permits a characterization of defective 
concepts like Boche.  I possess this concept; however, I do not employ it.  I do not employ this 
concept because I disagree with it in some sense.  In particular, I reject the inference from its 
conditions of application to its consequences of application.  Because I disagree with it in this 
sense, I do not formulate either positive or negative judgments with it—I do not apply it and I do 
not disapply it.  I reject both the claim that some person is Boche and the claim that he is not 
Boche.  However, I certainly possess it.  I can attribute it to others and I understand claims made 
with it.8   
                                                 
8 See also Brandom (1994: 116-130). 
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 Without the ability to distinguish between concept employment and concept possession, 
it is impossible to give a plausible account of how one person can attribute an inconsistent 
concept to another without falling into inconsistency herself.  Furthermore, if a theory of 
inconsistent concepts appeals to inconsistent concepts, then one cannot accept it without 
employing the inconsistent concepts in question.  A theory of inconsistent concepts is acceptable 
only if it implies both that a person can possess and attribute an inconsistent concept without 
employing it, and that one can accept a theory of an inconsistent concept X without employing 
X.   
One prominent account of inconsistent concepts has difficulty distinguishing between 
concept possession and concept employment.  This account combines the view that some 
sentences are meaning-constitutive with the view that the meaning of a linguistic expression is 
the concept it expresses.  A sentence is meaning-constitutive for a linguistic expression that 
occurs in it if and only if the sentence partially defines the linguistic expression in question.  The 
account of inconsistent concepts I have in mind implies that a concept is inconsistent if and only 
if the set of meaning-constitutive sentences for the linguistic expression that expresses the 
concept is inconsistent.9   
Before presenting the problem for this account of inconsistent concepts, I want to discuss 
an ambiguity in the account of meaning-constitutivity.  Assume that ‘w’ is the name of a word, 
‘p’ is the name of a sentence, and ‘m’ is the name of a meaning such that w occurs in p, and w 
means m.  If one claims that p is meaning-constitutive for w, then one could mean at least two 
different things.  First, one could mean that for a person’s use of w to mean m, that person must 
believe the proposition expressed by p.  This interpretation permits p to be both meaning-
                                                 
9 See Peacocke (1993, 2000), Boghossian (1996, 1997, 2000), Horwich (1998), and Hale and Wright (2000) for 
examples of meaning-constitutive theories.  See Chihara (1979, 1983), Priest (1987), Gupta (1999), and Eklund 
(2002) for examples of meaning-constitutive theories of inconsistent concepts. 
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 constitutive and false.  Second, one could mean that for w to mean m, p must be true.  This 
interpretation permits the person in question to disbelieve the proposition expressed by p.  I refer 
to the first type of meaning-constitutivity as cognitive and the second as aletheic.10   
These two types of meaning-constitutivity correspond to two accounts of inconsistent 
concepts.  On the first, the cognitive meaning-constitutive sentences associated with the concept 
are inconsistent; for the second, the aletheic meaning-constitutive sentences associated with the 
concept are inconsistent.  According to the second account, no one could ever express an 
inconsistent concept because for one’s use of some expression to express an inconsistent 
concept, the meaning-constitutive sentences associated with that concept must be inconsistent 
and true.  However, no set of true sentences is inconsistent.11  Hence, if meaning-constitutive 
accounts of inconsistent concepts are to be helpful or explanatory at all, then they must be taken 
in the cognitive sense.     
One can give a similar account of inconsistent concepts based on inference rules instead 
of sentences.  On this account, a concept is inconsistent if and only if the set of meaning-
constitutive inference rules associated with it is inconsistent (i.e., it is not the case that they can 
all be valid).  A similar ambiguity haunts this conception as well.  A set of inferences could be 
meaning-constitutive for some concept in the sense that that one has to endorse them to possess 
that concept, or they could be meaning-constitutive in the sense that they must be valid.  As with 
the sentence-based accounts, only one of the inference-based accounts is plausible; I refer to it as 
cognitive as well.   
According to the cognitive meaning-constitutive account, possession of an inconsistent 
concept is explained in terms of holding all the beliefs that belong to an inconsistent set or 
                                                 
10 Eklund (2002) contains some gestures toward this distinction. 
11 I am ignoring dialetheism for the moment. 
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 endorsing all the inference rules that belong to an incompatible set.  I use the term ‘principles’ as 
a generic term for beliefs and inference rules.  Thus, on both cognitive meaning-constitutive 
accounts, if a person possesses an inconsistent concept, then he accepts all its meaning-
constitutive principles.   
Consider how a cognitive meaning-constitutive account of inconsistent concepts applies 
to the Higherians.  Assume that U is the set of inconsistent meaning-constitutive principles for 
up above.  If the cognitive meaning-constitutive account is correct, then it is impossible for 
someone to possess up above without accepting all the members of U.  Thus, anyone who 
employs up above accepts all the members of U.  However, employing a concept is not the only 
thing one can do when one possesses it.  Indeed, one can attribute it to someone else.  In order to 
attribute an inconsistent concept, one must possess it.  Thus, anyone who attributes up above to 
someone else accepts all the members of U.  In particular, an interpreter of the Higherians must 
accept all the members of U in order to attribute up above to them.  This cannot be right.  One 
should not have to endorse an inconsistent set of principles to attribute an inconsistent concept to 
someone else.  Furthermore, if someday the Higherians are lucky enough to realize that their 
concept is inconsistent and they decide to stop using it, then according to the cognitive meaning-
constitutive account, they would no longer possess it.  Again, this is surely wrong.  Even if they 
change their beliefs and decide to no longer employ up above, they still possess it.  Therefore, a 
person should be able to attribute an inconsistent concept without accepting all the members of 
an inconsistent set of principles.  The cognitive meaning-constitutive account of inconsistent 
concepts does not respect the distinction between concept possession and concept employment.  
Without this distinction, I see no hope for a plausible account of inconsistent concepts.   
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 A consequence of this condition on theories of inconsistent concepts is that sentences that 
express inconsistent concepts do not have truth values.  Let T be a theory of an inconsistent 
concept X, and let T imply that a sentence p, which expresses X, has a truth-value.  Let p be ‘α is 
X’.  Assume that a person S who possesses X accepts T.  If T implies that p is true, then S 
accepts that p is true.  If S accepts that p is true, then S accepts that α is X.  Hence, if T implies 
that p is true and S accepts T, then S employs X.  On the other hand, if T implies that p is false, 
then S accepts that p is false.  If S accepts that p is false, then S accepts that α is not X.  Hence, if 
T implies that p is false and S accepts T, then S employs X.  Therefore, if T implies that p is 
either true or false and S accepts T, then S employs X.  Any theory of inconsistent concepts that 
implies that sentences that express inconsistent concepts have truth-values is unacceptable to 
someone who refuses to employ inconsistent concepts.  Consequently, any acceptable theory of 
inconsistent concepts implies that sentences that express inconsistent concepts are neither true 
nor false.12
The fourth condition on acceptable theories of inconsistent concepts is that they should 
apply to both essentially inconsistent concepts and empirically inconsistent concepts.  The 
example given in section E.2.1 of the Higherians and their concept up above shows that an 
account of concepts that are inconsistent by definition is not enough.  One must be able to 
explain concepts that turn out to be inconsistent because of the environment in which they are 
used. 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Camp argues that this condition follows from the inferential rationality condition as well; I discuss it in Chapter 
Five. 
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E.3  CONTEXT DEPENDENCE 
 
In this section, I consider an account of inconsistent concepts that implies that they are context 
dependent.  Gupta considers one such proposal on which ‘up above’ is an implicit indexical.  The 
suggestion is that the interpretation of ‘up above’ talk is relative to the context in which it is 
produced.  It seems that the best way to carry out this suggestion is to alter the criteria by which 
the sentences that contain ‘up above’ are evaluated.  The conceptual criterion should be based on 
the direction of Standard Up as determined by the location of the discussion (the ray from the 
center of the Earth through the object closer to it).  Gupta follows Kaplan in thinking of the 
meaning of sentences that contain ‘up above’ as a function from context to content.13  One can 
then evaluate the content of sentences that contain ‘up above’.  According to this suggestion, 
someone’s use of ‘up above’ will be evaluated by either the perceptual criterion or the 
conceptual criterion if her utterance takes place in the vicinity of the objects to which she refers 
(the two criteria should overlap) and by the conceptual criterion if her utterance takes place 
elsewhere. 
Gupta points out that the indexical semantics will provide the wrong verdict for claims 
made away from their subject matter.  The indexical semantics often attributes the wrong truth-
value to sentences containing ‘up above’ that are uttered some distance from the objects to which 
it refers.  This fact renders the practices of reassertion and appeal to authority useless in 
discussions involving ‘up above’.  Gupta also claims that propositional attitude attributions that 
contain ‘up above’ are not incomplete in the sense that they require some contextual element to 
                                                 
13 Kaplan (1989). 
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 fix their meaning.  Furthermore, the indexical theory implies that the contents of the Higherians’ 
beliefs about the relative positions of objects change as they move around the world.14   
The second and third problems seem to me to be less pressing than the first one because 
propositional attitude ascriptions that contain indexicals pose a general problem that is not 
specific to the Higherians and ‘up above’.  However, the first problem is serious and seems to me 
to sink the indexical semantics.  Nevertheless, there are other models of context dependent terms 
that do not make the semantic features of a word depend on the location of its utterance.  For 
example, one could say that the content of ‘up above’ is determined by the common knowledge 
of those participating in the conversation in which it is uttered.15  The common knowledge in the 
conversation would determine whether the sentence containing ‘up above’ should be evaluated 
by the conceptual criterion or the perceptual one.  If one posited a conceptual criterion for every 
location then such a theory might do a better job than the indexical ones.   
A significant problem would remain and it seems to me to be the most compelling reason 
to reject context dependent accounts of inconsistent concepts.  The problem is that linguistic 
expressions have their semantic features because of the way they are used.  If a linguistic 
expression is context dependent, then it has been used in a way that renders it context dependent.  
One might be able to make a case for the claim that, as described, the Higherians use ‘up above’ 
in a way that renders it context dependent.  However, one could present a new example in which 
the members of the linguistic practice do not use the expression in question in this way.  
Therefore, the context dependence theory does not satisfy the first condition on theories of 
inconsistent concepts; i.e., it reinterprets inconsistent concepts as consistent concepts that are 
context dependent. 
                                                 
14 Gupta (1999: 24-26). 
15 See Stalnaker (1973). 
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 I am not claiming that everyone who uses a context dependent expression must know that 
it is context dependent.  Indeed, if one asks English speakers whether ‘tall’ is context dependent, 
then many will say “no.”  Of course, even the people who deny that ‘tall’ is context dependent 
will treat it as context dependent, and once one gives them the appropriate examples, chances are 
that they will accept that ‘tall’ is context dependent.   
My point is that a theory of inconsistent concepts on which inconsistent concepts are 
context dependent is unacceptable as a general theory because it implies that some linguistic 
expressions display context dependence even though the members of the linguistic practices to 
which these expressions belong do not use them in a way that renders them context dependent.  I 
presented the Higherians as a people who use an inconsistent concept and I resist any attempt to 
reinterpret ‘up above’ to eliminate the inconsistency.   
 
E.4  INDIRECT CONTEXT DEPENDENCE 
 
One natural change to make to the context dependence theory is to allow the evaluation of 
sentences containing ‘up above’ to be relative to the context that contains the objects referred to 
by the singular terms in the sentence, rather than relative to the context of utterance.  I refer to 
this as the indirect context dependence theory.  How exactly would such a theory work?  Let us 
assume that Tim utters ‘A is up above B’ where ‘A’ and ‘B’ are names for objects.  Assume as 
well that the conversation takes place away from A and B.  What criteria should be used to 
evaluate Tim’s sentence?  Here is a suggestion.  If a normal observer in standard conditions near 
B could perceive both A and B simultaneously, then the perceptual criterion should be used, and 
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 it should be based on this ideal observer.  If A and B are not simultaneously perceivable by such 
an observer, then the conceptual criterion should be used. 
This indirect context dependence theory surely works better than the one based on 
treating ‘up above’ as context dependent.  However, one problem for the former is simply the 
lack of any clear theory to govern it.  For indexicals, we have several explicit theories from 
which to choose.  It is unclear whether we even have any terms that behave like ‘up above’ on 
the indirect context dependence theory.  I like to think of the difference between the behavior 
described by the two semantic theories as analogous to the difference between the behavior of an 
indexical and the behavior of words like ‘illegal’.  If I say ‘X occurred here’ then the truth-value 
of my claim should be interpreted relative to my position.  However, if I say ‘X is illegal’ then 
the truth-value of my claim should be determined not relative to my position when I uttered it, 
but rather relative to the place in which X was performed.  Tim’s utterance of ‘the action of the 
intruder who broke into my home in 1979 was illegal’ does not change based on the legal system 
in which he utters it.  Instead, it depends on the legal system that applies to the place where the 
action occurred.  This analogy does little to reply to the objection at hand.  It seems that ‘up 
above’ on the indirect context dependence theory and ‘illegal’ as it is used in English share some 
common features.  However, there is still no general theory to govern this behavior.   
Another problem is that the modified contextual semantics might work well for assigning 
truth-values to the Higherians’ sentences that contain ‘up above’, but it hardly constitutes a 
solution to the problem of providing a theory of inconsistent concepts.  I do not see any clear 
way of applying it to other examples of inconsistent concepts (e.g., rable and the other examples 
in Chapter Four).   
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 E.5  AMBIGUITY 
 
In this section, I want to consider the theory of inconsistent concepts on which linguistic 
expressions that express inconsistent concepts are ambiguous.  There are at least two distinct 
theories of this sort.  The first theory distinguishes between a number of different meanings of 
the expression in question and posits a principle for assigning one of these meanings to the 
linguistic expression (i.e., a disambiguation principle).  Any number of different logics and 
semantic theories are compatible with this theory; presumably, the theorist would use whichever 
logic and whichever semantic theory is appropriate for the discourse in question.  The second 
theory implies that the expression in question is ambiguous, but it does not disambiguate.  
Instead, it classifies an argument containing the expression in question as valid if and only if it 
would be valid no matter how the expression is disambiguated.  In this section, I consider only 
the first type of theory because the second is equivalent to a version of the dialetheic theory of 
inconsistent concepts, which is the topic of section eight.16  I call the first type a disambiguation 
theory. 
I assume that in the case of the Higherians, the most natural way to construct a 
disambiguation theory would be to posit one meaning for the perceptual criterion and another for 
the conceptual one.  I use the terms ‘perceptually up above’ and ‘conceptually up above’ as 
expressions with these meanings, respectively.  Any disambiguation theory will have to provide 
an account of which meaning should be assigned to ‘up above’ for each assertion in which it 
occurs.  I call this a disambiguation principle.  I suggest that we use the asserter’s dispositions to 
justify the assertion if challenged.  For example, assume that Tim asserts ‘A is up above B’.  If 
Tim were challenged to justify this assertion, then he would most likely either say that he 
                                                 
16 See Lewis (1982), Priest (1995), and Allen (forthcoming).   
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 perceives that A and B stand in this relation, or say that the ray connecting A and B is parallel to 
Standard Up.  In the former case, ‘up above’ had the same meaning as ‘perceptually up above’ 
and in the latter it had the same meaning as ‘conceptually up above’.  If a person’s assertion of a 
sentence containing ‘up above’ deserves the perceptual reading, then it is true just in case the 
perceptual analog is true; if a person’s assertion of a sentence containing ‘up above’ deserves the 
conceptual reading, then it is true just in case the conceptual analog is true.17
Presumably, a disambiguation theory for ‘up above’ would respect most of the intuitive 
assessments Gupta employs.  In particular, it provides the right truth-values for the lamp example 
and the Vishnu example.  Thus, it does better than any of the other options Gupta considers.  
However, there is a major problem with it.  It fails to draw an acceptable distinction between 
valid and invalid inferences that contain ‘up above’ sentences.  Because the Higherians do not 
know that ‘up above’ is ambiguous, they will often present and endorse arguments that contain 
sentences to which a disambiguation theory gives different readings.  For example, Tim might 
endorse the following argument: 
A is up above B. 
B is up above C. 
For all x, y, and z, if x is up above y and y is up above z, then x is up above y. 
        ∴ A is up above C. 
If the first premise should receive the perceptual up above interpretation and the second the 
conceptual up above interpretation, then the disambiguation theory entails that this argument 
contains an equivocation.  Thus, a disambiguation theory implies that many of the Higherians’ 
arguments contain equivocations.  Therefore, it is inferentially uncharitable.  In particular, it 
                                                 
17 This account is for illustration purposes only.  The points I make about ambiguity semantics hold regardless of 
one’s choice of meanings and how to disambiguate. 
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 implies that the Higherians are not capable of following the inference rules they endorse.  Hence, 
the disambiguation theory does not satisfy the second condition on theories of inconsistent 
concepts.18   
 
E.6  SUPERVALUATION  
  
In this section, I present two theories of inconsistent concepts that employ supervaluation.  
Supervaluation is a logical technique for assigning semantic values to sentences that display 
some sort of indeterminacy.  In the first subsection, I present the theory Field uses in his early 
account of referential indeterminacy.  In the second subsection, I present Eklund’s theory, which 
is designed for inconsistent concepts. 
 
E.6.1  FIELD’S THEORY 
 
Hartry Field began his career endorsing a version of the correspondence theory of truth.  This 
theory fits neatly with representational account of meaning, on which each singular term is 
linked via a relation (often called reference) between it and an object in the world and each 
predicate is linked via a relation (often called denotation) between it and a set of objects in the 
world.  Field then raised a problem for this account: the history of science often displays a 
phenomenon Field calls referential indeterminacy.  (It is essential to distinguish this 
phenomenon from indeterminacy (or inscrutability) of reference, which is a doctrine made 
famous by Quine and Davidson to the effect that one can rearrange all the references of our 
                                                 
18 This criticism is similar to the one Camp presents of ambiguity interpretations of confusion; see Chapter Five. 
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 words without disturbing the truth values of the sentences in which they occur.19)  In Chapter 
Five, I discussed Field’s example of referential indeterminacy, which involves the term ‘mass’ as 
it was used in Newtonian physics.  Recall that the problem is to specify the link between the term 
‘mass’ and the nonlinguistic elements of the world that explains how it functions.   
Field’s solution is to use a supervaluation semantics for sentences involving ‘mass’ in 
Newtonian physics.  That is, he treats ‘mass’ as if it partially denotes both relativistic mass and 
proper mass, but it does not fully denote either.  To determine whether a sentence with ‘mass’ in 
it is true, one must evaluate two other sentences, one with ‘relativistic mass’ in place of ‘mass’ 
and one with ‘proper mass’ in place of ‘mass’.  If both of these sentences are true, then the 
original is true too.  If both are false, then the original is false as well.  However, if one is true 
and one is false, then the original sentence is neither true nor false.  This method is called 
supervaluation; it is a popular strategy for dealing with a number of different types of defective 
discourse (e.g., reference failure20, presupposition failure21, vagueness22, and the semantic 
paradoxes23).   
A supervaluation semantics for ‘up above’ discourse would treat ‘up above’ as partially 
representing multiple relations (just as ‘mass’ partially denotes several properties).  The most 
natural choice is to use the perceptual up above relation and the conceptual up above relation.  
On this semantics, to determine whether a sentence with ‘up above’ is true, one must evaluate 
two other sentences, one with ‘perceptually up above’ in place of ‘up above’ and one with 
‘conceptually up above’ in place of ‘up above’.  If both sentences turn out true, then the original 
                                                 
19 See Quine (1960) and Davidson (1973). 
20 van Fraassen (1967). 
21 van Fraassen (1968). 
22 Fine (1974). 
23 van Fraassen (1968, 1970), Kripke (1975), McGee (1991). 
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 sentence is true; if both turn out false, then the original sentence is false.  If one is false and one 
is true, then the original sentence is neither true nor false.   
It seems that a supervaluation semantics will do a poor job of conforming to the 
Higherians’ intuitions.  The only sentences that turn out true will be those pertaining to objects 
connected by the Standard Up ray.  That does not seem right.  In particular, the supervaluation 
semantics does not provide the right verdict on either the lamp example or the Vishnu example.  
For a sentence containing ‘up above’ to count as false, it must fail both criteria for ‘up above’.  
Presumably, many of the sentences that are intuitively false will count as false on the 
supervaluation approach.  Virtually all of the sentences containing ‘up above’ that are intuitively 
true will be neither true nor false.  Given that this theory implies that some of the sentences 
containing ‘up above’ have truth-values, it fails to satisfy the third condition on theories of 
inconsistent concepts.24   
 
E.6.2  EKLUND’S THEORY 
 
Eklund provides a theory of truth and a theory of vague concepts on which truth and vague 
concepts are inconsistent.  He argues that by virtue of our semantic competence, we accept the 
premises and the inference rules that lead to the liar paradox and the sorites paradox.  Eklund’s 
theory is a cognitive meaning-constitutive theory.  That is, an inconsistent concept is one for 
which the associated set of principles that one must accept in order to possess the concept are 
inconsistent.  He resists the temptation to think of meaning-constitutive sentences as true or 
unrevisable.  To clarify this claim, he introduces the notions of competence dispositions and 
                                                 
24 There are several different validity criteria for supervaluation semantics, and I do not have the space to discuss 
them here, but it seems to me that they will pose problems that are similar to the problem with the disambiguation 
theory.  See Keefe (2000), Michael (2002), and Kremer and Kremer (2003). 
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 culprits.  One’s competence dispositions are belief-forming dispositions that one has by virtue of 
one’s semantic competence.  A culprit is the false premise or invalid inference used in the 
derivation of the contradiction in a paradox.  One can say that one’s competence dispositions 
lead one to accept the culprit of the paradox because the set of cognitive meaning-constitutive 
sentences associated with the concept in question is inconsistent.  If a concept displays this 
phenomenon, then the paradox associated with it is said to exert pull.  One of Eklund’s central 
theses is that the liar paradox and the sorites paradox exert pull (I call this the pull exertion 
thesis).25   
Eklund considers the compatibility of this claim with three popular theories of semantic 
competence: the truth conditional theory, conceptual role semantics, and the Fregean theory.26  
According to the first, to know the meaning of a sentence is to know its truth conditions.  For 
conceptual role semantics, to know the meaning of a sentence is to have the right belief-forming 
dispositions.  Fregean theories imply that the semantic values of sentences satisfy their senses.  
He argues that all three preclude the pull exertion thesis.  The first would require an inconsistent 
set of truths, the second would require an inconsistent set of valid inference rules, and the third 
would require semantic values to satisfy an unsatisfiable set of conditions.  Eklund also issues a 
challenge to theories of semantic competence that is similar to Gupta’s challenge to theories of 
meaning.  For if the liar paradox and the sorites paradox do exert pull then there must be 
something wrong with these three accounts of semantic competence.   
To remedy this situation, Eklund suggests some changes for conceptual role theories and 
for Fregean theories.  The remedy for the former is to allow competence dispositions for the 
acceptance of inferences that are not truth preserving and that are defeasible.  Fregean theories 
                                                 
25 Eklund (2002). 
26 Eklund obviously endorses the common view that theories of meaning and theories of semantic competence are 
closely linked. 
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 need to allow the sense of an expression to be the cognitive meaning-constitutive principles 
associated with it.  The sense of an expression then determines that the semantic value of an 
expression is whatever comes closest to satisfying these principles.27
Eklund’s suggestion for a semantics for inconsistent concepts is to define an acceptable 
assignment of semantic values to expressions of a language, L, as one that makes true a weighted 
majority of the cognitive meaning-constitutive principles for L.  Eklund says very little on how 
to determine whether an assignment is acceptable and on the weighting function that should be 
used.  In a footnote, Eklund compares his strategy with the traditional supervaluation semantics:   
Talk of “acceptable assignments” is familiar from supervaluationist analyses.  But 
note that the acceptable assignments considered here are quite different from the 
acceptable assignments—SV-assignments, let us call them—the supervaluationist 
talks about.  For the supervaluationist, the reason there are many SV-assignments 
for a natural language is that the meanings of some expressions are incomplete: 
they can be extended without being changed, as Kit Fine puts it (1975, p. 267).  
The SV-assignments correspond to all the possible completions of meanings of 
expressions of the language.  They are not, as the acceptable assignments 
discussed here, meant to be as faithful as possible to the meanings expressions 
actually are endowed with.  (As illustrated by, for example, the fact that although 
supervaluationists normally do not accept bivalence, all the particular SV-
assignments are bivalent), (Eklund 2002: 265n33). 
 
As I understand it, the big difference (according to Eklund) between his theory and 
supervaluation semantics is that, for supervaluation semantics, the semantic values of the 
expressions in question are determined by considering all sorts of assignments and constructing 
one on the basis of their shared properties, whereas Eklund’s theory determines semantic values 
by considering a bunch of assignments and picking one (or more) from among them on the basis 
of whether it satisfies the cognitive meaning-constitutive principles associated with the 
expressions of the language.  On the former, an expression has a certain semantic feature if all 
the various acceptable assignments imply that it does; on the latter, an expression has a certain 
                                                 
27 Eklund (2002: 260-266). 
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 semantic feature if the claim that it does is the most compatible with its cognitive meaning-
constitutive sentences.   
It seems to me that this way of putting the difference is misleading.  The real difference is 
just that most supervaluation semantics do not respect the cognitive meaning-constitutive 
sentences associated with the expressions of a language.  That is, a supervaluation semantics 
treats all meaning-constitutive sentences as aletheic—i.e., ones that must be true.  Eklund places 
a further constraint on what counts as an acceptable assignment.  An acceptable assignment must 
make a weighted majority of the cognitive meaning-constitutive sentences associated with the 
expressions of a language come out true.  In (still) other words, Eklund’s version of 
supervaluation semantics allows sentences that express penumbral connections to turn out 
false.28  Another difference seems to be that Eklund does not take a stand on what to do in the 
face of multiple incompatible acceptable assignments.  He suggests that it might be all right to 
retain bivalence at the cost of accepting multiple incompatible assignments for some expressions.   
Eklund’s suggestion does make a nice complement to Field’s.  Recall that Gupta issued 
separate challenges to representational theories of meaning and to conceptual role theories.  
Field’s supervaluation semantics is decidedly representational, but Eklund shows how to 
incorporate what is basically the same idea into a conceptual role approach.  Together, Field’s 
and Eklund’s semantic theories constitute an important reply to Gupta’s challenge.  If we assume 
that Eklund’s theory provides basically the same results as a standard supervaluation semantics, 
then both provide a way of determining truth values and validity for the Higherians’ use of ‘up 
above’.  We also see that one need not endorse representational semantics to have the 
supervaluation approach at one’s disposal. 
                                                 
28 Tappenden (1993) makes similar recommendations and Fodor and Lepore (1996) point out the tension between 
meaning-constitutive sentences and supervaluation semantics.  I certainly do not agree with Fodor and Lepore’s 
conclusion or their argument strategy, but the tension they point out is a real one. 
 439
 How could Eklund’s semantics be applied to ‘up above’ as it is used by the Higherians?  I 
assume that the sentences that express the two criteria would count as cognitive meaning-
constitutive.  The paradox associated with ‘up above’ is that for any two objects, A and B, that 
are some distance from Standard Up and in the proper perceptual relation, one can argue that ‘A 
is up above B’ is both true and false.  The paradox exerts pull because the Higherians’ 
competence dispositions (i.e., they accept the meaning-constitutive principles associated with ‘up 
above’, which are inconsistent) lead them to accept the culprits in the derivation of the 
contradiction.  It seems to me that Eklund’s diagnosis provides a nice way of putting the 
problem. 
Eklund’s semantic theory dictates that an acceptable assignment of semantic values to the 
sentences that contain ‘up above’ will be one that makes true a weighted majority of the 
cognitive meaning-constitutive sentences associated with ‘up above’ (I am assuming that ‘up 
above’ is the only inconsistent concept in the Higherians’ repertoire).  Does this constraint help 
at all?  It seems not.  We are still in the position of falsifying one criterion or the other and we do 
not have a good way of determining which one to privilege.  Either Eklund’s solution reduces to 
the standard supervaluation solution or it gives us no help in determining the semantic values for 
expressions of inconsistent concepts. 
Another problem with Eklund’s theory is that it implies that anyone who possesses an 
inconsistent concept accepts the meaning-constitutive principles associated with it.  Thus, his 
theory does not respect the distinction between concept possession and concept employment.  
One consequence is that anyone who endorses Eklund’s theory must accept an inconsistent set of 
principles.  Thus, it does not satisfy the third condition on theories of inconsistent concepts. 
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 E.7  CIRCULARITY  
 
In this section, I present Yablo’s theory of inconsistent concepts.  It is based on his theory of 
circular concepts, which, in turn, owes much to Gupta and Belnap’s theory of circular 
concepts.29  Yablo presents an account of inconsistent concepts by way of a theory of 
inconsistent definitions.  Let the canonical form of a definition be: Px =def φ(x), where φ(x) is a 
formula with only ‘x’ free.  He begins by distinguishing between noncircular, positive circular, 
and negative circular definitions.  A noncircular definition is one where P does not occur in φ, a 
positive circular definition is one where P occurs in ϕ in such a way that if P’s extension 
increases, φ’s does as well, and a negative circular definition is one where P occurs in φ in such a 
way that if P’s extension increases, φ’s decreases.  As for noncircular definitions, we can follow 
rule (D) to determine their extension on the basis of the definition: 
(D)  x satisfies P in world w if and only if x belongs to φ’s extension in w. 
To use (D) one must first determine φ’s extension in w, which I will assume can be done without 
trouble for noncircular definitions.   
 Rule (D) will not work for circular definitions because they require one to first know the 
extension of P in order to determine the extension of φ.  One might instead follow rule (E) to 
determine the extension of P: 
(E) x satisfies P if and only if x is a member of Φ, where Φ is a set that solves the 
equation ⎡Φ = φw (Φ)⎤ and φw(Φ) is the extension of φ in w on the assumption that P 
has Φ as its extension. 
 
If Φ solves the above equation, then setting P’s extension to Φ will make the definition come out 
true.  One problem for using (E) as a rule for determining the extension of circularly defined 
                                                 
29 Gupta and Belnap (1993).  
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 expressions is that the equation associated with a positive circular definition will usually have 
multiple solutions and that associated with a negative circular definition need not have any 
solution at all.30   
To solve this problem, one can rely on rule (F) for positive circular definitions: 
(F) x satisfies P in w if and only if x is a member of Φ, where Φ is a set that constitutes 
the least solution to the equation ⎡Φ = φw (Φ)⎤ and φw(Φ) is the extension of φ in w on 
the assumption that P has Φ as its extension. 
 
The difference between (E) and (F) is that the latter forces the extension of F to be the least 
solution to the equation associated with F’s definition and one can prove that any such equation 
has a least solution.   
 For negative circular definitions, one can use: 
 (G)  x satisfies P in w if and only if x is Δ-grounded in w. 
Unfortunately, the definition of ‘Δ-grounded’ is a bit complicated because it incorporates 
Tarski’s definition of satisfaction.  The following are the rules that are based on Tarski’s 
definition: 
 (AT)  s(x)∈A → T(Ax, s). 
(AF)  s(x)∈A → F(Ax, s). 
(~T)  F(ψ, s) → T(~ψ, s). 
(~F)  T(ψ, s) → F(~ψ, s). 
(∧T)  T(ψ, s) and T(χ, s) → T(ψ∧χ, s). 
(∧F)  F(ψ, s) and F(χ, s) → F(ψ∧χ, s). 
(∀T)  T(ψ, s′) for all s′ ≈ xs → T(∀xψ, s). 
                                                 
30 Positive circular definitions are also called inductive definitions, negative circular definitions are also called anti-
inductive definitions.  See Yablo (1993a: appendix). 
 442
 (∀F)  F(ψ, s′) for all s′ ≈ xs → F(∀xψ, s). 
⎡T (ψ, s)⎤ is synonymous with ⎡formula ψ is true of the object assigned to its variable by the 
function, s, which assigns objects from the domain to the variables of the language⎤ and ⎡F (ψ, 
s)⎤ is synonymous with ⎡formula ψ is false of the object assigned to its variable by  the function, 
s, which assigns objects from the domain to the variables of the language⎤.  Rest assured, these 
are just the standard clauses from Tarski’s definition of satisfaction.  I refer to these as the 
satisfaction rules.  The rest of the rules are: 
 (ΔT)  T(φ, x) → T(P, x). 
(ΔF)  F(φ, x) → F(P, x). 
The first says that one should add x to P’s extension if the satisfaction rules prove that φ is true 
of it; the second says that one should not add x to F’s extension if the satisfaction rules prove that 
φ is false of it.  Now we can define Δ-groundedness: 
(Δ-groundedness)  An object is Δ-grounded if and only if the satisfaction rules, (ΔT), and 
(ΔF) prove T(φ, x). 
 
It turns out that one can rephrase (E) in terms of proof by the satisfaction rules and one can 
rephrase (F) in terms of the satisfaction rules and (ΔT).  Thus, (G) will work for non-circular, 
positive circular, and negative circular definitions.   
 There is one more set of definitions that have yet to be dealt with.  These definitions are 
circular but are neither positive nor negative because the definiendum occurs both positively and 
negatively in the definiens.  For these, Yablo suggests a reflection rule that incorporates the 
reasoning from the groundlessness of the claim that φ is true of x to the claim that P is false of x:   
 (ΔR)  Θ → F(P, x), where Θ makes x ungroundable. 
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 Θ is a set of claims about which objects satisfy which formulas and Θ makes x ungroundable if 
and only if T(φ, x) is not provable using the satisfaction rules and (ΔT), from the set of F(P, s) 
such that T (P, s) ∉ Θ.  Rule (ΔR) allows us to infer that some object is not in P’s extension from 
the fact that T(φ, x) is not provable from the satisfaction rules and (ΔT) (i.e., it allows us to infer 
that x is not in P’s extension from the fact that T(φ, x) is groundless).   
Finally we get to inconsistent definitions.  For Yablo, a definition is consistent if and only 
if (E), (F), and (G) are jointly satisfiable.  A definition is inconsistent if and only if it is not 
consistent.  As a test of consistency, Yablo defines two sets: 
ΓΔ = {x: the reflective rules prove T(P, x)} 
ΓΔ = {x: the reflective rules do not prove F(P, x)} 
Here, the reflective rules are the satisfaction rules, (ΔT), and (ΔR).  A definition is consistent if 
and only if ΓΔ = ΓΔ.  Any attempt to follow the semantic rules when dealing with inconsistent 
definitions is impossible.  Yablo draws an analogy with incompatible moral obligations; the 
difference is that, with inconsistent definitions, an attempt to comply with one obligation creates 
another that one must defy.31   
The problems I have with Yablo’s theory of inconsistent concepts become apparent as 
soon as one tries to use it to arrive at a theory of up above.  The first problem is that, as I have 
defined it, ‘up above’ is not circular; I have no idea how to construct a circular definition of it, 
much less a circular definition that is neither positive nor negative.  I agree with Yablo that the 
concepts defined by the definitions he considers are inconsistent, and his theory might do a good 
job of handling them.  However, there are inconsistent concepts for which it is not obvious how 
to construct an inconsistent definition.  Moreover, given that all the inconsistent concepts Yablo 
                                                 
31 Yablo (1993a, 1993b). 
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 considers are inconsistent by definition, all these concepts are essentially inconsistent.  However, 
up above is an empirically inconsistent concept.  It is inconsistent, in part, because of the 
environment in which it is used.  If the Higherians all lived on a flat surface of a planet, then ‘up 
above’ would not be inconsistent.  The moral is that a theory of inconsistent concepts must treat 
empirically inconsistent ones along with the logically inconsistent ones.  Yablo’s account works 
only for the latter.  Therefore, it fails to satisfy the fourth condition on theories of inconsistent 
concepts. 
 
E.8   DIALETHEISM 
 
Dialetheism is the view that some truth bearers are both true and false.  As such, it is not a theory 
of inconsistent concepts.  However, it has been used in the construction of theories of 
inconsistent concepts.  In fact, if one accepts dialetheism, then one can treat the set of meaning-
constitutive principles for an inconsistent concept as a theory of that concept.  Of course, the 
theory will be inconsistent, but according to the dialetheist, some inconsistent theories are 
acceptable.  To accompany a dialetheist theory of inconsistent concepts, the dialetheist endorses 
a paraconsistent logic.  The most common one is LP.  On LP, sentences have one of three truth-
values: true, false or both true and false (glut).  True and glut are designated.  LP is a 
paraconsistent logic, which means that it is not the case that everything follows from a 
contradiction in LP.  However, LP is not trivial—it is not the case that all sentences are 
theorems.  Thus, one can use it to draw a substantive distinction between theorems and non-
theorems and between valid arguments and invalid arguments.   
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 On a dialetheic theory of up above, some of the Higherians’ sentences that contain ‘up 
above’ are gluts.  Indeed, because the constitutive principles for ‘up above’ conflict in many 
cases, most of the sentences containing ‘up above’ that are considered true by the Higherians are 
gluts on the dialetheic theory.  The dialetheist endorses LP as a logic for the Higherians’ 
language; it provides a standard by which one can assess their arguments for validity. 
Does the dialetheic theory of inconsistent concepts satisfy the conditions on theories of 
inconsistent concepts?  It seems to me that the principle of mono-aletheism (i.e., no truth-bearer 
is both true and false) is constitutive of our concept of truth.  Thus, it seems to me that one can 
reject dialetheism and the dialetheic theory of inconsistent concepts without giving any further 
justification.32  However, it has another problem as well.  It is a meaning-constitutive theory, 
which means that it cannot distinguish between concept possession and concept employment.  
Anyone who accepts the dialetheic theory employs an inconsistent concept and, thus, accepts an 
inconsistent set of principles.  Thus, it fails to satisfy condition three. 
 
E.9  FRAMES 
 
In this section, I discuss Gupta’s suggestion for interpreting the Higherians.  His suggestion 
requires a distinction between absolute and effective features of the Higherians’ discursive 
practice.  In particular, their linguistic expressions, mental states, and performances have both 
absolute pragmatic and semantic features and effective pragmatic and semantic features.  For 
example, ‘up above’ has an absolute meaning and an effective meaning, a sentence containing 
‘up above’ has an absolute truth-value and an effective truth-value, and an utterance of such a 
                                                 
32 See Lewis (1982: 101) for a similar view. 
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 sentence has an absolute force and an effective force.  The difference between an absolute 
feature and an effective feature is that a frame figures in the determination of an effective 
feature, but not for an absolute feature.   
Gupta’s idea is that a person who employs an inconsistent concept without knowing it is 
inconsistent privileges certain constitutive principles in certain situations.  A frame is a way of 
privileging certain constitutive principles over others when employing an inconsistent concept.  
In the case of ‘up above’, the Higherians privilege the perceptual criterion in some cases and 
they privilege the conceptual criterion in others.  Call the former the perceptual frame and the 
latter the conceptual frame.  One uses a frame to determine the effective semantic and pragmatic 
features of the Higherians’ linguistic expressions, mental states, and performances.   
It is common to assume that the meaning of a sentence and the context in which it is 
uttered determine its content, and that the content of a sentence and a possible world determine 
its truth-value in that world.  These are absolute features of the sentence.  Likewise, the meaning 
of a sentence, the context in which it is uttered, and a frame determine its effective content, and 
the effective content of a sentence and a possible world determine its effective truth-value in that 
world.  One can draw similar distinctions for other semantic and pragmatic concepts.   
Gupta claims that a frame is determined by the practice of those who employ the concept 
in question.  Some employments of the concept might not have a frame associated with them.  In 
addition, he cautions against thinking of frames as contexts or as determined by the rules of a 
language.  Rather, a frame can be in effect in many different contexts, and frames ways of 
interpreting the rules of a language.  Beyond these remarks, Gupta says very little on how to 
interpret the Higherians. 
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 Because Gupta’s theory is currently inchoate, it is hard to say much about it.  One thing 
should be clear: Gupta’s theory is not a theory of inconsistent concepts—he offers no account of 
the absolute features of the Higherians’ linguistic expressions, mental states, and performances.  
That is not a criticism of Gupta.  Indeed, I claim that there is an important place in a theory of 
inconsistent concepts for a theory of the sort Gupta presents.  Gupta’s theory is a theory of how 
those who employ an inconsistent concept actually use it.  It seems to me that employers of an 
inconsistent concept do privilege certain constitutive principles when employing it in a given 
situation.  Gupta gives us the tools to makes sense of this behavior.  However, his account is not 
a theory of inconsistent concepts.  Thus, Gupta’s theory should not be thought of as a competitor 
to the other theories I discuss in this paper. 
One might be tempted to assume that the effective semantic and pragmatic features just 
are their absolute semantic and pragmatic features; then one would have a genuine theory of 
inconsistent concepts based on Gupta’s theory.  I agree—one would have a genuine theory of 
inconsistent concepts.  However, it would be an inadequate theory.  The first problem is that this 
theory implies that inconsistent concepts are context dependent.  For example, one can find two 
objects, A and B, such that in one context the perceptual frame is effective and, consequently, 
<A, B> is in the extension of ‘up above’, but the conceptual frame is effective in a different 
context, which renders <A, B> a member of its anti-extension (assume that A and B are in the 
same positions in each context).  Thus, the extension of ‘up above’ depends on the frame that is 
effective, and so, on the context in which the utterance occurs.  We have already seen that 
context dependence theories of inconsistent concepts are inadequate because one can introduce 
concepts that are inconsistent and context-invariant.   
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 A second problem with this theory (again, it is not Gupta’s theory—it is one way of 
augmenting Gupta’s theory) is that it is incomplete.  In order to determine the effective content 
of a sentence, one must know its meaning, the context in which it is uttered, and the relevant 
frame.  Which type of meaning?  Is it the effective meaning or the absolute meaning?  If it is the 
effective meaning, then how do we determine that?  Gupta’s theory gives us no account of it.  If 
it is the absolute meaning, then Gupta’s theory depends on a theory of inconsistent concepts, 
which would specify the absolute meaning of the sentence.  Therefore, altering Gupta’s theory in 
this way does not constitute an adequate theory of inconsistent concepts. 
I want to return to the theory Gupta actually presents and discuss several issues 
surrounding it.  First the notion of a frame is imprecise.  It seems to me that we should think of a 
frame as an ordering of the constitutive principles for the concept in question.  In particular, a 
frame is a function from the set of constitutive principles to an initial segment of the ordinals.  A 
constitutive principle with a lower ordinal trumps one assigned a higher ordinal if there is a 
conflict.  The function can assign two constitutive principles the same ordinal if and only if they 
never conflict.  For example, the perceptual frame assigns the perceptual criterion 0 and the 
conceptual criterion 1; the conceptual frame assigns the conceptual criterion 0 and the perceptual 
criterion 1.  If the perceptual frame is in effect, then the perceptual criterion determines the 
effective extension of ‘up above’, and the conceptual criterion is ignored if the two conflict.33
Another issue is that sentences and arguments that are evaluated with multiple frames 
might pose a problem.  For example, assume that a Higherian, Hiram, asserts the following 
sentence: if A is up above B, then it is not the case that B is up above A.  Call this sentence p.  
                                                 
33 I suggest that we could abandon the idea that there are multiple discrete frames that are in play for a particular 
inconsistent concept and treat the frame as a function from the product of the set of constitutive principles and the 
set of contexts to an initial segment of the ordinals.  On this suggestion, the frame determines the way the principles 
are weighted in every context.   
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 Assume that ‘A’ and ‘B’ are functioning as names in p, that A is perceptually up above B, and 
that B is conceptually up above A (e.g., A and B are on the other side of the planet from 
Standard Up).  Assume as well that the perceptual frame is in effect for the first occurrence of 
‘up above’ in p and that the conceptual frame is in effect for the second occurrence of ‘up above’ 
in p.  The antecedent of p is effectively true and the consequent is effectively false; hence, the 
conditional is effectively false.  That is a strange consequence given that another constitutive 
principle of ‘up above’ should be that it is anti-symmetric.  Thus, sentences evaluated from 
multiple frames can violate other constitutive principles of the concept in question.   
A related example poses a problem for arguments whose sentences are evaluated from 
multiple frames: 
(a) A is up above B. 
  ∴ (b) A is up above B. 
If A and B are located away from Standard Up, A is perceptually up above B, the perceptual 
criterion is in effect for (a), and the conceptual criterion is in effect for (b), then the argument is 
effectively invalid (i.e., (a) is effectively true and (b) is effectively false).  Thus, if we use a logic 
to evaluate the Higherians’ arguments for validity that is based on the effective truth values of 
their sentences, then we treat them as if they are inferentially irrational (i.e., as if they cannot 
follow their own inference rules).  Thus, it is similar to the context dependence theory and the 
ambiguity theory in this regard.  We have to be careful if we use the effective features of the 
Higherians’ linguistic expressions in a logic or a semantic theory for ‘up above’.     
I see at least three roles for Gupta’s theory in a theory of inconsistent concepts.  First, it 
allows an interpreter of a discursive practice in which an inconsistent concept is employed to 
predict how the members of that community will use the concept.  An interpreter can observe the 
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 members of the community long enough to determine the frame they use, then he can use it to 
explain their employments of the concept.  He can use it to explain why they apply it and 
disapply it in the way they do, why they do not recognize that it is inconsistent, and why they do 
not accept contradictions by applying it.  It explains all the semantic and pragmatic features those 
who employ the inconsistent concept attribute to the linguistic expressions, mental states, and 
performances associated with it.  For example, it explains: (i) the truth-values they attribute to 
sentences that express the inconsistent concept (i.e., the effective truth-values), (ii) the validity-
values they attribute to arguments containing such sentences (i.e., the effective validity-values), 
and (iii) the forces they attribute to utterances of such sentences (i.e., the effective force-
values).34   
Second, the theory can be assimilated into a pragmatic theory for inconsistent concepts.  
In Chapter Six, I present such a scorekeeping-based pragmatic theory for inconsistent concepts.  
One issue I do not discuss is how someone who knows that a concept is inconsistent should keep 
track of how the people who employ it keep score on one another.  It seems to me that Gupta’s 
theory would work well for this purpose because it explains the semantic and pragmatic features 
attributed by the employers of the inconsistent concept.  For example, a person who knows that 
‘up above’ is inconsistent and is keeping score on a group of Higherians can use Gupta’s theory 
to keep track of the commitments and entitlements the Higherians attribute to each other when 
using ‘up above’.    
Third, Gupta’s theory can be used as part of an account of how someone who employs an 
inconsistent concept comes to discover that it is inconsistent.  For example, assume that Hiram 
sees two immobile objects, A and B, such that A is perceptually up above B, but A is not 
                                                 
34 It is interesting that, because the Higherians evaluate one another’s arguments based on effective truth-values, 
they treat one another as inferentially irrational without knowing it. 
 451
 conceptually above B.  Hiram asserts ‘A is up above B’ and he writes this down.  It seems that 
the perceptual frame is in effect for this assertion.  Thus, the sentence asserted is effectively true.  
Sometime later he has forgotten his report about A and B, he cannot find the paper on which he 
wrote it down, and he needs to determine whether A is up above B; however, at this time B is 
obscured.  Instead of using the perceptual criterion, Hiram decides to use the conceptual criterion 
to determine whether A is up above B.  He does so and discovers that the ray connecting A and 
B is not parallel to Standard Up.  He asserts ‘A is not up above B’, and writes this report down.  
It seems that the conceptual frame is in effect for this assertion.  Thus, the sentence asserted is 
effectively true.  At some later time, he finds both written reports.  He knows that A and B have 
not moved, so he is confused.  At one time he wrote that A is up above B and at another he wrote 
that A is not up above B.  He wonders what happened.  He decides to use the perceptual criterion 
and the conceptual criterion at the same time.  He is astonished to discover that they deliver 
different results.  He uses the perceptual criterion and asserts ‘A is up above B’; he uses the 
conceptual criterion and asserts ‘A is not up above B’.  Each of these is effectively true.  Hiram 
then infers ‘A is up above B and A is not up above B’.  Again, this sentence is effectively true.  
However, he has derived a contradiction.  Of course, he knows that contradictions cannot be true.  
He is perplexed.  He has been properly using the concept according to its constitutive principles, 
but he has derived a contradiction from intuitively correct assumptions via intuitively correct 
inference rules.  He decides after checking that he has not made any errors that he has discovered 
a paradox.  Perhaps he calls it the higher paradox.  It seems to me that neither the perceptual 
frame nor the conceptual frame is in effect from this point on.  Instead, we should think of this as 
a “conceptual time out.”  He is no longer attributing truth-values to the sentences in which ‘up 
above’ occurs and he no longer accepts either of them.  He has decided to try to figure out what 
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 has gone wrong before he continues using ‘up above’ in the unselfconscious way he did prior to 
his discovery.  He is now engaged in an investigation into his own conceptual repertoire.   
We can assume that after some time, he discovers that the conceptual criterion and the 
perceptual criterion deliver conflicting results for the vast majority of cases.  This conclusion 
probably comes after years of suggestions about the “mistakes” he is making in the derivation of 
the higher paradox (e.g., the sentences involved are meaningless, ‘up above’ is partially defined, 
the proper logic does not validate his reasoning).  Gupta’s theory helps us understand this 
process.  In ordinary cases, a frame is in effect and the person employing the concept does so 
without a second thought about the concept itself.  The theory posits effective semantic and 
pragmatic features to explain the person’s use of the concept.  These effective semantic and 
pragmatic features might eventually lead users of the concept to discover a paradox associated 
with it; the paradox is often the derivation of an effectively true contradiction.  Once this occurs, 
they begin looking into their employment of the concept in a new way.  We can think of this 
occurring without a frame in effect at all.  Eventually they discover that the problem lies not in 
how they have been using the concept, in the intuitions they have about it, or the inference rules 
they use for reasoning—the problem is their concept itself.35
There is, of course, much more to be said about this topic, but it is beyond the scope of 
this paper.  Furthermore, there is much more that needs to be said about Gupta’s theory before it 
will fill these three roles in a theory of inconsistent concepts; it will have to wait for some other 
occasion.  In summary, Gupta’s theory is not a theory of inconsistent concepts; rather, it is a 
theory of how inconsistent concepts are actually employed by those who are ignorant of their 
inconsistency.  There is an important place for this theory in an acceptable theory of inconsistent 
concepts. 
                                                 
35 See Camp (2002: chs. 14-16) for discussion of how one discovers that a concept one employs is inconsistent. 
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E.10  CONFUSION 
 
In this final section, I discuss the theory of inconsistent concepts I endorse.  On this theory, an 
inconsistent concept is one whose constitutive principles are inconsistent.  The central claim of 
this theory is that inconsistent concepts are confused concepts.  That is, for each inconsistent 
concept, there is a set of component concepts that play two roles.  First, they are used in the 
logic, the pragmatic theory, and the semantic theory for inconsistent concepts; second, they serve 
as replacements for the inconsistent concept. 
When considering an inconsistent concept, it is essential to distinguish between several 
sets of rules for using it.  First, there are the inconsistent rules that are constitutive of the concept.  
Those who employ the concept try to follow these rules.  Second, there are the rules stipulated by 
the logic, the pragmatic theory, and the semantic theory for inconsistent concepts.  An interpreter 
who knows the concept is inconsistent treats those who employ it as if they are bound by these 
rules.  Third, there are the rules stipulating that the concept should not be used at all.  Those who 
know that it is inconsistent are bound by these rules.   
It is essential to distinguish between an inconsistent concept’s application set, its 
extension, its disapplication set, its anti-extension, its range of inapplicability, and its non-
extension.  A concept’s application set includes all the items to which applies, its disapplication 
set contains all the items to which it disapplies, and its range of inapplicability consists of all the 
items to which it neither applies nor disapplies (all three are determined by its constitutive 
principles).  (The union of its application set and disapplication set is its range of applicability.)  
For acceptable concepts, the extension and the application set are identical, the anti-extension 
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 and the disapplication set are identical, and the non-extension and the range of inapplicability are 
identical.  An inconsistent concept has an empty extension and anti-extension, but its application 
set and a disapplication set need not be.  An inconsistent concept can be application-inconsistent 
or range-inconsistent (or both).  A concept is application-inconsistent if and only if its 
application set and disapplication set are not disjoint.  A concept is range-inconsistent if and only 
if its range of applicability and range of inapplicability are not disjoint.   
The theory of inconsistent concepts I offer has a logic, a pragmatic theory, and a semantic 
theory for inconsistent concepts.  The logic appropriate for an inconsistent concept depends on 
its components.  If it is completely defined and has n components, then an n-component logic is 
appropriate.  If it is partially defined and has n components, then a partial n-component logic is 
appropriate.  Both n-component logics and partial n-component logics are relevance logics.  The 
pragmatic theory is a scorekeeping theory—it specifies how those who know the concept is 
inconsistent keep score on those who employ it.  The semantic theory for inconsistent concepts is 
an inferential role theory—it specifies the inferential roles of the sentences that express the 
inconsistent concept (the inferential role of a sentence includes its role in perception and action 
as well).  These three theories are used to interpret those who employ inconsistent concepts.  In 
addition, I endorse the replacement policy for handling cases of conceptual inconsistency: 
inconsistent concepts should be replaced with consistent ones.  Thus, the theory I offer satisfies 
the first condition (i.e., it is a genuine theory of inconsistent concepts). 
The logic I advocate is inferentially charitable.  In particular, the logic implies that the 
employer of the confused concept is capable of following inference rules she accepts, that she is 
capable of following the rules of this logic, and that she is motivated to follow the rules of this 
logic.  Of course, the logic treats certain classically valid inference rules as invalid; thus, it 
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 implies that the person who employs an inconsistent concept has accepted the wrong inference 
rules.  However, this consequence is different from the claim that the person who employs an 
inconsistent concept is incapable of following the inference rules he accepts.  Thus, the theory of 
inconsistent concepts satisfies the second condition (i.e., it should be inferentially charitable).   
I say very little about concept possession and concept employment.  I can say that a 
person employs a particular concept if and only if he is disposed to apply it or disapply it in some 
circumstances (after due reflection).  A person applies (disapplies) a concept X if and only if he 
is disposed to utter a sentence of the form 〈α is X〉 (〈α is not X〉) or he accepts the belief 
expressed by this sentence (after due reflection).  I favor an account of concept possession that is 
based on understanding.  A person possesses a concept X if and only if he can understand some 
sentences that express X.  Therefore, although I endorse a theory on which inconsistent concepts 
have constitutive principles, it does not fall prey to the criticism of cognitive meaning-
constitutive theories I presented in E.2.2.  On the theory I endorse, the constitutive principles are 
involved in the employment of the concept, not in its possession.  When a person employs a 
concept, she commits herself to obeying its constitutive principles.  However, one can possess a 
concept without employing it. 
On the theory I offer, one can possess an inconsistent concept, one can attribute it to 
someone else, and one can use the logic, the pragmatic theory, and the semantic theory for 
inconsistent concepts without employing the inconsistent concept in question.  Indeed, on this 
account, one attributes an inconsistent concept to someone if one deems it appropriate to use the 
logic, the pragmatic theory, and the semantic theory to interpret that person.  However, the logic, 
the pragmatic theory, and the semantic theory appeal to the replacement concepts, not to the 
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 inconsistent concept.  Thus, the theory I offer satisfies condition three (i.e., it permits a 
distinction between concept possession and concept employment). 
Finally, this theory of inconsistent concepts allows a wide range of views on the 
constitutive principles for an inconsistent concept.  It permits the rules to appeal to empirical 
matters, which might have aspects unknown to the possessor of the concept.  Thus, it applies to 
both intrinsically inconsistent concepts and empirically inconsistent concepts.  Hence, it satisfies 
the fourth condition. 
To illustrate the theory, consider how it applies in the case of the Higherians.  Up above 
is an inconsistent concept.  The following definition seems to capture it: 
(5a) ‘up above’ applies to <x,y> if x and y are observable, x and y are within the borders 
of the Higherians’ nation, and either x and y satisfy a particular perceptually 
distinguishable relation, perceptually-up-above, or the ray that connects x and y is 
parallel to a particular ray, Standard Up, and y is closer to the surface of the 
Higherians’ planet than x.   
 
(5b) ‘up above’ disapplies to <x,y> if x and y are observable, x and y are within the 
borders of the Higherians’ nation, and either x and y do not satisfy the perceptually-
up-above relation or either the ray that connects x and y is not parallel to a 
particular ray, Standard Up, or y is not closer to the surface of the Higherians’ 
planet than x. 
   
(5c)  ‘up above’ is inapplicable to <x,y> if either x or y is not an observable object, or x 
or y are not within the borders of the Higherians’ nation.   
 
Note that up above is both inconsistent and partial.  It seems to me that when trying to decide on 
the components of such a concept, one should first decide whether the concept is application-
inconsistent, range-inconsistent, or both.  If the concept is merely application-inconsistent, then it 
seems best to choose components that all have the same range of applicability as the original.  
Up above seems to be merely application-inconsistent.   
The most natural way to construe up above as a confused concept is to think of it as the 
fusion of the perceptual component and the conceptual component.  The perceptual component is 
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 based on the relation, perceptually-up-above, which applies to pairs of objects that can be 
observed simultaneously.  To avoid the problems associated with response-dependent concepts, I 
will just assume that it is possible to describe the way in which two objects, one of which is 
perceptually up above the other, stimulate an appropriately placed observer’s retinas.  The 
conceptual component, I call conceptually-up-above is the relation that is based on the 
connecting ray being parallel to Standard Up.  The following definitions should clarify these two 
concepts: 
(6)  x is perceptually up above y if and only if x and y are both observable objects, x and 
y are within the borders of the Higherians’ nation, x and y are observable 
simultaneously, and x and y would stimulate an appropriately placed normal observer 
in normal conditions in way P. 
 
(7)  x is conceptually up above y if and only if x and y are both observable objects, x and 
y are within the borders of the Higherians’ nation, the ray connecting them is parallel 
to Standard Up, and y is closer to the surface of the Higherians’ planet than x. 
 
These two concepts are both consistent and will serve as the components in my explanation of 
up above.   
An interpreter of the Higherians (call her Doris) must have access to someone who is 
able to determine, for any two objects, whether one is conceptually up above the other and 
whether one is perceptually up above the other.  The interpretation begins with an account of 
validity.  Given that ‘up above’ is partially defined and has two components, a partial 2-
component logic is appropriate.  For any argument that contains an occurrence of ‘up above’, 
Doris should use the experts to determine the possible assignments of semantic values to the 
sentences containing ‘up above’.  Dorise then uses the partial 2-component logic to determine 
whether the argument in question is valid.  (See Chapter Six for details.) 
Doris also uses the pragmatic theory for inconsistent concepts in her interpretation of the 
Higherians.  Doris should first refrain from attributing a truth-value to sentences that contain ‘up 
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 above’.  She should then decide whether the person who uttered it is entitled to it.  The 
scorekeeping pragmatics can serve that purpose here.  If Doris determines that the person who 
uttered the sentence in question is not entitled to it by any other means, she should determine 
whether he is inferentially entitled to it.  If it follows from a claim to which he is entitled by the 
partial 2-component logic, then he is entitled to it; if not then he is not entitled to it.  As I have 
argued, none of the sentences containing ‘up above’ have truth values, and the notion of warrant 
involved here is an internal one.  There is a sense of ‘warrant’ in which any assertion of a 
sentence that contains ‘up above’ is unwarranted because the sentence expresses an inconsistent 
concept.  This notion of warrant is not he one the pragmatic theory tracks.  Instead, the pragmatic 
theory implies that some assertions of sentences containing ‘up above’ are warranted in the sense 
that, ceteris paribus, acting on them is likely to lead to the satisfaction of the Higherians’ desires. 
Finally, Doris should determine the freestanding inferential content and the freestanding 
assertional content of the sentences in which ‘up above’ occurs by using the semantic theory for 
inconsistent concepts.  This theory works together with the logic and the pragmatic theory to 
explain why the Higherians’ sentences that contain ‘up above’ have the contents they have. 
 
E.11  CONCLUSION 
 
In section two, I presented an example of an inconsistent concept and four conditions on a theory 
of inconsistent concepts.  I then discussed nine theories of inconsistent concepts: the context 
dependence theory, the indirect context dependence theory, the disambiguation theory, Field’s 
theory, Eklund’s theory, Yablo’s theory, the dialetheic theory, Gupta’s theory, and my theory.  
The context dependence theory, the indirect context dependence theory, and Gupta’s theory fail 
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 to satisfy the first condition (i.e., they are not genuine theories of inconsistent concepts).  
However, there is an important place for Gupta’s theory in a genuine theory of inconsistent 
concepts.  The disambiguation theory fails to satisfy the second condition (i.e., it implies that the 
employers of inconsistent concepts are irrational).  Field’s theory, Eklund’s theory, and the 
dialetheic theory fail to satisfy the third condition (i.e., they do not permit a distinction between 
concept possession and concept employment).  Yablo’s theory fails to satisfy the fourth 
condition (i.e., it does not apply to empirically inconsistent concepts).  The confusion-based 
theory of inconsistent concepts satisfies all four conditions: it treats inconsistent concepts as 
genuinely inconsistent, it is inferentially charitable, it respects the difference between possession 
and employment, and it applies to both essentially inconsistent concepts and empirically 
inconsistent concepts.   
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